Tales of the everyday city: geography and chronology in postcolonial Mombasa by Goodman, Zoe
   
  
 
  
 
 
Goodman, Zoe (2018) Tales of the everyday city: geography and chronology in postcolonial Mombasa. PhD thesis. 
SOAS University of London. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/30271 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding 
institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full 
thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination.
 
  
 
 
 
Tales of the everyday city: 
geography and chronology in 
postcolonial Mombasa 
 
 
 
Zoë Goodman 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD 
2017 
 
 
Department of Anthropology and Sociology 
SOAS, University of London 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
Grounded in ethnographic research conducted amongst Mombasa‘s small and 
heterogeneous Muslim population with roots in what is today the Indian state of 
Gujarat, this thesis explores the mobilities, insecurities, notions of Islamic reform 
and patterns of claims-making that circulate in the city. These themes are examined 
through the lens of ‗everyday‘ discourse and practice, paying particular attention to 
the multiplicity of dispositions towards time and space that inform these broader 
urban processes.  
The thesis describes Mombasan Muslims struggling with history and with the future. 
Through Art Deco façades, deep-fried delicacies and discourses of decay, I consider 
some of the ways individuals historicise their relations to the city, marking status and 
relations of affinity, as much as arraigning others for the political, economic and 
religious uncertainties of the present. Unpacking a blood donation drive and a gated 
community in-the-making, I trace the histories and geographies of piety that colour 
this Indian Ocean port, and how these are entangled with material aspirations and 
regional anxieties. The ‗Mombasan urbanism‘ that emerges in these pages is as 
scopic as it is rooted; it is infused with memory and with futurity. 
The discourses and practices of the littoral residents we encounter bring us into 
dialogue with a range of literatures, from the anthropology of architecture to 
ethnographies of insecurity, as well as studies of memory and mourning. These, and 
other thematic issues, are considered in tandem with the regional scholarship on 
Islam in Kenya, Asians in East Africa and Indian Ocean cosmopolitanisms. The 
research presented here offers possibilities for thinking beyond the racialised social 
categories that continue to structure stereotype and scholarship in East Africa, and 
expands the literature on ‗being‘ Muslim in Mombasa. Through the geographies and 
chronologies shown to constitute the Mombasan everyday, this thesis evinces the 
city as always in the making.  
4 
 
Acknowledgments  
First and foremost I would like to thank all the people in Mombasa who welcomed 
me into their homes, cafés and religious spaces with patience, kindness and mouth-
watering snacks. To the many Mombasans who, for reasons of anonymity are not 
named here, I am forever grateful for your patience as I slowly learnt how to ask 
questions and listen to answers. Sincerest thanks are due to the late Hassan Jaffer, 
whose publications were an inspiration from the outset, and whose wit, warmth and 
wisdom had a profound influence on my fieldwork.  
My supervisor, Edward Simpson, has supported this thesis at every stage. He wears 
his responsibilities as a supervisor lightly, but has gone above and beyond to 
encourage and challenge me throughout. I have benefitted enormously, not only 
from his intellectual rigor, but also his care.  
Parvathi Raman, my second supervisor for the last year of this project, has been a 
source of political and critical inspiration throughout my time at SOAS, and added 
much to the thesis in its final stages. I am eternally grateful to the support of Harry 
West, whose anthropology of food course changed my life trajectory.  
Staff in the anthropology department at SOAS have shaped me over a number years; 
I would particularly like to thank Christopher Davis, Trevor Marchand and Mahnaz 
Marashi. I am also especially grateful to Ishola Ajisegir and the many others who 
make SOAS such a pleasurable place to be first thing in the morning. 
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) provided the essential financial 
support that enabled me to carry out this project, funding which I gratefully 
acknowledge. I also appreciate the affiliation and advice extended by staff at 
Kenyatta University (Mombasa Campus).  
The writing up of this thesis would not have been possible without the extraordinary 
generosity of my godmother, Lindsey Hilsum. Thank you for letting me live 
alongside the newts, and for your limitless wand waving. Warm thanks also to Tim 
Lambon for his all his care, and for introducing me to the 15
th
 century. Alec Lambon 
and Max Lambon also deserve a big thank you.  
5 
 
Many thanks are due to everyone in 301 who made an otherwise unexceptional room 
the ideal environment to write in. I am particularly grateful for the support on 
matters emotional, grammatical, fantastical and political provided by Nithya 
Natarajan, Ezgi Unsal, Mehroosh Tak and Jo Tomkinson. It has been a pleasure and 
a privilege to share this journey with you.  
Thank you and more to Marta Agosti Pinilla, for treating life with comedy and care 
in equal measure, and for being the sturdiest of rocks. To Franzi Fay, best shogi I 
know, from Sauti to Green Lanes, asante sana. To Špela Drnovšek Zorko for many a 
soothing chat, and for the pens that scribbled this thesis into being.  
Also at SOAS, thank you to Ze Chen, tendonitis doctor extraordinaire and to 
Michele Serafini, who knows a thing or two about calendars. The friendship of Irene 
González-López, Feyzi Ismail, Ini Dele-Adedeji, Matt Fish, James Brown, Fiorella 
Picchioni and Shane Marotta has been hugely appreciated, as has the solidarity of 
everyone I met through the Fractionals for Fair Play (FFFP) campaign: we did it.  
S. Aykut Öztürk, muse and mentor, has given his intellectual generosity to this 
project, from its inception until its very last day. Our capacity to inspire each other 
only leaves me looking forward to more.  
To Pablo de Roulet, for all the journeys we took together. This thesis would never 
have begun without you, nor would it have such beautiful maps. Thank you.  
Thanks and more go to each and every one of the irrepressible ‗nuns‘, who have 
shared their joy for living this life. To Marianna Bacci Tamburlini, for that bracelet 
and much else, and to Giulia Battaglia for lovingly guiding me towards this path in 
the first place. I would also like to thank Shenel Shefik, for being my homie when it 
all began, and to both her and Maria Bordachenkova for their care along the way. 
Rosa Pérez Herrero and Ander Arenaza have been affectionate witnesses to the very 
last stages of writing. I am utterly indebted to Nadine Hobson and her healing hands.  
A wonderful group of people in Mombasa made a very special city all the more so. 
To Philip McAllister and Estrella de Andrés Sanz – thank you for those wide open 
arms with which you enfolded me into your lives, and for your infectious ways of 
being in the world. To Smriti Sharma for all your kindness, and our rooftop. And to 
6 
 
Andrea Shillolo, kachori taster bar none. Asanteni sana to Arjun Singh, Atrash Ali, 
Heidi Tryland and Blanca Sánchez-Bálgoma, who also introduced me to torta del 
casar. Special thanks to Manoj Mehta, for sharing his love of Mombasa, and for 
caring about buildings. And to Bevill Braganza and Keval Devani for the 
photographic coordination, amongst many other things. I was lucky to share the ups 
and downs of doing ethnography with three other doctoral students in Mombasa – 
Samar Al-Bulushi, Benjamin Cox and Zebulon Dingley.  
Finally, to my family: this thesis is a product of your love. To Caroline and James, 
for going to the Starlight in the first place, and for being great friends as well as truly 
incredible parents. Thank you to Mum, for all the wonder you see in the world, and 
to Dad, for your capacity to share the droll. To Jonno, an indelible influence on my 
own thinking, thanks for always being there, and for the tomatoes. Finally, to Lex, 
for all the rocks, social visits and spoons anyone could ever ask for. This thesis could 
not have been written without you, and I say that standing in the middle of the road.  
7 
 
Contents  
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 17 
Writing the city .................................................................................................. 18 
Introducing Mombasa: physical and social geographies ................................... 21 
A brief religious history through Old Town‘s mosques .................................... 27 
Living Old Town: part I ..................................................................................... 36 
Khoja Ithna-Asheris ........................................................................................... 39 
Living Old Town: part II .................................................................................... 42 
Markiti and beyond: ‗Town‘, Kizingo and the northern mainland .................... 44 
Accessing urbanity ............................................................................................. 48 
Research in uncertain times ............................................................................... 51 
A note on clothing: cosmopolitanism as method ............................................... 58 
Chapter outline ................................................................................................... 60 
Historical Prelude: Mombasa and Asians in text and context ............................. 64 
Writing coastal Muslims .................................................................................... 71 
Writing (without) ‗race‘: constructing ‗Asians‘ in text...................................... 74 
Chapter 1: Constructing (post)imperial citizens ................................................... 81 
Contextualising the Mombasa Renaissance ....................................................... 85 
Architecture and empire ..................................................................................... 91 
Deciphering Deco in Mombasa .......................................................................... 96 
Imperial citizens: Deco and colonised critique ................................................ 107 
Postcolonial anxieties: before and after independence .................................... 116 
Building to stay: post-imperial citizens............................................................ 120 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter 2: The world in a sweetshop? Localising the Indian Ocean ................ 126 
Indian delights? ................................................................................................ 128 
8 
 
Indian Ocean cosmopolitanisms: consuming beyond the nation ..................... 130 
Considering cosmopolitanisms ........................................................................ 135 
Localising the Indian Ocean............................................................................. 139 
Conclusion: bhajiyas as already local .............................................................. 150 
Chapter 3: Reform and the body politic .............................................................. 152 
Writing reform ................................................................................................. 156 
Thinking with blood donation .......................................................................... 158 
Commemorating Karbala: the reform of mourning ......................................... 162 
Tears of cognisance .......................................................................................... 168 
Negotiating bid’a in Mombasa......................................................................... 172 
Intersections of reform and insecurity.............................................................. 179 
Blood donation in Mombasa ............................................................................ 182 
Conclusion: from outpouring to containment .................................................. 189 
Chapter 4: Nostalgic desires: on the social value of loss in Mombasa .............. 193 
Reviewing nostalgia: observations from a postcolonial archipelago and a post-
Soviet littoral .................................................................................................... 199 
Nostalgic soil: economic and demographic seeds ............................................ 203 
On past longing and present distinction: nostalgia as status symbol ............... 209 
Claiming the city: nostalgia and civic relatedness ........................................... 213 
Coping with uncertainty: nostalgia and narratives of blame ............................ 217 
Conclusion: the desirability of nostalgia in Mombasa ..................................... 224 
Chapter 5: Negotiating the future: aspiration, anxiety and reform on a building 
site ............................................................................................................................ 226 
The religious economy of urban space............................................................. 232 
Building aspirations: the Jaffery Complex and (trans)local status ................... 235 
The political economy of sawab ...................................................................... 243 
‗Live in Confidence!‘: coping with insecurity ................................................. 249 
9 
 
‗Unidentifiable‘ arches: designing outreach and reform .................................. 252 
Preserving Khoja Mombasa ............................................................................. 260 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 264 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 265 
Mombasan urbanism through everyday timespaces ........................................ 270 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 273 
 
10 
 
List of Figures  
Figure 1: Municipality of Mombasa.. ........................................................................ 22 
Figure 2: Mombasa neighbourhoods.. ........................................................................ 23 
Figure 3: A permanently shuttered godown with elaborate wooden door, Old Town.
 .................................................................................................................................... 25 
Figure 4: An ornate ‗Mombasa balcony house‘, Old Town....................................... 26 
Figure 5: More modest homes, Old Town. ................................................................ 26 
Figure 6: Mombasa Old Town. .................................................................................. 28 
Figure 7: Memon Jamia Masjid, Old Town. .............................................................. 29 
Figure 8: Kuze Jamaatkhana, Old Town. ................................................................... 32 
Figure 9: New Burhani Masjid overlooking the Old Port, Old Town.. ..................... 34 
Figure 10: Bhadala Masjid, Old Town. ...................................................................... 35 
Figure 11: Banadir Café, Old Town. .......................................................................... 37 
Figure 12: A fruit vendor preparing for the day to begin at a central junction, Old 
Town. ......................................................................................................................... 38 
Figure 13: Mombasa as colonial object.. ................................................................... 64 
Figure 14: Art Deco house, near Nyerere Avenue. .................................................... 81 
Figure 15: Mombasa looking from Fort Jesus.. ......................................................... 87 
Figure 16: Thatched dwellings, Mombasa.. ............................................................... 88 
Figure 17: Freed Building, Moi Avenue.. .................................................................. 99 
Figure 18: Turquoise and white Art Deco house, Mwembe Tayari. .......................... 99 
Figure 19: Kampee House, above the Copy Cat Limited, Moi Avenue.. ................ 100 
Figure 20: White and green Art Deco apartments with commercial premises below, 
Mwembe Tayari Road. ............................................................................................. 101 
Figure 21: Art Deco apartments with commercial premises below, Digo Road. .... 102 
Figure 22: Urban villa, Ganjoni. .............................................................................. 102 
Figure 23: Urban villa, Ganjoni. .............................................................................. 103 
Figure 24: Moon's Cinema, Tononoka. .................................................................... 104 
Figure 25: Naaz Cinema, Makadara Road. .............................................................. 105 
Figure 26: The Seif bin Salim Library, off Haile Selassie Road. ............................ 107 
Figure 27: Zawery Building 1949. ........................................................................... 110 
Figure 28: Huseinali Building 1952. ........................................................................ 111 
11 
 
Figure 29: Moosajee Building 1949. ........................................................................ 111 
Figure 30: Jer Manzil 1940. ..................................................................................... 114 
Figure 31: Shiv Bhuvan 1950. ................................................................................. 114 
Figure 32: Cutch Castle 1947.. ................................................................................. 124 
Figure 33: Muharram murals in the car park of the Khoja imambargah, Old Town.
 .................................................................................................................................. 155 
Figure 34: The religious nucleus of the Jaffery Complex, including its ‗unidentifiable‘ 
arches........................................................................................................................ 227 
Figure 35: Jaffery Complex with apartment block foundations to the left. ............. 229 
Figure 36: Jaffery Complex in context.. .................................................................. 230 
Figure 37: Husseini Masjid, Old Town.. .................................................................. 257 
Figure 38: Hyderi imambargah and mosque, Old Town.. ....................................... 257 
Figure 39: Former jamaat offices embossed with the Gujarati numerals 786 above a 
star and crescent. ...................................................................................................... 259 
 
12 
 
A note on language  
The Mombasans I knew pride themselves on not speaking any language ‗properly‘. 
They are, however, indubitable polyglots: the people I spent time with traversed 
easily through contexts involving English, Swahili, Gujarati, Kutchi, Urdu and 
Arabic. While most of my research was conducted in English, the range of languages 
used here reflects the idiomatic timbres that reverberate through Mombasan daily life. 
The mix makes it impossible to follow a standardised orthographic or transliteration 
system. I have thus avoided transliteration and spell words here according to what I 
saw or heard most commonly in Mombasa. This includes using the word Ramadhan, 
instead of Ramadan, and imambargah, instead of imambara. The text contains 
Anglicised plurals of non-English words, such as jamaats (plural for jamaat) or 
buibuis (plural for buibui, the Swahili term for the loose black covering that many 
Muslim women wear when outside). The same applies to possessives (e.g. jamaat’s). 
These reflect usage in Mombasa.  
When mentioning one of the 12 Shia Imams in this thesis, Imam is capitalised, 
except in quotations by others. Imam Husain‘s name is subject to orthographic 
variation – including Hussain, Husayn, Husein, Hussein – both in the academic 
literature and in community texts. I have used Husain throughout, unless quoted 
differently by an author or organisation.  
The names of the people I met in Mombasa have been annonymised with 
pseudonyms.  
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‗Pick up the phone sweetie! Pick up the phone sweetie! Pick up the phone sweetie!‘ 
Latifah eventually responds to her commanding ringtone, its imperative made all the 
more abrasive by the Tweety Bird cartoon voice in which it is spoken. She holds the 
phone to her ear with her shoulder, continuing to stir the sizzling bhajiyas – bite-
sized balls of chickpea dhal, onions and spices – as they swim in the cavernous wok 
of oil below. Kasuku and Kasuku, the household‘s two parrots called Parrot,1 are as 
squawky as ever, gnawing at the bars of their cage and dribbling like old men. 
Luqman, the youngest addition to this joint household, is crying in a back room, 
while Juma, one of Latifah‘s servants, who today sports a faded orange ‗Vote Joho‘ 
t-shirt (a reference to the incumbent Mombasa County Governor), surveys the 
mountain of washing up.  
Latifah, whose unbridled generosity is combined with a rather brusque demeanour, 
ends her conversation and flips the phone shut: she is not amused. It‘s the woman 
who ordered the bhajiyas again. ‗Now she wants me to take a photo of everything 
before sending. Some people have problems‘, she clucks, ‗I don‘t know, maybe she 
doesn‘t trust me‘. Latifah vents some of her annoyance on the start button of the 
blender, turning desiccated coconut, chilli, lime and salt – the essential chutney 
accompaniment to bhajiyas – into a thick pulp.  
It‘s Ramadhan and Latifah is making a vast quantity of bhajiyas for a woman from 
the same Shia denomination as her; both are Khoja Ithna-Asheris, one of Mombasa‘s 
many religious communities with origins in the Kutch and Kathiawar regions of 
contemporary Gujarat. Latifah calls her client ‗the Dubai lady‘, in reference to the 
city in which the latter spends half of her time. This itinerant woman has paid for 
three-quarters of the bhajiyas to be distributed as iftar (fast breaking meal) amongst 
‗the most needy people‘. ‗But her husband is very strict‘, Latifah tells me.  
He wants to give to people who are fasting properly. I know many needy 
people but I don‘t know if they are fasting. Maybe they say they are but they 
are not. I can‘t guarantee. So I just told her, I know many needy people. She 
doesn‘t want Shia. So I‘m giving to mix people. Some African, some 
Bhadala, Kumbhar, Gamrai. 
                                                 
1
 Kasuku means parrot in Swahili.  
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The latter three proper nouns refer to Sunni communities whose members, like 
Latifah, trace their ancestry to the Kutch region of Gujarat. I learn that all the people 
Latifah is planning to distribute food to live in Kibokoni, the area of Old Town 
where her home is also located.  
Latifah will do the rest of the bhajiyas ‗half-fry‘ and stick them in her industrial, if 
ageing, freezer: her client will be taking them back to Dubai with her in a few days. 
‗Everyone who‘s left this place, they always ask for bhajiyas‘, Latifah explains. ‗Or 
mabuyu‘, Mahreen, Latifah‘s daughter-in-law, interjects. Mabuyu, baobab seeds 
preserved in a spiced sugar mixture of luminous red hues, are another hugely popular 
coastal snack.  
‗That was the first thing I wanted when I got back from ziyarat [pilgrimage]‘, 
Latifah admits, smacking her lips at the memory of the mabuyu‘s irresistible tartness. 
Mention of Latifah‘s relatively recent trip to Mashhad (in Iran) prompts me to ask 
Mahreen if she has ever gone on ziyarat to Iran or Iraq. She hasn‘t but Daria, 
Latifah‘s other daughter-in-law, appears, ready as ever to extol Iran‘s virtues. An 
assertive young mother, Daria spent eight months in Qom before she married, 
teaching science and English in a school there. Unlike Mahreen, Daria keeps her 
headscarf on when inside the house. ‗Iran is such a nice country‘, she exclaims with 
her usual vigour. ‗There are government subsidies so you hardly find a beggar. 
There‘s no music. Everywhere you go, you feel it‘s so peaceful‘.  
‗Not like here‘, Latifah sighs heavily, coating the room with a sombre mood. 
‗Inshallah no more of this fujo before Eid [fujo meaning chaos in Swahili]‘. 
‗Inshallah‘, her daughter-in-laws repeat reflexively. Within the last month al-
Shabaab, the most prominent militant group in the region, has claimed involvement 
in an attack that killed over 60 people in Mpeketoni, a town north of Mombasa; there 
have also been several violent incidents in and around Mombasa, including the 
shooting of a second white woman in Old Town just a few days ago. ‗We really 
thought it was you‘, Latifah clucks; she had very sweetly called me the morning after 
the incident to check I was still alive. Qaasim, Latifah‘s teenage son, asserts that he 
had no such doubts: ‗That girl had a skirt. You usually dress like Samantha‘, he 
jokes, associating me with Samantha Lewthwaite, the white British widow of one of 
the London 7/7 bombers, rumoured to be at large in Kenya. Qaasim is by no means 
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the first to make comparisons between me and the ‗White Widow‘, who is always 
dressed in hijab, as I often am in Mombasa.  
Oblivious to this chatter, Tariq, Latifah‘s four year-old grandson, is running in and 
out of the kitchen playing with a toy alam, a battle standard used in ritual 
commemorations of the Battle of Karbala. This event, which occurred in 680 CE, 
involved Sunni forces associated with Yazid – the Umayyad caliph who held court in 
Damascus – who surrounded and ultimately killed a small band of Shia followers 
near the banks of the Euphrates. The Shia were led by Imam Husain, a grandson of 
Prophet Mohammed, and, according to Shia doctrine, his fourth rightful successor. 
Karbala is the defining event of Shia history and a critical part of Khoja Ithna-Asheri 
daily life. Tariq‘s toy, made of a plastic broomstick and a piece of old curtain, 
mimics the alams that decorate the imambargah (congregation hall) round the corner, 
where Latifah and her family go daily during Ramadhan. Latifah reduces Tariq to 
squeals of delight every time he comes near the kitchen entranceway by making silly 
faces. At one point she tries to get him to say hi to me. ‗Mbusu mzungu [Give the 
white person a kiss]‘, she says in Swahili. Tariq giggles and runs off. Tariq and his 
little sister Shahla live nearby and are often at Latifah‘s. Both understand Kutchi (a 
language also spoken in Kutch) and some English but prefer to speak in Swahili. 
A few moments later the electricity goes off; humidity tightens its soggy grip but at 
least the small kitchen window provides enough light to see. Latifah, still standing 
over what must be the seventh batch of bhajiyas, is reminded of the problems with 
the new electricity meter they‘ve been required to install. ‗In six days I've spent 2000 
shillings [approximately 13 pounds sterling at the time]. Before, it used to be 6000 a 
month‘. I remark that at least there are much less power cuts than earlier in the year. 
‗Bah, everything is too much expensive‘, Latifah retorts. ‗Mombasa was not like 
this‘. I ask Latifah if she would ever considering moving to the Jaffery Complex, the 
enormous gated residential, religious and commercial complex her jamaat
2
 is 
building in the centre of the island. ‗No way! I was married in this house and I‘ll die 
                                                 
2
 The term jamaat (meaning assembly in Arabic) can apply to the congregation in a 
particular place – e.g. ‗the Mombasa jamaat’ – or to a place of gathering, such as a 
mosque. 
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in this house!‘ comes her categorical reply. Mercifully, the power cut only lasts a 
few minutes, and the fan soon whirs us back to life. 
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Introduction 
Grounded in ethnographic research conducted amongst Mombasa‘s small and 
heterogeneous Muslim population with roots in what is today the Indian state of 
Gujarat, this thesis examines various political, economic, religious and demographic 
processes through the lens of ‗everyday‘ discourse and practice. In Mombasa and 
East Africa more broadly, people of South Asian heritage are often referred to as 
‗Asians‘, a colonial category of lasting endurance.3 Writing about ‗Asians‘, who are 
the first to distance themselves from the Subcontinent, in a place often described as 
‗neither completely African nor, by extension, Kenyan‘ (Prestholdt 2011: 6), has 
proved fertile ground for considering dispositions towards time and space. In the 
pages that follow, my analysis is particularly concerned with the heterogeneity of 
geographies and chronologies that shape life in the city. The above vignette, which I 
return to in the Chapter Outline at the end of this Introduction, introduces the major 
themes explored here. 
I came to Mombasa with a research agenda that sought to understand what it meant 
to be Muslim and Asian in the city, adding a minority angle to decades of 
scholarship on Islam in the region, and its thorny place within the Kenyan nation. 
The size of the task and the complexity of the city soon swamped what had seemed 
like an innocent and practical research question. Not only were there many Asian 
Muslims, quite careful to distinguish themselves from one another, I began to 
question what it meant to understand life in Mombasa, a sprawling postcolonial city 
touched by geopolitical instability, neoliberal economics, historical racial and class 
inequalities, and a century of marginalisation in relation to the state. Over the course 
of 18 months of fieldwork, repeated conversation and careful observation led me to 
focus on the themes of mobility (social and physical), Islamic reform, insecurity and 
                                                 
3
 Aptly described by Shiva Naipaul (1979: 107) as ‗a peculiarly East African 
political category‘, the term ‗Asian‘ refers exclusively to those of South Asian 
provenance. ‗Asian‘ gradually replaced ‗Indian‘ over the course of the colonial 
period, particularly after Partition, distinguishing those in East Africa from their 
counterparts in independent India. ‗Asian‘ is used for official purposes, as well as in 
everyday life, and the term ‗Indian‘ is often employed to refer exclusively to those 
who reside in the Subcontinent. People of Gujarati-origin in contemporary Mombasa 
use both terms, and a host of others, to describe themselves.  
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patterns of claims-making, and how each of these intersect with notions of time and 
space. These processes are both abstract and expansive, and therefore quite difficult 
to root in description. I thus open each of the subsequent chapters with an 
ethnographic vignette as a concrete way into the broader transformations that 
pervade everyday life on this particular urban littoral. In conclusion, I propose the 
concept of ‗Mombasan urbanism‘ and consider it in relation to my original research 
motivations. 
 
Writing the city 
But I lacked the vocabulary to tell the story of the boa constrictor and the 
elephant. All I had were drawings of hats (Roy 2016: 201). 
The above quote describes urban theorist Ananya Roy‘s (2016) recourse to the 
allegories of Antoine de Saint-Exup ry‘s (2009 [1943]) The little prince as she 
struggled to come to terms with the disjuncture between the theories of urbanism she 
had been trained in and her efforts to explain city life in Calcutta, site of her doctoral 
research. Roy initially conducted fieldwork in the mid-1990s and is of a generation 
of urbanists whose ethnography helped seal the collapse of a ‗modernist‘ ontology of 
the city as a spatial or social whole, shifting the debate away from myths of 
coherence and stark dualisms – city/country, formal/informal – towards the 
multiplicity and heterogeneity of metropolitan forms. This trajectory has permitted 
lines of inquiry such as, ‗Whose urban experience is necessarily negotiated at spatial 
scales that implode the city?‘ (Roy 2016: 206).  
In consonance with Roy, recent urban scholarship in Africa eschews categorisations 
that position the African city as a site of crisis, or as a target for development and 
civic planning, turning instead to the myriad ways in which cities on the continent 
are lived, a mode of research that frequently highlights the municipal bounds 
exceeded by the urban quotidian (de Boeck & Plissart 2014; Mbembé & Nuttall 
2004; Myers 2011; Simone 2004, 2009). Ato Quayson‘s (2014) analysis of Accra‘s 
principal commercial boulevard, Oxford Street, is exemplary here. At the heart of 
Quayson‘s sophisticated weaving of history and ethnography are the transnational 
itineraries embedded within the urban spaces on which he focuses. His chapter on 
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fitness studios, for example, explores the intersection of IMF policies, contemporary 
unemployment and urban ‗gymming‘, and describes how gymmers‘ corporeal 
ambitions draw on both Hollywood and local military notions of the muscle-
masculinity nexus.  
The multi-scalar messiness enlivened by contemporary urban studies finds echoes in 
decades of anthropological scholarship on space and time. Akhil Gupta & James 
Ferguson‘s observation that space has ‗always been hierarchically interconnected, 
instead of naturally disconnected‘ succinctly summarised what ethnography could 
not but expose (1992: 8). Building on seminal histories of global connection by 
scholars such as Eric Wolf (1982) and Sidney Mintz (1986), the inextricable 
intermeshing of local and global has long been central to the anthropologist‘s view, 
and demonstrated through cultural forms as diverse as soap opera (Abu-Lughod 
1995), homemade biodiversity dictionaries (Tsing 2005) and opinions of tinned soup 
(Wilk 1999). Ever-mindful of interconnection, this thesis retains a focus on the ways 
in which space is imagined, allowing me to highlight contiguous and divisive spatial 
visions from Mombasa.  
The collapsing of scales regarding space is mirrored in the anthropological literature 
on time. Describing increasing attention to issues of chronology in two recent review 
articles, Laura Bear finds evidence of a disciplinary ‗temporal turn‘ (2016: 488), and 
makes a compelling case for the ‗heterochrony‘ of the contemporary era (2014a: 20). 
The mutual interdependence of time and space – made explicit in Bakhtin‘s (1981 
[1934-1941]) ‗chronotopes‘, Gell‘s (1992) ‗time-maps‘ and Massey‘s (2005) 
‗throwntogetherness‘ – is assumed by Bear and others working in this field, often 
under the label of ‗timespace‘ (see also May & Thrift 2003). In her own research on 
the subject, Bear (2014b) argues that attention to the multiplicity of temporalities 
that infuse workplaces offers productive avenues for unpacking processes of capital 
accumulation: her analysis of the timespaces of labour on the Hooghly demonstrates 
the piecemeal activities such as the mapping carried out by river pilots – grounded as 
an ethical approach to time in the sense that it enables seafarers to prevent accidents 
by sharing knowledge – that permit the flow of goods along its watery course. 
Amongst the plethora of other recent works on time‘s multiplicity, Holbraad & 
Pedersen (2013) highlight the varied temporal logics that characterise experiences of 
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and responses to (in)security – these are not simply future-oriented – while Guyer 
(2007) charts parallels between macroeconomic and evangelical conceptualisations 
of time, and how this overlay may enable us to better historicise contemporary 
uncertainty. This thesis will return frequently to intersections of time, religion, 
insecurity and political economy.  
What the aforementioned accounts demonstrate so vividly is the capacity of 
‗everyday‘ discourses and practices to reveal structural processes of impressive 
chronological and geographical reach. Implicit in much contemporary anthropology, 
my understanding of the everyday draws on the incisive scholarship of Henri 
Lefebvre (2014 [1947, 1961, 1981]). In volume one of his oeuvre, Lefebvre writes, 
‗[t]he immediate – the given human raw material of everyday life – at one and the 
same time reveals and disguises the deepest of realities both implying them and 
concealing them‘ (2014 [1947]: 209–210). By this, Lefebvre means that while the 
habits and chatter of daily life may appear natural, self-evident and trivial, it is these 
gestures and enunciations that contain – and therefore have critical potential to 
illuminate – moments and processes of monumental significance, from the alienation 
of labour to the workings of state power. Veena Das (2007) has taken up this line of 
thinking with lucidity, demolishing the distinction between extraordinary violence 
and everyday life by demonstrating how two catastrophic moments of Indian history 
– Partition and the assassination of Indira Gandhi – are woven into rumour, 
neighbourhood jealousies and refusals to bathe. The sociality of aftermath, in other 
words, encodes the horrors that preceded it: neither history nor violence stops at the 
event itself.  
How to feed this back into an understanding of the city? Based on fieldwork 
conducted along the US-Mexican border, comparative urbanist Michael Dear (2005) 
employs the term ‗articulation‘ to account for the conjunction of multiple 
temporalities and spatialities that infuse the ‗postborder city‘ (see also Dear & 
Leclerc 2013). For Dear, thinking in these terms allows him to examine the 
pervasiveness of the border, as much as the rooted histories of contemporary 
mestizaje (mixed race) cultures. Articulation is familiar terrain for anthropologists, 
who have long drawn on Antonio Gramsci‘s (1971 [1929-1935]) observation that 
social constructions such as race, class and gender are always inter-related in lived 
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experience. This is not articulation in an anatomical or architectural sense of 
appending distinct joints, but rather a framework for emphasising the indivisibility of 
particular categories of subjecthood. I use articulation here in three senses. At the 
level of the individual, this thesis frequently points to the ways in which class 
intersects with racialised notions of piety and ‗origin‘ in Mombasa. Equally, I use 
articulation to conceptualise the collision of temporalities and geographies as urban 
residents envisage and act on the city. Throughout, I consider the articulation of 
urban processes and everyday life.  
This constellation of articulations, I suggest, offers critical purchase on the concept 
of ‗cityness‘, a term advanced by AbdouMaliq Simone to describe the city as 
‗always in the making‘ (2009: 3). Urban planners, government institutions and 
development agencies in Mombasa indubitably play a role in shaping the form and 
flow of the city; they are, however, not my concern here. The ‗cityness‘ I explore in 
the following pages emerges from everyday interactions between residents, 
interactions which are always both imbued with, and revelatory of, broader historical, 
political, religious and economic processes, as well as diverse temporal and 
geographical imaginaries. Applying ethnographic exegesis to the ways in which 
Mombasa is made and remade through discourse and practice is the central concern 
of the chapters that follow. I return to how the metropolitan tales presented here 
might enrich the theoretical constructs of ‗cityness‘ and ‗Mombasan urbanism‘ in the 
conclusion. 
 
Introducing Mombasa: physical and social geographies  
The Municipality of Mombasa, home to approximately 1.2 million people, is divided 
into six parliamentary constituencies which stretch over the island of Mvita
4
 and the 
surrounding mainland, as can be seen in the maps on the following pages (Fig. 1 and 
Fig. 2). The second map (Fig. 2) details some of the key neighbourhoods discussed 
in this thesis, including Old Town (on the eastern side of the island, near the Old 
                                                 
4
 Mvita, the historic and official name of the island, was not used by my informants, 
who referred to the island as ‗Mombasa‘ or ‗Town‘ when wishing to distinguish 
from the surrounding mainland. For instance, the question ‗Does she live in Town?‘ 
serves to clarify whether someone lives on the island or not.  
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Port), Kizingo (south of Old Town) and Nyali (the south coast of the northern 
mainland). With a handful of exceptions, the people I did research with all lived on 
Mombasa island, which is a mere five kilometres long and three kilometres wide. 
Most people had homes in Old Town, or the residential suburbs of Kizingo and 
Ganjoni (a neighbourhood in the island‘s southwest). Others I met lived in Makupa 
and Tudor in the north, or in the central neighbourhoods of Tononka, Saba Saba and 
Bondeni. All of these can be seen in the map on the next page (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 1: Municipality of Mombasa.  
Map created by Pablo de Roulet.  
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Figure 2: Mombasa neighbourhoods. 
This map details the neighbourhoods and locations discussed in the thesis. Some of 
the island‘s numerous Muslim cemeteries and sports clubs are marked in green.  
Map created by Pablo de Roulet.  
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Combining the most recent estimations available regarding the size and distribution 
of Kenya‘s Asian population, I suggest that around 35,000 live in Mombasa, 
although this is a very approximate figure (Adam 2006; Nowick 2015). As will be 
discussed further in the Historical Prelude that follows this Introduction, the term 
‗Asian‘ describes a colonial social category of enduring political traction; it also 
subsumes – and is often superseded by – a remarkable variety of other social 
divisions. ‗Asians‘ in Mombasa include Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Christians and 
Muslims; each of these groupings is further divided into numerous castes and sects. 
Hindus include people of the Bhatia, Lohana, Kutchi Leva Patel, Brahmin and Surat 
Prajapati castes who worship a pantheon of gods such as Brahma, Shiva, Vishnu and 
Ganesh, and might be followers of saintly individuals such as Swami Narayan, 
Jalaram Nivas or Sai Baba, or part of movements such as Arya Samaj or the 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness (also known as Hare Krishna). Jains 
are divided into several vanik (communities), of which the vast majority in Kenya 
are Visha Oshwal. Sunni Muslims include Baluchis, Koknis, Memons (further 
divided as Nasserpuria, Okhai and Halai, groupings which relate to place of origin), 
as well as Punjabi and Surati Muslims. There are many ‗Kutchi Sunnis‘, an umbrella 
term which comprises myriad sub-castes with origins in the Kutch region of Gujarat, 
including Bhadala, Luhar, Kumbhar, Gamrai, Sonara and Dhobi, categories which 
relate to historical professions. Shia Muslims comprise Khoja Ismailis, Khoja Ithna-
Asheris and Daudi Bohras. Sikhs and Goan Catholics complete this heterogeneous 
picture. 
Latifah, who we met in the opening vignette, is Khoja Ithna-Asheri. Latifah lives in 
the Kibokoni area of Old Town, which, as the name suggests, constitutes Mombasa‘s 
historical centre. Whether or not they now reside there, almost everyone I knew in 
Mombasa traced their family roots to Old Town, evidencing the area‘s position as 
the epicentre of city life for most of its existence. Clustered around Mombasa 
Harbour – long known and referred to here as the Old Port – Old Town is a stark 
contrast to the city beyond. Located on the eastern side of the island, many of the 
area‘s labyrinthine streets are impassable to vehicular traffic. Latifah‘s house, where 
I spent many mornings, is a simple, one storey stone construction, characteristic of 
the area; others are grander, rising several storeys with godowns (warehouses) or 
small dukas (shops) at the bottom and residential quarters above. This contrast is 
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demonstrated in the photographs on the following page (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). Old 
Town‘s many fine wooden doors and ornate balconies, one of which is depicted 
below (Fig. 3), evince the fortunes upon which it was built. Today, although many 
with wealth still live here, the area is synonymous with poverty and drugs, a number 
of the most impressive houses appear abandoned. Long the city‘s commercial and 
administrative, as well as religious, heart, Old Town‘s secluded corners and 
crumbling waterfront are commonly perceived as junkie‘s paradise, the heroin 
hotbed of the city. Humble or grand, almost everything in this part of the city is 
heavy with the patina of time.  
 
 
Figure 3: A permanently shuttered godown with elaborate wooden door, Old 
Town. 
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Figure 4: An ornate ‘Mombasa balcony house’, Old Town. 
 
 
Figure 5: More modest homes, Old Town. 
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Old Town is an appropriate place to start an introduction to Mombasa, not only 
because of its historical eminence, but also because a journey through its streets 
provides a map of the city‘s religious and social make up critical for understanding 
the littoral and this thesis. History is followed by three further sections which 
introduce the lives of a handful of the individuals that appear in the pages that follow. 
I introduce glimpses of their quotidian habits to give some indication of the social 
categories necessary to understand the rest of the chapters, as well as illustrate the 
multiplicity of ways of living the city, and the myriad sites of my research. These 
snippets are by no means intended to portray any of the people described here as 
‗representative‘ of the communities to which they belong, a mode of analysis I hold 
no store in. The mix of details presented here reflects the very different modes of 
access I had to people and places in Mombasa; methodological issues are returned to 
at the end of the Introduction.  
 
A brief religious history through Old Town’s mosques  
Although mosques proliferate throughout the municipality, Old Town is widely 
perceived to be the city‘s Islamic core, home to the conically shaped mosques of 
Basheikh
5
 (which likely dates from the 13
th
 century) and Mandhry (built in 1570), 
and tens of smaller Islamic religious spaces, the majority built by Swahilis and Arabs 
adherent to the Shafii school of Sunni jurisprudence.
6
 Old Town‘s mosques are 
frequently juxtaposed to places of worship in the rest of the city, many of which are 
perceived to have been ‗taken over‘ by ‗Wahhabis‘7 (Eisenberg 2013; Kresse 2007a). 
Regardless of the veracity of this correlation between urban and religious 
geographies, the stereotype retains discursive traction in the city.  
                                                 
5
 Basheikh is also known as Mnara or Tangana mosque.  
6
 The Shafii school, which dominates East Africa, is one of the four principal Sunni 
madhhab, the others being Hanafi, Hanbali and Maliki, each named for the classical 
Islamic jurists who founded them in the two centuries following the death of Prophet 
Mohammed in 632 CE. Omani Arabs in Mombasa were originally followers of the 
Ibadhi madhhab, but adopted Shafiism at the end of the 19
th
 century (Kresse 2007a).  
7
 As I explain further below, ‗Wahhabi‘ is a term used by people who do not imagine 
themselves as part of this social category, glossing a broad constellation of Muslims 
who are seen to align their belief and practice with interpretations of Islam followed 
in the Gulf. Wahhabism is believed by many to be increasingly prevalent at the coast. 
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Old Town also hosts all the oldest religious sites of the city‘s Asian Muslims, 
indicated in the map below (Fig. 6). 
 
Figure 6: Mombasa Old Town.  
This map details the numerous Shia and Hanafi mosques described below. 
Map created by Pablo de Roulet.  
In 1880 Hajji Mohamed, a trader who arrived in Mombasa from Mandvi, in Kutch, 
via Zanzibar and Bagamoyo (Tanzania), financed the city‘s first Memon mosque, the 
Memon Jamia Masjid. Hajji Mohamed was Nasserpuria Memon, Sunni Muslims of 
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the Hanafi school of jurisprudence who trace their ancestry – via Gujarat – back to 
the town of Nasarpur in Sindh province, present day Pakistan (Nasserpuria Memons 
continue to distinguish themselves via this genealogy from the other Memon 
communities in Mombasa).
8
 The mosque‘s delicate minaret, which can be seen 
below (Fig. 7), was added in 1908. Although now dwarfed by other buildings, I start 
with this mosque as it was long the tallest structure in Mombasa (Salvadori 1996). 
The Memon Jamia Masjid is regularly re-painted and still in use, but, as a religious 
and social hub has been eclipsed by the larger Memon Villa, located in the centre of 
the island. Memon Villa now hosts most significant Memon celebrations, as well as 
welcoming a wide variety of Sunni Muslims on Fridays. 
 
 
Figure 7: Memon Jamia Masjid, Old Town. 
                                                 
8
 Mombasa is home to three Memon communities, with Nasserpuria being by far the 
largest. The others are Okhai and a single extended family of Halai, each of which 
draw on origin narratives emphasising links to different places in Gujarat and Sindh.  
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The best view of the cupola of the Memon Jamia Masjid is from in front of the 
Hyderi imambargah (congregation hall)
9
 and adjacent mosque, the centre of Khoja 
Ithna-Asheri religious life, and place where Latifah, who we met making bhajiyas at 
the outset, spends much of her time.
10
 Khoja Ithna-Asheris are Twelver Shias who 
adhere to the same branch of Shiism as practiced in Iran, parts of Iraq and Lebanon, 
although there are various ways in which Khojas imagine themselves as distinct from 
this wider following. Although the contemporary structure (which is depicted in Fig. 
38 on p.257 and will be considered in the final chapter of this thesis) reveals nothing 
of historical schism, this building was at the heart of one of the most acrimonious 
religious feuds of late 19
th
 century Mombasa, involving the Khoja Ithna-Asheri and 
Khoja Ismaili communities. As their shared ‗Khoja‘ appellation suggests, Khoja 
Ismailis and Khoja Ithna-Asheris share a long and often tense history, which is the 
subject of numerous accounts (Shodhan 2001; see also Akhtar 2016; Amiji 1971; H. 
Jaffer 2012). Both sects hail from the Khoja caste, traders with origins in the Kutch 
and Kathiawar regions of present-day Gujarat. Until the mid-19
th
 century Khoja 
religious practices could be said to comprise a mix of ‗Shia Ithna-Asheri‘, ‗Sunni‘, 
and ‗Ismaili‘ aspects, as well as ‗Hindu‘ elements, keeping in mind that what it 
meant to identify with any of these categories in that era bears little similarity to 
contemporary understandings. In 1846, the Aga Khan, leader of the Ismaili sect of 
Islam, arrived in Bombay
11
 from Persia. Along with many of his followers, the Aga 
Khan believed himself to be the undisputed spiritual leader of all Khojas and 
attempted to assert greater control over ‗his‘ congregation. This spurned a series of 
                                                 
9
 An imambargah is a Shia congregation hall used for religious events including 
weekly majalis (religious gatherings or the sermons around which such gatherings 
are structured; sg. majlis), birth or death anniversaries of members of the Prophet‘s 
family, ritual commemorations of the Battle of Karbala, as well as communal 
feasting, funerals and weddings. An imambargah is different from a mosque in that 
it is not the site for daily prayers, but rather hosts events structured around majalis. 
Like mehfiles (privately owned religious spaces used for similar events), the 
imambargah in Mombasa contains a large number of relics, including replica 
mausoleums of the Shia Imams and various objects associated with their martyrdom.  
10
 Old Town also houses a second Khoja Ithna-Asheri mosque, Husseini, which we 
return to in Chapter 5. Latifah‘s sons attend this mosque. Neither the Hyderi nor 
Husseini mosques include a prayer space for women, although women are welcome 
in the Hyderi imambargah.  
11
 I use both Bombay and Mumbai in this thesis, depending on the historical period 
to which I am referring. 
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acrimonious court cases and Khojas ultimately split along three doctrinal lines: 
Ismaili, Ithna-Asheri and Sunni. Dewji Jamal, one of the Aga Khan‘s most 
prominent critics, was ‗outcasted‘ and permanently left Bombay for Zanzibar (where 
he had already been trading for some years), establishing the first Khoja Ithna-Asheri 
mosque in 1881.  
From the 1870s on, Jamal played an influential role in encouraging Khojas in 
Bombay and East Africa to declare their allegiance to the Ithna-Asheri fold (and, 
safe from the reprisals common in Gujarat and Bombay, many formally did so upon 
arrival in East Africa). At the end of the 19
th
 century, Jamal shifted his headquarters 
to Mombasa, keen to exploit the growing commercial opportunities of this 
expanding trading hub. Upon arrival, Jamal quickly bought up a large amount of 
property (including much of the land between the railway and Kilindini port; 
Salvadori 1996), and donated the plot for Mombasa‘s first Khoja Ithna-Asheri 
mosque and imambargah, on the site now known as Hyderi. His timing could not 
have been more significant: the Aga Khan had visited Mombasa the previous year 
(1897) and, frustrated by the growing number of Khojas formally rejecting his 
authority, issued a particularly fiery firman (directive) upon his return to Bombay. 
The firman predicted the demise of the Ithna-Asheri faith worldwide within 100 
years and instructed his following to keep well clear of Khoja Ithna-Asheris, 
including avoiding food and water touched by them (H. Jaffer 2012). In this thesis I 
refer to Khoja Ithna-Asheris as Khojas and Khoja Ismailis as Ismailis.
12
  
The significance of Mombasa as a site of struggle between these two factions helps 
explain the size and opulence of the Kuze jamaatkhana, the largest and oldest of the 
Ismaili religious halls in the city. Kuze is about five minutes‘ walk away from 
Hyderi, heading in a northerly direction. Greatly expanded and re-opened with 
fanfare by the previous Aga Khan in 1914,
13
 Kuze has hosted the present and former 
                                                 
12
 The global Khoja Ismaili population is far larger than that of the Khoja Ithna-
Asheris, and in many places ‗Khoja‘ refers particularly to Ismailis. Here I use the 
term Khoja (or Khojas) to refer exclusively to Khoja Ithna-Asheris. This reflects 
usage in Mombasa, where Khoja Ithna-Asheris refer to themselves as Khojas and 
Khoja Ismailis generally prefer the term Ismaili. 
13
 See: ‗The visit of H. H. the Aga Khan to East Africa: the pope of the Ismailiah 
community‘. East African Standard, 11 July 1914. Article obtained from a personal 
archive in Mombasa. 
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leaders of the Ismaili faith, a position that is both divine and hereditary,
14
 on a 
number of occasions. Although now counting a regular attendance of only a handful 
of congregants, Kuze, which draws its name from the area of Old Town that 
surrounds it, was long the religious and residential heart of the Ismaili community in 
Mombasa. Its volume and intricate plasterwork, typical of the Imperial classical style, 
can be seen in the photograph on below (Fig. 8).  
 
Figure 8: Kuze Jamaatkhana, Old Town. 
Continuing southeast to the Old Port sits the vast New Burhani Masjid of the Daudi 
Bohras (henceforth Bohras). Like Khoja Ithna-Asheris and Khoja Ismailis, Bohras 
are also Shia Muslims, but their religious life is centralised around the figure of the 
                                                 
14
 The Aga Khan is considered to be a living Imam by Ismailis. Divine intervention 
dictates who the Aga Khan will appoint to succeed him; although choice is always 
from amongst his male progeny, it does not necessarily follow birth order or 
generation. This method of designating leadership is also followed by the Daudi 
Bohras, discussed below.  
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Dai al-Mutlaq
15
 or Syedna, their divinely appointed religious leader who heads his 
global following from his palatial headquarters Mumbai. This angular and imposing 
building, exhibited on the next page (Fig. 9), was allegedly modelled on an ancient 
mosque in Sana‘a, Yemen, a design choice that speaks to on-going efforts to unify 
disparate elements of the Bohra diaspora, which includes a large number of ‗Yemeni 
Bohras‘, and underscore the hegemony of the ‗reformist‘ faction of Bohras formally 
allied to the Syedna.
16
 New Burhani Masjid remains the centre of religious life for 
the vast majority of Mombasa‘s large Bohra population (who also sometimes use the 
smaller and older Badri mosque nearby).  
                                                 
15
 Hereafter referred to as Dai, distinct from dai or dais, which denotes other senior 
clergy.  
16
 The New Burhani Masjid sits on the site of what was probably the most 
impressive of all the colonial era mosques: the decorative detail and size of the 
original Burhani Masjid – a very large white complex overlooking the Old Port, right 
next to the city‘s original Customs Office – is evident from photographic archives. 
The mosque was built in 1901-3 by Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee, a hugely successful 
merchant who travelled regularly between Karachi, Bombay, Mombasa and Nairobi. 
What is most interesting about the original mosque – sight of which would have 
greeted all arrivals to the Old Port for most of the 20
th
 century – is that it is no longer 
there. Burhani Masjid was raised to the ground in 1982, an action which Jeevanjee‘s 
granddaughter argues cannot be divorced from her relative‘s prominence within the 
anti-establishment Bohra reform movement, which has demanded fiscal 
accountability from the Syedna since the 1910s (Patel 1997). The Bohra 
establishment does not recognise any of Jeevanjee‘s philanthropic or commercial 
contributions in East Africa or beyond. Globally, the schism between Bohras who 
claim allegiance to the Syedna and those who reject his authority continues to this 
day (Blank 2001): the handful of reformists I met in Mombasa do not attend 
community religious functions and no one from the chitti warah faction (allied to the 
Syedna) speaks of the old mosque.  
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Figure 9: New Burhani Masjid overlooking the Old Port, Old Town.  
Nyali, the wealthy suburb of the northern mainland, can be seen in the distance on 
the left.  
There are several other mosques in Old Town built by communities with roots in 
India. The last I mention here takes us back into the centre of Kibokoni, and is 
known as the Bhadala Masjid, a photograph of which can be seen on the following 
page (Fig. 10). Originally built by Bhadalas, one subgrouping of Mombasa‘s 
variegated Kutchi Sunni population, this mosque was, like the Memon construction 
mentioned above, established in the late 19
th
 century (Berg & Walter 1968). As well 
as sharing a Hanafi Sunni orientation and date of origin, the two buildings both boast 
an onion domed minaret not seen on old or new Shia constructions. Historically a 
seafaring caste, Bhadalas trace the longevity of their roots in Mombasa to the 
nakhoda (captain) Jurab Adam, who is said to have settled in the town
17
 in 1705 
(Mehta & Wilson 1958). As with some other Sunni mosques formally adherent to 
the Hanafi school, the Bhadala mosque is today frequented by a diverse male Sunni 
population. Many Bhadalas continue to live in Kibokoni and go to the Bhadala 
mosque, although a larger number prefer the mosque in Saba Saba, an area in the 
centre of the island now the focal point of their jamaat.  
                                                 
17
 Following local terminology, I use both ‗city‘ and ‗town‘ to refer to Mombasa. 
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The island‘s centre also houses a Kokni mosque, frequented by the last Muslim 
community addressed in these pages. Koknis are originally from the Konkan coast of 
Maharashtra state and, like Memons and Bhadalas, are Hanafi Muslim.
18
  
Reference to Koknis indicates that not all Muslims of South Asian heritage in 
Mombasa are from Gujarat; Mombasa is also home to Punjabis and Baluchis, who 
have founded a number of the city‘s older mosques, but amongst whom I conducted 
very little research. The vast majority of my informants – and the vast majority of 
Asian Muslims in Mombasa – trace genealogies to either Kutch or Kathiawar.  
 
Figure 10: Bhadala Masjid, Old Town. 
                                                 
18
 In some places, Koknis are also referred to as Konkanis, a term I did not hear in 
Mombasa.  
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As the above descriptions suggest, I learnt much more about the religious history of 
particular Shia sects than I did of Sunnis in Mombasa. This relates not only to the 
documented significance of history in Shia lived experience (Fischer 1980; Hyder 
2006; Pinault 1992), but also, I suspect, because Sunnis of Indian origin share a 
majority faith in this city.  
 
Living Old Town: part I  
Old Town is a hive of commercial, as much as religious, activity. Small shops selling 
fabric, sliced bread and gas cylinders line the pavements; hand painted adverts for 
electrical appliances, uniforms and fish food decorate the walls. The area‘s character 
– and its social heterogeneity – is captured through a cursory glance at some of its 
myriad commercial ventures. Half London Barber‘s, an establishment owned by 
Bajunis (close cousins of the Swahili), enjoys a steady stream of male custom. The 
name, currently used to designate many Mombasa establishments, is a play on the 
title of a recent Kenyan Oscar-entry, Nairobi half life (dir. Gitonga 2012), a film 
about the challenges of city living, and, according to a Bajuni friend of mine, 
intended to demarcate the fact that life in Mombasa is ‗half as good as London‘. A 
few streets away the word Banadir, an administrative region in Somalia, currently 
decorates the front of a long-standing café now popular with young Somali men (see 
Fig. 11 on the following page). Island Dishes, a Swahili restaurant whose décor 
includes postcards from some of the established anthropologists named in these 
pages, sells the best kima chapatti (stuffed with fried egg and minced beef) in town. 
Down a smaller side street, The Gunner‘s is a tiny fruit and veg stall run by diehard 
Arsenal fans with roots in the coastal interior. Before he passed away, the gentle Mr 
Jamshed, who, like Latifah, is of the Khoja jamaat, ran the last workshop 
specialising in the ornate brass work that has historically decorated doors and chests 
in this part of the world. Hajji Mohamed & Sons, a venture run by descendants of the 
Memon mosque patron mentioned above, is famed for its herbal medicines as much 
as its Islamic texts. The small shop is panelled, walls and ceiling, in ‗Burma teak‘, 
brought over from India at the turn of the century.  
37 
 
 
Figure 11: Banadir Café, Old Town. 
Old Town‘s streets, and the food available on them, change dramatically according 
to the time of day. Early in the morning, ambulant fruit sellers, set up shop in prime 
locations, a daily ritual illustrated in the scene on the next page (Fig. 12). Soon after 
dawn, areas of Kibokoni become archipelagos of benches, where people breakfast on 
milky chai and thick chapattis, as well as mahambris (the local donut) or mithai (the 
Swahili term, which also means sweet in Gujarati, for bite-sized dough balls covered 
in sugar). The women and men who serve these items pack up by about 9am.  
Around four o‘clock, a new army of food producers emerge, sitting on barazas 
(stone stoops)
19
 or walking with buckets through the streets selling bhajiyas, vibibi 
(rice cakes) and various incarnations of viazi (potatoes). Chapattis are made-to-order 
on particular corners; one of my favourites was run by a two-woman team whose 
faces were covered by niqab (a veil revealing only the wearer‘s eyes). Dusk marks 
the arrival of choma (short for nyama choma or barbecued meat); the ubiquitous 
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 A baraza is a stone bench built into the front of many houses in Mombasa, 
particularly in the Old Town. A social institution throughout East Africa, barazas 
have been much studied as a meeting place for men to chat and debate (Kresse 2007a; 
Loimeier 2007).  
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charcoal stoves forming evening extensions of the established cafés to which they 
belong.  
 
Figure 12: A fruit vendor preparing for the day to begin at a central junction, 
Old Town. 
For Latifah, city life is largely enacted in her home and at the many religious and 
social functions organised by the Khoja jamaat. Latifah buys most of the produce 
that sustains her family and her home catering business from one of the ambulant 
fruit and vegetable sellers who pass down the dusty pedestrian lane in front of her 
house. Accompanied by one of her sons, she makes periodic trips to A-One 
supermarket, located on the major thoroughfare of Digo Road (outside of Old Town), 
for non-perishables. A-One is at the lower end of Mombasa‘s supermarket spectrum 
but is still pricier than many of its tiny corner shops.  
Latifah, like many Asians, would never breakfast on a roadside bench in the street, 
although she buys vibibi to resell at Khoja social functions, and enjoys the 
occasional evening meal at Mubin‘s, the Memon-owned mishkaki joint in the centre 
of the island, unanimously assessed as the best place in town for the coast‘s much-
loved barbecued meat skewers (Latifah‘s favourite is nundu, roasted ‗fat of cow‘). 
Latifah knew of MNKafe – a trendy, air-conditioned eatery on the edge of Old Town 
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that I visited with a number of wealthier and younger Khoja women – but baulked at 
the price of their cupcakes.  
Latifah‘s house is only a few minutes‘ walk from Hyderi imambargah, introduced 
above, where she, like other Khoja women, attends ladies‘ majalis (religious 
gatherings; sg. majlis) every Friday afternoon, as well as several evenings a month 
for events associated with the 12 Shia Imams and other holy personalities whose 
lives structure the Khoja liturgical calendar. Religious events are particularly 
concentrated in the Islamic months of Muharram and Ramadhan. Latifah also 
occasionally attends events at one of the various mehfiles – religious spaces usually 
located in private homes
20
 – or when someone wealthy hosts a majlis in their house, 
for instance as part of wedding celebrations. Aside from going to and from religious 
functions, Latifah rarely travels around Mombasa or outside of Kenya, but she has 
been to Mecca for Hajj and on ziyarat (pilgrimage) to both Iran and Iraq, visiting 
mausoleums of the 12 Imams. These trips were heavily subsidised by the jamaat. 
Qaasim, the youngest of Latifah‘s children, goes to school at the Jaffery Academy, 
located in the upmarket suburb of Kizingo (an area we explore shortly), home also to 
the approximately 50 percent of the Khoja jamaat that does not live in Kibokoni. 
Like many of Mombasa‘s best educational establishments, Jaffery originally catered 
to a specific Asian community (in this case Khojas), but is now open to all those who 
can afford the fees (although fees are waived for poorer members of the Khoja 
jamaat). We return to Latifah and some of the religious and residential concerns of 
Khojas in two of the following chapters; the extended focus on this particular 
religious community necessitates a brief contextualisation here. 
 
Khoja Ithna-Asheris 
If the multiplicity and fluid nature of subjectivity is axiomatic to most contemporary 
anthropology, I have sought to capture something of its complexity in Mombasa, by 
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 Some Khoja families in Mombasa have dedicated a room in their house for 
worship, where others will be invited for majalis during Muharram and other 
commemorative events. These rooms contain relics, such as mausoleum replicas and 
battle standards, associated with the Battle of Karbala and the 12 Shia Imams. Given 
their small size, events in mehfiles are always either for men or women (not both). 
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shifting between registers in the structure of this thesis. While the ways in which 
particular subject positions constantly intersect with others is highlighted throughout, 
three chapters are based on research amongst a broad swathe of Muslims of Gujarati 
origin (Chapters 1, 2 and 4), while Chapters 3 and 5 are based primarily on the 
discourses and practices of Khojas. Weaving between these two frames reflects the 
enduring importance of sectarian affiliation amongst my informants, as well as the 
many ways in which it is superseded by other modes of identification.  
My decision to focus on Khojas is intended to provide a Shia angle to the much 
studied question of what it means to be Muslim in Kenya – both in relation to the 
state and the littoral beyond. While Kresse‘s (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2009) research 
discusses the lectures of prominent Swahili Shia personality, Sheikh Abdilahi Nassir, 
his work is not concerned with the everyday life of Shias in Mombasa. For Khojas, 
daily life and ritual is centred around the commemoration of the 12 Shia Imams, 
believed by Shias to be the spiritual and political successors of Prophet Mohammed. 
The first Shia Imam was Ali, cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed (an individual 
who is known by Sunnis as the fourth leader of the Rashidun Caliphate). The third 
Shia Imam was Husain, grandson of the Prophet, and key protagonist of the Battle of 
Karbala. The 12
th
 Imam, also known as the Mahdi, is believed to have been in 
occultation since 868 CE; according to Shia eschatology, he will reveal himself and 
restore rightful Islamic government on earth at an unknown date before the Day of 
Judgement. Unlike Ismailis and Bohras who believe that their divinely appointed 
leaders are the descendants and chosen representatives of the 12 Imams, Khojas 
believe that no mortal being can take the Mahdi‘s place. Instead, for guidance in this 
period of occultation of the 12
th
 Imam, Ithna-Asheris around the world (Khojas and 
others) are encouraged to follow and emulate one of the numerous Shia Ithna-Asheri 
maraji (singular marja or marja al-taqlid), clergy of the highest authority (marja al-
taqlid means source of emulation). Maraji are mostly based in Najaf, Qom or Beirut. 
While the decision of who to emulate is formally an individual one, Khoja jamaats 
and their members generally follow the interpretations and guidance of Ayatollah Ali 
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al-Sistani, who is based in Najaf.
21
 Like Muslims around the world, Ithna-Asheris 
give a percentage of their income to charity as zakat annually; unlike Sunnis, Ithna-
Asheris also pay one fifth of their earnings (calculated after subtracting living costs) 
as khums. For Khojas, this tithe is presented to al-Sistani annually. Al-Sistani has 
provided a dispensation, meaning that half of this sum (the half collected for the 
Imam in occultation) remains with Khoja jamaats, and is reinvested into community 
development projects (Akhtar 2016).  
Khojas, like many Mombasa residents, imagine themselves part of extensive 
diasporas that span the globe. Khojas with roots in Mombasa often differentiate 
themselves from ‗Somali‘ Khojas or ‗Jangbaris‘ (Khojas from Zanzibar), as much as 
those from Karachi or Toronto. Today, there are approximately 125,000 Khojas 
worldwide (H. Jaffer 2012: 1). The global network of jamaats come under the 
umbrella of the World Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities, 
as well as regional bodies such as the Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Jamaats 
of Africa (hereafter the Africa Federation), which is older than the larger London-
based World Federation. Many in the Mombasa jamaat have intimate relations with 
others in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, London and Canada; some have family ties to 
Karachi, but the majority have no or very limited contact with Khojas on the 
Subcontinent. The global reach of Khojas and other East African Asian communities 
is in no small part due to the extensive outmigration that occurred in the early 
postcolonial period, spurred by ‗Africanisation‘ policies in the region and 
culminating in Idi Amin‘s infamous expulsion of Asians from Uganda.22 Being part 
of a global caste and religious community is central to some aspects of Khoja daily 
life, as it is for many in the city, and my analysis in this thesis highlights instances 
where a diasporic imaginary is important. However, perhaps due in part to the 
longevity of Asian settlement along the littoral, the lens of diaspora does not capture 
                                                 
21
 Some older people continue to follow al-Sistani‘s predecessor al-Khoei, a practice 
that the former has explicitly permitted. An individual‘s relationship with their marja 
is usually but not necessarily a life-long affair: some of the younger Khojas I knew 
in Mombasa discussed the possibility of transferring their allegiance to Ayatollah 
Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader of Iran. The decision to change marja is 
taken very seriously, those who articulated it as a possibility also emphasised the 
need for extensive research before doing so.  
22
 ‗Africanisation‘ policies and the climate they generated are discussed further in 
subsequent chapters.  
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much of what I encountered in the city, or many of the ways in which my informants 
purported to imagine themselves. Remaining true to my ethnography, I highlight 
diaspora‘s shifting relevance in Mombasa. 
 
Living Old Town: part II  
The focal point of Latifah‘s life, Kibokoni, is also cherished abode to Shahina, a 
Memon who we spend some time with later on (Chapter 2). Shahina, who usually 
lives in a Memon widows‘ compound near Piggot Place (a market square now used 
predominantly as a car park), comes to inhabit the flat below me whenever her sister-
in-law is required to travel out of Mombasa, usually to care for an ill relative in 
Nairobi. Shahina is, in other words, temporarily summoned to cook for her brother 
and nephew; the family‘s sassy Christian maid Lillian would never be trusted with 
such a task. Shahina and her brother are Nasserpuria Memons, while her sister-in-
law is from a different branch of the Memon tree: Yaqeen is Okhai Memon, claiming 
roots in the small coastal town of Okha on Gujarat‘s Kathiawar peninsula. Memons, 
like most people I knew in Mombasa, are ‗aspirationally endogamous‘: while many 
marry other sects in practice, union within caste and religious affiliation is 
considered the ideal. Marriage outside of one‘s own community often involves 
conversion: for instance, I knew of a number of Bohra and Memon women who had 
converted to Ithna-Asherism upon marriage. Marrying non-Asians is less common 
but by no means unheard of. In this context, marriage between different factions of 
Memon remains relatively rare, and ancestral difference is but one of the many 
things that Shahina and Yaqeen fault in each other.  
Shahina does the odd sewing job to earn a bit of extra cash, but is otherwise entirely 
dependent on welfare support provided by her jamaat. Most of her time, is spent 
cooking, praying and relaxing in her tiny but wonderfully light and breezy apartment, 
a self-contained room in the Memon widows‘ compound. Shahina is a devout Sunni 
(Hanafi) but only goes to Memon Villa – which comprises the jamaat’s main 
mosque, school and various social institutions – for the occasional wedding or majlis. 
Not only is the Memon calendar ostensibly less exigent than that of Khojas, Shahina 
has neither the money, nor the company to make the trip regularly. Shahina would 
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never travel by tuk tuk or matatu (minivan) alone; she and the other ageing women 
that occupy her block of flats prefer not to venture out at night. The decorations in 
her home include a Hijri (Islamic) calendar – memorably sponsored by ‗Fantasy 
Lingerie Fashions‘ – and a clock with a picture of the Taj Mahal on its face. ‗It‘s 
from Nairobi‘, Shahina told me proudly; she has been to the capital once. As well as 
occasional trips to visit her sister in Malindi, a town 120 kilometres up the coast, 
Shahina hugely enjoys pottering around the market and beyond – she has firm 
opinions about who sells the freshest carrots and the cheapest notebooks (defying 
wider Mombasan preference for the Bohra-owned establishment of Salmanji‘s, 
Shahina opts for the place run by her niece in the Soko Ndogo area of town).  
Shahina almost never eats out, but we had the chance to visit Jawad‘s Cold Store 
during the afternoon of maulidi (the Prophet‘s birthday, an occasion marked by a 
major procession through Mombasa‘s streets and an evening religious programme on 
Makadara Grounds, a large field adjacent to Old Town). Run by Kabir, a Bhadala 
who we meet again several times in this thesis, Jawad‘s interior is painted lurid green 
and orange; Uhuru Kenyatta‘s bloodshot eyes peer down from a photo near the 
entrance (all businesses in Kenya are required to display a photograph of the 
president) and the Coca Cola branded plastic table cloths are sticky with the 
delicious green chilli and coconut chutneys that accompany his famous bhajiyas. 
Kabir lives with his wife in a place nearby; he has no time for mosque in-between his 
running this perpetually-busy café and raising his nine children (even though they 
usually stay with his mother who lives a few streets away). ‗Family feuds‘, he grins 
languidly, his wife and mother do not get on. A number of Kabir‘s children go to the 
Santokben Nanji Kalidas Mehta Nursery School, an institution founded by one of the 
region‘s most successful Hindu industrialists.  
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Markiti and beyond: ‘Town’, Kizingo and the northern mainland  
Markiti, officially known as MacKinnon Market after a pre-colonial administrator,
23
 
is the main market place in town. A bustling border zone between the Old Town and 
the rest of the city, this is where Shahina does her shopping. The large stone and 
wrought iron structure which houses the market proper is filled with stall-owners 
who sell Chinese and Kenyan garlic (the latter smaller and more expensive but 
prized for its superior taste), the coast‘s famous ‗apple mangoes‘ (a succulent local 
variety), tomatoes and onions, as well as vegetable gourds such as tindora and the 
cankerous karela, indigenous to the Indian Subcontinent. Depending on the 
Munisipali’s (Municipal Police) shifting stance on street vending, a host of others 
sell their wares in the surrounding streets. Fruit vendors push overladen mikoketeni 
(wooden carts) between tuk tuks and the odd car, deftly negotiating potholes and the 
width of the road. Young men peddle handbags, curtain wires or cashews. A number 
of ‗ration shops‘ sell rice, lentils and spices; in one, the Digo shop assistant, Ali, 
claims to speak more Gujarati than its Hindu proprietor.  
Markiti is where Hashim‘s shop is located; it his haven of salt and sugar which 
commences Chapter 2. Hashim‘s family have sold sweet and savoury snacks from 
this establishment every day except Sundays since 1868. Like many other 
confectioners in the city, Hashim is a Bohra whose life is intimately bound up with 
that of his religious leader, the Syedna or Dai. Trained in archaeology at a Scottish 
university, Hashim had dreams to ‗change the face of Egyptology‘ but consulted the 
Syedna for career advice during one of the Dai‘s many visits to Mombasa. This is 
normal practice for Bohras, who confer with the Syedna, or, more frequently, his 
local representatives, for blessings and guidance before many small and large life 
events, from naming a child to taking a trip. The Bohra leader advised Hashim to 
continue in his father‘s footsteps, counsel Hashim has dutifully complied with for 
over three decades.  
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 MacKinnon founded the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), the 
commercial organisation that administered East Africa from 1888 to 1895 before the 
British government assumed direct control over the newly created Protectorates of 
British East Africa (now Kenya) and Uganda (Gregory 1993b).  
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Although I never went to Hashim‘s home, I heard quite a lot about the dimmer 
switches and other accoutrements he had added to his flat in the Bohra housing estate 
in Bombolulu, an area on the mainland north of the island, where he and his wife 
moved five years ago. It can easily take an hour to commute to Markiti from 
Bombolulu, a journey which Hashim makes by matatu. Travelling by the minivans 
that form the most common source of ‗public‘ transport in Mombasa allows Hashim 
to avoid having to negotiate the traffic, plus, as he explained, ‗There‘s nothing like 
being able to properly enjoy the sea breeze as you cross Nyali Bridge‘ (which 
connects the island to the northern mainland). His wife, always dressed in the 
colourful rida (a two-piece ensemble that covers the head and body) expected of 
Bohra women – an outfit Khadija paired with equally bright trainers – drives in with 
their Rav 4 on Saturdays. ‗Everyone else has a Toyota Probox‘, Hashim told me one 
day, remarking on the city‘s latest vehicular fashions. ‗At least I can find mine 
easily!‘  
West of Markiti is the island‘s centre, an area sometimes hyperbolically referred to 
as the Central Business District (CBD), but more often simply known as ‗Town‘. 
Town is a bustling place, everyday but Sunday; it is densely built up but the majority 
of its skyline is low level. The island is dusty and often chock full of matatus, tuks 
tuks and other vehicles vying for space on its ageing roads. Its green spaces are 
predominately either Muslim cemeteries or sports clubs; many of these are owned by 
communities of Gujarati origin and marked in green in the map we saw above (Fig. 2, 
p.23). The centre is crisscrossed by several major boulevards: Digo Road, which 
becomes Nyerere Avenue, runs north south, past the marketplace; Moi Avenue, 
Nkrumah Road, Haile Selassie and Mwembe Tayari run east west; Jomo Kenyatta 
Avenue leads northwest from the centre to the Makupa Causeway, which connects 
the island to the main road to Nairobi and the Kenyan interior. Myriad smaller lanes 
connect these roads, but it is the larger avenues that are dotted with major 
supermarket chains and more established commercial ventures, from telephone 
companies, hotels, spare parts suppliers, and Mombasan catering institutions such as 
Fayaz Bakery and Blue Moon. To give but one example, Blue Room, caters to a 
broad swathe of Mombasa‘s more affluent, its spacious interior includes a large 
framed photograph of the Ismaili leader the Aga Khan, next to a wall of humorous 
aphorisms, including ‗D jà poo: the feeling that you‘ve heard this crap before‘. 
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Town also comprises many mosques, from the towering Konzi to Sheikh Jundani, 
described to me by one individual as ‗Ottoman-esque‘. A number have been built or 
refurbished with Saudi funds in the last three decades.  
Much of the most westerly part of the island is taken up by Shimanzi, the industrial 
zone that borders Kilindini port. Shimanzi houses many large godowns, as well as a 
range of shipping and trading corporations. It is here that I first met Rabi Jalal, key 
protagonist of Chapter 6, in his office at the imposing headquarters of Grain Bulk, 
the biggest grain cargo handlers in East Africa. Grain Bulk is Khoja-owned, its 
founder and many of the top management executive are members of the jamaat (this 
includes Rabi). The road to the office is one of the worst in Mombasa, eroded daily 
by the steady stream of trucks going into and out of the port. While the potholed 
tarmac lays bare the contradictory economics of the coast – a regional trade and 
transport hub sorely lacking in state investment – the headquarters is a gleaming 
tower block; a selection of African flags flutter outside. On my first visit to Rabi‘s 
office, I pass an enormous watercolour mural, depicting Grain Bulk‘s grain and 
fertilizer handling terminal, the infrastructural centrepiece of Kilindini port. The 
artist‘s thrilling homage to industrial capital glimmers against an Indian Ocean 
backdrop. Up one more flight of stairs and I‘m ushered into Rabi‘s office. He sits 
behind a vast wooden desk, which seems all the larger for the absence of other things 
in the room. It is here that I learn Rabi spent his childhood in Moshi (Tanzania), but 
came to Kenya as a teenager and managed to secure a Kenyan government 
scholarship to attend university in Lahore, eastern Pakistan, in the early 1970s. 
Today, Rabi prides himself on dedicating all his free time to jamaat activities: since 
2012, he has been at the helm of coordinating the construction of the Jaffery 
Complex, the Khoja gated community and religious centre that is the subject of 
Chapter 5.  
We now head to Kizingo, a residential suburb on the south eastern side of the island 
whose sizable houses and luxuriant vegetation are unambiguously indicative of the 
wealth that has characterised the area since colonialists began to build there at the 
onset of the 20
th
 century. Nadesh, a vivacious Ismaili woman some 70 years young, 
lives in a large colonial bungalow, filled with knickknacks from her travels and 
nestled in a garden beautifully maintained by her Digo servant Abdullah. Nadesh and 
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her late husband were long at the forefront of Ismaili community life in Mombasa 
and met their leader, the Aga Khan, on a number of his visits to the city. Nadesh 
remains a fixture at Ismaili religious and social events – of which there are many – 
usually held in one of the two Ismaili gated compounds on the island (located in the 
northern areas of Makupa and Tudor); built round jamaatkhanas these residential 
hubs have constituted the centre of Ismaili social life since the 1950s. Nadesh, 
however, is one of the very few Ismailis that still attends daily dawn and evening 
prayers at the Kuze jamaatkhana in Old Town. She grew up in a house near the 
enormous prayer hall; her excursions to Old Town these days are do not divert from 
driving to and from the walled jamaatkhana.  
Always accompanied by Abdullah, Nadesh has shopped in Markiti (the marketplace 
introduced above) every Tuesday for as long as she can remember. She is also a self-
proclaimed ‗culture buff‘. Although often lamenting the poverty of the contemporary 
Mombasan theatre scene, she loves going to see plays at La Veranda (a posh Italian 
restaurant on the northern mainland that includes a small stage) or the Little Theatre 
Club, a colonial institution currently being reinvigorated by a generation of youthful 
coastal actors. Nadesh also enjoys the occasional trip to the cinema, an outing which 
usually involves dinner at Bollywood Bites, the upmarket South Indian restaurant 
(whose chefs reportedly come from Chennai) adjacent to the Nyali Cinemax. 
Cinemax, a shopping mall with Cineplex, is now the only remaining movie hall in a 
city that used to count six. Cinemax always has at least two Bollywood and 
Hollywood films on offer, on one occasion we watched Ram-Leela (dir. Bhansali 
2013). ‗No one stands for the national anthem anymore‘, Nadesh remarked as ‗Ee 
mungu nguvu yetu‘ (‗Oh god of all creation‘) played in the background. Nadesh, like 
all Ismaili women in Mombasa, dresses in blouses and skirts, or a shirt and linen 
trousers, although she dons glittering salwar kameez
24
 for functions like the Aga 
Khan‘s birthday. This is a marked contrast to most other Muslim women in 
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 This is an outfit that usually combines a long-sleeved and knee-length top with 
loose trousers and a scarf.  
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Mombasa: Shahina and Latifah always wear a buibui (loose outer garment) and hijab 
when outdoors; this is the norm for women in both their jamaats.
25
  
Cinemax is one of the three opulent shopping plazas on the northern mainland, an 
area which includes the municipality‘s most expensive real estate along the 
beachfront areas of Nyali and Bamburi, as well as large segments of its working 
class, who reside in Kisauni and Kongowea. Access to zones of conspicuous 
consumption such as Cinemax is closely policed: vehicles undergo an obligatory 
bomb check and those who choose to enter by foot are turned away if deemed to lack 
sufficient capital by the diligent security guards. These plazas house establishments 
such as Mr Price, a South African clothing and home store, or the recently opened 
and exorbitantly priced Planet Yoghurt.  
Ghalib‘s, the paan shop we visit in Chapter 3, is located on the same street as 
Cinemax. Ghalib‘s is a small institution in a wealthy neighbourhood. Its proprietor, 
Nadim, whose life story I present at length in the aforementioned chapter, is Kokni, 
of the Sunni Muslim caste with roots in the Konkan coast of Maharashtra state. 
Nadim, like Nadesh and many of my wealthier informants, lives in Kizingo. He 
occasionally attends the Kokni mosque in the centre of the island, but otherwise 
simply prays in the tiny office behind his café. Nadim‘s wife, who I greeted briefly 
once, wears a niqab when helping her husband on the till.  
 
Accessing urbanity 
What each of the urban theorists cited at the outset of this thesis emphasise is the 
multiplicity of ways in which cities are inhabited and inscribed with meaning. 
Accessing urbanity in Mombasa thus entailed ‗living‘ the city with my informants; 
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 Buibui refers to the loose, black, floor-length and long-sleeved dress worn over the 
top of women‘s other clothes when outdoors, or whenever in front of men (however, 
most women I knew did not cover themselves in front of their male mahram, 
meaning unmarriageble kin, a category which includes close blood relations and in-
laws). While in Arabic, hijab refers exclusively to the scarf that covers a woman‘s 
head, shoulders and chest, in Mombasa, buibui and hijab were used interchangeably 
to refer to head-to-toe covering, i.e. long dress and headscarf. Accordingly, the verb 
to buibui, or to hijab, means to dress in clothing that conceals everything but one‘s 
face and hands. I follow these local iterations here. 
49 
 
following their routes and routines made evident the many different ‗Mombasas‘ that 
coexist in this port town. As the descriptions above suggest, I was warmly received 
in a number of Mombasan homes, by people I gradually met at religious and social 
functions, or on my excursions around town. Latifah and Shahina were quite happy 
for me to while away long mornings and extended lunches in their domestic realms; I 
also accompanied both on shopping trips, visits to family members and to religious 
gatherings. Visits to Nadesh‘s house were structured by our Gujarati lessons; we also 
went to the cinema, as well as Ismaili socials, together. Others would invite me over 
for the occasional lunch or afternoon chai, and I visited a number of Khoja houses in 
the context of majalis. The people introduced above are aged between 40 and 75, and 
indeed, many that I spent time with in Mombasa were middle aged or ageing. This 
reflects not only a demographic that had more time, but also patterns of youth 
outmigration. However, as will be seen in the chapters that follow, there were also 
many young people in Mombasa who shared something of their lives with me. To 
protect the anonymity of the people I met, the names used here are pseudonyms.  
In line with Islamic stipulations on sex segregation followed by the majority of my 
non-Ismaili informants, most of the people who invited me to their homes, or on 
their travels around the city, were women, although I was free to talk to brothers, 
husbands and sons once indoors. Two men, one of whom I met through his sister, the 
other a Khoja community historian with whom I had initiated correspondence via e-
mail, also invited me to their homes on a number of occasions; their wives would 
usually remain within earshot. Most of the homes I called on were located either in 
Old Town or Kizingo (or in the area that connects the two), although I also visited 
houses in Ganjoni, a residential area on the south western side of the island, and 
Nyali, the elite suburb on the northern mainland. Households in Kizingo tended to be 
markedly wealthier than those in Old Town, although there were several exceptions 
that bucked this trend. While none of the subsequent chapters starts inside a house, 
conversations and considerations derived from within dwellings are an integral part 
of the ethnography presented here. This reflects the fact that, for many of my 
informants, city life is a thoroughly domestic affair.  
A lot of my time was spent wandering the city, observing its rhythms, roads and 
residents. My conclusions from these sojourns underpin my observations of the 
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city‘s architecture and its social meanings. These urban journeys led me into many of 
the city‘s ubiquitous cafés and small commercial ventures run by people with roots 
in Gujarat, including Hashim‘s sweetshop. Hashim, who has befriended 
anthropologists in the past, introduced himself by calling out, ‗You‘re not a tourist, 
are you?‘ a conclusion he had surmised from my leisurely pace. Male entrepreneurs 
such as Hashim, Nadim and Kabir (each of whom were introduced above), were 
happy to chat with me within the context of their businesses: their words pepper 
these pages. Business can be slow in Mombasa these days, I think our discussions 
were something of a welcome distraction.  
Almost all my interactions with Muslims in the city – be they Khoja, Ismaili, Bohra, 
Memon or Swahili – would involve some allusion to the openness of the speaker‘s 
community above all others. ‗Who else are you doing research with?‘ Shanaz, a 
Khoja with family roots in Mogadishu, asked me as we sipped sugary chai after 
ladies‘ majlis one afternoon. Explaining that I also spent time with Ismailis and 
Bohras, among others, there was no need to guess what her next question would be. 
‗And do they let you into their mosques?‘ Shanaz asked with the rhetorical flourish 
of one who already knows the answer. ‗No‘, I confirmed; Ismailis and Bohras do not 
allow non-Ismailis and non-Bohras into their religious spaces (although I attended 
and sometimes helped cook for a number of the social functions that follow Ismaili 
religious events). This prescription helps explain why much of my time was spent at 
Khoja religious functions in the imambargah and mehfiles. The women‘s blood 
donation drive that concerns us later (Chapter 3), held as part of Khoja Muharram 
commemorations, was one such function. Khojas formally allow anyone into their 
religious spaces, although this invitation was not extended to Mombasa‘s black 
Ithna-Asheri population, one of the many realities which caused me to reflect on the 
effects of my skin colour and class on this research. Being a white woman, I was also 
afforded ease of access to places such as Cinemax, described above.  
Khojas are firmly invested in proselyting, largely through the Bilal Muslim Mission, 
a charitable organisation that promotes conversion and social development through 
centres around the coast (we return briefly to Bilal, as it is known, in Chapter 2). 
Many Khoja women expressed the conviction that I had been guided to Mombasa by 
Allah and would eventually become a Shia Muslim, an explanation I came to view as 
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logical as any other for my presence in the city. Others – Khoja and not – were less 
concerned with the fate of my soul, but keen to demonstrate the welcoming values of 
what many called ‗true Islam‘, a category juxtaposed with the ‗fundamentalist‘ and 
‗Wahhabi‘ versions imagined to threaten life on the littoral, and which I turn to 
below.  
 
Research in uncertain times 
Although not present in Kenya for either event, my research was bookended by the 
September 2013 attack on Nairobi‘s Westgate shopping mall and the Garissa 
University massacre of April 2015, where gunmen claiming association with al-
Shabaab killed 150 students in the country‘s northeast. These tragic incidents – and 
the numerous raids, attacks and targeted killings that took place along the coast 
during my fieldwork – had significant impacts on life in the city and my research.  
Kenya‘s relationship with what is often problematically referred to as ‗Islamist 
terrorism‘ began with the US embassy bombings of 1998, where coordinated attacks 
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killed over 200 and brought al-Qaeda into broad public 
notoriety for the first time. I mention this previous event to indicate the longevity of 
Kenya‘s experience of ‗terrorism‘; the embassy bombings initiated a period of close 
cooperation between Kenya, US and UK security forces that continues to this day. 
Reflecting Kenya‘s prominence as the site of major commercial interests, as well as 
the region‘s key diplomatic, UN and NGO headquarters, Kenya has been positioned 
as an important ally and key battleground in the ‗war on terror‘ since its inception. 
While security analysts have concluded that the US embassy bombings were carried 
out by individuals born and trained elsewhere (Shinn 2007), in the intervening 
decades the nature of the ‗terrorist‘ threat in Kenya is perceived to have shifted, 
particularly with the rise of al-Shabaab in the region (see below) and the often-
associated ‗radicalisation‘ of Kenyan youth (Botha 2016). It is against this history 
that I consider the security situation that structured my fieldwork.  
The Westgate siege began on a busy Saturday afternoon shortly before I arrived in 
Mombasa, when masked gunmen stormed Nairobi‘s largest and most expensive 
haven of elite consumption. Shooting, involving a difficult to determine range of 
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national and international actors, went on for four days, leaving over 65 people dead 
and at least 200 wounded (Williams 2014: 907). The attack was quickly claimed by 
al-Shabaab, the militant organisation that emerged as the most powerful mobilising 
force in Somalia following the breakup of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the 
coalition of sharia courts that vied for power with Somalia‘s Transitional Federal 
Government during the early 2000s, an evolution of Somalia‘s unremitting civil war. 
Following the defeat of the ICU by Ethiopian forces in January 2007, the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was formed. Backed by the UN, AMISOM‘s 
primary objective is to reduce the threat of al-Shabaab and other armed opposition 
groups, as well as promote peace-building in the country. Kenya was not initially 
involved in this mission, but, following a series of kidnappings and other incidents 
on Kenyan soil attributed to al-Shabaab, Kenyan Defence Forces launched Operation 
Linda Nchi (‗Protect the Country‘) and entered Somalia in October 2011. Kenyan 
troops were formally integrated into AMISOM a few months later, and have played a 
pivotal military and policing role within it since.  
Al-Shabaab explicitly framed the Westgate attack as retaliation for crimes committed 
by Kenyan troops in Somalia. These tensions have a long history. Kenya and 
Somalia share a lengthy and porous border and ethnic Somalis have always been a 
significant demographic in the country (particularly in the northeast), constituting 
what Mwakimako & Willis describe as ‗Kenya‘s most intimate enemy‘.26 Kenyan 
forces fought the so-called shifta war (shifta meaning bandit or rebel) against 
secessionist ethnic Somalis in the decade following independence (Whittaker 2012); 
the antagonistic legacies of this brutal conflict have been amplified since the early 
1990s, with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the Somali civil 
war. Many have settled in the vast complexes of Kakuma and Dadaab – which count 
amongst the largest refugee camps in the world – but those with family connections 
or financial means have sought livelihoods and residence in Nairobi and Mombasa. 
Somali success as urban entrepreneurs and real estate investors in both cities has 
                                                 
26
 See p.11 of H. Mwakimako & J. Willis‘ paper for the Observatoire des Enjeux 
Politiques et Sécuritaires dans la Corne de l‘Afrique, ‗Islam, politics, and violence 
on the Kenya coast‘. 2014 (available online: 
http://www.lam.sciencespobordeaux.fr/sites/lam/files/note4_observatoire.pdf, 
accessed 13 August 2017). 
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only heightened tensions, an issue we return to in subsequent chapters.
27
 Although 
many Kenyans are now reported to be part of al-Shabaab, the group‘s association 
with Somalia underpins the ‗Somali as terrorist‘ imaginary in Kenya, a construct 
only exacerbated by Westgate. Under the pretext of addressing the threat of 
‗terrorism‘, the Kenyan state periodically attempts to distinguish between Somali 
citizens and refugees, compelling the latter to ‗return‘ to refugee camps in the north, 
most recently through Operation Usalama Watch (usalama meaning peace in 
Swahili), which was launched in March 2014.
28
 Following thousands of arrests and 
the temporary detention of many in a Nairobi stadium, this xenophobic population 
transfer was eventually quashed by the Supreme Court. I discuss these tensions 
further in later chapters.  
Westgate was followed by numerous other attacks in Kenya, some claimed by al-
Shabaab, others not. In Nairobi during the course of 2014, churches, matatus, 
markets and police stations were targeted by bombs and grenades, often in the 
Eastleigh suburb of the city, which is home to a large Somali population. At the 
close of 2014, an attack on a bus transporting teachers and government workers 
killed 28 in Mandera County (that borders Somalia);
29
 a few days later nearly 40 
quarry workers were killed in the same area.
30
  
At the coast, the first significant incident of this nature during the course of my 
fieldwork was the police raid of Masjid Musa, a mosque in central Mombasa, which 
                                                 
27
 See the Chatham House report by F. Abdulsamed: Somali investment in Kenya. 
2011 (available online: http://somalithinktank.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/Somali-Investmen-In-Kenya1.pdf, accessed 13 August 
2017). 
28
 See the Human Rights Watch article: ‗Kenya: end abusive round-ups‘. 2014 
(available online: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/12/kenya-end-abusive-round-
ups, accessed 10 September 2017). 
29See M. Otsialo & A. Hajir: ‗At least 28 killed in Shabaab attack on Nairobi-bound 
bus in Mandera‘. Daily Nation, 22 November 2014 (available online: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/28-dead-suspected-Al-Shabaab-attack-in-
Mandera/-/1107872/2531256/-/ljsywl/-/index.html, accessed 19 August 2017). 
30
 See C. Stewart: ‗Kenya bus attack: al-Shabaab gunmen behead and shoot 36 non-
Muslim labourers at Mandera quarry‘. The Independent, 2 December 2014 (available 
online: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenya-bus-attack-gunmen-
kill-36-at-mandera-quarry-9896973.html, accessed 19 August 2017). 
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was allegedly holding a meeting aimed at recruiting al-Shabaab members.
31
 The 
mosque had long been at the centre of controversy as the platform for Sheikh Aboud 
Rogo, a ‗radical‘ preacher shot in August 2012. Police raided Masjid Musa in 
February of 2014, officially for resisting a police order not to convene the meeting, 
and over 100 men were arrested. Further raids on the Musa and Sakina mosques 
occurred in November 2014, during which 480 officers from the General Services 
Unit (GSU) and the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) arrested hundreds of people, 
killing several.
32
 According to prominent local human rights NGOs, Muslims for 
Human Rights (Muhuri) and Haki Africa, some of those arrested were eventually 
released, others were charged. Details of these raids and the cases that followed are 
hard to verify but both organisations condemned the heavy handed actions of the 
police, part of a long tale of persecution of young Muslim men by state security 
forces.
33
  
In June 2014, Mombasa awoke to the news of the ambush of the small town of 
Mpeketoni, located in Lamu County some 300 kilometres north of the city. Armed 
attackers burned shops and vehicles, and murdered some 60 people. Claimed by al-
Shabaab (a claim reiterated by various foreign governments), this event was much 
politicised, with President Kenyatta placing the blame on ‗local politicians‘ and the 
Mombasa County Police Commissioner explicitly accusing opposition leader Raila 
Odinga of involvement; both inferred that this was an ethnically motivated attack 
against the Kikuyu population that have settled in Mpeketoni since the 1970s.
34
 
                                                 
31
 See: ‗Deadly clashes after police raid Kenya mosque‘. Al Jazeera, 2 February 
2014 (available online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/clashes-after-
police-storm-kenya-mosque-20142213377444840.html, accessed 8 September 2017). 
32
 See: ‗Deadly raids on mosques in Kenya‘s Mombasa‘. Al Jazeera, 17 November 
2014 (available online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/11/deadly-raids-
mosques-kenya-mombasa-2014111715249473661.html, accessed 8 September 2017). 
33
 See the report by Muhuri (Muslims for Human Rights): ‗We’re tired of taking you 
to the court‘: human rights abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. 2013 
(available online: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/human-
rights-abuses-by-kenya-atpu-20140220.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017), as well as 
the Al Jazeera documentary: Inside Kenya’s death squads. 2014 (available online: 
https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/kenyadeathsquads/, accessed 19 August 2017). 
34
 See I. Ongiri & B. Namunane: ‗Uhuru blames massacre on tribalism, hate politics‘. 
Daily Nation, 17 June 2014 (available online: http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Uhuru-
blames-massacre-on-tribalism--hate-politics/-/1056/2352306/-/wyy1laz/-/index.html, 
accessed 19 August 2017). 
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Other senior officials asserted that Mpeketoni and a similar attack two weeks later 
was the work of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a secessionist 
organisation whose prominence has waxed and waned at the coast over the last two 
decades.
35
 In the wake of Mpeketoni, mentioned above, several people were killed 
by hooded attackers in the Likoni area of Mombasa.
36
  
‗Minor‘ events involving guns and explosives occurred throughout 2014. In March, 
two people were arrested in Mombasa after improvised explosive devices were 
found in their vehicle.
37
 Two months later, three people were killed and 15 injured 
when a hand grenade detonated inside an overnight bus, recently arrived in the port 
city from Nairobi. Explosives were recovered near a beachside hotel later that same 
day.
38
 Within the same month, a grenade was thrown at a police vehicle, injuring two. 
In addition to these incidents involving explosives, six Muslim clerics (as well as 
one of their alleged financiers) were killed in Mombasa during the 18 months of my 
fieldwork, apparently targeted either by state security forces for being ‗too radical‘, 
or by others, for ‗not being radical enough‘. 39 Finally, as mentioned in the opening 
vignette and much discussed in Mombasa was the shooting of two white female 
                                                 
35
 See: ‗Hindi, Gamba attacks work of MRC – Kaindi‘. The Star, 6 July 2014 
(available online: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2014/07/06/hindigamba-attacks-
work-of-mrc-kaindi_c966758, accessed 20 August 2017). 
36
 See: ‗Deaths in Mombasa shooting rampage‘. Al Jazeera, 21 July 2014 (available 
online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/07/deaths-shooting-rampage-
kenya-mombasa-20147214444141458.html, accessed 20 August 2017). 
37
 See: ‗Kenya arrests two after bombs ―found in car‖‘. BBC News, 18 March 2014 
(available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26624387, accessed 20 
August 2017). 
38
 See: ‗Kenya blasts: three dead after twin attacks in Mombasa‘. The Telegraph, 3 
May 2014 (available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10806810/
Kenya-blasts-three-dead-after-twin-attacks-in-Mombasa.html, accessed 20 August 
2017). 
39
 See the Al Jazeera documentary: Inside Kenya’s death squads. 2014 (available 
online: https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/kenyadeathsquads/, accessed 19 August 
2017), as well as the IRIN news agency‘s report: ‗Gunned down in Mombasa – the 
clerics that have died‘. 2014 (available online: 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/100412/gunned-down-mombasa-%E2%80%93-
clerics-have-died, accessed 20 August 2017).  
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tourists in separate incidents in Old Town in July 2014.
40
 While the first had been 
widely assumed as a robbery gone wrong, the second shooting, less than two weeks 
later, left the city on edge. It was after this that I moved out of Old Town (and went 
to live on one of the major thoroughfares in town), although I continued to return to 
Old Town almost daily.  
In light of these local and national events, it is unsurprising that concerns about 
insecurity pervaded everyday life in Mombasa; understanding how people 
experience, manage and mitigate insecurity soon became a key theme of my research, 
and led, amongst other things, to a focus on the Jaffery Complex, the gated 
community that forms the subject of the final chapter. The literature on insecurity in 
the region is often oriented towards policymakers and, although regularly identifying 
the role of state violence in fomenting radicalisation,
41
 also highlights more reductive 
variables such as ‗personality type‘ and birth order (Botha 2016). Some authors 
continue to rely on the problematic notion of ‗African Islam‘ to explain the limited 
potential for radicalisation at the coast (Vittori et al. 2009). More thoughtful analysts 
have eschewed such essentialist narratives, and instead consider the consequences of 
state violence and global geopolitics on the entrenchment of Muslim marginalisation 
within the nation-state (Prestholdt 2011; Seesemann 2007).
42
 Highlighting the 
growing cooperation between the North American and Kenyan administrations, these 
works detail the racial profiling, torture, detention and murder of coastal Muslims, 
particularly young men of Afro-Arab descent. I take a more everyday approach to 
insecurity, examining how it affects residential choices, and how it intersects with 
themes such as aspiration and diaspora.  
                                                 
40
 See: ‗Gunmen kill female tourist on Kenya coast‘. Daily Mail Online, 7 July 2014 
(available online: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2704556/Gunmen-kill-
female-tourist-Kenya-coast.html, accessed 20 August 2017). 
41
 See the report by Muhuri (Muslims for Human Rights): ‗We’re tired of taking you 
to the court‘: human rights abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. 2013 
(available online: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/human-
rights-abuses-by-kenya-atpu-20140220.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017). 
42
 See also H. Mwakimako & J. Willis‘ paper for the Observatoire des Enjeux 
Politiques et Sécuritaires dans la Corne de l‘Afrique, ‗Islam, politics, and violence 
on the Kenya coast‘. 2014 (available online: 
http://www.lam.sciencespobordeaux.fr/sites/lam/files/note4_observatoire.pdf, 
accessed 13 August 2017). 
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Whether blamed on the state, ‗radical youth‘, ‗Wahhabis‘, al-Shabaab, coastal 
secessionists or local politicians, all of these events were understood to be 
inseparable from the rise of Islamic ‗extremism‘ in the region and beyond, 
exacerbating a climate of hostility towards Muslims that, as outlined above, was 
already well established in the Kenyan context. What effects did this have on my 
research? My interlocutors‘ acute awareness of the crisis of representation regarding 
Muslims that currently plagues public imagination in Kenya and beyond was made 
obvious through frequent requests I received, like the following from Sahil. Sahil, a 
respected Khoja community adviser who appears on several other occasions in this 
thesis, always had time to receive me in his office, a shabby room attached to the 
Bilal proselytising headquarters. During our first meeting, Sahil warned me, ‗Many 
people here are scared of outsiders because there are so many stories of the CIA and 
FBI sending agents. I only ask you, don‘t do anything that will aid our enemy. We 
are also a target‘. A few weeks later he reminded me, ‗If I share with you, you must 
be just. Don‘t publish anything that will harm Islam‘. Sahil, the frontline of 
community outreach, was a picture of welcome in his demeanour – but also clearly 
worried about where my research might lead his beloved community.  
Sahil‘s comments succinctly summarise the oft-repeated maxim that I, as someone 
doing research about Muslims, was either a government spy or motivated by 
malicious intent. Not only did many fear that I was out to ruin the name of their 
religion, others seemed to suggest that I could be part of the ‗terrorist‘ threat, as 
captured by Qaasim‘s comments comparing me to the ‗White Widow‘ in the opening 
vignette. This comparison, however, was generally made jokingly and I took it to be 
symptomatic of the extent to which ‗terror‘ pervades Mombasan thought, rather than 
a personal accusation. The suspicion many expressed towards me was a permanent 
feature of my research: while causing many challenges and frustrations during my 
stay in the city, I came to understand the difficulties I faced as indicative of what it 
means to be Muslim in Mombasa in the contemporary historical moment, and 
became important aspect of my inquiry. Suspicion towards me waxed and waned but 
never abated. To the best of my ability I sought to reassure the people I spent time 
with that I was neither a spy nor a ‗terrorist‘, and that my research agenda sought in 
part to redress the generalisations and misconceptions about Muslims that feed 
global Islamophobia. It is my hope that these pages are a testament to this.  
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A note on clothing: cosmopolitanism as method  
Qaasim‘s comments about me as dressing like the ‗White Widow‘ lead me to a final 
methodological issue: clothing. On my first visit to the Khoja imambargah, the 
disjuncture between my outfit and everyone else‘s was only the most visible element 
of my sense of out-of-place-ness that day. Amongst a sea of black buibuis and black 
headscarves – in accordance with the fact that this was the commemoration of the 
martyrdom of Imam Husain – I stuck out like a sore thumb, in a flowery long-
sleeved shirt and baggy trousers. Loosely draping a colourful scarf over my head did 
little to improve the picture. I was very grateful when Rahila, a woman with 
luminous skin and a placid demeanour, volunteered to bring me a black headscarf for 
the events that evening; she gently suggested it might be nice if I wore black. Upon 
re-entry, the Chairlady was so delighted with my transformation she exclaimed, 
‗Now you are my daughter!‘  
Needless to say, I had soon acquired a buibui and, like many anthropologists before 
me, found clothing to be an important technique of fieldwork (Gold 1988; Gupta 
2015). I want to complicate this picture somewhat by considering my buibui-wearing 
as spatialised practice, a performance that generated a range of sentiments, both in 
myself and amongst those I encountered, depending on the setting. I came to feel 
very comfortable wearing hijab while wandering the streets of Old Town – this was 
the area I lived for over half of my fieldwork; it is also the location of many of the 
religious spaces and homes I have described above. Although the hijab is by no 
means universally adopted in Old Town, only the occasional tourist would be seen 
exposing much flesh. In Old Town, my buibui generally elicited respectful salaam 
alaikums from men and women alike. Not wearing hijab in the imambargah or in 
other Khoja religious spaces quickly became unthinkable. However, largely related 
to the contexts in which I met and spent time with others, this was not the case 
elsewhere. 
Although I always dressed modestly, usually in a salwar kameez, I rarely ventured 
outside of Old Town in a buibui, at least not on foot. Very simply, wandering around 
Markiti, the town centre or the various residential areas mentioned above, I did not 
feel comfortable in hijab. My different experiences in these locations expose 
something of the different sensibilities that dominate different parts of the city. I felt 
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it would have been ‗impossible‘ for me to sit in Hashim‘s sweetshop in hijab, or 
wear a buibui while traipsing around the building site that concerns us later. Nadesh 
and Aishani, my Ismaili and Hindu (Kutchi Leva Patel) Gujarati teachers, both 
respected my decision to wear a hijab for the purposes of research with Khojas – a 
community they both viewed as particularly insular – but made it crystal clear that a 
buibui would not be welcome in their homes.  
Admittedly, these rather eclectic dressing habits baffled my immediate neighbours, 
who would make friendly jests, ‗Leo ni Mwislamu‘ (‗Today you‘re a Muslim‘), and 
watch in bemusement at my various costume changes (I would often nip home 
between chats and social events to change into what I considered appropriate for the 
next). Clearly inconsistent on one level, I came to see my clothing changes in terms 
of the theories of cosmopolitanism discussed further in Chapter 2 (Osella & Osella 
2007; Simpson & Kresse 2007; Werbner 2008). These authors define 
cosmopolitanism as an awareness of difference and a range of strategies for 
managing that diversity. As an anthropologist, attempting to construct and maintain 
relationships with a broad range of Mombasa‘s inhabitants, I came to see 
cosmopolitanism as method, in which clothing was a prop. Clothing changes were a 
way of recognising and respecting the differences between my interlocutors, and 
perhaps sometimes reducing the divergences between myself and others.  
How did my principal informants respond to my shifting apparel? For a start, I never 
had to buy a headscarf during fieldwork, being the lucky recipient of donations from 
a number of women. Even people I never really chatted with otherwise were 
incredibly forthcoming with their gifts of headscarves. This was coupled, throughout 
my fieldwork, with frequent compliments about my ability to headscarf 
appropriately. Women of all ages often proclaimed, ‗You wear it even better than us!‘ 
This was a generous lie at the best of times – I looked like a chipmunk in a nun‘s 
habit, never managing to achieve the folded ridges that add that all-critical volume, 
or the effortless ‗just tied‘ look. Many would elicit my experience of wearing hijab; 
variations on Rahila‘s questions, ‗Don‘t you feel so good? You see that everyone 
respects you now, no?‘ were oft-repeated. In many contexts I interpreted the 
commentary on and contributions to my modest appearance as evidence of a desire 
to bring me into the fold: this mode of dressing would at least help me see the merits 
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of Islam, if not eventually facilitate my conversion. Clothed as if I might convert, the 
potentiality my apparel symbolised in this regard undoubtedly eased my access to 
some people and places. In some instances, the borderline figure I represented was a 
positive thing.  
In other contexts, my dressing decisions went down less well. On a handful of 
occasions, I was castigated in the street for not wearing hijab, by women accustomed 
to seeing me it. ‗The hijab is a commitment for life. You can‘t just put it on and off!‘ 
Maalia exclaimed after bumping into me, without hijab, near the marketplace. I 
apologised profusely and explained that I wore it out of respect in many contexts, but 
that I was not Muslim, a response Maalia found no comfort in. Returning to the idea 
of cosmopolitanism as method, this was of course the opposite of what I was 
attempting to achieve through clothing changes – I never wanted to upset anyone, let 
alone act in ways perceived as disrespectful towards Islam. I worried about this, and 
asked many for their advice on what to do; no one advocated my total abandonment 
and agreed that there were lots of places it was not appropriate for me to visit 
without hijab. I thus continued to wear a buibui in Khoja religious spaces, as well as 
in homes where I knew that women wore hijab when outdoors. My fluctuating 
fashions were a visible manifestation of the social geographies I traversed daily in 
Mombasa; a cartography in which I could easily not be mapped. Occupying a liminal 
space certainly did nothing to improve the suspicion I generated, but I saw no easy 
way out of these wardrobe conundrums as I sought to maintain relationships with a 
diverse urban population.  
 
Chapter outline 
I conclude this Introduction by explaining the chapters that follow in relation to the 
conversation in Latifah‘s kitchen that initiated the thesis. 
Latifah complains frequently about corruption, power cuts and the rising cost of 
living, but is not ‗political‘ in the conventional sense of the term. She votes – ‗for 
anyone but the Kikuyus‘ – but is otherwise largely uninterested in the politics of 
state. She is, however, profoundly attached to Mombasa. This sentiment is not 
unique to her or new to her generation. The first chapter of this thesis tells a 20
th
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century history of the city, focussing on the ways in which Asians have shaped 
littoral urbanity through buildings. An established body of scholarship has 
challenged prevailing stereotypes about the lack of Asian participation in national 
politics, demonstrating the minority‘s critical role in trade unionism and anti-colonial 
struggles. The façades I consider in Chapter 1 shift the focus away from the world of 
formal politics and provide a street-side view of engagement with empire, 
demonstrating how building patrons forged alternative (post)colonial landscapes in 
Mombasa. Beginning with Art Deco, the building style that dominated the major 
urban expansion of the 1930s, 40s and 50s, I consider Asians as agents in the 
construction of a racialised colonial order. Harnessing an architectural vocabulary 
linked to Europe and Bombay, Asians deployed Art Deco to position themselves as 
‗imperial citizens‘ (T. Metcalf 2007: 2), registering both their commitment to and 
critique of empire, as well as their superiority in relation to Mombasa‘s 
heterogeneous ‗African‘ majority. The chapter concludes by reading building 
façades against narratives of Asian emigration and national apathy around 
independence, considering bold additions to the cityscape as investments in a 
postcolonial future despite the rampant anti-Asianism of the era.  
While Art Deco is revealed as a quintessentially transoceanic style in the first 
chapter, Chapter 2 considers everyday food practices as a means to complicate this 
view of littoral connectivity. The bhajiyas Latifah is cooking in the opening vignette, 
as with many of the delicacies sold in the sweetshop that grounds this chapter, look 
to be emblematic of the transoceanic histories emphasised in the literature on Indian 
Ocean cultural forms. However, Latifah‘s own emphasis on the iconically local 
status of these deep-fried delicacies – as foods that evoke Mombasa and entice 
Mombasan palettes – indicates the limitations of this lens. Mombasa is 
fundamentally connected to wider worlds, a reality decades of anthropological and 
historical scholarship has revealed to be true of every locale. Through the lens of 
everyday consumption, this chapter argues that focusing on Indian Ocean 
connections misses how much quotidian practice is perceived in the city. If research 
on Indian Ocean urbanity and ethnographies of cosmopolitanism more generally 
have tended to focus particularly on the ways in which worlds beyond are valorised 
or concealed, discourses and practices of eating in Mombasa compel us to examine 
the ways in which such connections are often not imagined at all. In calling for 
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attention to the ways in which Indian Ocean webs are ‗already local‘ (Pennycook 
2010: 70), the ethnography presented here demonstrates Mombasa‘s ‗inherent 
connectedness‘ (Kresse 2012: 36) to be a contingent and contextually specific social 
fact in Mombasa. 
Latifah‘s life outside the home, like that of many of my informants, is structured 
around religious functions. As is normal for Khojas, her existence is infused with the 
metaphor and materiality of Karbala, an event of far less significance to Mombasa‘s 
Sunni majority. Moreover, conversation in Latifah‘s household, as much as at the 
imambargah, is never far from debates about Islamic reform – the politics of 
headscarves, music and fasting were alluded to in the above vignette – influenced in 
part by Khoja connections to Iran and Iraq. At first blush, Latifah‘s life might seem 
to bypass the city and fit neatly into the stereotype that suggests that an orientation 
towards communally defined religiosity segregates Asians from the concerns of their 
compatriots. Demonstrating the ways in which the broader religio-political landscape 
of Mombasa implicates Khoja ritual practice, Chapter 3 provides a Shia perspective 
on the subject of Islamic reform that has long absorbed scholars of the Swahili coast. 
Through the lens of a Muharram blood donation drive, initiated by Khojas in 2014, I 
examine how a multiplicity of reformist discourses intersect in the city, always 
entangled with other concerns. Khoja ideas about blood and the performance of 
Karbala mourning rituals are shown to be infused by perceptions of local 
sectarianism, regional insecurity and global geographies of reform. In addition to 
bringing new topologies and idioms of piety into the literature on Islam in Kenya, 
this chapter suggests that, rather than serving as a barrier, there is much slippage 
between piety and nation: globalising religious histories shape how Khojas imagine 
their relations to fellow citizens, as well as provide a lens for understanding 
contemporary local and national events.  
Nostalgia, which appears as a sense of loss for an era of religious harmony in 
Chapter 3, is the focus of Chapter 4. In the opening vignette, Latifah laments a 
bygone era, wherein the city was more peaceful, orderly and economically stable. 
Mentioning the culinary desires of those who have left, and emphasising the distance 
between herself and ‗the Dubai lady‘, she also alludes to some of the patterns of 
mobility – social and geographic – that shape Mombasa in the present moment. 
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Starting in Nadim‘s paan shop, this chapter examines the ways in which Mombasans 
deploy time as witness to make particular claims on place. I examine nostalgia as a 
source of social capital, a trope which, although also registering the vagaries of the 
postcolonial era, enables residents to record proud stories of wealth accumulation, 
made possible on the back of transoceanic trade. This adds nuance to the stereotype 
of Asians as wealthy exploiters and illuminates some of the contradictions of 
contemporary coastal economics. By historicising the speaker‘s relationship to the 
city and fostering links to a broader mnemonic community of Mombasans, nostalgia 
talk is shown to reinforce the claims of some littoral inhabitants to the city over 
others, thus enabling Somalis and people from upcountry to be positioned as a 
source of contemporary urban anxieties.  
If Chapter 4 looks towards the past, the final chapter is concerned with the future, 
and the ways in which Khojas seek to act on it through space. We start with a site 
tour of the Jaffery Complex, a Khoja gated community being constructed around ‗a 
mosque for all‘. Our guide here is Rabi Jalal, the jamaat member in charge of 
coordinating this ambitious project, a man whose opinions contrast markedly with 
Latifah‘s dismissal of it. The chapter examines the motivations for and reception of 
the Complex, as well as particularities of its design features, considering the global 
geographies of reform, diaspora and ‗terror‘ that have shaped its development, as 
well as the mobilities and aspirations it gathers. The chapter concludes by thinking 
about the interplays of time and space the Jaffery Complex evinces, as Khojas both 
preserve and erase histories embedded in community landmarks as a means to secure 
a place for themselves in the city‘s future. 
The conclusion draws the themes discussed in the preceding chapters together, and 
outlines the main features of the ‗Mombasan urbanism‘ that emerge therein.  
Mombasa is steeped in history, some of which is essential for understanding the 
pages that follow. Before commencing the chapters described above, I provide a 
short Historical Prelude, detailing key events and texts that contextualise the city, as 
well as the history of Asian settlement in East Africa. 
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Historical Prelude 
Mombasa and Asians in text and 
context  
 
Figure 13: Mombasa as colonial object.  
‗East Africa (Mombasa) defence scheme map‘. British Library (available online: 
http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/onlineex/maps/africa/largeimage136509.html, 
accessed 7 September 2017). 
Mombasa, an island nestled into the surrounding mainland on three sides, has had a 
long and sometimes glorious history as an Indian Ocean port. Flanked by two natural 
harbours, this happenstance of geography has had immeasurable consequences on 
the city‘s history. Mombasa is one of the oldest urban settlements in East Africa and 
has been inhabited by Swahili-speaking Muslims, their slaves and farming tenants, 
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as well as people from around the littoral for over 1000 years, procuring its fortune 
from trade connecting the African interior to the Indian Ocean world beyond (Horton 
& Middleton 2000). Mombasa‘s integration within global circulations of goods and 
people made it one of the most powerful Swahili city states; its optimal location and 
immense wealth was not lost on the Portuguese (Strandes 1961 [1899]), who sought, 
over the course of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries to assert and maintain their control of 
the city. Mombasa was then ruled by a succession of Omani dynasties – Yarubi, 
Mazrui and Busaidi – who reigned through a liwali or governor, but in many respects 
left power in the hands of local Swahili patricians.
43
 Following a succession dispute 
in 1834, the Busaidis established a sultanate in Zanzibar, from where they 
maintained control over most of the East African coast.  
By the late 19
th
 century, the Europeans were jockeying for power in the region. 
British dominance of the coast began in 1887, when the British East Africa 
Association (later known as the Imperial British East Africa Company), leased a ten-
mile strip of the coast from the Sultan of Zanzibar (Salim 1972). Over the next 
several years, the Company sought to entrench its domination of what is today 
Kenya and Uganda; this included brutally repressing local revolts, such as the 
Mazrui rebellion of 1895. In the face of growing local discontent, the British 
government took over from the Company in 1895, proclaiming the East Africa 
Protectorate from its capital at Mombasa in 1895. The rest of Kenya was declared a 
colony in 1920; although a de facto British dominion throughout the colonial period, 
the coastal strip (that included the city and its environs) remained officially under the 
sovereignty of the Zanzibari Sultan until independence in 1963. Imperial power in 
British East Africa was administered from Bombay, through the agency of the 
Bombay Presidency, which ruled as if its western outpost ‗were a district of a 
presidency of India‘ (Colonial Order-in-Council quoted in T. Metcalf 2007: 23).  
                                                 
43
 Decades of scholarship on what constitutes Swahili identity illustrates the 
fuzziness created by centuries of Indian Ocean exchange (Eastman 1971; Mazrui & 
Shariff 1993; Parkin 1985, 1989). Throughout this thesis, my use of the term Swahili 
refers to people with roots in the urban areas of the East African coast, who call 
themselves Swahili and may also highlight their Arab, African or South Asian 
ancestry.  
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Much more than legal code was transported from Bombay. One of the most 
significant consequences of British hegemony in East Africa was the expansion and 
permanent settlement of Indian trading communities in the region, encouraged by 
colonial officials in India and the UK who believed that Indians would help entrench 
capital and ‗civilisation‘ on the African continent (Mangat 1969; T. Metcalf 2007). 
By this means, tens of thousands of Indians, of wealthy and impoverished trading, 
farming, artisanal and professional backgrounds, came to settle in East Africa, many 
arriving and settling permanently in Mombasa. The majority of those who migrated 
were from the Kutch and Kathiawar regions of contemporary Gujarat, and came 
eventually to be known as ‗Asians‘ (as explained in footnote three on p.17). The 
British defined and governed over the region‘s populace according to the three-tier 
system that segregated Asians, Africans and Europeans in law, as well as in terms of 
education, work, taxation and residence. This hierarchy of races prohibited those 
classed as ‗African‘, also known as ‗natives‘, from most professions other than 
farming and manual labour, as well as excluding them from political representation 
and imposing strict rules on their mobility. ‗Asians‘ occupied an intermediary position, 
accorded some political power, but far less than ‗Europeans‘; this discriminatory set up 
that was persistently challenged by Asians, with incremental success, throughout the 
colonial era (Gregory 1993a; Mangat 1969; Patel 1997). Prohibited from owning 
prime agricultural land, Asians became integral to all levels of commerce, establishing 
themselves as principal economic actors in urban areas (including Mombasa), as well 
as setting up tiny dukas (shops) throughout the interior (the stereotype of the Asian as 
dukawallah or shopkeeper continues to this day). Asians sold and traded commodities 
imported from India, the US and Europe, often in return for raw agricultural produce, 
which they were also involved in buying from local producers.  
Karim Janmohamed‘s (1978) doctoral thesis gives extensive attention to the effects 
of Asian migration to Mombasa. His analysis charts the town‘s development from 
1895 to 1939; three chapters outline the role that Indians played in transforming the 
economy and physical structure of the city. Focussed on the dynamics of urban 
growth, Janmohamed examines colonial infrastructure and the rise of Mombasa as 
the region‘s most important trading hub (surpassing the previously dominant 
Zanzibar), as well as the role of Indian traders, middlemen, craftspeople and 
shopkeepers – and the system of credit which they operated and extended – in 
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transforming the city‘s economic system. Janmohamed details the emergence of a 
distinct class of land magnates that cut across particular racial and occupational 
divisions, as well as the expansion of the city‘s built environment resulting from 
colonial town planning schemes and Indian investment; the latter favouring the Art 
Deco style that I discuss at length in Chapter 1. These developments fostered an 
exponential influx of wage labourers from inland, which in turn brought far reaching 
changes to the city and precipitated the emergence of an impoverished – and heavily 
policed – urbanising working class. A number of Janmohamed‘s reflections on the 
significance of Indians in shaping the colonial urban landscape are reiterated in Berg 
& Walter‘s (1968) article on mosque construction in the city. I return to both 
Janmohamed and Berg & Walter in the following chapter. 
Janmohamed is one of many authors to stress that the three-tier system was at best a 
partial reality in Mombasa. For a start, the British had great difficulty in deciding 
which urban residents should be classed as ‗native‘. By 1910, those who styled 
themselves as ‗Arab‘ – elites who had long wielded power at the coast through their 
proximity to Omani rulers – had convinced the administration that they should be 
classified as ‗non-native‘, thus avoiding the Hut Tax imposed on all ‗Africans‘, and 
securing marginally better rights (Salim 1976; Willis 1993). The ‗Swahili‘, for 
whom status had long been derived from an emphasis on their Arab ancestry, 
confounded imperial classificatory systems. As Jeremy Prestholdt has summarised,  
Those who could qualify as Arab or Asian benefited from the advantages 
offered to Non-Natives, but most [Swahili] occupied the awkward position of 
having neither a recognised African ‗tribal‘ identity nor the higher legal 
status of Non-Native (2011: 6).  
As we shall see below, this ambiguity continues to structure the relationship between 
the coast and the central government.  
In addition to posing a challenge to colonial taxonomy, Mombasa‘s long history – an 
urban history of living together – made residential segregation in the city ‗not 
practicable‘, to quote a Provincial Commissioner of the 1930s (in K. Janmohamed 
1978: 405). Janmohamed writes, 
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The single most important and a ―natural‖ factor militating against 
[residential segregation]…. was the reality that Mombasa was a ―Native 
Town‖.44 Here the African urban tradition pre-dated European colonisation. 
The town‘s social structure had evolved as a result of ethnic interaction 
between diverse elements…(1978: 413).  
Despite the best efforts of the British (see below), Asians, Swahilis and Arabs 
already constituted, and in many cases remained, major landowners and commercial 
players in the town.  
If colony provided commercial opportunity for some, the British construction of the 
Kenya-Uganda Railway and the deep-water port at Kilindini in the early 20
th
 century 
marked the end of Arab and Swahili trading supremacy, which had largely been 
conducted via caravan and dhow, and channelled through Mombasa Harbour (today 
known as the Old Port) on the opposite side of the island to Kilindini (Berg & Walter 
1968; Cruise O‘Brien 1995; K. Janmohamed 1978). This was coupled with the 
abolition of slavery and the usurpation of agricultural land, destroying the social 
underpinnings of status, patronage and dependence that had formed the basis of 
Swahili power, and structured relationships between the city and the surrounding 
coast, for centuries (Salim 1972). Ground-breaking histories of the city have 
examined the effects of colonial labour policies on ‗Swahili‘ and ‗Mijikenda‘45 
ethnogenesis along the Kenyan seaboard (Willis 1993), as well as the emergence of 
new forms of class consciousness amongst labourers on the Kilindini docks (Cooper 
1987).  
Although initially the epicentre of colonial rule and the site of major infrastructural 
development oriented towards the expansion of international trade, Mombasa was 
demoted from its position as the capital of the Protectorate in 1907, as the British 
                                                 
44
 Here, Janmohamed is not employing the colonial sense of the term ‗native‘, but 
rather emphasising the already urban structure of Mombasa at the onset of British 
rule. Beyond the coast, Kenya did not have other significant urban settlements; at the 
start of the colonial period, Nairobi was a sparsely inhabited plain.  
45
 ‗Mijikenda‘, a term coined in the 1930s, was used to assert a collective identity for 
a constellation of nine ethnic groups who presented themselves as the autochthony of 
the coastal hinterland (Willis 1993). Digo and Giriama are the largest of these and 
today constitute a significant proportion of Mombasa‘s working class. 
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increasingly focussed their attentions on the development of Nairobi and the ‗White 
Highlands‘, an exclusively European agricultural zone in the interior. The relocation 
of the capital marked the beginning of coastal marginalisation in relation to the rest 
of Kenya, a pattern that continues into the present era. The colonial powers made 
their views of ‗lazy‘, ‗suspicious‘ and ambiguously ‗native‘ coastal Muslims evident 
through labour and development policies, investing heavily in missionary activities 
in the interior and systematically preferring Christians from inland (Cruise O‘Brien 
1995). This legacy has had profound implications for post-independence Kenya: 
political and commercial power, as well as land, remain firmly entrenched in 
Christian hands (Gifford 2008), including at the coast.
46
 Kenyan politicos court the 
coast, but power, even after devolution to the counties created in 2013, is a thing that 
littoral residents largely imagine to exist elsewhere. This was made obvious in the 
aftermath of many of the police raids, described in the Introduction, which occurred 
during my fieldwork; it was common knowledge in Mombasa that county officials 
were as much in the dark as urban residents prior to these incursions by central 
government police units.  
Since independence, Kenyan politics has been dominated by the Kenyatta and 
Odinga dynasties, whose latest electoral showdown is being played out as I write. 
Jomo Kenyatta was Kenya‘s first president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga his deputy. 
The Kikuyu ethnic group to which the Kenyatta family belongs have provided three 
out of the country‘s four post-independence leaders; Daniel arap Moi, of Kalenjin 
ethnicity, retained power for 24 years through close coalition with Kikuyus. Kenya 
was effectively and then officially a one-party state between 1969 and 1992. During 
this time, Raila Odinga, son of the first vice-president and from the Luo ethnic group 
that dominates western Kenya, emerged as the central, if controversial, opposition 
figure. Since the re-introduction of multiparty politics, Raila, the perpetual underdog 
of Kenyan politics, has headed a shifting coalition of those who feel excluded from 
decades of ‗Kikuyuisation‘, a term I heard widely in Mombasa.  
These tensions came to a head in the aftermath of the disputed 2007 elections. Raila 
and his supporters (organised under the banner of the Orange Democratic 
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 See the report by S. Yahya: Who owns the Kenya coast? The climaxing of land 
conflicts on the Indian Ocean seaboard. USAID and CERTI. 2000. 
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Movement), contested the results, which reinstated incumbent Mwai Kibaki. Two 
months of clashes followed, in which over 1200 people were killed and tens of 
thousands displaced (although there were riots and looting in Mombasa during this 
two month period, the city was spared the carnage seen in the Rift Valley and other 
areas).
47
 Most of Kenya‘s political heavyweights are believed to have played a 
critical role in mobilising violence along ethnic lines. In the aftermath, Uhuru 
Kenyatta and William Ruto, two politicians who were later to be elected as president 
and vice-president (the former being the son of the country‘s first president), were 
put on trial for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court. Charges 
against both were eventually dropped with the prosecution claiming that witnesses 
had been bribed and intimidated, and that crucial evidence had been withheld by the 
Kenyan government (of which the defendants were by this point the apex). Despite 
these allegations and Raila‘s protests, the 2013 elections installed Uhuru as 
president.
48
 In sum, the Kikuyu-Luo domination of national politics in the 
postcolonial era has helped solidify a narrative of nationhood that imagines Kenya as 
a coalition of ‗tribes‘ with roots in the country‘s rural interior and a Christian 
religious orientation (Lonsdale 2004). This imaginary leaves little space for the 
historically urbane and Muslim littoral, inhabited by peoples whose ‗African‘ 
heritage has long been questioned, and indeed often downplayed by themselves 
(Kresse 2007a). 
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 See: ‗ICC drops Uhuru Kenyatta charges for Kenya ethnic violence‘. BBC News, 5 
December 2014 (available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
30347019, accessed 19 August 2017). 
48
 Uhuru was returned to power in the recent August 2017 elections, the results of 
which were once again contested by Raila through the courts. In a move that 
surprised many, the election was annulled by the Kenyan Supreme Court the 
following month, on the grounds of procedural failures. The poll will be re-run in 
October 2017. See the article by C. Mwagiru: ‗Kenyan court flexes muscle and 
annuls poll‘. Daily Nation, 3 September 2017 (available online: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Kenyan-court-flexes-muscle-and-annuls-
poll/440808-4080662-al8clpz/index.html, accessed 10 September 2017). 
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Writing coastal Muslims  
Against this backdrop, many academic accounts highlight discrimination towards 
Muslims in political, educational and employment settings, as well as the difficulties 
they face in obtaining national documentation (Ayubi & Mohyuddin 1994; Bakari & 
Yahya 1995; A. A. Mazrui 1993; A. M. Mazrui 1993; Ndzovu 2014; Oded 2000). 
Here I should note that the littoral is not the only part of the country with a 
substantial Muslim population – the northeast and particular areas of Nairobi are 
home to significant numbers of ethnic Somalis, many of whom are Kenyan citizens, 
while others are refugees who have arrived since the onset of the Somali civil war. 
The UNHCR estimates that there are over 300,000 Somali refugees in Kenya, some 
of whom have settled in Mombasa.
49
 As I examine further in Chapter 4, Somalis face 
much discrimination at the hands of the state (Lochery 2012)
50
 and from other 
Kenyans, but they are not my focus in this review. Mombasan Muslims‘ (non-
Somalis) engagement in national politics have been assessed in terms of pre-
independence efforts to secure coastal autonomy (the failed Mwambao movement; 
see Brennan 2008; Kindy 1972; Salim 1970), the emergence and subsequent state-
sponsored destruction of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) in the 1990s (A. A. 
Mazrui 1993; A. M. Mazrui 1993; Oded 2000), and muted efforts by Muslim 
umbrella organisations to advance religious minority rights (Mwakimako 1995; 
Ndzovu 2014). Reflecting its actual and metaphorical distance from state power, the 
seaboard is an opposition stronghold and coastal voting patterns have also garnered 
attention, particularly in the aftermath of broad Muslim support for the opposition 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in the disputed 2007 elections (Mwakimako 
& Willis 2016).  
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 See the UNHCR website: ‗Horn of Africa – Somalia situation: Kenya‘. 2017 
(available online: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/horn/location/178, accessed 
20 August 2017). 
50
 State discrimination against Somalis is also detailed in two Human Rights Watch 
reports, see: From horror to hopelessness: Kenya’s forgotten Somali refugee crisis. 
2009 (available online: https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/30/horror-
hopelessness/kenyas-forgotten-somali-refugee-crisis, accessed 19 August 2017), as 
well as ‗You are all terrorists‘: Kenyan police abuse of refugees in Nairobi. 2013 
(available online: https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/29/you-are-all-
terrorists/kenyan-police-abuse-refugees-nairobi, accessed 19 August 2017). 
72 
 
Perceptions of marginalisation are an integral component of several anthropological 
accounts of littoral Muslims. Andrew Eisenberg‘s (2009, 2012, 2013) 
‗acoustemology‘ of Mombasa‘s historic centre adds ethnographic colour to the 
sentiment that Old Town, the city and the coast more generally are besieged by 
people from upcountry and the social mores of inland. His work considers how a 
distinctly Swahili ethnicity is vocalised through Old Town‘s soundscapes. In line 
with the scholarship of Hirschkind (2006), Eisenberg is attentive to the ways in 
which the adhan (call to prayer) and the khutba (Friday sermon) produce particular 
responses amongst those residing, working in or passing through the area. Many 
Muslims respond to the adhan through ‗cultivated bodily orientations‘ (see also 
Mahmood 2005), repeating its opening salvo (Allahu Akbar), ceasing other activities 
and muting competing sounds in order to engage fully in the ‗participatory listening‘ 
expected of the pious (Eisenberg 2013: 192). These sounds, in other words, produce 
particular performances of pious subjectivity, distinguishing Muslims from others in 
the area. However, non-Muslims are also expected to respond to this soundscape 
according to specific normative prescriptions. As Ahmadi, one of Eisenberg‘s 
informants explains, if any of the (Christian) police officers at the station adjacent to 
Old Town – a building within earshot of several mosques – so much as dared to 
appear that they were listening to the khutba in their capacity as agents of the state 
(by, for instance, standing haughtily, as if to confirm its accordance with national 
law), this would be taken as an affront by the area‘s Muslim population. Ahmadi 
makes clear, attentive posturing on the part of a police officer – participatory 
listening from the wrong kind of subject – could not but evoke some kind of 
retaliation. The soundscape produced via Old Town‘s mosques ultimately constructs 
an ‗Islamic communitarian privacy‘ (2013: 201) and effectively transforms the area‘s 
ostensibly public space into a zone which Muslims demarcate and defend as theirs. 
The notion of life in Mombasa as threatened by rapacious outsiders is a recurring 
theme of this thesis, addressed particularly in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Kai Kresse (2009: S78) takes notions of coastal marginality a step further, 
employing the concept of the ‗double-periphery‘ in order to capture the interplay 
between Kenyan Muslim perceptions of themselves in relation to the state and a 
global Muslim ummah. Kresse‘s work (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2009), which draws on 
his intimate relationship with a number of Mombasa‘s prominent Muslim 
73 
 
intellectuals, highlights the significance of the impact of discourses of Islamic reform 
on life in the city. Many customary Muslim practices at the coast – such as the use of 
traditional healers or the celebration of Prophet Mohammed‘s birthday – have, 
particularly in the last three decades, been derided as ‗unIslamic‘ by an increasingly 
powerful constituency who draw their authority, and often financial resources, from 
the Gulf. The growing prominence of ‗Wahhabis‘, as they are known by their others, 
has helped foster the sentiment that coastal Muslims are not only materially and 
ideologically excluded from state power, but also occupy a space at the ‗edge of 
Islam‘, an assertion reiterated by McIntosh (2009). Although careful to avoid 
essentialising the dichotomy between so-called ‗reformists‘ and their others – see 
Seesemann (2006) for an excellent outline of the pitfalls of this binary in relation to 
Kenya – Kresse highlights the significance of this division for Muslim daily life in 
the city, as well as the emerging forms of solidarity it has fostered. ‗Wahhabis‘ 
appear frequently in the latter chapters of this thesis, and Kresse‘s scholarship is an 
important buttress to my own considerations of reform.  
Others have focussed on the everyday life and ritual of Muslim women in the city. 
Margaret Strobel‘s (1979) thesis on Swahili women charts nearly a century of 
tradition, change, social mobility and subjugation, focussing particularly on dance 
societies, puberty rites and wedding celebrations. This text, accompanied by her 
collection of life histories co-authored with Sarah Mirza (Mirza & Strobel 1989), 
provide a fine-grained picture of the lives of urban Swahili women in the colonial 
and early postcolonial eras. Based on research conducted at the coast, two further 
works consider intersections of gender, Islam and the state. Susan Hirsch‘s (1998) 
legal ethnography of Kadhis‘ Courts51 (Muslim personal and inheritance law courts), 
located in Malindi and, to a lesser extent, Mombasa, describes the production and 
negotiation of gendered subject positions through discourses relating to marital 
conflict in these trials. Mary Porter (1998) examines the way gendered ideologies 
around modesty, modernity and success shape the experiences of students at a girls‘ 
school in Mombasa. 
The literature on Muslims of Asian origin in Kenya is sparse and tends to be 
divorced from the issues discussed above. Most studies provide general overviews 
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 A Kadhi is an Islamic judge.  
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(Bakari 1995a) or brief outlines of particular Asian Muslim communities, often 
mentioning but not specific to Kenya, let alone Mombasa (Amiji 1971, 1975; Le 
Cour Grandmaison 2015; Gomes 2015; Rizvi & King 1973; Salvadori 1983; Walji 
1995). We are only afforded glimpses of their everyday lives, and see little of their 
relationships to the state as Muslims, or of the effects of reformist discourses 
circulating at the coast on their perceptions of and practices of Islam. More often 
than not, people of Gujarati ancestry have been written about as ‗Asians‘.  
 
Writing (without) ‘race’: constructing ‘Asians’ in text  
The racialisation of most aspects of daily life during the colonial period inscribed a 
legacy of politicised antagonism, the effects of which remain visible today. By the 
end of imperial rule, the privileges and commercial successes afforded to Asians had 
sowed deep resentment amongst the disenfranchised and exploited African majority. 
Post-independence politicians sought to rectify decades of political and economic 
subjugation by institutionalising ‗Africanisation‘ policies, while lambasting Asians 
through media and rhetoric (these issues are taken up again in Chapter 1). 
Grievances towards Asians in Kenya were summarised by historian Mougo Nyaggah 
(1974) to include: their collaboration with colonial powers, and the privileged 
treatment they were accorded as a result, coupled with a failure to recognise this 
collaboration in the postcolonial context; systematic abuse of their commercially 
dominant position in Kenyan society; and their lack of attachment to the country, 
defined particularly in terms of their residential and scholastic segregation (the latter 
made illegal at independence), and their failure to participate in politics, intermarry 
or obtain citizenship. Michel Adam (2015b) finds ample evidence of the persistence 
of these stereotypes in the Kenyan press in the late 1990s. Today, the minority 
continue to be referred to as wageni (foreigners or guests) or ‗paper citizens‘ (i.e. 
citizens in name alone) by others, despite having lived in Kenya for generations 
(Herzig 2006).  
The otherness of Asians within wider Kenyan imaginaries was frequently reiterated 
to me in Mombasa. Early one morning at the city‘s Moi International Airport, a 
plump, jovial looking immigration officer – somehow managing to stay cool in his 
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navy green blazer – examined my passport for what seemed like an age, carefully 
thumbing through its pages. Eventually he asked me what I was doing in Kenya. 
‗Research‘, I responded as cheerfully as the nocturnal hour allowed. ‗So what‘s your 
area of specialisation?‘ he inquired. When I told him I was studying the Wahindi 
(Asian) communities, the bureaucrat assumed a knowing tone, ‗Ah, culture. You‘re 
studying introverts, how they‘ve managed not to change. At all. I know a guy whose 
grandfather came here in 1909‘, he paused for effect, ‗and he still thinks he‘s Indian 
even though he‘s never been to India!‘ The officer laughed, thoroughly pleased with 
his own joke, and waved me through to the departure gates.  
Acknowledging these stereotypes helps unpack the form and content of the literature 
on Asians in East Africa. Published against a backdrop of the distinctly racialised 
nationalism that has dominated East Africa in the postcolonial era, writings about 
Asians have sought to make a maligned minoritarian experience intelligible to a 
wider audience, emphasising their contributions to the economics and politics of the 
region during the colonial period. Jagjit Singh Mangat‘s (1969) seminal account is 
indicative of this style of counter-narrative: drawing on English- and Gujarati-
language sources, he provides a rich historical overview of Asian migration histories, 
patterns of travel and settlement, growing economic power, and efforts to secure 
political parity (see also Bharati 1972; Delf 1963; Ghai & Ghai 1965; Hollingsworth 
1960; Seidenberg 1996). In a similar vein, Robert Gregory‘s extensive research on 
the subject includes a detailed exploration of Asian commerce and secondary 
occupations (1993b), Asian involvement in the formal political realm, trade 
unionism and journalism (1993a), as well as philanthropy (1992).  
Cynthia Salvadori‘s (1983) indispensible contribution was the first comprehensive 
overview of Asians in Kenya according to denomination, problematising the 
category ‗Asian‘ while continuing to frame her work under its banner. Salvadori 
details the history of each sect in terms of place of origin and belief, describes their 
arrival in Kenya and outlines key aspects of their contemporary religious and social 
life in the country. Salvadori‘s and Mangat‘s works are more than just texts: they 
have a social life of their own in Kenya. On my first encounter with Hashim, the 
sweetshop owner who we meet below and again in Chapter 4, he immediately pulled 
out a well-worn copy of Salvadori‘s recognisable hardback from a drawer beneath 
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his till. Similarly, consulting Chand, owner of Nairobi‘s best-stocked bookstore, 
what else he could recommend written by or about Asians, he responded with his 
affable grin, ‗If you‘ve got Salvadori and Mangat, what more do you need?‘ (albeit 
eventually helping me source a number of other publications).  
Salvadori‘s first publication on Asians was followed by We came in dhows (1996), a 
beautiful three-volume collection combining snapshots of oral history, newspaper 
clippings and photographs arranged according to the approximate location in Kenya 
to which they pertain (i.e. coast, railway line, Nairobi and the interior). In the two 
decades since, a number of other scholars have followed the style she established, 
detailing the differences that characterise particular religious communities, while 
retaining the category ‗Asian‘ as organising principle. Based on ethnographic and 
survey data, Pascale Herzig (2006) considers the role of gender and generation in 
shaping inter-ethic, intra-ethnic and family relations amongst Asians in Kenya; her 
research draws largely from the Nairobi context. Taking a regional rather than 
country specific perspective, Gijsbert Oonk‘s (2013) latest book brings together 
some of the themes of his earlier works – on shifting preferences for meat or 
marriage partners (2004) and business suits (2011) – to chart 120 years of ‗settling 
and unsettling‘ by Asians in East Africa. Although supplemented by ethnographic 
examples which suggest a more complex picture, Oonk‘s prose tends towards 
generalisation at the level of region-wide generations. For example, speaking of the 
consumption practices of ‗third generation‘ youth, he writes,  
They are raised in East Africa and they study, or have studied, in the West. In 
addition, they speak English, Gujarati and Swahili. When it comes to food 
habits, some of them would state that they ―eat everything‖. Others even 
emphasised that they ―eat everything but Indian food‖ (2013: 124).  
The variations Oonk charts are typically explained with recourse to internal family or 
community politics, rather than exploring how they might relate to particular 
regional locations. Many of the contributors to Michel Adam‘s (2015a) Indian Africa 
write in similar terms. Each of the works cited in this section are, and were intended 
to be, general overviews. Each simultaneously complicate and perpetuate the 
tripartite vision of race in the region sedimented in the colonial period: the category 
‗Asian‘ is persistently demonstrated to gloss social complexity, and yet abstractions 
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are frequently made in racialised terms. Moreover, whether regional or Kenya-
specific, what is often lost in these accounts is the significance of locality and the 
everyday. ‗Asians‘ or ‗Hindus‘ or ‗Bohras‘ are written about in general terms: the 
life we do see often appears to happen in something of a vacuum, ultimately 
replicating the notion of the minority(ies) as insular and detached from the particular 
places in which they reside.  
Other scholars have eschewed race in favour of exploring internal dynamics of 
change amongst particular Asian communities. Early studies by David Pocock (1957) 
and Agehananda Bharati (1965, 1967) examined the evolution of patterns of caste 
distinction for Hindus in East Africa (see also Twaddle 2001 regarding the 
development of communalism in the colonial period). More recently, Iqbal Akhtar‘s 
The Kh j  of Tanzania skilfully weaves historical, political, linguistic and 
ethnographic analyses to trace the development of an ‗Afro-Asian Islamic identity‘ 
(2016: 1). Particularly interesting is his examination of written language use amongst 
Khojas, tracing how religious transformations relate to a shift from Khojki (the now 
dormant Khoja ‗caste script‘) to Gujarati, English and Arabic. This work marks a 
new standard for scholarship on religious minorities in the region. Also based on 
research in Dar es Salaam, Richa Nagar‘s careful ethnographic examinations of 
Asians in the city focus on communal politics, such as the processes through which 
Hindu communal organisations came into being (1997b) or Khoja Ithna-Asheri 
debates around the Shia institution of temporary marriage (mut’a) (2000). Although 
still framed as ‗community studies‘, these latter works from the Tanzanian context 
provide deeper insights into everyday life, as well as how this is affected by the 
broader politics of place, addressing issues such as the effects of liberalisation 
following the end of President Nyerere‘s socialist era.  
These more nuanced academic publications have been accompanied by an 
outpouring of biographical and autobiographical works on East African Asians in 
recent decades; I focus here on those that specifically address Kenya. MG Visram 
(1990) draws on the documentary evidence available to provide a semi-fictionalised 
biography of Allidina Visram, undoubtedly the most influential of the early Indian 
traders in East Africa. Allidina, who arrived in Zanzibar from Kutch as an 
impoverished 12 year-old, had moved his headquarters to Mombasa by 1899, while 
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continuing to travel extensively throughout the region. His monopolisation of trade 
around the turn of the century is hard to exaggerate: with commercial outlets and 
industrial ventures throughout the region, in the early years of the railway, it was 
principally goods traded in his name that traversed the line (see also Mangat 1968). 
The turn of the century diaries of two Indian travellers, brought to publication by 
Salvadori (1997), gives a more humble, and first-hand, insight into the lives of early 
itinerant traders. In the realm of biography, Zarina Patel‘s scholarship is unparalleled; 
her major works consider the lives of Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee (1997), a hugely 
influential early trader and key architect of Nairobi, as well as Makhan Singh (2006), 
father of trade unionism in Kenya,
52
 and Manilal Ambalal Desai (2011), a luminary 
of Kenyan politics and journalism in the 1920s.  
A number of other works give something of an update to the colonial-era focus of 
the aforementioned publications. These include Madatally Manji‘s (1995) 
autobiographical Memoirs of a biscuit baron and Hassan Jaffer‘s (2009) Relentless 
endeavours, a biography of Asgarali Jaffer, scion of the Khoja Ithna-Asheri jamaat 
in Mombasa. Ameer Janmohamed‘s (2008) autobiography, A Regal romance and 
other memories, offers intimate glimpses of a childhood and early adulthood in 
Mombasa. Finally, Rasna Warah‘s (1998) and Neera Kapur-Dromson‘s (2007) 
family histories-cum-autobiographies provide contemporary gendered perspectives 
on being Kenyan Asian women. Many of these accounts are rich and reflective; they 
also, unsurprisingly, illuminate the lives of prominent Kenyan Asians. The trope of 
the pioneer – in terms of commerce, politics, community and philanthropy – is at the 
heart of all these texts, as many of their titles suggest.  
This mode of structuring the ‗story‘ of ‗Asians in Kenya‘ was reproduced by the 
Asian African Heritage Exhibition, hosted by the Nairobi National Museum from 
2000 to 2005 and being made permanent at the time of my fieldwork. The tone of 
these textual and material productions indicate that there is still much to be done in 
terms of reimagining relations between the state and this long-standing minority. 
This thesis shifts this narrative in two ways. Chapter 1, where I chart Asian 
contributions to Mombasa‘s built environment and racialised colonial landscape, 
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 Makhan Singh‘s (1969, 1980) own works on the development of trade unionism in 
the country also merit mention here.  
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demonstrates the influence that the absence of Asians within Kenyan national 
narratives has had on my own perceptions and agenda as a researcher. However, my 
intention in the chapter is to shift our focus away from prominent, politically active 
Asians, providing a street-side view of attachment and investment in the nation. The 
building façades I discuss both reinforce and break apart ‗Asian‘ as a category, 
serving as an appropriate metaphor for the term‘s shifting relevance to daily life in 
Mombasa. The rest of the thesis pursues a different narrative mode. Rather than 
examining ‗Asians‘ in general or the evolution of particular religious communities in 
particular, I explore how lots of different kinds of people of Gujarati origin and 
Muslim faith go about living and imagining the city of Mombasa. Put differently, 
instead of writing about Asians as a ‗race‘ still striving to be a part of an ambivalent 
nation state or focussing on their development as communities, I take as axiomatic 
that the Mombasans I encountered are first and foremost residents of a very 
particular place, and write their lives accordingly. This thesis thus strives to move 
away from the teleological view encompassed in notions of pioneer and communal 
change, focussing instead on the multiplicity and heterogeneity of everyday urban 
life. 
The problems posed by neat racialised categories is implicit in the literature that 
considers the effects of centuries of Indian Ocean exchange on the littoral‘s cultural 
forms and ways of being (Fuglesang 1994; Green 2011; Hofmeyr et al. 2011), a 
body of scholarship I consider in Chapter 2. Gurav Desai‘s (2013) lyrical Commerce 
with the universe, which considers what he calls the ‗Afrasian imagination‘ evident 
in over a century of fictional and nonfictional writing, is one of the finest examples 
of this scholarship to date. Desai draws on the textual narratives of East African 
Asian businessmen, travellers, novelists and political activists, illuminating 
imaginative projects that eschew racial and national categorisations. Desai explicitly 
aligns himself with Gilroy‘s (2001) project of ‗imagining political culture beyond the 
colour line‘, however, his recourse to linguistic gymnastics with the term ‗Afrasian‘ 
demonstrates the difficulties of thinking and speaking outside of these categories in 
East Africa. 
The characters that fill the pages of this thesis are Asian and would claim themselves 
to be so in particular instances, such as when explaining to me that Asians are 
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excluded from the political landscape in Kenya because, as Zarina put it, ‗We have 
no tribe‘.53 My informants were also fond of making remarks like ‗Only Africans 
live in Majengo‘ – denoting that an area of the city was predominantly inhabited by 
‗black‘ people – while at the same time also referring to themselves as African. The 
racialised social categories ‗African‘ and ‗Asian‘ have meaning – even if blurry and 
contextually specific – in Mombasa. However, the people I spent with frequently 
employed more specific social categories to explain themselves and their social 
universe. Following the ethnographic precision of my informants, and in an effort to 
portray their lived experience, I use the terms ‗Asian‘ and ‗African‘ with care in this 
thesis, relying primarily on the more nuanced lexicon that defines social life in 
Mombasa.  
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 The broad purchase of this perception is evidenced by the recent campaign initated 
by a group of Asians in Nairobi to have ‗Asian‘ reclassified as a tribe. See K. de 
Freytas-Tamura‘s article: ‗Asian Kenyans seek to be declared a ―tribe‖ of their own‘. 
New York Times, 25 May 2017 (available online: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/world/africa/kenya-ethnic-groups-
asians.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share, accessed 19 August 
2017). 
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Chapter 1 
Constructing (post)imperial citizens  
 
As they flocked to the new colonial territories and took up positions within 
them, Indians increasingly came to imagine their own identities in new ways. 
Above all, they conceived of themselves not merely as colonial subjects but 
as imperial citizens (T. Metcalf 2007: 2).  
 
 
Figure 14: Art Deco house, near Nyerere Avenue. 
We start the body of this thesis in front of the house depicted in the image above (Fig. 
14). A capacious ‗urban villa‘ (FitzGerald Khan 1996: 139), its curvilinear balconies 
mimic the glide of the corner on which it sits. An elaborate glass staircase tower 
accentuates one of the walls, its verticality juxtaposed against the flat roof. More 
delicate than the frosted glass frontages I‘ve seen elsewhere on the island, its upper 
panes appear coloured, a couple are missing. The house is creamy off-white in tone; 
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a vivacious bougainvillea spills over its perimeter wall, accompanied by rather more 
straggly banana fronds. Humidity has left her stain in places, but the paintwork is 
relatively fresh by city standards. A white, concertina-like plasterwork pattern – a 
recurring Mombasa motif – ribbons along the top of an enclosed roof terrace, as well 
as above the building‘s entrance bulge. The window shading fins, which offer 
limited protection against the already blazing sun, are also painted white, 
underscoring their protrusion. The top balcony boasts a modest colonnade, 
decoration more than support to the staggered roof above. Wrought iron swirls 
provide seclusion, and security, to two lower balconies. Several shutters and upper 
doors are flung open, beckoning Mombasa‘s morning breeze. Louver windows – a 
favourite throughout this town – adorn the uppermost rooms. The air-conditioning 
unit looks old, the water tank and little satellite dish much newer. The house behind 
appears to be in the midst of a paint job.  
This house is but one of Mombasa‘s many Art Deco gems. This chapter reads a 
range of Mombasa‘s 20th century buildings as a means to provide a contextually-
specific account of the construction of what Thomas Metcalf has productively 
termed ‗imperial citizens‘ (2007: 2). Considering the Indian Ocean world from the 
perspective of the Bombay Presidency and all that emanated from it, Metcalf 
describes a new notion of citizenship emerging as Indians moved, with the British, to 
new colonies and into new social positions around the littoral. Indians, he argues, 
envisaged, and sought to position themselves, not only as superior to the majority 
populations amongst whom they lived, but also as critical players in the ‗spread of 
wealth and knowledge to all‘ (T. Metcalf 2007: 2). In this sense, British and Indians 
held something of a shared civilising mission vis-à-vis East Africa. If colonial 
discourses encouraged migration to the continent on the basis that Asians could ‗be a 
―teacher‖ to the African‘ and facilitate ‗a salutary process of racial improvement‘(T. 
Metcalf 2007: 174), Kresse & Simpson (2011) find Gujarati accounts of the era to 
paint Africans in equally pejorative, if ameliorable, tones (see Sampat 1946 as an 
example). As well as seeing themselves as different from and superior to the ‗others‘ 
amongst which they lived, Metcalf (2007) notes that Indians in British colonies 
began to think of themselves as Indian in this period. Employing the façade as 
heuristic device, this chapter fleshes out some of the complexities and contradictions 
embedded within the notion of imperial citizenry in Mombasa.  
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The chapter is particularly concerned with Art Deco, the architectural style that 
characterises the house depicted above, and is found throughout the island. Accounts 
of Asians in East Africa rightly emphasise the far-reaching consequences of the 
three-tier system on (post)colonial antagonisms and ways of imagining the self 
(Gregory 1993a, 1993b; Mangat 1969; Twaddle 2001); my intention here is to 
consider racialised distinctions as something constructed in part through the 
architectural practices of the colonised, in other words, to consider Mombasans as 
agents within, rather than simply subjects of, the three-tier system. It is in this sense 
that I read Art Deco in Mombasa. Specifically, I examine how the three-tier system 
was concretised and criticised through edifice. Art Deco façades, I contend, were an 
important means through which some Mombasans in the 1930s, 40s and 50s 
constructed an elite intermediary position for themselves, both within the Kenyan 
colonial order, and between the city and the world beyond. Putting colonial history 
into conversation with the literature on architecture and empire, my analysis 
considers the implications of architectural decisions for relations between the 
colonised on both sides of the Indian Ocean, as well as in relation to the British.  
Extending Metcalf‘s gaze into the postcolonial era, the chapter then reads building 
façades against narratives of Asian detachment and departure in the years before and 
after independence. In contrast to the widely held stereotype that Asians, ‗foreigners‘ 
and British subjects loyal to the imperial powers, played a negligent role in 
supporting self-rule, there are now a range of accounts which highlight the 
involvement of particular Asian personalities in fostering trade unionism, equal 
rights and nationalism in Kenya (Gregory 1993a; Mangat 1969; Patel 1997, 2006, 
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2011; Singh 1969, 1980).
54
 This important body of work centres on prominent 
personalities, organised politics and explicitly political discourses. The building 
façades I consider throughout this chapter – dating from the 1930s to the late 1960s – 
shift the focus away from these more formalised political structures and provide a 
street-side view of the ways in which Asians contested imperial policy and sought to 
construct alternative (post)colonial landscapes. Much as Asians remain largely 
unrecognised for their contributions to the independence struggle (despite the 
aforementioned revisionist literature), these buildings have not been taken up as 
evidence of Asian involvement in imagining and shaping new kinds of political 
space. Part of the reason for this, I argue, is because façades hide as much as they 
reveal. 
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 The pivotal roles played by Makhan Singh, founder of trade unionism in the 
country, and Pio Gama Pinto, his successor, have been especially highlighted. So too, 
has the Asian contribution to the production of national sentiment in text: during the 
colonial era, a proliferation of Asian printing presses and newspapers helped write 
the nation into being, fostering the construction of an imagined community of 
Kenyans who deserved to rule themselves (Carter 1970; Gregory 1993b; Singh 1969; 
see Anderson 2016 [1983] for the origins of this idea). These efforts well predate the 
violence of the 1950s. In the 1920s, Mombasa was the centre of print journalism in 
Kenya; in 1923, Sitaram Achariar founded the Democrat, a Mombasa weekly printed 
in English and Gujarati, that promoted equal rights for Africans and Asians (Gregory 
1993b). Achariar also printed Mwigwithania (The Conciliator), the Kikuyu Central 
Association‘s press organ edited by future president Jomo Kenyatta. The Kenyan 
Daily Mail, founded in Mombasa by J. B. Pandya in 1927, had a similar position on 
racial equality and political representation from its outset. By the early 1950s, Felice 
Carter (1970) notes that various Asian-owned newspapers, including the Daily 
Chronicle, Colonial Times and the Tribune, were at the forefront of demanding equal 
rights for Africans. Moreover, various pro-independence circulars written in Kikuyu, 
Swahili and other vernacular languages were also printed on Asian presses, usually 
for free or at very subsidised rates. Many of these print-active Asians incurred heavy 
fines and imprisonment on charges of sedition, particularly via the emergency 
legislation brought in during Mau Mau. However, as noted by Carter, the colonial 
government ‗permitted a remarkable freedom to the press‘ (1970: 243), a situation 
which Asians effectively exploited to circulate alternative narratives of nationhood. 
As surmised by Gregory, ‗African journalism, as well as African nationalism, clearly 
owes much to the Asians‘ (1993a: 187). 
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Contextualising the Mombasa Renaissance  
As attested by the dates which feature prominently on many of the Art Deco façades 
we will examine below, most construction in this style occurred between the 1930s 
and early 1950s. This was the era of what a newspaper at the time labelled the 
‗Mombasa Renaissance‘55 (in K. Janmohamed 1978: 308), a building boom spurred 
by demographic, economic and political factors. This section considers some of the 
events that preceded an Art Deco explosion in Mombasa. The building boom cannot 
be understood without reference to the ‗revolutionary‘ impact of the Kenya Uganda 
Railway on Mombasa (K. Janmohamed 1978: 53). The railway, which from 1901 
connected Mombasa to the eastern shores of Lake Victoria and Kampala beyond, 
profoundly expanded Mombasa‘s centrality within vast international trading 
networks, in terms of both speed and geographical scope. Ensuring cheaper, faster 
and more reliable access to the vast African hinterland beyond (source of ivory and 
agricultural produce, and site of untapped markets), the railway meant that imports 
and exports previously routed through Zanzibar came to cross paths at the Kenyan 
coast – cotton from Uganda met cloth from India and candles from the UK. 
Mombasa‘s importance as a trading entrepôt increased exponentially with the 
building of a deep water port at Kilindini, built to accommodate ocean liners too 
large for the shallower waters at Mombasa Harbour (now the Old Port). In 1907, 
traffic coming through Kilindini was valued at one million pounds; this had 
increased to 18 million in 1925 (Sabini 1993: 76). Dhow traffic to the Old Port also 
grew considerably during this time, particularly via the multiplication of vessels of 
Indian origin. The effects of these developments on Mombasa cannot be 
overestimated:  
Railway and port, far more than innovations consciously devised by the 
colonial administration, wrought a far-reaching economic and social re-
structuring of urban life. The major gainers from the transformation were the 
Indians, the major losers the Swahili and, to a lesser extent, the Arabs (Berg 
& Walter 1968: 67). 
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 The term was first used by the Mombasa Times, a colonial era broadsheet, to 
describe the 1926 Town Planning Scheme and the phenomenal building explosion 
that it helped spur (K. Janmohamed 1978: 308). 
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As suggested by Berg & Walter‘s observation, Indians were key drivers and 
beneficiaries of this commercial expansion. While only a few individuals amassed 
fortunes on the scale of Allidina Visram, Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee or Dewji Jamal 
(men, mentioned in the Introduction, who had arrived in Mombasa on the back of 
already successful trading careers in Zanzibar, Australia and beyond), there are 
countless rags to riches stories from this era. Janmohamed (1978) recounts the tale of 
Fatehali Dhalla, now a household name in Mombasa, who started a tiny stall near the 
main marketplace in 1922. Dhalla reinvested the profits made selling bread, rice and 
sugar to a clientele made up largely of labourers and, in the early 1930s, opened 
Mombasa‘s first ‗supermarket‘, City Grocers Ltd. Located off one of the town‘s new 
main roads, City Grocers catered to Mombasa‘s European and Asian elites. 
Increasing commercial opportunities in turn led to a population boom, particularly on 
the part of Asians and people from elsewhere in Kenya (some from the surrounding 
coast, others from as far away as the country‘s western border). If the island 
population sat at 23,000 in 1921, it was 92,000 by 1945 (K. Janmohamed 1978: 257). 
The Asian population, which constituted 20 to 35 percent of the total throughout this 
period, had doubled in the 1920s, remained relatively stable in the 1930s and 
increased by another 60 percent in the early 1940s (K. Janmohamed 1978: 257).
56
 
Buoyed by migration from India in the 1920s, particularly of those of Hindu faith,
57
 
Gregory (1993b) notes that immigration from India to East Africa ceased almost 
completely in the 1930s, a consequence of the global economic depression. ‗That the 
economic depression of the thirties had so profound an impact on Asian immigration 
illustrates the continuing importance of economic opportunity as a motivation [for 
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 This early 1940s increase may be somewhat misleading, especially given that all 
populations, including the otherwise relatively stagnant ‗Arab‘ population, doubled 
in this time – suggesting that figures became more accurate after 1945, rather than 
actually increasing to the extent presented here. 
57
 Gregory states that by 1948, the total Hindu/Jain population of Kenya was over 
45,000, compared to less than 28,000 Muslims (1993b: 26). These proportions would 
not have been as marked in Mombasa, given Asian Muslim preference for this 
‗Muslim‘ town, particularly during the colonial era. 
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migration]‘ (Gregory 1993b: 4), and gives some indication of the effects of the 
global economic downturn on East Africa.
58
  
As attested by the turn of the century photographs below and on the following page 
(Fig. 15 and Fig. 16), Mombasa island was largely shamba (farmland) at the onset of 
the colonial era, and remained so until the 1920s, covered mostly in coconut trees 
and small-scale cultivation (K. Janmohamed 1978). Stone construction was confined 
to the Old Town (which housed, according to one colonial report, ‗Muscat Arabs, 
―better class‖ Swahilis, Indians and Goans‘; in K. Janmohamed 1978: 272), with 
additional pockets to the south (predominantly inhabited by Europeans) and north 
(inhabited by a mix of Swahilis, Africans, Arabs and Indians). Elsewhere, 
settlements consisted of earthen makuti (thatched roof) dwellings, examples of which 
can be seen in these photographs.  
 
Figure 15: Mombasa looking from Fort Jesus.  
Fort Jesus is a 16
th
 century Portuguese Fort south of Old Town. 
‗Mombasa looking from the fort‘. ca. 1897-1901, Mss.afr.s.1493, Photographs of 
British East Africa belonging to Arthur W. Read, Bodleian Library, University of 
Oxford. 
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 While the extent of building construction in Mombasa in the 1930s and 40s might 
thus seem quite remarkable, it suggests that the city itself weathered the depression 
rather well and that those building had already amassed considerable wealth (or had 
opportunities to do so during this era). 
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Figure 16: Thatched dwellings, Mombasa.  
‗A native residence in Mombasa‘. ca. 1897-1901, Mss.afr.s.1493, Photographs of 
British East Africa belonging to Arthur W. Read, Bodleian Library, University of 
Oxford. 
After years of indecision and debate over town planning, the colossal expansion of 
imports and exports eventually heralded significant colonial investments in the 
town‘s infrastructure in the late 1920s, essential to accommodate this flourishing 
international trade and growing population. Particularly important was the building 
of the city‘s main arteries – Kilindini Avenue (now Moi) leading to the port, Salim 
Road (now Digo) around the main market place and Makupa Road (now Jomo 
Kenyatta Avenue) leading to the railway bridge (known as Makupa Causeway) in the 
northwest (K. Janmohamed 1978). This was supplemented by the building of the 
Nyali Pontoon Bridge, connecting the island with the northern mainland in 1929, as 
well as a new railway station in the centre of the island in 1932. Station Road (now 
Haile Selassie), which served as a link between the central market (Markiti) and the 
new railway station, opened three years later. These axes laid the foundations for the 
rapid expansion of the city‘s built environment. As the Mombasa Medical Officer of 
Health remarked in 1932, ‗Everywhere in Mombasa, agricultural activities are giving 
place to residential and commercial expansion…‘ (in K. Janmohamed 1978: 271).  
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Politically, the Mombasa Renaissance was preceded by an era of hardening tensions 
within the colony, and a growing politicisation along racial lines. Aware of their 
indispensible role in developing the commercial sector and cognisant of their 
numerical supremacy, Indian political associations in the country had long demanded 
equality with Europeans, particularly regarding access to the fertile agricultural land 
of the ‗White Highlands‘, parity in terms of political representation, and an end to 
segregationist policies and threatened immigration restrictions (Gregory 1993a; 
Mangat 1969). European settlers, on the other hand, were increasingly vocal in their 
calls for ‗white dominion‘ (as seen in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, now 
Zimbabwe). This culminated in the UK parliament‘s 1923 Devonshire Declaration 
which, via the principle of African paramountcy (proclaiming, at least in theory, that 
African interests should override those of Europeans and Asians), sought to appease 
both sides (Maxon 1991). In practice, the Declaration did little to change colonial 
policy in Kenya, and, by reaffirming Asian exclusion from agricultural land, only 
entrenched the latter‘s orientation toward urban areas and commercial activity. 
With white settlers‘ efforts to bolster their rights and limit those of Asians continuing 
throughout the 1920s, Gregory (1993a) notes that the economic depression of the 
early 1930s was also the beginning of a vocal and explicitly anti-Asian sentiment on 
the part of the African majority, linked to the marked drop in prices offered by Asian 
middlemen to farmers for their produce. African demands for legislation curtailing 
Asian agricultural activity were enacted to a limited extent, a move which saw 
Asians retreat further from the sector and (re)turn to urban centres. While this only 
directly affected Asians in contact with Africans living on agricultural reserves – 
probably a small minority of Mombasans – this background gives some sense of 
emerging patterns of racialised tension in Kenya at the time.  
However, as also suggested in the Introduction, racial dynamics in Mombasa 
differed markedly to Nairobi and the rest of Kenya, a product of the island‘s history, 
size and historically concentrated pattern of residency. Mombasa, when the British 
arrived, was already a town with a heterogeneous population that had long lived side 
by side around what is now the Old Port. Urban residents were, as various colonial 
officials including Thornton White remarked, rather good at living together:  
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…the social discipline evidenced in the low crime rate of this densely 
inhabited and mixed township. People have sorted themselves out, and one 
hears of many acts of neighbourly kindliness and of a mutual give and take 
(in Sabini 1993: 81). 
Moreover, from the very early days of colonial rule, the town had a heterogeneous 
commercial and land-owning elite, composed of wealthy Swahilis, Arabs, Asians 
and Europeans who often worked in close partnership (K. Janmohamed 1978).
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 The 
power of the non-European elite and the constrained nature of space on the island are 
certainly part of what compelled the British to move the capital to the sparsely 
inhabited plains that now encompass the metropolis of Nairobi. With the increasing 
development of the interior, Mombasa became the ‗periphery of [white] settlerdom‘, 
with a small European population never exceeding more than around 1000 
individuals (K. Janmohamed 1978: 414). The relative power of Asians in Mombasa, 
in contrast to Nairobi where Europeans were unmatched, is made evident by the 
composition of the city‘s first Municipal Council, finally established in 1928,60 
whose members (all nominated by the Governor), included equal numbers of 
Europeans and Indians (seven apiece), plus one Arab (K. Janmohamed 1978: 301). 
Thus, while the British certainly harboured desires to institutionalise residential 
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 Circa 1910, Provincial Commissioner Hobley noted,  
The antagonisms between the Asiatic and the European which has so 
unfortunately developed upcountry, is little evident at the coast; much 
business is daily transacted between the merchants of the East and West and 
trading cannot be successfully constructed if bad temper exists on both sides 
(K. Janmohamed 1978: 275). 
60
 The lateness of this date, in comparison to Nairobi, arose in part from the complex 
nature of Britain‘s legal authority with regards to the town‘s residents. Although the 
British were de facto rulers, the ten mile coastal strip which included Mombasa 
remained formerly under Zanzibari sovereignty throughout the colonial period. 
British rights to tax the city‘s heterogeneous trading population – British, Indian, 
German, French Comorian – was only resolved, via legislation, in 1914. Following 
this, a lack of required expertise in municipal matters, among other excuses, was 
used to stall the creation of a municipal body, reflecting British attitudes towards 
coastal Muslims (K. Janmohamed 1978). 
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segregation in Mombasa,
61
 these plans largely did not materialise with the exception 
of the predominately European area of Kizingo.  
By the late 1920s, many thousands of Asians had been in Mombasa for several 
decades, if not longer. They had not only benefited from the impressive expansion of 
trade and infrastructure in the city, many knew no other home: it was a moment 
where there was both the desire and the possibility to invest in property. This was 
coupled with a phenomenal increase in population in the era – of both Asians and 
city dwellers more generally – and a resulting need for new abodes, as much as new 
modes of status performance in a rapidly changing social landscape. Building was 
made possible because of the ready availability of construction materials: improved 
trading links had brought cheap cement and steel, in addition to wealth (FitzGerald 
Khan 1996). It was also facilitated by the fact that Asians were significant 
landowners, and largely free to build where they wished. On the back of these 
developments in the urban political economy, people of Gujarati origin came to 
construct hundreds of commercial-cum-residential premises (ranging from the very 
large to the very small) along the city‘s new central thoroughfares and the small 
lanes that came to connect them. Moreover, it was Asians who pioneered the 
‗systematic opening up of new areas‘ of the island (K. Janmohamed 1978: 308). 
With vastly improved connections to the commercial and political heart of the city, 
concrete dwellings sprung up in areas such as Ganjoni and Tononoka, which became 
the established residential neighbourhoods that they remain to this day. Most of these 
buildings were constructed in Art Deco fashion.  
 
Architecture and empire 
In order to unpack some of the meanings and effects of Art Deco in the Mombasan 
context, I turn first to the rich literature on architecture‘s relationship to colonial rule. 
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 From the early years, colonial officials voiced their desire to organise the city‘s 
residential patterns along racial lines. In 1910, Coast Provincial Commissioner 
Hobley urged the government to invest in land to make way for a ‗native‘ living area. 
Similarly, Simpson‘s 1913 report on Sanitation in East Africa strongly recommended 
zoning on health grounds, and, in 1915, Ainsworth suggested that the whole island 
should be recognised as a ‗non-native‘ area (K. Janmohamed 1978). 
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Much has been written about the role of architecture in structuring European 
imperial power, particularly in British (Dossal 1991; Evenson 1989) and French 
(Rabinow 1989; Wright 1991) dominions (see King 1995 for a review of this 
literature). In An imperial vision Metcalf (2002 [1989]) examines architecture in 
India as a manifestation of the shifting politics of the British Raj between 1857 and 
the early 1920s. From the formal declaration of crown rule, the British invested 
heavily in monuments of gothic and European classicism to denote power, authority 
and sovereignty over Indian subjects. Carefully located and imposing government 
buildings, churches and centres of learning not only ‗made visible Britain‘s imperial 
position‘ (T. Metcalf 2002 [1989]: 2), these edifices conveyed the Raj‘s intention to 
remain permanent rulers, and asserted the superiority of the Christian faith. The 
classical revival of early 20
th
 century Raj architecture is presented in a different light. 
Metcalf sees this revival, also known as neo- or orientalised classicism for its 
selective incorporation of ‗Indian‘ design features within a European classical 
idiom,
62
 as directly linked to the rapid expansion of empire in Africa. The revival 
referenced Rome (and the glories of an expanding empire), but its Indic elements 
were necessary to ‗proclaim that the Raj was now Indian as well as British‘ (2002 
[1989]: 227). For all its pomp, the revival ‗masked a growing sense of insecurity‘ 
(2002 [1989]: 177) about the future of empire, with threats to British imperial 
dominance – particularly from Germany – and rising nationalist movements in India 
and South Africa. 
If Metcalf is concerned with architecture as a tool and indicator of imperial power, 
scholars such as Swati Chattopadhyay (2006) consider colonial era-architecture from 
a different perspective: architectural form is shown as equally integral to the 
construction of Indian elites. Chattopadhyay‘s account takes us to Calcutta. While 
pre-colonial houses in the city focussed on interiority, imperial powers popularised 
‗the European notion of a façade‘ (2006: 157), producing entirely new modes of 
relating outwards towards the street. The sweeping changes wrought by the British 
also included an increasingly commodified housing market. Attentive to the social 
implications of these rapid shifts – ‗[t]his was, after all, no longer a town where 
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 These features included chattris, jaalis, and chajjas. The chajja is a wide, 
overhanging eave, the jaali a latticed screen often made from stone and the chattri is 
a ‗free-standing canopied turret‘ (T. Metcalf 2002 [1989]: 224). 
93 
 
status was easily recognised‘ (2006: 200) – Chattopadhyay suggests that the façade 
became a particularly significant theatre for defining social location, as well as 
making a claim to the city. ‗Where land and buildings had become commodities, one 
had to claim a presence by displaying one‘s wealth, performing one‘s ―culture‖‘ 
(2006: 200). Calcutta‘s new façades, characterised by venetianed balconies and 
highly articulated doors and windows, in other words, became ‗part of a celebratory 
ritual of belonging to the city‘ (2006: 224). 
Coupled with residential façades, the formation of a ‗modern‘ Bengali identity was 
produced through the construction of new public spheres. Chattopadhyay considers 
precursors to the theatres, cafés, cinemas and parks built in the early 20
th
 century 
through her analysis of 19
th
 century dals (socio-religious groups) and voluntary 
associations. These institutions, in both form and function, facilitated the production 
of new kinds of sociality and subjectivity for the Bengali elites who sponsored and 
patronised them. The 1840 construction of the Nat-mandir by pious aristocrat 
Radhakanta Deb, for example, accommodated both religious and social gatherings 
and combined a Palladian façade with Hindu temple architecture and a large public 
hall. The ‗definitional challenge‘ (2006: 159) posed by the building enabled Deb and 
others like him to distance themselves from European rulers and Calcutta‘s lower 
classes and ‗claim their own ground within the colonial order‘ (2006: 141). In sum, 
Chattopadhyay and others like her (see Hosagrahar 2005 for a description of similar 
processes in Delhi), highlight the significance of fluency and ingenuity with regards 
to various spatial vocabularies in the construction of elite Indian subjectivities during 
the colonial era. While certainly influenced by European architectural forms, these 
new modes of performance and presentation of the self were by no means 
determined by the colonial regime.  
The centrality of Art Deco to these colonial projects of positioning has been 
emphasised by various scholars of colonial Bombay (Dwivedi & Mehrotra 2008; 
Lang et al. 1997; Ramani 2007) and Hong Kong (Lau 2016). Before considering Art 
Deco in Bombay and then Mombasa, I first present a working definition of the style 
and its meanings. Derived from the French arts décoratifs, Art Deco originated in 
early 20
th
 century Paris and was intended, according to art historian Bevis Hillier 
who coined the term, ‗to reflect a marriage of art and industry‘ (1985 [1968]: 16). In 
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his recent intervention on the subject, Michael Windover (2012: 3) presents Art 
Deco as a ‗mode of mobility‘. Not only is mobility ‗present on the very surfaces of 
Deco objects and architecture‘ (from the zigzag bas-relief to the curvilinear balcony), 
the style was a product of ‗intersecting forms of mobilities‘ (Windover 2012: 3), 
including the rapid expansion of mechanised and mass production, transport and 
communications technologies and urbanisation, as well as colonialism and rising 
nationalist tides. In a broad range of local contexts, architects, designers and their 
patrons responded to the particular conditions they faced – the particular intersection 
of mobilities – with visions ‗of what they thought modernity should look like‘ (2012: 
7, emphasis original). In this sense, Art Deco was always ‗embedded in local, public 
culture while gesturing to other places‘ (2012: 3) and parallel processes elsewhere. 
‗[S]elf-consciously a modern style‘, Art Deco was both cognisant and symbolic of 
the increasing plurality of modernities (2012: 6, emphasis original). If other scholars 
have judged Art Deco to be anti-elitist – rightly pointing to its implicit rejection of 
the inaccessible nobility enshrined in the classical styles that had dominated Europe 
until then – Windover refines this position, conceiving Art Deco as a sort of 
‗popularized elitism‘ (2012: 11) which coupled references to what had, until very 
recently, been the height of aristocratic luxury (the ocean liner, the cinema) with 
individualism and mass consumer culture. Against a backdrop of scarcity caused by 
the Great Depression, Art Deco provided ‗an optimistic future vision of prosperity‘ 
(2012: 30); this vision, however, was premised on the extension of pre-existing 
patterns of capitalist consumption. Consequently, Windover argues, Art Deco should 
be viewed as a fundamentally conservative phenomenon, promising social mobility 
without broader societal transformation, and reinscribing existing social hierarchies 
through its very novelty.  
Art Deco has always had its detractors, with one recent curator of New York‘s 
Museum of Modern Art proclaiming that the style ‗hasn‘t any ideology‘ (in Woods 
2014: 234). Contrary to this dismissal (which is also clearly rejected by Windover), 
architectural historians working on the Indian Subcontinent have argued that Art 
Deco cannot be disentangled from a broader politics of thought in India of the 1930s 
and 40s. Art Deco in India centred on Bombay, with most construction in this mode 
occurring between 1930 and 1947, a period marked by the rapid expansion of the 
city‘s commercial elite, along with the population more generally (Dwivedi & 
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Mehrotra 2008). Home to the Sir JJ College of Architecture – Asia‘s first 
architectural school (est. 1913) – and the first professional architectural association, 
Bombay was indisputably ‗the centre of architectural discussion and production in 
India‘ (Lang et al. 1997: 158) – at least in terms of formal, professionalised 
architecture. While Indians trained in Western architectural traditions, if not the 
West itself, had played a significant role in Bombay‘s architectural scene since the 
beginning of the century, Lang, Desai & Desai (1997) link Art Deco to the decline of 
British hegemony at the upper echelons of the sector in Bombay, which, by the 
1930s, comprised a majority of Indian-owned firms. It was these companies, and 
their Indian clientele, who constituted Bombay‘s Deco pioneers.63 If Anglo-Indian 
firms moved increasingly towards a modernised and often orientalised classicism – 
which, as also noted by Metcalf (2002 [1989]) above, the colonial powers saw as an 
appropriate response to the rise of Indian nationalism – Indian architects embraced 
Art Deco precisely because it represented a break with imperial traditions, and ‗by 
extension, questioned the logic of colonial rule‘(Dwivedi & Mehrotra 2008: 9). If not 
an outright rejection of British power, Lang, Desai & Desai argue that the style was 
certainly imbued with ‗nationalist overtones‘ (1997: 137) – a way in which Indian 
architects and their wealthy clientele could express their fluency in an architectural 
language infused with notions of Western modernity, while at the same time 
distancing themselves from the Indo-Palladium hues favoured by the imperial regime.  
Part of what made this style possible was the introduction of reinforced cement 
concrete – a building material that was both cheap and highly versatile. In Bombay, 
Dwivedi & Mehrotra (2008: 277) note that ‗[b]y 1936, construction costs had 
reduced by 50% [compared to] the very early 1920s‘ making possible previously 
unthinkable (and unaffordable) modifications to verandas, balconies and outer walls, 
in terms of depth, length, shape and decoration. For its critics, Art Deco‘s myriad 
influences and hybrid forms are what make it impure, its buildings the ‗mongrels‘ of 
the architectural world (Goldberg in Woods 2014: 234). However, for the authors 
cited here, it was this very adaptability that offered in Art Deco the possibility of the 
construction of definitively Indian modernities. Drawing inspiration from Bauhaus, 
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 A few of the more ‗progressive‘ Anglo-Indian firms, particularly those associated 
with Claude Batley, also constructed Art Deco buildings (Lang et al. 1997). 
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Tutankhamen‘s tomb, cubism and the Ballets Russes (to name but a few of Art 
Deco‘s more commonly cited influences), Art Deco architects in Bombay also added 
various ‗Indian motifs‘ (Dwivedi & Mehrotra 2008: 288), such as bas-reliefs 
reflecting Hindu religious iconography, or depicting toiling Indian farmers and 
craftspeople. Premised on amalgamation, it is evident that this was an architectural 
form one could make one‘s own (whether incorporating ‗Indian motifs‘ or not), 
through the novel conjunction of various features. In other words, it was Art Deco‘s 
creative potential and novelty that made it so well suited to the construction of a 
vanguard Indian elite. Moreover, Art Deco‘s neoteric quality made it a particularly 
apt style to adorn the explosion of new sites of sociality emerging in Bombay. 
Dwivedi & Mehrotra (2008: 46) underscore cinemas as ‗[t]he real trailblazers of the 
Art Deco movement‘: the city counted 60 cinemas in 1933, and nearly 300 by 1939, 
many of them Art Deco gems.  
 
Deciphering Deco in Mombasa  
The literature discussed above provides a rich foundation from which to consider Art 
Deco in Mombasa. Unlike Miami, Mumbai or Asmara, Mombasa is not known for 
its Art Deco architecture: the city boasts no architectural tours or ‗Mombasa Deco‘ 
coffee table books. This, I argue, is an oversight, not only for the rich heritage of the 
buildings, but also because of what the genre tells us about the city and its history. 
Art Deco façades, I suggest, are indicative of complex interplays of agency, power 
and subjugation, as well as the local and littoral concerns at the heart of what it 
meant to be an ‗imperial citizen‘.  
Art Deco is a material manifestation of the profound effects of migration, coupled 
with the colonial three-tier system, on ways of imagining the self in Mombasa. As 
Metcalf has written, ‗Residence overseas….by its very nature encouraged Indians to 
conceive of themselves as Indian‘ (2007: 3, emphasis added), a form of collective 
identification that the Raj in colonial India had done all they could to divide and 
deny. The fact that so many people from diverse backgrounds, places of origin and 
faith in Mombasa opted for this style served to construct and reinforce the notion of 
some kind of unity amongst this population. Art Deco adds further evidence to the 
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observation that the racialised division of life in East Africa affected projects and 
possibilities of self-hood in the region (Gregory 1993a, 1993b; Mangat 1969; 
Twaddle 2001): Deco, in many ways, projected ‗Asian‘ – as a distinct social 
category – onto the Mombasan cityscape.64  
At the same time, Art Deco emphasises that the three-tier system was not simply an 
imperial imposition: these façades evidence the involvement of Asians in the 
construction of a unique position within the colonial hierarchy. Art Deco was a 
choice, one that emphasised the numerical presence of those of Gujarati origin, their 
ties to each other, as well as their distinction from both Europeans and the African 
majority. During the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries the British built a selection of 
government offices (such as the Law Courts and the Treasury), an Anglican and a 
Catholic cathedral, a few hotels and a number of houses in the southern Kizingo area; 
several of these buildings were designed and built by architects from India and 
evoked the Indian neoclassical and imperial bungalow styles of the Raj (FitzGerald 
Khan 1996). Until the beginning of the Mombasa Renaissance, non-European 
buildings, which centred around Old Town, comprised a mix of large, three-storey 
stereometric coral stone constructions and more humble one or two storey buildings 
of the same material. As noted in the Introduction, larger buildings generally 
combined a godown at street level – often decorated with an impressive wooden 
door (Aldrick 1988) – where business was conducted and commodities warehoused. 
Upper floors were residential quarters, decorated with wooden shuttered windows 
and, frequently, wooden balconies composed of ornate geometrical fretwork, 
‗supported by clusters of carved brackets‘ and shaded by ‗prominent eaves‘ (Sabini 
1993: 183).  
Art Deco, when it emerged in the 1930s, was a marked contrast to all of these styles, 
enabling those who constructed houses in this style to proclaim their difference 
within the social order. Deco was different, not only from European edifices, but also 
from the stone houses – balconied or not – favoured by other pre-colonial and early 
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 Here I should clarify that many people of Gujarati origin did not have the money 
to build at all, while others chose not to build in Art Deco style. Some built 
neoclassical edifices; others opted for a modernist look. Art Deco may have been the 
most common architectural preference of the 1930s, 40s and early 50s amongst 
sufficiently wealthy individuals, but it was not the only one. 
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colonial merchant traders. While many Deco constructions retained a mixed 
commercial-residential pattern favoured in Old Town, they also helped define a 
rapidly expanding Asian elite. 
As the name suggests, Deco is decorative: Art Deco articulations and colour schemes 
are assertive and unequivocal, designed to stand out, not blend in. Turning to the 
photographs on the following two pages (Fig. 17, Fig. 18 and Fig. 19), one can see 
that the frontages of the buildings constructed in this era are frequently accentuated 
with plasterwork, glasswork, and coloured paint, which further highlight design 
features such as window fins, balustrades and geometric patterns. As Chattopadhyay 
(2006) has suggested for Calcutta, part of being an imperial subject in Mombasa 
involved showing status on the exterior of buildings, projecting the results of capital 
accumulation towards the street for all to see. Through Art Deco, Asians very visibly 
proclaimed their wealth: status was not to be confined to the courtyard. Indian Ocean 
migration precipitated impressive social mobility for some in Mombasa, a trajectory 
that was etched onto the cityscape, particularly through Art Deco. Moreover, in 
representing Asians as purveyors of progress – encapsulated in the movement and 
mechanised aesthetic that defines its façades – Deco helped to emphasise their place 
as partners in the advancement of the colony and of ‗Africans‘ in particular. This 
was not, however, to be achieved through radical social change: Art Deco made 
manifest the potential riches to be gained from the colonial context, but via patterns 
of accumulation inaccessible to the majority. Art Deco, following Windover‘s (2012) 
perceptive observations, reflected the social mobility of some, while entrenching a 
social order which rested on the economic, legal and political disenfranchisement of 
those classified as ‗African‘.  
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Figure 17: Freed Building, Moi Avenue. 
Pink plasterwork piping and quirky mustard cupolas adorn the building. 
 
 
Figure 18: Turquoise and white Art Deco house, Mwembe Tayari.  
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Figure 19: Kampee House, above the Copy Cat Limited, Moi Avenue. 
An oversized ventilation grill forms its central pillar.  
From the 1930s onwards, many of Gujarati origin with means opted for an 
architectural style previously unseen in East Africa. Novel and premised on creative 
amalgam, Art Deco not only marked burgeoning wealth, it was also particularly well 
suited for the construction of an elite that imagined its presence in Africa in 
pioneering terms. The notion of the pioneer was at the heart of early colonial 
encouragement of Indian migration to Africa – epitomised by British commissioner 
Harry Johnston‘s memorable proclamation, in 1900, that ‗East Africa, is and should 
be, from every point of view, the America of the Hindu‘ (Mangat 1969: 64)65 – a 
vision reflected in various biographical and autobiographical accounts of the early 
days of African adventure (Patel 1997; Sampat 1946; Visram 1990). While many of 
these works emphasise intrepid adventures into an ‗untamed‘ interior, 19th and 20th 
century settlers were also at the forefront of the construction of new forms of 
urbanity, fostering new ways of living, and new ways of living together, in the city 
(see also A. Janmohamed 2008). Various original types of residential construction 
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 This view was reiterated by Winston Churchill a few years later: ‗The mighty 
continent of tropical Africa lies open to the colonizing and organizing capacities of 
the East‘ (in Mangat 1969: 64). 
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emerged in the Art Deco style. As FitzGerald Khan (1996) has noted, these new 
residential patterns are indicative of capital accumulation; they are also suggest new 
ways of imagining and organising relations between kith and kin, structured around 
smaller family units. While the stone constructions of Old Town had housed large 
extended families (and often multiple extended families) under the same roof, the 
apartment complexes that emerged along the city‘s newly constructed main roads, 
were matched with ‗urban villas‘ and smaller blocks of flats in the newly settled 
areas of the island; examples of these building styles can be seen below and on the 
next two pages (Fig. 20, Fig. 21, Fig. 22 and Fig. 23). Some of these constructions 
undoubtedly continued to house many people, but nevertheless imposed the 
boundaries of the family unit on urban space in stark – and decorative – ways. Art 
Deco‘s novelty helped to underscore these changes.  
 
 
Figure 20: White and green Art Deco apartments with commercial premises 
below, Mwembe Tayari Road. 
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Figure 21: Art Deco apartments with commercial premises below, Digo Road. 
 
 
Figure 22: Urban villa, Ganjoni. 
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Figure 23: Urban villa, Ganjoni. 
As discussed in the context of Bombay and Calcutta above, Asian elites in Mombasa 
funded and patronised various novel public spaces, such as cinemas, cafés, voluntary 
associations and large commercial premises. Some of these – such as Oriental 
Building and Hassanali‘s Building – were unambiguously neoclassical in style: these 
expansive commercial buildings both feature imposing columns, the former also 
boasting a pagoda-like roof. Many more, however, were Art Deco. The Fontanella 
Building (referred to by some as Karachiwallah‘s, after its original patrons), a large 
commercial and office space, wrapped round an entire corner at one the city‘s main 
roundabouts in classic curvilinear mode. Cafés and paan houses
66
 – Love & Joy, 
Stavrose, Cosy Tearoom – all bore Deco exteriors, as did many schools (such as the 
Goan School, now Sacred Heart) and voluntary associations (such as the Free 
Mason‘s building). These buildings fostered the performance of new modes of 
identification, new kinds of sociality and new modes of doing business, and new 
patterns of middle class consumption. As in Bombay, cinemas were at the forefront 
of this emerging littoral urbanity. As can be seen on the next page (Fig. 24), the 
exterior of Moon‘s, a much-loved but long closed movie hall, comprised six vertical 
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 Paan is a chewable stimulant made of betel leaf and areca nut, and sometimes 
mixed with tobacco. We return to paan houses, and their demise, in Chapter 4.  
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accents with an iconic shooting star pinnacle, its name spelt out in large bubble font. 
Kenya Cinema combined a rising pyramid shaped roof and prominent vertical 
accents with Corinthian column plasterwork. While the latter‘s façade paid homage 
to Deco and classicism, its interior was decidedly Deco, with futuristic mosaic tiles 
and an embellished main screen. As is evident from the colonial era photograph of 
Naaz Cinema on the following page (Fig. 25), these new zones of consumption 
would have not been accessible to Mombasa‘s majority population. These spaces 
were simultaneously indicative of social mobility and exclusion: off limits to those 
without means and, in some cases, those of the ‗wrong‘ skin tone. 67  
 
Figure 24: Moon's Cinema, Tononoka. 
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 As outlined in the Introduction, coastal inhabitants posed persistent problems in 
relation to colonial classification systems; the fluidity of social categories in 
Mombasa makes it impossible to know who would have been able to frequent its 
colonial era cinemas. Labourers from the coastal interior or further inland would 
most likely not have had the money or social capital to attend. However, as also 
attested by Eisenberg‘s (2009) informants, these movie halls were, frequented and 
remembered with great fondness by a broad spectrum of the Mombasans I knew – 
Bohra, Ithna-Asheri, Hindu, Swahili, Memon, Arab, Baluchi – until well into the 
1980s. We return to cinemas in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 25: Naaz Cinema, Makadara Road.  
Saved by Alexander Erz-Gehölz to Pinterest. (available online: 
https://www.pinterest.co.uk/pin/492370171744000074/, accessed 23 August 2017). 
The above illustrates how reading the contemporary cityscape can help illuminate 
how racialised urban relations were entrenched over time. However, other façades 
effectively obscure colonial-era efforts to produce alternative patterns of encounter 
in Mombasa. A quiet side street perpendicular to Haile Selassie Road today houses a 
range of small business – Hermes Hotel (somewhat less opulent than its luxurious 
appellation suggests), Husseini Hardware and a ‗Tours & Safari‘ company whose 
name has been effaced. The tarmac is in fine condition compared to some of the 
smaller adjacent lanes – smoothing the way for matatus (minivans), tuk tuks and 
other vehicles – but the bustle of the main roads it connects feels distant. As can be 
seen by turning to the page after next (Fig. 26), a large, rectangular building sits 
disconnected from its neighbours – this is unusual in this area, where edifices more 
often appear to be falling over each other; the spacing emphasises its clean lines. The 
creamy exterior of this two-storey establishment is broken up by six long vertical 
protrusions that give it its Deco flair. Topped with a flag-less flagpole, a signboard at 
roof level bears the distinctive orange and purple logo of the KNLS, the theatre-like 
entrance way reads Kenya National Library Services: Seif bin Salim Branch. 
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Wrought iron arches over the two modest gates to the property repeat the word 
‗Library‘ above an abstract motif; these are clearly older than the signage on the 
façade. Thinly spaced wires, possibly electrified, add a layer of security to the 
original, waist-high perimeter wall. 
Although many decades have passed since they last frequented it, the Seif bin Salim 
Public Library and Free Reading Room was remembered fondly by a number of my 
informants: ‗We still didn‘t have books at home then‘, explained Jamal, an Ismaili 
accountant who visited the library often as a schoolboy in the early 1970s; ‗It was a 
haven‘. Jamal and others I spoke to associated the Library‘s construction with Seif 
bin Salim: ‗He was a public figure in the true sense, we don‘t have people like that 
anymore‘, remarked Abedi, a development practioner from a Lamu Swahili family. 
This version of history is repeated on the internet, including on the Wikipedia page 
of the Kenya National Library Service, under whose jurisdiction the Library now 
falls. I cite Wikipedia here to evidence the accepted nature of this version of the 
building‘s past. Obscured from these narratives is the history – and vision – of racial 
interaction on which this vanguard institution was premised.  
In 1903, two prominent businessmen of Gujarati origin, Jaffer Dewji and Allidina 
Visram, provided the necessary endowment for the Mombasa Public Library. From 
its outset, membership was open to all, making the Library the ‗oldest inter-racial 
cultural institution in East Africa‘ (Gregory 1992: 104). While the Library 
undoubtedly catered to Asian and Arab elites during its early history, the 
significance of its avowedly non-racial admissions policy should not be 
underestimated. Decades before the commencement of organised anti-colonial 
struggle in Kenya, the Library‘s pioneering founders imagined and helped bring into 
being a reading public and new modes of citizenship, composed of citizens who had 
a right to knowledge, regardless of their place within the imperial order. Under 
reinvigorated leadership and with an expanding membership, the Library moved to 
its current location in 1939, a building that also housed the Mombasa Indian 
Association. The Library was vigorously supported by Sir Ali bin Salim, the liwali 
of the time (Mombasa‘s leading Arab political figure), and was renamed after his 
brother that same year, following Sir Ali‘s pledge to provide 100 pounds sterling 
annually for the institution‘s upkeep. It is not surprising, given the renaming, that the 
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Library is now associated with Seif in the public imagination, nor is it odd that the 
building‘s Deco façade and current signage tell us little of the visions of racial 
equality on which it was premised. The building‘s exterior conceals the stories of 
encounter and cooperation behind its present façade. It is easy to walk around 
Mombasa and be oblivious to such signs: façades obscure as much as they reveal.  
 
Figure 26: The Seif bin Salim Library, off Haile Selassie Road.  
Photograph by Keval Devani. 
 
Imperial citizens: Deco and colonised critique  
The above demonstrates a significant degree of overlap between Asian and European 
ideologies of racialised hierarchy in Mombasa, as well as the effects of the three-tier 
system in producing particular ways of imagining – and projecting – oneself into the 
world. However, as the example of the Library suggests, Art Deco might also be 
read as a tool in the realm of colonial critique, which as I argue here, was part and 
parcel of being an imperial citizen. As suggested by several of the scholars 
referenced in the section on architecture, Art Deco demonstrated Asian fluency in 
European spatial vocabularies and the visions of modernity with which it was 
associated. However, Asian preference for a style that was simultaneously 
indisputably European in origin but not favoured by the colonial powers allowed 
them, if not necessarily to contest imperial power, to distinguish themselves from the 
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European population while demonstrating a mastery of European fashions. Art Deco 
implied critique by simultaneously obscuring and marking Asian distinction from 
European rulers.` 
This concurrent display of commitment to and critique of empire occurred on a 
transoceanic scale. The coeval development of Art Deco in Bombay and Mombasa is 
suggestive of the ‗imperial connections‘ Metcalf (2007) has extensively addressed. If 
Metcalf‘s research highlights the flow of ideas, laws, people and commodities 
radiating out from Bombay into the Indian Ocean realm, Art Deco façades in 
Mombasa point to littoral dialogues traversing the sea in both directions. Although 
Art Deco in Mombasa likely drew inspiration from Bombay trade magazines 
(FitzGerald Khan 1996), the identical construction peak in both cities suggests that 
Deco in Mombasa was not the imitation of an Indian trend, but rather a common 
language that littoral elites of Indian origin employed to speak to each other, as well 
as to their respective social orders. Deco indicated conceptual and material proximity 
between Mombasa and Bombay in the era, and allowed elites to demonstrate their 
parallel levels of wealth and shared visions of what ‗modernity should look like‘ 
(Windover 2012: 7, emphasis original).  
Moreover, in favouring Art Deco over the styles of empire, Indians presented an 
edificial challenge to British rule on both sides of the Indian Ocean, and implied a 
transoceanic debate over the future of its colonies. In this sense, I suggest that Art 
Deco adds a further dimension to the rich literature on the Indian Ocean as 
productive of universalisms (Bose 2006; Ho 2004; Hofmeyr 2012; Ravinder Frost 
2004), as well as with regards to the role of Africa in the formation of Indian 
nationalism (Burton 2016; Hofmeyr et al. 2011; Markovits 2003). In posing a 
challenge to the notion of a singular, European ‗modernity‘, Art Deco exposed 
modernities as a fundamentally plural phenomenon.
68
 Moreover, Art Deco was a 
foundation of notions of imperial citizenship, allowing Indian-origin elites within 
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 Joel Kahn (2001: 664) is one of a number of theorists who prefers to use 
modernity in the singular, to denote a ‗process that is global and multicultural from 
its inception‘. Cognisant of this debate, I retain the plural form in this context, as 
further evidence of the universalisms often written about in the Indian Ocean 
literature.  
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and between littoral locales to imagine their connections to each other, as much as 
structure relations of proximity and distance to those around them.  
In both Mombasa and Bombay, Art Deco was favoured by emerging elites precisely 
because it was not Indian, at least not in an historical sense. However, some aspects 
of Art Deco architecture in Mombasa suggest that it may also have been a way in 
which those in the city marked subtle distinctions from their counterparts in Bombay. 
Specifically, while Art Deco in Mombasa includes many of the same motifs and 
elements popular in Bombay – sunbursts, geometric shapes, rounded balconies and 
nautical features – there are almost no buildings with large ‗Indian‘ motifs69 as 
described by Dwivedi & Mehrotra (2008). Aside from a few Om symbols, those in 
Mombasa did not adorn their Art Deco houses, cinemas or commercial properties 
with Indian labourers, agriculturalists or artisans, nor with religious iconography. 
Part of this can be explained by the faith of many building financiers: human and 
animal imagery is avoided in most interpretations of Islam. However, that Hindus, 
Jains, Christians and Sikhs also eschewed such embellishments is suggestive of an 
Asian desire to distance themselves from a farming and artisanal past, valorised in 
some Bombay Deco, as well as in nationalist discourses on the Subcontinent. I see 
this as part and parcel of the ways in which people in Mombasa marked their 
difference from Indians in India, a recurring theme in this thesis (and also taken up 
by Kresse & Simpson 2011). Imperial citizens did not simply come to think of 
themselves as Indians as Metcalf (2007) has suggested; they thought of themselves 
as particular kinds of Indians, in a persistently ambivalent relationship with their 
country of origin.  
Above I have argued that in favouring Art Deco, people of Guajarati origin in 
Mombasa helped to bring into being a racialised colonial order which positioned 
them as part of the amorphous social category of ‗Asian‘. However, Art Deco 
façades also constituted a fundamental challenge to the three-tier system: through 
architecture, imperial citizens in Mombasa entrenched and contested the racial 
triptych. Epigraphy played a significant role in this process, an aspect of building 
façades that receives scant attention in the Bombay Deco literature. Casting your eye 
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 The exceptions here are two Jain and two Swaminarayan temples (only one of 
which could be described as Deco), which I return to below. 
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over the buildings depicted below and on the next page (Fig. 27, Fig. 28 and Fig. 29), 
you can see that Art Deco façades in Mombasa were frequently embellished with 
surnames – Moosajee, Zawery, Nathwani, Sequeira, Panesar – or, less commonly, 
explicit communal descriptors (like Memon House) and place names (such as Cutch 
Castle, which we return to at the end of this chapter).
70
 This fashion of naming 
buildings may at first sight appear quite banal. However, read against the political 
backdrop of the time, such epigraphy lodged a weighty critique of the three-tier 
system, which lumped together Asians in a single homogenous category. By 
individualising building patrons, and positioning them as part of communities 
defined in non-racialised terms, epigraphy problematised the category ‗Asian‘ in a 
context in which its heterogeneity was persistently overlooked by the colonisers. 
While the Swahili sought to be categorised as ‗non-native‘ by emphasising their 
Arab pedigree (Salim 1976; Willis 1993), people of Gujarati origin employed 
architectural vocabularies to unsettle colonial classificatory systems.  
 
Figure 27: Zawery Building 1949. 
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 Cutch is an alternative spelling of Kutch, the region of Gujarat from which many 
in Mombasa trace family roots.  
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Figure 28: Huseinali Building 1952. 
 
 
Figure 29: Moosajee Building 1949. 
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The variety of inscriptions on Art Deco buildings make plain that their financiers 
were communicating to a broad range of colonial others, not simply the imperial 
powers. These edifices speak to Muslim and Hindu populations defined by their 
knowledge of English and other languages. This relates not only to Arabic, Gujarati 
and Hindi (which I discuss below), but also the language of caste. Because Asian 
surnames are so often associated with a particular caste (or jamaat), their inclusion 
on buildings does more than demonstrate individual wealth: by indicating caste and 
religious affiliations, surnames simultaneously proclaim the existence, and affluence, 
of their associated communities. These associations were – and are – common 
knowledge amongst Asians. Memon House is explicit in this regard, but many other 
names would be equally obvious to people of Gujarati origin: Nathwani is a common 
Lohana (Hindu) surname, Panesar is Sikh, Shah is Jain, Moosajee is Bohra,
71
 Jaffery 
is Ithna-Asheri, Sequeira is Goan (Roman Catholic) and so on. Some names are less 
definitively attributable but still point in a general direction: Huseinali could only be 
Shia (the building it designates was built by Khoja Ithna-Asheris); many are 
identifiably Muslim (Noorani, Mustafa, Amir) or Hindu (Parti, Savani). Combining 
Art Deco with communally legible epigraphy, in other words, allowed a 
heterogeneous population with origins in the Subcontinent to speak a common 
architectural language while marking hierarchy and distinction within and between 
communities. Here I should note that while many, if not most, Mombasan residents 
would not have been literate at the time of construction, it is partly in expecting their 
publics to be able to read that these buildings denote the status of their proprietors.  
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 Bohras have long tended to spell their last names with double e, rather than the i 
preferred by other Muslims in Mombasa. 
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Mombasan epigraphy is interesting not only for the fact that the vast majority of it is 
in the Latin alphabet,
72
 it also frequently included references to English edificial 
nouns: Huseinali Building, Savani Villa, Shah Mansion, number among the 
explicitly named ‗houses‘, ‗flats‘ and ‗castles‘. Needless to say, some of these 
descriptors exaggerate the size of the building in question, but, I contend, were 
important for demonstrating a linguistic, as well as architectural, fluency: English 
was – and is – the language of power in Kenya. The coupling of Indian surnames 
with English script and sometimes English nouns on an Art Deco backdrop defined 
Asians as masters of at least two ‗European‘ idioms (i.e. linguistic and architectural). 
However, epigraphy also worked to probe the limits of European hegemony in the 
linguistic domain by including words that some readers of the Latin alphabet would 
not necessarily have been familiar with. Although written in Roman script, many 
buildings, including the one on the page overleaf (Fig. 30), are marked by the Arabic 
word manzil, meaning house or inn in Arabic, as well as one referring to one of the 
seven parts of the Quran. Others are worded with phrases like Shiv Bhuvan (see Fig. 
31 on the next page). Shiv Bhuvan designates a ‗home of Lord Shiva‘ in Hindi, 
identifying its residents with the Shaivite branch of Hinduism. Following Foucault‘s 
(1990 [1978]) well known maxim that knowledge is power, some building patrons in 
the city were able to exert power by marking the urban landscape in a way that 
potentially excluded colonial rulers and other subjects.  
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 To my knowledge, the only Art Deco residential property marked with Devanagri 
script in Mombasa is the Shree Ram Nivas (House of Lord Rama) building. The 
script which adorns the upper floor of this building, a block of flats with commercial 
premise at street-level, includes the horizontal bar above the letters not used in 
Gujarati. The Shree Swetamber Sthanakwasi Sangh, a Jain temple on Haile Selassie 
Road, combines Art Deco and Jain religious iconography, and is inscribed in both 
English and Gujarati script. A red-brick community hall, resolutely not of Deco style 
and belonging to Hindus of the Surat Prajapati caste, includes the words Shree Surat 
Prajapati Sanstag in Gujarati. Most Hindus and Jains, like their Muslim counterparts, 
opted for Latin script in their building epigraphy. However, the fact that the very few 
buildings in Mombasa engraved with non-Latin script are associated with Hindus 
and Jains speaks to the widely held stereotype that they retain a closer connection 
with India in comparison to Muslims of Gujarati origin. The veracity of this 
stereotype was regularly proven and disproven in my experience, but it nevertheless 
circulates in the city. Hindus and Jains are assumed to speak ‗proper Gujarati‘, in 
contrast to the mongrelised tongue most Muslims pride themselves on. Moreover, 
when referring to people or food, the term ‗Gujarati‘ was used by my Muslim 
informants to mean Hindus and Jains in Mombasa. 
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Figure 30: Jer Manzil 1940. 
 
Figure 31: Shiv Bhuvan 1950. 
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Mombasan Deco was clearly a tool for various projects of distinction. However, it 
also very assertively claims an affinity to place. In Imperial connections, Metcalf 
writes that, ‗For many Indian traders… East Africa was little more than an extension 
of Gujarat‘ (2007: 182). This comment, while undoubtedly true in some instances, 
implies a sense of detachment from the locality of Mombasa that also appears 
frequently in colonial records; the stereotype that Asians repatriated most of their 
wealth to India circulated widely in Mombasa in the early 20
th
 century (K. 
Janmohamed 1978). However, Janmohamed cites the comments of an American 
doctor who visited Mombasa in 1937 and provided a counter narrative to the 
prevailing perceptions of the time:  
Much is heard of Indians bleeding the Colony by remitting their earnings to 
Bombay, but reference to the building records of Mombasa, however, 
showed me that hundreds of thousands of pounds have been invested by 
Indians in business and residential properties (Wallbank in K. Janmohamed 
1978: 207).  
Following Dr Wallbank, and in concluding this section, I contend that the 
contemporary cityscape exposes a more complicated story than that allowed by 
stereotypes of detachment and metaphors of ‗extension‘. Art Deco was certainly 
deployed to demonstrate distinction and distance from a disenfranchised majority. 
The style illustrated and helped reinforce the convergence between building patrons 
and the racialised and civilising ideologies of empire, as well as their concern with 
transnational patterns of distinction that defined them in relation to elites in western 
India. However, Art Deco was also a defiant assertion of affinity to the East African 
littoral. As evidenced by the photographs in this chapter, Deco‘s colour schemes and 
embellishments make very public declarations of settledness, and an intention to stay 
in Mombasa. Of course, as Metcalf (2002 [1989]) has written elsewhere with regards 
to neo-classicism being revelatory of imperial anxieties over the future of empire, the 
assertiveness of Art Deco could equally be read as indicative of Asian uncertainty 
over their future in the colony. These bold additions to the urban landscape claimed 
belonging to a place that was both increasingly ‗home‘, but in some ways 
increasingly hostile, as racial divisions continued to thicken. Settledness, prosperity 
and uncertainty, as well as distinction and affinity, appear intimately bound up in 
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architectural form. The Mombasa Renaissance can thus be seen as a product of the 
opportunities and anxieties of empire, a tension that Art Deco – the style that 
dominated the building boom – was particularly well suited to mediate. 
 
Postcolonial anxieties: before and after independence  
Kenya was declared a sovereign nation in 1963, following a protracted nationalist 
struggle known as Mau Mau, which took place between 1952 and 1960. Pitting 
groups led largely by Kikuyus against white settlers and the British Army in the 
country‘s central highlands, this conflict saw hundreds of thousands detained and 
tens of thousands killed at the hands of the colonial state (Elkins 2005).
73
 While 
some people of Gujarati origin were sharply critical of Mau Mau, a Colonial Office 
intelligence report of the time concluded that most supported the insurrection, even if 
they (like most non-Kikuyus) did not participate in it (Gregory 1993b). Mombasa 
was sheltered from the violence of Mau Mau, which largely occurred inland, but 
change was clearly afoot on the littoral. In 1951 the editor of one Asian-owned 
Mombasa broadsheet, the Kenyan Daily Mail, opined, ‗This land belongs to the 
African and in all affairs, political and economic, it is their word that must count‘ (in 
Gregory 1993b: 171). In 1957, the colony‘s governing Legislative Council allowed 
the election of African representatives for the first time (eight, compared to six 
Asians and 14 Europeans), one of many signs that colonial rule was coming to an 
end (Salim 1970: 217).  
This was also a moment of rising tensions between Africans and Swahili-speaking 
Muslims at the coast. Salim (1970) notes that Ronald Ngala, a coastal politician of 
upcountry origin, along with other newly elected African members of the Legislative 
Council, started making vocal attacks on the land rights and other privileges of 
Swahili-speaking Muslims. This battle pitted the coast‘s increasingly empowered but 
less historically established ‗upcountry‘ population (the majority of whom had 
arrived in Mombasa during the 20
th
 century), against those who could count 
centuries of residence at the coast. Fearing upcountry domination in the approaching 
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 Precise figures on the number of deaths and detentions relating to Mau Mau are 
the subject of much debate, but not my concern here.  
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postcolonial era, older coastal elites sought ways of securing their power. This 
struggle took form in the Mwambao movement (meaning coast or coastal in Swahili). 
Involving multiple groups with often-divergent aims, the protagonists of Mwambao 
were loosely united in their desire for some sort of coastal autonomy (see also 
Brennan 2008; Kindy 1972). The idea for an independent (or semi-independent) 
coastal strip was born of the peculiar legal status of the Kenyan littoral throughout 
the colonial period, as a British Protectorate officially under Zanzibari sovereignty. 
Those involved in Mwambao attempted to use the separate legal status of the strip as 
a bargaining chip, hoping to secure colonial assurances of independence/autonomy 
that would accord Swahili-speaking Muslims local control following the British 
handover of power. I mention Mwambao here, a political project which ultimately 
failed,
74
 to describe something of the volatile political climate of the 1950s. As 
British subjects with relatively privileged positions within the imperial hierarchy, 
Asians had neither the Swahili heritage claims nor the political will to participate in 
Mwambao – but, as demonstrated above, they were also long time littoral residents 
and colonised peoples often critical of empire. As I will show below, while not 
involved in Mwambao, people of Gujarati origin were nevertheless keenly engaged 
with the emerging postcolonial landscape. 
Following independence in 1963, long-standing antagonisms between ‗African‘ and 
‗Asian‘ Kenyans came to a head. As illustrated above, these should be seen as a 
product, not only of imperial policy, but of Asian efforts to distinguish themselves as 
superior to Africans, including in concrete form. Against this backdrop, and given 
continued Asian commercial influence, it is unsurprising that anti-Asianism became 
particularly virulent during the 1960s, as politicians and a rights-bearing majority 
population sought to wrest power from Asians by delegitimising their claims to the 
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 The British government eventually followed the Robertson report‘s 
recommendations to reject coastal autonomy and the Sultan of Zanzibar, facing 
growing unrest in his own territory, ceded his rights over the strip in September 1963 
(Salim 1970). Likewise, the postcolonial government soon abandoned the principle 
of majimbo – regional federalism, an idea enshrined in Kenya‘s first (pre-
independence) constitution – signifying the end of the Mwambao movement 
(McIntosh 2009). In addition to failing to achieve political security for Swahili-
speaking Muslims, the Mwambao movement also positioned the coast as ‗traitors to 
the cause of Kenyan independence‘ (Prestholdt 2011: 7), shoring up their ambivalent 
position within the postcolonial nation. 
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new nation. Asians were positioned as a foreign minority whose loyalties could not 
be trusted. Their foreign-ness was evidenced on two counts. Not only, as I unpack 
further below, did they retain British passports ‗[sticking] to these precious 
documents…like leeches‘ (in the words of a 1960s radio commentator), their hearts 
and souls were divided, with, to paraphrase a speech by then-vice-president Moi, one 
leg in Kenya and the other in India (Theroux 1997 [1967]: 67).  
Given the unbridled racism circulating at the time (reaching its zenith with Idi 
Amin‘s expulsion of the Ugandan Asians in 1972), it is hardly surprising that many 
Asians did not immediately opt to obtain Kenyan citizenship, preferring instead to 
either leave while still able to enter the UK as British subjects or stay in the country 
but retain British passports (see below). Many families sought to hedge their bets by 
obtaining Kenyan passports for some members (often men involved in business), 
while retaining British citizenship – and alternative escape routes – for others. Again, 
in light of the anti-Asian political climate throughout the region, this strategy could 
only be expected. Moreover, the allegation that Asians did not jump at the chance at 
Kenyan nationality obscures the independent government‘s seemingly intentionally 
slow processing of Asian citizenship applications: writing in the same year these 
laws came into being Theroux reported that ‗14,000 applications for citizenship 
remain unprocessed, and that some Asians have been waiting over three years to 
become citizens‘ (1997 [1967]: 69). Importantly, the accusations pertaining to 
passports fallaciously equate formal citizenship with a desire to live and remain in 
Kenya, or a perception of oneself as Kenyan. 
Anti-Asian sentiment involved the very public denigration of Asians by postcolonial 
politicians, articulating sentiments that received broad coverage in the press. At the 
beginning of 1967 the Daily Nation ran the headline ‗Mombasa moves on Asian 
boycott‘, reporting that KANU leaders at the coast (representatives of the Kenyan 
African National Union, the party that held power until 2002), critical of Asians‘ 
failure to attend political rallies, were advocating a boycott of their shops (Theroux 
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1997 [1967]: 64).
75
 A few months later both President Kenyatta and Vice-President 
Moi used speeches on Madaraka Day, a national holiday commemorating the 
attainment of self-rule, to threaten Asians. Jomo Kenyatta did not mince his words:  
This is a final warning to them and unless they change their ways, they 
should not blame the government for any measures that may be taken to deal 
with their nonsense (in Theroux 1997 [1967]: 63).  
The travel writer Paul Theroux, who lived in Kenya in the 1960s, argued that this 
racist discourse had quickly become a trope via which many in the postcolony came 
to position themselves as nationalists: the rhetoric was so fashionable, he mused, it 
was ‗as if every good Kenyan must be anti-Asian‘ (1997: 63). (The irony that this 
should be the case, given that Asians had played a critical role in the achievement of 
majority rule, was not lost on Theroux). As historian Robert Gregory argues, this 
discourse was particularly useful for post-independence politicians, given that the 
transfer of political power had not translated into ‗the anticipated economic progress‘ 
(1993a: 359). 
Asian preponderance within the commercial sector – itself, as we have seen above, a 
product of imperial policy – came to be viewed as a critical impediment to the 
development of the nation. The Kenyan government, in line with its neighbours in 
Tanzania and Uganda, thus embarked on a project of ‗Africanisation‘ (headed by the 
Kenyanisation Bureau), designed to put commercial power and public sector jobs 
firmly in black Kenyan hands. In Kenya, two legislative acts were particularly 
significant in this regard: the Trade Licensing Act, which came into force in 1969, 
and the Kenya Immigration Act of 1967  (Herzig 2006). While the Trade Licensing 
Act revoked the licenses of all non-citizen traders, the new immigration policy 
required all non-citizens to obtain work permits or face dismissal; such permits were 
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 That the Nation Media Group, the largest private media company in East Africa, 
was established in 1958 with ‗massive financial backing from the Aga Khan‘ (Carter 
1970: 258), leader of Ismailis in Kenya and beyond, seems to have little consequence 
for the Daily Nation‘s editorial policy with regards to Asians. Today, the Aga Khan 
Fund for Economic Development remains by far the largest shareholder of the Group. 
See the Dhahabu Kenya blog: ‗Top ten Nation Media Group shareholders‘. 2015 
(available online: http://www.dhahabu.co.ke/2015/09/10/top-ten-nation-media-
group-shareholders/, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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only granted once the Kenyanisation Bureau had determined that no citizen was 
qualified for the position. These policies intentionally targeted Asians, given, as 
Maxon (1991) states, that the overwhelming majority did not choose to become 
citizens at independence, opting instead for British passports which they were 
entitled to as former British subjects. Doing business was suddenly a lot harder for 
Asians and many, even those with citizenship, lost their jobs in the police, railway, 
civil service and teaching professions (Theroux 1997 [1967]: 69–70). Concurrent to 
this, the British government of the mid-1960s started discussing restrictions on entry 
to UK, proposing to limit entry to passport holders who could prove that either they 
or their immediate forefathers had been born in the British Isles (Herzig 2006; 
Mattausch 1998).  
With increasingly restricted economic rights and employment opportunities in Kenya 
and the looming possibility of near statelessness at the hands of the UK government, 
thousands of Asians chose to leave Kenya in the late 1960s, a period described as 
‗the Exodus‘ (Gregory 1993b; Herzig 2006; Salvadori 1983). From 192,000 in 1967-
8, the Asian population of Kenya had dropped to 78,000 by 1979 (Salvadori 1983: 
10). As these numbers suggest, the 1950s and 60s was a moment of intense unease 
for Asians regarding their fate in Kenya‘s future. 
 
Building to stay: post-imperial citizens  
What is perhaps, then, most striking is the extent of Asian construction in Mombasa 
in this era. Despite the uncertainty, Asians were building to stay. This is made 
evident studying the adverts that bookend Mombasa: the official handbook (1971),
76
 
a 1971 publication for the Mombasa Municipal Council that clearly sought to 
promote tourism and investment at the coast. Published at the height of anti-
Asianism in the country, the Handbook is replete with adverts for Blanket 
Manufacturers (Kenya) Ltd (providers of ‗―Kenya‖ Quality Blankets‘), Trifoil (the 
‗unsinkable fibre glass boat‘) and the ‗Latest London fumigation for all pest 
problems‘ (1971: 7–13). These are far outnumbered by pages sponsored by building 
contractors and hardware merchants, all of which were owned by people of Gujarati 
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 Hereafter referred to as the Handbook. 
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origin. Mistry Ruda Limba and Sons‘ two-page spread features photographs of some 
of their best known projects, all built in the 1950s. These include Khaderbhai 
Building (built 1953), an iconic commercial building on Nkrumah Road, featuring an 
Art Deco staircase tower below a minaret-like dome and balcony, the Bohra School 
(built 1954), as well as several apartment blocks and houses (Municipal Council of 
Mombasa 1971: 26–7).  
In addition to commercial and residential properties, a number of Asian mosques and 
temples were built at this time. Berg & Walter (1968) list eight ‗Indian‘ mosques 
built between 1940 and 1961 (most in the 1950s), and note the leading financial role 
played by Asians in the construction of several non-communal mosques in the same 
period. At least two of these mosques were exclusively Asian religious spaces, 
namely the Ismaili jamaatkhanas (religious and social halls) in Makupa and Tudor, 
enclosed as they are within surrounding gated communities, both built at the same 
time. The Sunni mosques, including the communally marked Memon Villa, did not 
formally exclude Muslim others, but some were, and remain, predominantly Hanafi 
in orientation. Hindus and Jains were equally engaged in the expansion of religious 
space, producing some of Mombasa‘s most opulent landmarks shortly before 
independence. These include the BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir, the first to be built 
outside of India,
77
 and the Lord Shiva Temple (its futuristic spire crowned with a 
mass of gold), both constructed in 1955 (Jewell 1987). The Shree Jain Temple, a vast, 
gleaming structure composed of Indian marble and built by a team of architects and 
artisans from Kathiawar, was completed in the year of independence (Municipal 
Council of Mombasa 1971).  
These religious edifices underscored the wealth of the communities that constructed 
them; they are also a testament to the continued significance of communal ties 
amongst Mombasa‘s Asian population and the patterns of distinction – grounded in a 
South Asian past – through which they sought to identify themselves. The Shree Jain 
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 BAPS stands for the Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan 
Sanstha, a Hindu socio-spiritual organisation of global reach, organised around the 
teachings of the 19
th
 century ascetic Swaminarayan. See the website of BAPS 
Swaminarayan Sanstha for information about its temple in Mombasa: ‗Murti 
pratishtha mahotsav, Mombasa, Kenya‘. 2012 (available online: 
http://www.baps.org/News/2012/Murti-Pratishtha-Mahotsav-3878.aspx, accessed 23 
August 2017). 
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Temple, in particular, makes tangible the on-going proximity of the Subcontinent to 
Asian projects of selfhood. As with Art Deco, these buildings could, in many ways, 
be read as monuments to Asian insularity and desire to differentiate themselves from 
others in the city – stereotypes I am sure they have done little to trouble. However, 
echoing my reading of Art Deco above, I suggest these buildings also reveal a 
different narrative. These buildings constitute major investments in the local 
landscape: at a time of uncertainty over the decolonisation process, coupled with 
mounting anti-Asianism and separatist momentum at the coast, Asians were 
investing heavily in a Mombasan future. Many of these buildings draw on a rich 
Indian religious heritage and certainly designate distinction; however, in light of 
their dates of construction, they also demonstrate a firm intention to be part of a 
multi-faith and multiracial future in Kenya. These prominent places of worship 
indicate faith, not only in a particular religious tradition, but in a pluralistic future for 
Kenya. Most guides and publications about the city make brief notes about these 
religious buildings as places of interest, particularly the Hindu and Jain temples 
(visitors are guided to Swahili mosques, rarely those associated with Hanafi or Shia 
Islam). My argument here is that these edifices must also be read as evidence of a 
different kind of interest: specifically, a desire to stay.  
Mombasa‘s built environment also paints a rather different picture to the narratives 
and numbers of ‗Exodus‘ described in many scholarly accounts (Gregory 1993b; 
Herzig 2006; Mattausch 1998; Salvadori 1983). I suspect that emigration figures 
from Mombasa were significantly lower than the overall trend in the country at the 
time, based in part on my informants narratives: many I met agreed that community 
numbers had dropped markedly in the late 1980s and 1990s, a fact they attributed to 
the growing dissonance between educational trajectories and employment 
opportunities at the coast (an issue I consider in Chapter 4). That emigration from 
and to Mombasa in the postcolonial era has been less marked than in the rest of the 
country is bolstered by Nowick‘s recent estimation that three-quarters of Asians 
living in Mombasa were born in the city, a proportion that falls to less than half in 
Nairobi (2015: 131). Rather than leaving, Asians in Mombasa in the 1950s and 
1960s were concretising their roots despite the political turmoil. Turning again to 
adverts of the Municipal Government‘s Handbook (1971) – most of which were 
placed by Asian builders and building suppliers – a number specifically reference the 
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newly independent government as clientele. Godrej & Sons, specialists in roofing, 
tiling and flooring, provide a list of their satisfied customers: these include State 
House (the official residence of the president in Mombasa), the city‘s Municipal 
Council and ‗His Excellency the President‘s Beach Bungalow at Bamburi‘ 
(Municipal Council of Mombasa 1971: 21). Huseini Electrical Store similarly 
promotes its state connections: ‗Contractors to local government authorities and 
Mombasa Municipal Council‘ (Municipal Council of Mombasa 1971: 11). These 
adverts illustrate that Asians remained significant players in the construction sector 
in Mombasa of the early 1970s. They also evidence Asian desires to make a home, 
and a living, in the postcolony. The emphasis on government contracts serves to 
underscore Asian anxieties around, but also underlying commitment to, the project 
of nation building. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a Mombasan perspective on what it meant to be a 
(post)imperial citizen, tracing how buildings helped forge various kinds of 
ambivalent relations, not only between ruler and ruled, but also between what Jon 
Soske has called ‗also-colonised other[s]‘ (2009: 188). Art Deco reveals many of the 
mobilities, modernities and elsewheres encapsulated in imperial citizenship, as well 
as the tension between social change and hierarchy on which colonial society was 
built. Mombasa Deco, I have suggested, allowed elites of Gujarati origin to 
demonstrate their commitment to and critique of empire, their dialogue and distance 
with India, as well as their superiority and status in a hugely unequal and rapidly 
changing colonial city. The assertiveness of Deco, however, should also be read as 
revelatory of the anxieties that were part and parcel of being at the middle wrung of a 
racialised colonial order. The same could be said of the many impressive religious, 
commercial and residential buildings constructed shortly before and after 
independence: these bold additions to the cityscape say little of the decolonising 
apprehensions and intense anti-Asianism that lay at their foundations, but the 
historical context, I have suggested, helps explain how and why they came to be built 
at all. In a moment of flux, these buildings make a steadfast claim to the city, rooting 
their patrons and wider communities in a postcolonial urban future.  
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The edifices discussed here – whether in the shape of Art Deco apartments or 
communal mosques – could be read solely as manifestations of Asian distinction. 
However, as I have sought to show, buildings tell multiple stories. The façades 
examined here, I suggest, both marked and muddied their patron‘s difference in 
relation to wider Mombasan society. While concretising some forms of social 
distance, each also proudly proclaims presence and affinity to place, and a 
commitment to shaping a pluralistic future in Mombasa. From urban villas to 
towering temples, 20
th
 century individuals of Gujarati origin have used architecture 
to claim the city as theirs, marking a material and emotional investment in the urban 
littoral.  
Of course, much has happened in Mombasa in the intervening years, as the city has 
continued to grow and change, strikingly captured in the photograph below (Fig. 32).  
 
Figure 32: Cutch Castle 1947.  
The epigraphy – Cutch Castle 1947 – which adorns the Art Deco house on the right 
can be seen faintly above the bush in the foreground.  
The ageing Art Deco house on the right, engraved with the (mostly hidden) words 
‗Cutch Castle 1947‘, is dwarfed by a luminous green apartment block. The block, as 
one architect in Mombasa informed me, ‗…speaks to the gaudy neoclassicism of the 
Gulf‘. The following chapters shift our focus from history to ethnography, further 
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elaborating the processes of mobility, insecurity and claims-making introduced here, 
as well as adding Islamic reform to the picture. This chapter has considered some of 
the more assertive ways in which people have laid claim to the city, fostering 
dialogues around the Indian Ocean and connections with Mombasa in the colonial 
and early colonial eras. We now turn to the present and to food, considering some of 
the more taken-for-granted forms of claims-making that characterise daily life in 
Mombasa, practices that reveal a multiplicity of ways that the city, and its relations 
to the world beyond, are imagined. 
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Chapter 2  
The world in a sweetshop? Localising 
the Indian Ocean  
 
As I walk in, Hashim is signalling to his favourite chaiwallah,
78
 a young Digo
79
 man 
who circulates the market place with a large tin kettle and a selection of mugs, which 
are temporarily loaned out to the purchasers of tea. Hashim greets me warmly and I 
gratefully accept his offer of a cup; cardamom-infused sweetness being a tried and 
tested antidote to the sweaty bustle of the market. ‗It‘s days since my last cup‘, 
Hashim remarks jovially, enjoying the rare(ish) exception to his diabetic regime.  
Five small round tables are squeezed into the tiny seating area behind the glass 
cabinet that displays Hashim‘s wares – salty snacks on the top, a garish collection of 
sweets on the shelves below. As usual, Hashim is positioned at the table that 
provides the best vantage point onto the market beyond – ideal for people watching 
and catching the eye of a potential customer. The back wall of the shop behind him 
is covered in an orientalised painting depicting a brown skinned, moustachioed 
gentleman in pink military uniform (replete with medals and matching turban), 
extending a love heart to a pale, blue-eyed woman in front of the Taj Mahal. She 
wears a tiger print top, her headscarf blows glamorously in the wind. On this warm 
morning, a Swahili woman, seated to the left of the painting and dressed in a buibui 
and canary yellow head covering, is sharing a plate of kachoris – mouth-wateringly 
delicious deep fried balls of moong dhal, chickpea flour, green mango and spices – 
with a friend who is similarly attired. At the table next to them, a woman in a short 
denim ensemble is nonchalantly eating chips drenched in Peptang, Kenya‘s 
radioactive-looking ketchup brand.  
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 A chaiwallah is a person who sells tea.  
79
 As mentioned in the Historical Prelude, people of Digo ethnicity have roots in the 
coastal hinterland and are one of the nine Mijikenda communities.  
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Hashim gestures for me to sit down and he is about to take a sip of tea when a plump 
Swahili man in a long white kanzu and embroidered kofiya, (the cotton robe and 
skull cap warn by Muslim men throughout East Africa), comes to the counter. 
Hashim and his client exchange a long chain of greetings, as is customary in Swahili, 
after which the kanzu waddles off, content with his large packets of chevro and 
ghatiya (crunchy snacks made of chickpea flour and spices).
80
  
A black woman in a simple trouser suit and heels also wants 50 shillings worth of 
ghatiya. She taps her manicured nails on the counter top while waiting for Hashim to 
sort out her change.  
Hashim returns to his chai and is launching into a polemic about Somalis when a 
middle-aged Asian lady in a kurta (a knee length top) and baggy trousers arrives. 
She repositions her sunglasses on top of her head and beams at Hashim, ‗Aje tamara 
Holiness ni birthday che, nahi? [Today is your Holiness‘s birthday, no?]‘, she asks 
in English-inflected Gujarati, gesturing to the large, framed photograph of a man in 
white robes and turban, sitting before a hollowed grave. Hashim confirms, today is 
the Syedna‘s birthday.81 Parti nods knowingly, but she‘s not just here for small talk; 
she‘s also after some of Hashim‘s freshest penda, round sweets made predominately 
of concentrated milk and sugar, to take to her temple as prasad tonight. ‗Badam 
avtha kaju ni penda? [Almond or cashew sweets?]‘, Hashim inquires. Settling on a 
portion of both, I learn that Parti will be taking these offerings to the futuristic if 
dated looking Shiva Temple later, just as soon as she can finish work at Grain Bulk. 
Grain Bulk is the largest grain handlers in East Africa, a company owned by Khojas.  
As Hashim is sorting out Parti‘s sweets, Nuru, one of his two employees comes into 
the shop front from the kitchen behind, carrying a mountain of fresh tikha ghatiya 
(another spicy chickpea flour snack) to replenish a nearly empty compartment at the 
counter. Dusted in soot from hours spent over the large charcoal jikos (burning 
                                                 
80
 Known in the UK as ‗Bombay mix‘, chevro includes a range of ingredients, such 
as roasted peanuts, dried peas and puffed rice, in addition to crunchy sticks of deep 
fried chickpea flour.  
81
 To remind the reader, the Syedna is the leader of the Daudi Bohras, the Shia sect 
Hassan belongs to. 
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stoves) in the semi-open air space behind the shop, Nuru deposits her creations and 
returns to her labours.  
 
Indian delights?  
Those familiar with South Asia, particularly Gujarat, or its many diasporas will find 
a host of recognisable references in the above vignette. From the chai Hashim slurps 
to the kachoris munched and the penda purchased for prasad; the Taj Mahal wall 
painting is only the icing on the cake. In various respects, the sweetshop seems like 
exactly the kind of place scholars have analysed as sites for the (re)production of 
diaspora. Food and foodscapes are often positioned as mechanisms par excellence 
for the reproduction of community, facilitating home-making in contexts of 
displacement and the construction of national imaginings well beyond state borders 
(Law 2001; Mintz 2008; Sutton 2001). Purnima Mankekar‘s (2002) reflections on 
‗India shopping‘ are a case in point. Mankekar traces the role of grocery stores in the 
San Francisco Bay Area in the ‗ongoing construction of India and Indian culture‘ 
(2002: 76). For Sunita, one of Mankekar‘s informants, such shops are the source of 
the Glucose Biscuits which constitute her breakfast; dipping them in her tea is a daily 
reminder of mornings in her parents‘ home. The brand name biscuits, drenched in 
nostalgia for a childhood spent in India, root Sunita in ‗the shifting signifier that is 
the homeland‘ (Mankekar 2002: 86) even if she has no desire to return there.  
Mankekar usefully specifies the range of imagery and discourses available for 
consumption in such settings – these shops, and her analysis, go well beyond tasty 
morsels – and she is attentive to the tensions these stores evoke about the nation and 
its discontents. These stores are by no means experienced uniformly and play a role 
in the reproduction of regional and gendered hierarchies. A shop in Sunnyvale called 
India Palace, for instance, stocks a vast range of CDs and cassettes; however, its 
‗South Indian Music‘ section does not distinguish between Tamil, Malayalam and 
Telugu productions, lumping together the south of the country in ways that 
reproduces hegemonic Northern assumptions about what constitutes ‗Indian culture‘.  
Although ostensibly amenable to the sort of diasporic analysis thoughtfully 
elucidated by Mankekar, I argue here that Hashim‘s sweetshop is not ‗Indian‘ or 
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‗diasporic‘ – or at least that these lenses are at odds with the way he and many of his 
customers perceive it. This is perhaps best illustrated by starting with an example of 
individuals who did see such sites as intimately connected to the Subcontinent. On 
one of my first nights in Mombasa, I dutifully accompanied a new friend to an 
expatriate networking event at an upmarket Italian restaurant. After managing to 
extract myself from a conversation with an Austrian whose business card, depicting 
a zebra in jaunty sunglasses, promised ‗African fantasy tours‘, I took refuge by the 
peanuts with two young Indian men. Both had just finished university in India – one 
in Delhi, the other in Mumbai – and had been recruited by shipping companies to 
come and work in Mombasa. When I inquired about their impressions of the city to 
date, their responses were unequivocal. ‗Everything is the same as India‘, they 
assured me, ‗the architecture, the food, the tuk tuks‘. This assessment chimes with 
Simpson & Kresse‘s (2007) observations about the selective nature of attention to 
disjuncture and difference around the Indian Ocean. Drawing on the work of Kirti 
Chaudhuri (1990, 2006) they put forward the idea that it is because individuals 
experience a sense of ‗equivalence‘ amongst disparate littoral locations – i.e. a sense 
that things like ritual practices, modes of social organisation and architectural forms 
are similar – that ‗essentially allows people to be blind (to not see) to the differences 
between home and the place they have travelled to‘ (Simpson & Kresse 2007: 23). It 
is this lack of attention to difference that in turn allows individuals to imagine 
themselves as part of various transoceanic collectives, in the face of evidence that 
disrupts such shared imaginaries. This observation rings true for the population of 
(relatively) recently arrived Indian and Pakistani migrants I met in Mombasa. Known 
as ‗rockets‘ by the city‘s long-standing Asian minority,82 the name itself alludes to 
the social division that is generally maintained between the two: rockets and their 
more established Asian counterparts that I knew from various communities all 
reported that length of stay in East Africa determined the intimacy of social relations 
in Mombasa.  
However, in contrast to rockets who often testified to the equivalence between the 
‗India‘ they found in Mombasa and the ‗India‘ they knew back home, most other city 
                                                 
82
 ‗Rockets‘ refers to the propensity of more recent migrants to shoot back and forth 
between India and East Africa.  
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dwellers I met – Asians and others alike – assessed what might at first blush be taken 
as manifestations of ‗India‘ in ways that eschewed the Subcontinent entirely. 
Engaging with research on cosmopolitanism – from along the East African littoral 
and beyond – I argue here that the sweetshop is one of many sites in the city where 
the Indian Ocean is made local, enabling the construction of Mombasan ways of 
being in the world for a wide range of residents.  
 
Indian Ocean cosmopolitanisms: consuming beyond the nation 
A rich body of work examines the effects of centuries of Indian Ocean exchange on 
the region‘s cultural and material forms. This scholarship spans a great variety of 
domains, from oceanic circulations of print (Burton 2016; Green 2011; Hofmeyr et 
al. 2011), to 19
th
 century wooden doors (Aldrick 1988). If the literature on Indian 
Ocean print cultures is often particularly concerned with the texts and lives of 
prominent individuals – such as Mohandas Gandhi (Markovits 2003) and 
Rabindranath Tagore (Bose 2006) – others have turned their attention to more 
everyday matters. A number of academics have considered the role of Bollywood 
films (Fair 2009; Fuglesang 1994) and Hindi film melodies (Eisenberg 2009) in the 
construction of Swahili subjectivities. Minou Fuglesang (1994), for instance, 
highlights the repertoire that Bollywood afforded to young Swahili women in late 
1980s and 90s Lamu for dealing with notions of femininity, sexuality, emotions and 
marital strife. For a generation whose educational and employment expectations 
made their life trajectories quite different from that of their elder female relatives, 
gossiping about Bollywood actor Amitabh Bachchan‘s latest escapades proved 
instrumental for negotiating life in changing Lamu. Fuglesang highlights cinema as 
resource for her informants precisely because standard Bollywood tropes – such as 
the challenges created by stringent societal expectations, coupled with storylines that 
condemned extra-marital sex while illuminating the intimacies of amorous 
exchanges – found echoes in Lamu society.  
Others have considered the role of Indian film and photography in the construction 
of littoral urban subjectivities more broadly (i.e. not just Swahili), particularly during 
the colonial era. This scholarship is significant in that it helps unsettle what Jon 
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Soske (2009: 3) has called the ‗bifurcated‘ historiographies that continue to structure 
scholarship on the region. The East African literature mirrors that of South Africa, 
on which Soske writes: in both contexts historical and ethnographic accounts tend to 
address either ‗Africans‘ or ‗Asians‘,83 with forms of interaction between the two 
often limited to more formalised political spheres (Gregory 1993a; Mangat 1969). 
Historian Ned Bertz‘s (2015) careful and imaginative reading of the Tanzanian 
archives highlights the limitations of this approach in the context of colonial Dar es 
Salaam. Focusing on urban life, part of Bertz‘s analysis is concerned with cinema 
halls, an important feature of city living since 1929. From its inception, Tanzania‘s 
cinema industry was a product of Asian investment and ingenuity – by 1976 Asians 
owned almost all of Dar‘s 36 movie theatres (Bertz 2015: 186). However, Bertz 
pools ethnographic and archival evidence to demonstrate that it is erroneous to view 
cinema halls as ‗the privileged domain of a diasporic minority‘ (2015: 91). From the 
1940s onwards, Africans constituted an important (and ever-growing) element of 
racially mixed cinematic audiences, who were fed on a diet of Bollywood and, to a 
lesser extent, Hollywood productions. Foreign films – of Indian or North American 
origin – were not subtitled but nevertheless drew large crowds; cinema going was a 
cheap and much-loved form of urban sociality throughout the colonial period. Even 
following vague attempts to Africanise Tanzania‘s cinema scene following 
independence, Bollywood films remained by far the most popular fare.
84
 Bertz 
provides an apt illustration of this from the early 1970s: in 1971 almost 10,000 
people watched Kal aaj aur kal (Yesterday, today and tomorrow, dir. Kapoor 1971) 
in a single day, while a Hollywood production starring Harry Belafonte the 
following year sold less than 6,000 tickets over six days, despite the fact that 
Belafonte himself had come to help boost sales (2015: 183). For Bertz, the cultural 
significance of Bollywood within urban life in Dar for much of the 20
th
 century, 
‗complicate[s] simplistic but prevailing labels like ‗African cinema‘ or ‗Indian films‘, 
terms that conflate and collapse nation and race‘ (2015: 92–93).  
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 Or ‗Indians‘ as they are known in South Africa, the location of Soske‘s research. 
84
 Eisenberg reports that the same was true in Mombasa, where, between the 1950s 
and mid-1990s, ‗going to see a Hindi musical film (in Hindi, with no subtitled 
translation) at local a cinema was, undoubtedly, the most popular form of leisure for 
most Mombasans‘ (2009: 192).  
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Bertz is careful to demonstrate that cinema halls were implicated in the racialisation 
of urban space in Tanzania, citing numerous instances of Asian staff restricting entry 
to Africans during the colonial period. However, he shows that movie theatres were 
also important spaces for interaction, where the lines of what is ‗Indian‘ and ‗African‘ 
blurred and what he sees as Indian Ocean cultural forms were brought into being. In 
sum, Bertz argues that positioning cinema halls as ‗Asian‘ or ‗diasporic‘ belies the 
historical evidence. Instead, he sees the ‗enduring popularity of Bombay cinema in 
Tanzania‘ – at least until the 1980s85 – as evidence of a ‗cosmopolitan culture of 
Indian Ocean exchange‘ (2015: 195).  
The scholarship of Heike Behrend (1998) and Isolde Brielmaier (2008) reiterates this 
conclusion. Both focus on Asian-owned photography studios along the Kenya coast, 
prominent sites for the performance of urban life until the 1980s.
86
 What both 
scholars‘ lucid analyses underscore is the range of influences Asian studio 
photographers and their diverse clientele drew on to construct representations of 
themselves. From Corinthian columns to saris, Omani turbans to Zippo lighters, 
poser and photographer drew on a wealth of elements to emphasise, often 
simultaneously, their urbanity, individuality, modernity, Indian-ness, Swahili-ness or 
Western-ness. The work of Bertz, Behrend and Brielmaier provides robust evidence 
for the futility of the labels ‗Asian‘ and ‗African‘ to describe these public spaces and 
patterns of consumption in East Africa, a conclusion which dovetails with my own 
analysis, as I demonstrate in the following section. Where I aim to build on these 
accounts, however, is with regard to the place of wider worlds within these 
performances of urbanity. The cited works focus particularly on the ways in which 
wider worlds are drawn on to produce specific – and multiple – subject positions. 
The ethnography I present below shifts our focus to contemporary food practices, 
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 Bertz (2015) argues that the above was true until the economic liberalisation of the 
1980s, when, in part because of the rise of televisions and video cassettes, the urban 
cinema scene was decimated, replaced by a single, multiplex cinema-mall shopping 
complex. Although cinema houses still draw mixed crowds, and Bollywood still 
features heavily on the bill, cinema-going has become a more exclusive and less 
commonplace affair. As I explore below, shifting entertainment preferences and the 
concentration of wealth within the Dar cinema scene has strong parallels with 
Mombasa. 
86
 All these studios, once dotted around Lamu and Mombasa, have now closed, 
linked in part to the emigration patterns I discuss in Chapter 4. 
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and examines how worlds beyond might be valorised, concealed or not imagined at 
all in the act of consumption. 
 Before returning to Hashim‘s sweetshop, it is necessary to introduce a further 
element I find underdeveloped in the aforementioned literature; namely the political 
implications of the practices and performances he so successfully describes. What 
does it mean – at the level of the city and the nation – for the Indian Ocean to be so 
integral to everyday urban entertainment and subjectivity?
87
 This question is taken 
up in the work of Andrew Eisenberg (2009, 2012, 2013), whose approach to Old 
Town‘s soundscapes was outlined in the Historical Prelude. Beyond the sonorous 
politics of Friday prayers, Eisenberg has conducted research amongst hip-hop artists 
and Indian taarab players in Mombasa, and politicises ‗Indian Ocean 
cosmopolitanisms‘ by starting with a consideration of the littoral as viewed within 
Kenyan national imaginaries. Mombasa is the country‘s second largest urban 
conglomeration, the critical transport hub for regional trade and an important (albeit 
diminished) tourist destination, for both domestic and international travellers. 
However, it remains an exotic ‗internal Orient‘ (Eisenberg 2012: 566) in the eyes of 
most Kenyans. This coastal othering has a long history, as described in the 
Introduction and Historical Prelude. To recap some key elements here, Cruise 
O‘Brien (1995: 202) describes colonial policy towards the coast as one of ‗benign 
neglect‘ – the construction of roads, telecommunications and social infrastructure, 
such as schools and health centres, was very limited. Successive postcolonial 
governments have, to a large extent, perpetuated colonial inequalities. Mazrui 
describes the government‘s coastal economic strategy as one of ‗internal colonisation‘ 
(quoted in Cruise O‘Brien 1995: 215) – objectives remain firmly oriented towards 
the interior and the development that does occur in Mombasa is often controlled by 
people from upcountry or foreign nationals. The tourism industry, for instance, is 
seen as a haven for Kikuyus, Luos, Italians and Anglophones (Eastman 1995). This 
is coupled with the continued neglect of the coast‘s social infrastructure. In a country 
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 This absence, at least in Bertz‘s work, probably stems from the very different 
relationship Dar es Salaam has with the nation of Tanzania when compared with 
Mombasa‘s position within Kenya. These differences are in turn related to the fact 
that marginalisation in Tanzania does not coalesce around religion in the way that it 
does in Kenya; the population of Tanzania, and the country‘s government, is 
comprised of a relatively even mix of Christians, Muslims and others.  
134 
 
chock full of universities, Mombasa‘s tertiary education sector is almost non-existent, 
despite being Kenya‘s second city (see Chapter 4). The standard of primary and 
secondary education is well below Nairobi‘s, something that many of Kresse‘s 
informants see as a deliberate effort on the part of the central government to keep 
coastal people ‗dominated and ―backward‖‘(Kresse 2007a: 61; see also Ayubi & 
Mohyuddin 1994; A. A. Mazrui 1993; A. M. Mazrui 1993). As also mentioned 
previously, this has gone hand in hand with the political silencing of Muslims. In the 
early 1990s, the government was notoriously involved in the destruction of the 
Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), whose support base centred around Mombasa (A. A. 
Mazrui 1993; A. M. Mazrui 1993; Oded 2000). More recently, national ‗anti-
terrorism‘ strategies over the last 15 years, financially and logistically supported by 
the US, ‗… have compounded an already deep sense of alienation among those most 
severely affected by the new measures: Kenyan Muslims, particularly those of Arab 
and Somali ancestry‘ (Prestholdt 2011: 4).  
In light of this history, it is perhaps unsurprising that, the coast is largely absent from 
symbols of nation, such as the currency. As Eisenberg notes, only the city‘s faux 
elephant tusks, themselves a colonial instalment arching over Moi Avenue, are 
included on the 50-shilling bill. The banknote also ‗inexplicably fades into an image 
of camel riders in Kenya‘s untamed north-east‘ (Eisenberg 2012: 563), which only 
compounds the city‘s oriental associations. This imaginary was made evident to me 
in a restaurant one evening when the waiter, a Kikuyu from near Athi River, near 
Nairobi, informed me, ‗Swahili are not true Kenyans. Legally, you are a Kenyan if 
you‘re born here. But you‘re only a true Kenyan if both your parents are Kenyan, not 
from foreign places‘. The implication here was that few at the coast could claim such 
pedigree. Mombasa‘s distance from the state was further emphasised during 
celebrations for the 50
th
 anniversary of Kenya independence in December 2013. 
Aside from one subdued political rally, the main evidence of this historical moment 
was the mass exodus from the city (with people making the most of a day off). In 
contrast, Nairobi was a mass of bunting and celebration for weeks before the date 
itself. The lack of state-sponsored pomp and circumstance is no doubt also due to the 
fact that Mombasa is an opposition stronghold (Mwakimako & Willis 2016); this 
voting record itself reflects the city‘s antagonistic relationship to the state.  
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It is in this context that Eisenberg (2012) suggests that the mobilisation of Indian 
Ocean cosmopolitanisms must be seen as a political act. Given the absence of the 
Kenyan coast – and the alternative littoral histories it represents – within the Kenyan 
national imaginary, Eisenberg writes that the use of Bhangra beats and orientalist 
Indian imagery in the songs and music videos of his rapper informants is a way in 
which artists of South Asian and Swahili descent emphasise the fundamentally 
interconnected nature of the city to places around the littoral. He employs Ong‘s 
notion of ‗cultural citizenship‘ – defined as ‗self-making and being made in relation 
to nation states and transnational processes‘ (Ong 1996: 737) – to argue that such 
artistic decisions problematise hegemonic notions of the nation‘s boundaries and 
force us to consider Kenyan citizenship in terms of broader geographies.  
 
Considering cosmopolitanisms  
Eisenberg‘s analysis is very useful for thinking through the consumption of kachoris, 
and much else that goes on in Hashim‘s sweetshop. I share his observation that 
particular practices, whether chomping on chevro or sampling Bhangra, root 
Mombasa and its inhabitants in a world well beyond (and often at right angles to) the 
contours of the Kenyan state, and are thus ‗already political‘ (2012: 574). However, I 
think what is perhaps underexplored in Eisenberg‘s account is the everyday and 
taken-for-granted nature of many such acts. Moreover, if Eisenberg suggests that 
hip-hop artists proudly and explicitly demonstrate their long-standing personal 
connections with worlds beyond the city, I argue that it is the fact that these wider 
worlds are not imagined that makes the food consumption described here political. In 
contrast to the literature on Indian Ocean subjectivities described above, as well as 
the scholarship on cosmopolitanism more generally – which I turn to below – I 
suggest that a Mombasan way of being in the world often emerges not from the 
valorisation or concealment of the littoral‘s intimate connections to the world 
beyond, but rather from their localisation.  
The line of thinking I wish to pursue here is in dialogue with cosmopolitan theorists 
who consider the mutually constitutive relationship between parochial subject 
positions and wider worlds (Appiah 1998; Werbner 2008). In contrast to earlier 
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understandings (e.g. Hannerz 1993), this body of literature problematises the myth of 
cosmopolitanism as divorced from, and superior to, patterns of loyalty linked to kin 
and country, and sees it as axiomatic that tactics for coping with difference may 
reinforce prejudice, ethnocentrism and indifference as much as civility, 
accommodation and dialogue. Some scholars in this field have pointed to wider 
worlds as a source of local differentiation and status. Osella & Osella‘s (2007) work 
amongst Koya Muslims in Kozhikode, Kerala and the Arabian Gulf illustrates this 
point nicely. The authors argue that being Koya is simultaneously dependent on 
genealogical connections to a particular area of Kozhikode (dominated by matrilineal 
joint households) and historically grounded ties to the Gulf and Gulf Arabs. In other 
words, ‗[t]here is an extremely specific and exclusivist Koya identity…‘ but this is 
itself ‗…recognised to be an outcome of wider links‘ (Osella & Osella 2007: 350). 
Descent from and long-standing affiliations to Gulf Arabs (stemming from 
Kozhikode‘s historical position as a busy port within Arab maritime trade, and 
continuing today through extensive labour migration to the Gulf) is also what Koyas 
believe make them ‗true‘ followers of Islam – especially in contrast to the other 
Muslims they interact with in Kozhikode or imagine in the north of the country. In 
other words, not only is a highly localised and particularistic Koya sense of self 
derived from these wider connections, Koyas also articulate narratives of historical 
and contemporary mobilities to differentiate themselves from those who cannot lay 
claim to such ties. This has strong parallels with the East African literature described 
above, where young women construct themselves in contrast to their elders via 
Bollywood (Fuglesang 1994), or use Omani turbans to emphasise their superiority 
within racialised Mombasan landscapes (Brielmaier 2008).  
In contrast to those who cultivate local prestige through emphasising transoceanic 
connections, Brink-Danan‘s (2011) work amongst Jews in Istanbul reminds us that 
another means of dealing with diversity may be in understanding when to conceal it. 
She demonstrates that many Jews choose to keep manifestations of Jewishness away 
from the public eye, avoiding the use of Ladino or French, as well as particular types 
of clothing or symbols suggestive of their religious persuasion, when outdoors. 
Brink-Danan emphasises that Jewish displays of cosmopolitanism – linguistic, 
architectural and stylistic practices that connect them to worlds beyond the Turkish 
republic – are perceived as ‗dangerous‘ by Jews themselves, a threat to their personal 
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security in a context where such articulations are seen by some onlookers as an 
affront to the ‗secular‘ and Sunni status quo. Accordingly, investigating Jewish 
cosmopolitanism involves paying attention to knowledge: Brink-Danan argues that 
‗[b]eing a Jewish cosmopolitan means not only knowing about different ways of 
being, but knowing in which context one should (and should not) perform difference‘ 
(2011: 448). Keeping this ‗cosmopolitan knowledge‘ of multiple audiences – and the 
types of performances each demands in mind – is what, Brink-Danan suggests, 
enables Jews to ‗maintain a delicate balance between being ―too Jewish‖ and ―too 
assimilated‖‘(2011: 465).  
Magnus Marsden‘s (2008) article on the dynamics of cosmopolitan discourses in 
Chitral, northern Pakistan, adds a further dimension to the emphasising/concealing 
strategies provided in the above examples. Marsden notes that for people in 
Rowshan, a village characterised by an oft-shifting mix of Chitralis and ‗refugees‘ 
from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, certain histories of transregional mobility are a 
source of social capital, while others are a source of shame. Through personal and 
family narratives, Chitrali elites frequently assert their long-standing connections 
with Afghanistan – in recent years, such claims have been reinforced by a growing 
number of return visits to the country. In contrast, those who originally migrated as 
seasonal labourers from Afghanistan‘s Wakhan corridor do all they can to conceal 
their Wakhik origins, and the simpleton, impoverished associations such roots (and 
routes) signify locally. In Rowshan, transregional pasts convey a range of meanings 
for contemporary interactions, the consequences of which must be carefully 
managed, particularly by those with histories of ‗improper mobility‘ (Marsden 2008: 
239). Marsden‘s example demonstrates that cosmopolitan histories may be both 
resource and burden.  
What I find especially useful in Marsden‘s account is his attentiveness to the 
multiple and contextually specific meanings accorded to relationships with the world 
beyond. In Mombasa, people similarly constructed a variety of relationships between 
the things they ate (saw, said, did) and the world beyond the city. Some, like Yash, a 
wiry Hindu management consultant, were quick to point out the Gujarati or Indian 
origins of particular cultural forms. ‗Bhajiya‘, he informed me, picking one up from 
the plate in front of us, ‗is a Gujarati word. Everywhere else they‘re called pakoras‘. 
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Later during the same conversation Yash asks if I‘ve already sampled mishkaki, 
skewers of chargrilled meat, sold in the evenings outside cafés alongside various 
other types of choma (as barbecued meat, nyama choma, is often referred to). 
‗Although the name is Swahili‘, I learn, ‗it‘s definitely not a Swahili way of 
preparing meat. You can tell by the way it‘s marinated and barbecued, there‘s 
definitely an Indian influence‘. Compared to many of my Muslim informants, Yash, 
like some of the other Hindus and Jains I knew, was far more invested in (i.e. more 
likely to point out) linkages of this nature. This is in line with the fact that my non-
Muslim acquaintances were more likely to visit India, more likely to have family 
there and more likely to be glued to their televisions on the 26
th
 of January (Indian 
National Day, an event that went by unnoticed for most of my interlocutors). The 
allegedly more proximate nature of Hindus/Jains to Gujarat/India was also voiced by 
Asian Muslims, who would refer to Hindus as ‗Gujaratis‘, a term they did not apply 
to themselves. This pattern of difference between Muslims and Hindu/Jains and the 
idea of Gujarat or India has been observed by many other scholars of the 
Subcontinent (see Ghassem-Fachandi 2012 regarding Gujarat).  
In contrast to Yash‘s attention to and valorisation of Gujarat, many of the Asians I 
spent time with in Mombasa were more intent on explicitly downplaying 
connections with India – in other words, ‗seeing‘ while simultaneously making an 
effort to extenuate said links. ‗We make bhajiyas the same like they do in India but 
we would never put them with yoghurt‘, Fayruz explained over a post-majlis lunch 
at the home of a family recently migrated from Pakistan. The comment, made while 
we were being served dahi wara, a dish composed of bhajiyas in yoghurt, 
underscored Fayruz‘s distance from South Asia, and difference from our hosts.  
Hashim‘s relationship to the painting of the Taj Mahal, emblazoned on his shop‘s 
back wall, tells a similar story. As Hashim would often remind me, this artwork is 
the creation of one of his dearest friends from his youth: the former Belgian consul‘s 
son. Jean, now long returned to Brussels, Hashim and a motley crew of educated 
Africans, Asians and Europeans, were all part of the same social circle during their 
late teens and 20s – enjoying frequent outings to the Drive-In (see Chapter 4) and 
hosting their famous biryani parties on special weekends. Soon after taking over the 
family business, Hashim asked Jean, known for his creative bent, to contribute to the 
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décor. And so Jean began to paint, allegedly with little input from Hashim. The Taj 
Mahal, the turbaned military man and the pale hijab-ed woman together produce a 
mythical, faraway scene; the image conjures fantasy. Ultimately, both Hashim‘s 
account of how the painting came into being and the image itself work to distance 
Hashim from the Subcontinent – it was not him who brought ‗India‘ into the 
sweetshop, and the representation itself positions India as a figment of the 
imagination. This is consistent with Kresse & Simpson‘s observation that Asians in 
East Africa are ‗in a constant dialogue with their own senses of cultural difference‘ 
in relation to India (Kresse & Simpson 2011: 9; see also Oonk 2004).  
Yash, Fayruz and Hashim‘s narratives clearly speak to the cosmopolitan literature 
cited above, wherein connections to wider worlds are either underscored or obscured. 
However, another prevalent mode of imaging the world from the Mombasan littoral 
is untouched by the aforementioned texts. While my appreciation for the intertwined 
nature of transcendent and particular modes of self-understanding has benefited 
greatly from the cosmopolitan theorists quoted here, none captures what I saw in 
places like Hashim‘s sweetshop, where, as I now elaborate, the world beyond was 
often neither glorified nor concealed.  
 
Localising the Indian Ocean  
Kachori, ghatiya, chevro, bhajiya: all of these words, and the ingredients the foods 
themselves consist of, suggest South Asian origins. However, following the mode of 
analysis introduced through the work of Bertz (2015), Brielmaier (2008) and others 
cited above, to see them as South Asian foods is to fundamentally miss the point. A 
quick perusal of Hashim‘s clientele demonstrates that these edibles cannot be 
defined as ‗Asian‘ or ‗African‘, diasporic or Kenyan in any straightforward way; 
they are staple elements of many littoral diets. This was made evident to me one 
Sunday afternoon, when I went to see how the Women‘s Economic Upliftment 
Programme was progressing, a three day trade fair and training opportunity 
organised by the Bilal Muslim Mission (Bilal, as it is usually referred to, being the 
development and proselytising charitable trust affiliated to the Khoja jamaat). 
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Women from Bilal centres around the coast
88
 had come to Mombasa for crash 
courses in financial literacy and marketing, as well as the chance to sell their wares 
(including soap, woodwork and avocados). ‗We even had county government 
officials attending this morning‘, Bilal‘s young and purposeful CEO tells me, ‗we‘re 
looking for contacts where women can sell and distribute their goods‘. On this 
particular afternoon, a training event is being organised by the Creative Cooking 
Committee, one of the numerous groups run by (and usually for) Khoja women.  
I settle down amongst an audience of women from around the coast, most clad in 
kangas (brightly patterned printed cotton cloth worn by women throughout East 
Africa), expertly wrapped around their heads and bodies. The woman sitting next me 
introduces herself as Beatrice, she‘s younger than most of the other attendees and 
keen to practice her already excellent English. The members of the Creative Cooking 
Committee, all Khoja women dressed in buibuis, arrange themselves behind two 
long tables at the front of the room. Adorned with a black and white chequered 
tablecloth, along with matching blue and white tea towels – not to mention a wok, 
two gas stoves, an electric mixer and a series of neatly labelled Tupperwares – the 
table and its contents begin to make me feel distinctly aware of the wealth disparities 
in the room. The afternoon‘s MC carefully adjusts her gold-rimmed aviator 
sunglasses around her headscarf, and informs her audience of the day‘s menu: ‗Leo 
tutapika sev, keki ya isingi na chevro [Today we are going to cook sev,
89
 an iced 
cake and chevro]‘.  
Almost immediately, I find myself feeling annoyed. In addition to the ostentatious 
culinary gadgetry on display, it seems to me that these dishes have been chosen with 
little regard for what the women in the audience might be able to reproduce and sell 
                                                 
88
 Bilal‘s proselytising activities are organised through its headquarters in Mombasa, 
as well as its 15 rural centres, located along the coast and further inland. Comprising 
a mosque and madrasa often along with other facilities, these centres aim to promote 
the spiritual and material ‗upliftment‘ of the communities living around them, 
combining Shia religious education and worship with various development 
initiatives related to health, women‘s empowerment and primary school study. See 
the website of the Bilal Muslim Mission of Kenya: ‗About Bilal Muslim Mission of 
Kenya‘. (available online: 
http://www.kenbilal.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Ite
mid=107, accessed 13 September 2017).  
89
 Sev is the Gujarati word for a vermicelli-shaped chickpea flour snack.  
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in their home villages. ‗Who wants to buy sev in Shimoni?‘ I wonder incredulously 
to myself (Shimoni, a small village some 80 kilometres south of Mombasa, being the 
location of one of Bilal‘s numerous centres). The disjuncture is made particularly 
acute when, having observed the process of pushing chickpea flour paste through a 
specially crafted vermicelli-producing tube, a member of the audience asks where 
one might obtain such an item. ‗Unaweza kupata katika Nakumatt na Nawal [You 
can find them at Nakumatt and Nawal]‘, the MC responds, citing the city‘s most 
expensive supermarket chain and a more affordable but still definitively middle class 
shopping centre as options. I can‘t help but snort. Beatrice asks me what‘s funny. ‗I 
don‘t understand who is going to be able to make this at home‘, I whisper, ‗do you 
even eat sev?‘ Beatrice looks at me sharply. ‗Bila shaka! [Of course!]‘, comes her 
admonishing reply. ‗Sev is my favourite snack‘. I learn that it was the audience who 
determined the menu for the day (based, no doubt, on their knowledge of local 
preferences), and leave Bilal feeling humbled, guilty of assuming that the poor, 
coastal women that surrounded me in the audience would not be familiar with sev, 
let alone able to make a living out of it. Sev, it turns out, is as local in Shimoni as it is 
in Surat.  
The entrenched locality of particular items is further underlined when we consider 
the relations of production that make many coastal consumption practices possible. 
As evident in the opening vignette, various forms of consumption in Mombasa are 
predicated on a confluence of Asian capital and black working class labour. In 
Hashim‘s shop, it is his two Giriama employees who produce the goods so 
fundamental to everyday Mombasan snacking habits. Giriama have historically 
hailed from the area between Mombasa and Malindi to the north, as well as further 
inland, constituting one of the nine Mijikenda ethnic groups with roots along the 
Kenyan coast. Members of these communities have long been linked to the city 
through relations of dependence with wealthier urban elites (Willis 1993), and today 
form the backbone of the lowest rung of Mombasa‘s labour force. To be sure, low 
paid jobs are done by people from all over inland Kenya, who have flocked to the 
city to find work over the course of the last century, but it is the Mijikenda who 
make up Mombasa‘s service underclass; it is Mijikenda who tend to have the most 
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precarious and poorly remunerated jobs. From the thali
90
 chefs at New Chetna‘s, the 
men frying bhajiyas at Jawad‘s, to the people cleaning the temple where Parti will 
donate Hashim‘s penda: all these a priori ‗Asian‘ zones of consumption are 
structurally dependent on Mijikenda labour. Kachoris – whether eaten by a poor 
Khoja seamstress or an international school teacher from a wealthy Swahili family – 
must be seen as a product of urban structural inequalities that reproduce racialised 
class hierarchies at the same time as exposing the fundamentally entangled nature of 
what is ‗African‘ and ‗Asian‘ in Mombasa. 
Beyond labour, what are the conditions that produce a taste for these goods? 
Certainly, as the master of distinction (Bourdieu 1984) pointed out long ago, class is 
an important factor. Hashim‘s wares are significantly more expensive than the hard 
boiled eggs sprinkled with salt and chilli that you can buy on the ferry to Likoni, the 
southern mainland where much of Mombasa‘s working class live. His foods are not 
filling like maharagwe wa nazi (kidney beans in coconut sauce, served with thick, 
buttery chapattis, are a lunch-time favourite). Hashim‘s speciality is snacks (although 
many people lunch on this kind of thing, as well as the chips he also sells). Buying at 
Hashim‘s is a possibility for those with a greater degree of expendable income, 
allowing his customers to distinguish themselves as part of the better off.  
More importantly for my purposes here, in choosing Hashim‘s for a late morning 
snack, prasad purchase or takeaway treat, his customers simultaneously affirm and 
ignore Mombasa‘s longstanding connections with wider worlds. In one sense, the 
decision to consume these foods affirms a preference for tastes that look east, 
towards the Indian Ocean and its myriad littorals, rather than inland. Ghatiya, chevro, 
kachoris – the spices that give these foods flavour are not only absent from inland 
Kenyan cuisine, they are generally not appreciated. Nairobi residents also have 
plenty of access to ‗Asian‘ cuisine, reflecting patterns of Asian settlement, 
particularly since independence, when Asians largely relocated away from small 
towns and settled in the country‘s three largest cities. However, my experience of the 
capital‘s ‗Asian‘ eateries suggests that these are sites of occasional, rather than 
everyday, consumption for most Nairobians. I suspect that this is partly because the 
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 Thali refers to a set meal (consisting of rice, dhal, vegetables and other additions), 
as well as the metal plate on which it is served.  
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capital‘s food scene is bigger and more diverse – there‘s more choice so people eat 
less ‗Indian‘ food – but also because the history of local connections with ‗Asian‘ 
cuisine is far less entrenched. Drawing on Eisenberg‘s (2012) observations above, 
these geographies of consumption must be seen as intricately entangled within long 
histories of coastal marginalisation: if the coast was not so at odds with the nation, 
bhajiyas and the other foods described here would not be so emblematic of, nor so 
particularly rooted in, the littoral.  
I use Hashim‘s sugary emporium as an example, but it is hard to overestimate the 
predominance of establishments serving cuisine of ostensibly Indian Ocean heritage 
in Mombasa. Bhajiyas, pilau, chicken tikka, paneer rolls – these are sold everywhere 
from Hashmi‘s and Barka (restaurants owned by Swahili families) to Jawad‘s Cold 
Store and Bollywood Bites (whose proprietors trace their origins to Kutch and 
Kathiawar respectively). Part of this indicates the overrepresentation of people of 
Gujarati-origin in the catering sector, and middle class who can afford to eat out. 
However, given the relatively small size of the city‘s Gujarati-origin population and 
the broad appeal of such eateries (they are not ethnic enclaves by any stretch of the 
imagination), it is clear that eating out in Mombasa is inseparable from centuries of 
Indian Ocean exchange. From roadside tables serving chai and chapattis to the 
labourers who descend on the island at dawn, to small cafés like Hashim‘s which 
accommodate Mombasans‘ penchant for deep fried everything, or the many possible 
gentrifications of paneer that can be found in the beach resorts in the north, the city 
caters to littoral tastes.  
The point I want to underscore here is that while such foods might speak to the 
presence of elsewheres in Mombasan palates, they are often not imagined as such. 
From the chevro to the chips, the food served in places like Hashim‘s is considered 
ordinary, everyday and local. Several examples help demonstrate this point. Salwa, a 
Swahili friend at university in Nairobi was ecstatic when we met at Shaam-e-Bahaar 
one day for lunch. ‗Finally, a chicken tikka worth eating!‘ she exclaimed, tucking in 
to a leg. Nairobi tikkas, I learn, just aren‘t up to scratch. ‗Everyone knows that tikka 
is a Mombasan specialty‘, she pointed out prosaically between mouthfuls. I 
happened upon a similar conceptualisation of Mombasan cuisine when in the capital 
myself. Inspecting the wares at Diamond Plaza, Nairobi‘s largest Asian mall, my 
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eyes were drawn to a small, handwritten sign at the counter of Seth‘s Food and 
Sundry Goods store: ‗Special Mombasa Bhagwanji Kachoris, available Tuesdays 
and Fridays‘. Returning to Mombasa, I learn that the Bhagwanji family – 
competitors of Hashim‘s – continue to send their kachoris to Nairobi twice weekly, 
but used to export them all over the world. ‗We still have the boxes‘, Ashish tells me, 
indicating towards the cardboard containers – each embossed with ‗Special 
Mombasa Bhagwanji Kachoris‘ in swirly green and yellow font – that used to 
transport his family‘s famous kachoris across the East African Asian diaspora and 
beyond. There are customs difficulties these days apparently, but Ashish hopes to 
rejuvenate his kachori empire again soon. I nod sympathetically, wondering how 
wistful this desire is. The point, however, is clear: kachoris born of a Mombasan 
terroir have a special place in the imagination of many (the same is true of samosas, 
which everyone knows should only be consumed if produced by hands with an East 
African connection).  
Further examples I would like to consider here involve an expedition with my 
sometime neighbour Shahina, a tiny Memon woman with cherubic cheeks and an 
always slightly smudged ring of kohl encircling her eyes. It‘s the 50th anniversary of 
Kenyan independence and Shahina and I embark on a cross-town mission to visit 
relatives she hasn‘t seen in months. On our way out of Old Town, Shahina points out 
a caf  I‘ve not yet been to. La Chooza, she tells me, is owned by her cousin 
Mohammed. ‗What is chooza?‘ I inquire, perplexed by the name. ‗You know, it‘s the 
sauce‘, Shahina explains matter-of-factly. This was my first encounter with chooza, a 
sauce made principally of chillies, cumin, ginger, garlic and lime to which I was to 
become totally addicted. Each recipe is slightly different and everyone has their own 
theory as to which of the various establishments in Mombasa that serve this fine 
condiment make it best. Absent from menus elsewhere in the country, it usually 
accompanies chicken, but also paneer rolls and occasionally fish. I continued to find 
chooza rather an odd word and asked many after Shahina what it meant; no one had 
an explanation that offered more clarity. Only after many months of fieldwork did a 
perusal online for a chooza sauce recipe lead me to the fact that chooza means ‗chick‘ 
– young chicken – in Urdu and Hindi. No one, including the various Urdu speakers 
in Mombasa who I had asked about chooza, had pointed this out. This is not to 
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suggest that they didn‘t know, rather that chooza does not mean ‗chick‘ in Mombasa: 
chooza has been entirely localised. 
On the day of our outing, Shahina and I make our way to Buxton, the matatu stage 
(minivan depot) for commuters heading north. Matatus, privately owned minivans 
running day and night within and between major cities, are common throughout East 
Africa. After boda bodas (motorcycle taxis), matatus are the cheapest form of 
transport for travelling around the city – much cheaper than tuk tuks (which provide 
a door-to-door service), but more expensive than buses for longer distances. Driver-
conductor teams charge their passengers fixed rates for transport; prices generally 
only fluctuate when a mzungu – white person – appears. Profits are shared between 
the driver, conductor and owner of the van; livelihoods depend entirely on speed and 
fullness of the vehicle and the competition is thick. Conductors, always dressed in 
distinctive crimson shirts, spend a lot of time shouting out their destinations 
(‗Bamburi, Bamburi, Bamburi, beba, beba, beba!‘91) and attempting to bully 
potential customers – i.e. anyone in the vicinity looking vaguely interested in the 
mere possibility of travel – into riding with them and not their rivals. Matatus 
congregate at key junctions – known as stages – but also stop frequently to pick up 
those walking along the road. The intensity of harassment by matatu touts, 
particularly at stages, has resulted in a system by which potential passengers do 
everything in their power to look as disinterested as possible, allowing them to 
imperceptibly size up the competition before making the slightest of movement of 
the head, indicating to the conductor that they would like to proceed with his ride 
(matatu conductors and drivers are always men, but you do occasionally see female 
tuk tuk drivers). Today, Shahina and I find an almost full matatu and squeeze in. As 
the last passengers follow behind us, Lady Jaydee – bongo flava92 star of the moment 
– comes blasting through the speakers, the conductor slams the sliding door shut and 
we‘re off. I glance around, searching for any gems to add to my collection of ‗matatu 
wisdom‘ and am not disappointed: a red and white sticker above the windscreen 
reads ‗Weather never beats fashion‘. 
                                                 
91
 This means ‗Bamburi, get on!‘ with Bamburi being an area in the northern 
outskirts of Mombasa (on the mainland) and beba the imperative form of kubeba, 
meaning to load or carry in Swahili.  
92
 Bongo flava refers to a genre of Tanzanian hip-hop. 
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As we edge into the heavy traffic – it seems the whole city is choosing to mark this 
public holiday by escaping – I note a huge new flour advert above a building along 
the Nyali Road. ‗Kama si Jamii si chapatti! [If it‘s not Jamii, it‘s not chapatti!]‘, the 
billboard advises sweaty commuters and perambulators alike. In this sign, not only is 
the word chapatti naturalised as part of local language and cuisine, the advert 
suggests that if a chapatti is not made with Jamii flour – a popular Kenyan brand – it 
is not deserving of the name. Of course, this is an advert. But the words chooza and 
chapatti, and the foods they describe, have a local genealogy that cannot be 
explained away through reference to other places: they are Mombasan.  
A similar point could be made about various herbs. This was made clear to me one 
day when I accompanied Nadesh, one of my ever-patient Gujarati teachers, on a trip 
to Markiti for her weekly shopping trip. While Nadesh was verifying with a stall 
owner that the garlic she wanted was grown in Kenya (‗The Chinese stuff has no 
taste‘), his assistant turned to me. ‗Unasema Swahili? [Do you speak Swahili?]‘, he 
probed with an affable grin. I told him that I was learning, an answer he took as his 
prerogative to assess my progress. ‗Hii ni nini? [What‘s this?]‘, he asked, pointing to 
a stack of neatly tied bunches of plants with small, clover-like leaves. ‗Methi 
[fenugreek]‘, I replied confidently. ‗Na hii? [And this?]‘ he implored, brushing his 
fingers through an adjacent pile. ‗Dhaniya [coriander]‘. He confirms that I‘m doing 
well, ‗Unajua Swahili! [You know Swahili!]‘. I smile, thinking back to the Gujarati 
exam I took in London that has helped me pass this Swahili test. Methi and dhaniya 
are the Gujarati and, at least in Mombasa, Swahili words for fenugreek and coriander, 
herbs embedded in coastal cuisine as much as littoral lexicon.  
These linguistic legacies have implications on both sides of the Indian Ocean. On 
Tuesday afternoons during fieldwork, I would make my way to Aishani‘s house for 
our weekly efforts to improve each other‘s linguistic repertoire; before rewarding 
ourselves with chai and snacks, Aishani and I would spend a couple of hours 
chatting first in Gujarati and then in English. Aishani grew up in Madhapar, a town 
in northwest Gujarat, but came to Mombasa 26 years ago to marry her now deceased 
husband. Madhapar‘s East Africa connections are long established, and it is not 
unusual that Aishani‘s grandmother spent most of her life in Nairobi; her mother was 
born in Kenya shortly before the family returned to India, unable to maintain profit 
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margins in an increasingly Africanised construction sector. However, it was only 
after arriving in Mombasa as a young bride that Aishani realised that many of the 
words she had grown up using were actually Swahili. ‗Ndizi, mfuko, nyanya‘, 
Aishani reels off the Swahili for ‗banana‘, ‗bag‘ and ‗tomato‘, telling me that she had 
no idea these were Swahili words before her arrival in Kenya. The biggest shock, I 
learn, was peanuts. ‗How could jugu not be jugu?‘ Aishani remembers her disbelief 
at learning that jugu (peanuts) was not a Gujarati word. ‗We would never say 
singhdana or mughfari‘, Aishani knows the Gujarati terms but makes a face while 
saying them, emphasising their foreignness to her tongue. Aishani and her in-laws 
speak Gujarati to each other; the family return to Madhapar every two years, they 
have opinions on Narendra Modi. India was present in their lives, in a way that was 
simply not the case for most of my informants. Nevertheless, Aishani‘s linguistic 
discoveries in later life demonstrate that connections between Kenya and Gujarat are 
often not seen in India either. 
Returning to my outing with Shahina: when we finally arrive at her extended 
family‘s home, the door opened by a young woman lost somewhere under a large 
shawl, clearly hastily donned in the interests of modesty. Off comes the scarf as the 
two greet each other warmly; Ruksar is one of Shahina‘s numerous great-nieces. The 
family welcome us with some bemusement – Shahina has kept her visit and unusual 
companion (me) a surprise. Nevertheless, we are quickly included in the easy chat 
that flows through their breezy living room. What I would come to appreciate as 
standard fixtures of middle class Mombasan interior design are all present: 
decorative wallpaper (in this case red and curiously fluffy looking, with a pink tiger 
stripe motif below the coving), watercolour paintings of the mountains-behind-
streams variety, louver windows and a large TV surrounded by a heavy crimson sofa 
set. The most remarkable feature, though, is an enormous cage – almost two metres 
high – in which is perched an African grey parrot. Another of the many African grey 
parrots (Psittacus erithacus) I would meet in Mombasa, this ‗Kasuku‘, as he was 
known, was a keen whistler, and not shy to participate in the conversations going on 
around him.  
Because we arrive so late, the family has already eaten lunch. There is, however, 
plenty leftover and Shahina and I are soon ushered to the dining table. Serving up a 
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generous plate of mutton biryani and sweet mango pickle, Ruksar turns to me and 
asks, ‗Do you like African food?‘  
I add these verbal articulations to the everyday eating practices documented 
elsewhere in the chapter as a means of emphasising the locality (by which I mean 
bearing local qualities) of tastes and foods that might be perceived as bearers of 
Indian Ocean heritage to those not from the city. Contra to what we might expect 
from the cosmopolitan theorists that introduced this section, the ‗wider world-ness‘ 
of these foods is neither celebrated nor veiled: Indian Ocean historiographies are 
frequently not remarked upon at all, if anything, it is the local qualities of these same 
foods that is emphasised. In some cases, I suggest that my informants experience of 
and ideas about items like kachoris accords with what Engseng Ho has called 
‗resolute localism‘ (2006: 68). Ho‘s Hadrami informants in the city of Tarim, 
southern Yemen, made a point of emphasising the superior value of ‗local‘ products, 
such as rice, even when these products were known to be of foreign ‗origin‘. This 
hierarchy of valorisation, Ho contends, is resolute ‗because it is not always unaware 
of the trajectories of localisation; it is resolute despite that knowledge‘ (2006: 68). 
Sitting down to a feast centred around steamed white rice, one of Ho‘s hosts notes 
the Jawa-nese
93
 roots of a preference for this staple, while at the same time 
positioning it as ‗local‘ in contrast to the greasy, red-tinted stuff served in the town‘s 
two restaurants. ‗Foreign‘ products are denigrated and avoided: Ho is usually one of 
the only customers in the establishments selling ‗foreign‘ rice.  
A foreign/local binary does not have traction in Mombasa, nor did I see a 
demonising of ‗foreign‘ products in the way that Ho describes. However, the point is 
Mombasans may be – and, in the case of Asians, often were – aware of the South 
Asian historiographies bundled up in items like biryani or kachoris. But these 
histories are frequently localised in the experience of eating. The difference, as I see 
it, between the cosmopolitanism literature described above and the position laid out 
by Ho, is that in the former, wider worlds (and knowledge of/access to them) are 
discursively glorified or obscured. In contrast, in the case of Tarim and Mombasa, 
these connections are often not so much downplayed as made local.  
                                                 
93
 Jawa refers to ‗island Southeast Asia‘ in local parlance (Ho 2006: 66). 
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Ho‘s remarks certainly appear to ring true for some of my informants. However, his 
‗resolute localism‘ depends on a foreign/local binary that assumes some things 
actually are local, and other things are not – and that it is possible to distinguish 
definitively between the two. For many Mombasans I submit, it is not simply that 
wider connections were ‗resolutely localised‘, but that they were not imagined to 
exist at all. In the same way that Britain‘s long history of exchange with China is 
completely irrelevant when I make myself a cup of tea, I contend that Indian Ocean 
historiographies are often absent when Mombasans like Beatrice or Ruksar catch up 
over kachoris or snack on sev. 
My thoughts on this subject have benefitted from Alastair Pennycook‘s (2007, 2010) 
work on the relationship between language (particularly English) and locality. 
Analysing the lyrics of ‗If I die tonight‘ by Malaysian hip-hop group Too Phat, 
Pennycook notes that the song, rapped in English and peppered with ‗local‘ 
references, could easily be interpreted as ‗the kind of English localization that is the 
meat and drink of world Englishes‘ (2007: 111). The lyrics take listeners on a 
journey through the rappers‘ last day on earth ‗to do‘ list, which includes making 
time for a final pre-dawn prayer, breakfasting on fried kuey teow (a popular noodle 
dish) and organising their shoe collection for distribution amongst friends:  
…line up my shoes one by one/Start with Jordans and end with Air Force 
Ones/Put a Post-it on the tongue of each one with the name of each dun/I 
think I know my homies and who would want which one (Pennycook 2007: 
111).  
If English is ‗[localised] through [reference] to local cultural elements‘ (2007: 111), 
Pennycook asks the reader to consider the (im)possibility of distinguishing the local, 
in this instance and beyond. If, for example, we take kuey teow to be 
paradigmatically local (itself something of a challenge given the long histories of 
migration and exchange that have given rise to Malaysian cuisine), 
…can we assume that other references are not local? Or, put another way, 
when do… [Air] Jordans become local? Once we take into account the 
localization that has already occurred previously, and once we consider 
enactment and recontextualization as localizing processes, it is far less clear 
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whether we can take this as a global or a local reference…‘ (Pennycook 2007: 
111, emphasis added).  
Pennycook points to the need to challenge the linearity bound up in existing accounts 
of language localisation, which, in privileging narratives of origins, spread and 
adaptation, endlessly perpetuate notions of centre/periphery, local/global, 
original/copy. ‗Rather‘, he urges, ‗we have to understand ways in which [languages] 
are already local‘ (Pennycook 2010: 70). Accepting the multiple, simultaneous 
origins of locality leads us away from ‗asking whether… language use is local or not‘ 
and towards ‗how it is rendered local in the doing‘ (2007: 111).  
 Applying Pennycook‘s observations to my informants unmarked, everyday 
consumption of various foods – be that chapattis or chevro, chips or choma – 
provides a means of capturing the discourses and practices outlined in this chapter: 
in many instances, these foods are ‗already local‘. Moreover, following Pennycook‘s 
rejection of attempts to determine what is local, I see no utility in creating 
hierarchies of Indian Ocean significance in Mombasa. In some instances, and for 
some people, Indian Ocean histories were intimately bound up in the experience of 
eating, even if these experiences were also ‗resolutely local‘. In many others, these 
histories were not simply irrelevant, they were not there. Sometimes Indian Ocean 
historiographies mattered and, more than that, were imagined to exist; in others they 
were not. 
 
Conclusion: bhajiyas as already local  
Kresse writes of Mombasa‘s ‗inherent connectivity to other regions‘ (2012: 37). 
‗Indeed‘, he emphasises, ‗without reference to these [other places], urban life here 
cannot really be understood‘ (2012: 37). However, Kresse also rightly underscores 
the importance of not lazily assuming ‗an all-embracing and unifying ―Indian Ocean 
cosmopolitanism‖‘ (2012: 37) based on contemporary social diversity; his thinking 
on the subject, traces Mombasa‘s long history of integrating outsiders, in order to 
demonstrate how the city‘s ‗inherent connectedness‘ (2012: 36) is made and remade. 
Some of the examples provided in this chapter, such as Yash‘s remarks about 
mishkaki or Hashim‘s Belgian Taj Mahal, illustrate these processes clearly: wider 
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worlds were frequently brought into being, whether valued or devalued, in urban 
discursive practice. However, to overlook the way in which wider connections were 
often not valued at all is to miss much of what I saw in Mombasa.  
Mombasa is intimately and evidently connected to wider worlds. Where I diverge 
from the cosmopolitan authors cited here is that I think these ‗inherent connections‘ 
are often absent from everyday practice, just as England‘s long-standing historical 
relationship with China is not a feature of my tea-drinking habits. In buying bhajiyas, 
cherishing chooza or guzzling ghatiya, people in Mombasa enact ways of being in 
the world that, although always embedded in elsewheres, are ‗already local‘. 
Moreover, building on Eisenberg (2012), I have suggested that it is the everyday-
ness of these practices that makes them ‗already political‘, implicitly and persistently 
underscoring the coast‘s distinction from the Kenyan nation.  
This conclusion points to the need for a more nuanced approach to Indian Ocean 
cosmopolitanism. Following earlier trends in the study of community or diaspora, 
which powerfully demonstrate that such categories only make sense when people 
imagine them to exist (e.g. Sökefeld 2006), I have sought to show that that the Indian 
Ocean is not always an appropriate lens in Mombasa. Drawing on Pennycook‘s 
(2007, 2010) incisive observations, I have suggested that we ‗localise‘ the Indian 
Ocean. Indian Ocean interconnections are a ubiquitous part of daily life in Mombasa 
– but they are often not imagined as such by the people whose activities scholars like 
myself are trying to describe. The ethnography presented here demonstrates the need 
to start by describing what people understand as local – to localise the Indian Ocean 
from the bottom up – in order to represent how the world beyond is imagined, and 
not imagined, from this particular urban littoral.  
This theme of understanding Mombasa within a shifting spectrum of geographies is 
continued in the next chapter, where I turn our attention to discussions of Islamic 
reform, and add a host of chronologies to the emerging analysis of the city.  
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Chapter 3  
Reform and the body politic 
 
Even under the gazebo the sun is blistering. I‘m standing in a queue in the car park 
of the Khoja Ithna-Asheri imambargah (congregation hall) with about 30 Khoja 
women, each waiting our turn to donate blood. There‘s a steady stream of people in 
and out of the small tent, as people come and go in cars, tuk tuks or on foot. Five 
reclining chairs have been installed, on which donors are lying upright as their blood 
runs through clear plastic tubes into collection bags below. Those donating are 
having their photos taken by friends and relatives. Chatter and giggles abound, the 
jovial atmosphere is quite a contrast to the solemnity that has characterised the many 
majalis (religious gatherings) I‘ve attended since the start of Muharram. Every now 
and then someone calls out ‗Labaik ya Husain‘ (‗We are at your service Husain‘), to 
which the rest of us respond in kind. I notice that fewer cries of allegiance are 
coming from the men‘s gazebo, which is stationed about five metres away, further to 
the front of the car park.  
Screens encircle three sides of the ladies‘ gazebo; these ensure privacy, as women 
have been instructed to remove their headscarves while donating by the National 
Blood Transfusion Service (NBTS) staff. The medics, dressed in dressed in starched 
white uniforms and coordinating the event, explain that this is a precautionary 
measure, designed to prevent women from overheating in a moment when they are 
also being drained of their vital energies. Yasmine, a member of the Zainabiyya 
Ladies‘ Committee (responsible for the women‘s section of the Khoja imambargah), 
periodically reminds the assembled crowd not to circulate any of the images being 
snapped on smartphones – photographs of women without hijab must not end up on 
Facebook. While waiting for the next chair to free up, we fill out official forms, 
declaring our weight, age, medical history and current medication regime, as well as 
confirming that we have not recently been tattooed or pierced. Maalia is distributing 
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and collecting the forms, but the donating itself is organised by the NBTS team, 
none of whom are Khojas.  
The medics are efficient at finding veins but the small number of donating stations 
means the process is all quite slow. I start chatting with Tameen, who‘s about the 
same age as me. Both of us are excited, we‘ve not donated before. ‗You feel so good, 
no?‘ Tameen chirps, ‗It‘s so good to give back‘. Masuma, who‘s in front of us, 
agrees with a simple ‗Ya Husain‘. She has cleverly bought a little handheld folding 
fan with her, which Tameen and I eye longingly. ‗It seems even hotter than usual 
today‘, I remark. ‗Tell me, I‘m in socks!‘ Tameen replies, pointing her right foot out 
from under her buibui to display snow-white socks under her black sandals. Sock-
wearers are a minority amongst Khoja women and I haven‘t noticed Tameen in them 
before. Querying her about it, she explains, ‗I‘ve been meaning to start for ages and 
finally decided to do it on the first of Muharram‘.  
I‘m curious to know more but it‘s Tameen‘s turn to donate and she‘s whisked off to 
a chair further down the line. Now at the front of the queue, I see Sakina grinning as 
Mubina takes a photograph of her blood-donating daughter. Sakina is dressed in the 
Jaffery Academy‘s distinct green and white school uniform and I wonder if those 
who want to donate have been given time off from class.
94
 ‗I‘m sending it straight to 
Laila‘, Mubina exclaims with a proud mother smile; Laila, Mubina‘s eldest daughter, 
has recently given birth in Toronto. ‗I think the blood drive [in Toronto] is later 
today, but of course Laila won‘t be giving this year‘, Mubina informs me with more 
glowing pride.  
Once Sakina has given the requisite blood, the needle is carefully removed by an 
NBTS attendant. Rearranging her hijab, Sakina starts heading towards the table 
where cans of Azam Cola have been laid out to help rejuvenate blood sugar levels. 
Azam Cola, produced in Tanzania, is Khojas‘ preferred alternative to Coca Cola, 
which is boycotted by many and not distributed in religious or social spaces 
associated with the jamaat because of its links with the Israeli state. A number of 
cafés in Mombasa also only serve Azam soft drinks. Seeing it on the table, I ask 
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 As mentioned in the Introduction, the Jaffery Academy is linked to the Khoja 
jamaat but educates a diverse swathe of Mombasa‘s more affluent children.  
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Mubina if Coca Cola ever found its way into her home. ‗No, no‘, she pressed, ‗we 
avoid as many Israeli products as possible. L‘Oréal, Nestlé, Johnson & Johnson. 
There‘s the list online‘, Mubina added. Although not endorsed by the official 
Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement (which advocates the avoidance of 
products and services linked to companies that play a direct role in Israel‘s violations 
of international law), such lists were regularly circulated on WhatsApp groups I was 
part of, forwarded by Khojas and other Mombasan Muslims.  
At this moment, Sakina, who had finished adjusting her headscarf and was reaching 
for a drink, faints. She‘s clearly completely blacked out and there‘s some commotion 
as we try to resuscitate her and get her back onto one of the reclining chairs. One of 
the NBTS nurses takes charge of removing Sakina‘s headscarf and getting people to 
give her some air. Still looking like a ghost, she eventually moves with her mother to 
leave and very nearly faints again. A woman from the NBTS advises that Sakina not 
put her headscarf back on this time, so Mubina drives their 4x4 right up to the 
entrance of the gazebo, ensuring that her daughter does not expose her uncovered 
head to the outside world; they eventually get away.  
Finally it‘s my turn. Everything goes smoothly but I too almost faint afterwards; 
blood donating in the sun suddenly feels like something of an extreme sport. 
Regrouping on a chair near the refreshments table, my eyes are drawn to the murals 
which have recently been painted on the outside of the building that constitutes the 
car park‘s western wall.  
 
155 
 
 
Figure 33: Muharram murals in the car park of the Khoja imambargah, Old 
Town.  
The paintings, (Fig. 33 above), which I haven‘t had the chance to observe properly 
until now, display the artwork of the winners of the annual children‘s drawing 
competition, held in the weeks leading up to Muharram. The winning images have 
been enlarged and transposed onto the wall – each over two metres wide – 
presumably by a professional sign painter. One of them depicts a small group of 
blank-faced people praying in the middle of a barren desert; an army approaches the 
beleaguered worshipers and arrows are already flying towards them. The aphorism 
above reads ‗Verily prayers keeps [sic] you away from all indecency and evil – Al-
Quran. Imam Husayn in a state of war did not forget prayer‘. The second painting 
shows a pair of hands bringing a sword down on a man‘s bleeding shoulders. 
Resembling Atlas, the man is holding up the world, which is simultaneously being 
attacked by arrows, each of which is labelled with a negative attribute (power, greed, 
depravation, slavery, to name a few). The world drips blood, creating pools of blood 
below it. Next to each red pool is the name of a particular geographic location: Gaza, 
Iraq, Latin America, North Korea, Bahrain, Burma, among others. Above this image 
are the words ‗Imam Husayn sacrificed his Life to fight injustice. Never accept any 
kind of injustice in society‘. The final painting is a diptych with hands shackled in 
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cuffs in front of a fiery orange background on one side; on the other, open hands 
release a dove against a blue background. The message reads: Imam Husayn ‗If you 
don‘t believe in any religion or the hereafter, at least be free in this world. Don‘t be a 
slave to your worldly desires‘.  
As with the Muharram placards that decorate the interior of the imambargah at the 
moment, what strikes me most is the collapsing of scales between Karbala and other 
places, and the claims to universality that the messages portray. Feeling revived by 
the sugary cola, I find my things and say goodbye to the remaining donors; many are 
also heading home for lunch. Maalia holds a flap of the gazebo open for me, ‗Did 
you enjoy? So organised, no?‘ she waggles her head, admiring the scene one last 
time. We confirm we‘ll see each other at the majlis in a few hours.  
 
Writing reform  
Islamic reform has received a great deal of anthropological attention in recent 
decades; perhaps the key conclusion to emerge from this rich body of scholarship is 
that the term itself does little to illuminate the complexity it names. In broadly 
linking ‗projects whose specific focus is the brining into line of religious beliefs and 
practices with what are held to be the core foundations of Islam‘ (Osella & Osella 
2013: xi), reform suggests a consistency, and imposes an always questionable 
dichotomy – between reformists and their others – upon the blurred realities of lived 
experience. Rather than precipitating the term‘s abandonment, however, 
ethnographic studies have proved well-suited for illustrating the geographical and 
historical specificity of reform: the ideas and practices considered to fall under its 
banner shift across time and space, can wear a variety of garbs within the same place 
and change over the course of individual lifetimes (Ewing 1997; Gardner 1993; 
Green 2005). Careful ethnography has helped illuminate that what emerges as reform 
in a particular context stems from local concerns and interactions, as much as 
engagements with an imagined ‗global Islam‘ (Alam 2011; Haniffa 2013). Projects 
of reform, moreover, do not exist in isolation, often deeply enmeshed within and 
motivated by wider political, social and personal landscapes. Reform is neither 
‗simply‘ nor solely a religious affair; as Edward Simpson (2008) has persuasively 
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shown in the context of Gujarat, individual opinions around reform are shifting and 
the positions expressed at any given moment might have more to do with lovers, 
bureaucratic mishaps and local political calculations than religious doctrine and 
belief. Finally, ethnography has helped to unpack the significance of the trope 
between reformists and their others; although always at best a partial truth, the 
dichotomy forms an important part of social life in many parts of the world, a lens 
through which Muslims in different contexts imagine themselves in relation to 
proximate and distant others (Kresse 2006; Marsden 2005).  
The aim of this chapter is to tease out some of this complexity as it relates to Khojas 
in Mombasa. The opening vignette paints a scene infused with reform. Discussions 
around reform feed concerns about being photographed or seen without headscarves: 
wearing a hijab when outdoors is now practiced with near uniformity amongst Khoja 
women, but only became commonplace in the 1980s. This gendered intersection 
between sartorial and religious politics – of which the adoption of socks is a further 
manifestation – is the subject of numerous scholarly accounts (L. Ahmed 2012; 
Akhtar 2016; Mahmood 2005; Tarlo 2014). In Mombasa, the political economy of 
reform is also embedded within cans of Azam Cola. Products associated with the 
state of Israel are boycotted by many as commodified emblems of a central threat to 
the global Muslim ummah. For Khojas, consumption is not only motivated by pan-
Islamic solidarity, it is also understood to cultivate and deviate religious resolve: as 
others have also noted, crafting pious subjectivity involves following food 
prescriptions that extend beyond halal (Fadil 2009; Gillette 2000).  
Rather than clothing or food, this chapter focuses on how reformist discourses 
inform blood donation itself, as well as structure its relationship to other 
commemorative acts. Using the blood donation drive as a lens, I examine how 
shifting ideas about the soteriological potential of mourning rituals (which mirror 
debates in the wider Shia world), meet concerns about bid’a (undue Islamic 
innovation) and the threat of Wahhabis (discourses which animate the Swahili coast), 
as well as notions about the need for Asians to make ‗productive‘ contributions 
towards national development. Highlighting how these themes intersect with 
questions of class and insecurity, the blood donation drive is presented as a 
multivalent event, imagined to respond to enmeshed religious and political goals.  
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Thinking with blood donation 
The link between religious reform and blood donation form a central part of Jacob 
Copeman‘s (2009b) analyses of blood donors and donor recruiters in North India. 
Copeman describes blood donation as an important way in which giving mechanisms 
have been ‗made social‘ and more able to serve the goals of reformist conceptions of 
Hinduism (2009b: 50). Customary giving practices – such as monetary donations to 
temples or the sponsoring of public feasts for one‘s congregational fellows – have 
come to be viewed as wasteful, non-productive forms of worship, activities in need 
of reform. In replacing these conventional rites, Copeman argues that blood donation 
performs a ‗substitutive ennoblement‘ (2009b: 58), leaving giving practices intact 
(and thus avoiding rupture in people‘s giving experiences), but at the same time co-
opting these structures to affect new – and various – outcomes. If previous modes of 
giving involved a ‗centripetal aim‘ – namely ‗securing the soul‘s peace‘ – blood 
donation achieves the same and more, by producing ‗centrifugal (socialized) effects‘ 
(2009b: 62).
95
 In other words, blood donation does not efface the spiritual goals of 
giving; rather, the practical utility of blood donation – its secular outcomes – 
becomes a way of achieving individual salvation (via, and at the same time as, 
contributing to wider society). Not only does blood literally reproduce and multiply 
in the body of both donor and recipient, it is blood donation‘s incontestable social 
utility that make it so amenable to the ideology of ‗action as worship‘ (2009b: 57) at 
the heart of reformist Hinduism.  
As Copeman‘s research makes plain, blood donors‘ motivations are by no means 
exclusively religious. For many of Copeman‘s informants, one of blood‘s principal 
and most lauded effects is its capacity to traverse difference, an imaginary based on 
the anonymous nature of donation. He writes,  
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 An imagined shift from centripetal to centrifugal blood flow also relates to the on-
going transformation of the Indian blood service. Copeman notes that donations were 
historically motivated by the needs of a known, specified recipient, usually a family 
member. While such donations were rarely received by the ailing person themselves, 
they were ‗nevertheless given ―for‖ them in order to facilitate their treatment‘ (2009a: 
95). This is being phased out in favour a centrifugally-oriented voluntary system, 
with the emphasis on blood going to anyone one (and potentially to many people). 
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…anonymity makes it possible for blood donation to almost mechanically 
transgress caste and community boundaries, and then for those involved in 
the donation to construct any number of possible meanings linked to this 
transgression (2009b: 10). 
 The national significance of this is the focus of another article, where Copeman 
(2009a) finds Nehruvian ideologies of integration alive and well amongst medics and 
donors alike (see also 2009b: 149–168) . Those involved with blood camps 
frequently underscore their heterogeneous character (these events draw together 
thousands of people from various castes, religious affiliations and parts of the 
country), as well as imagine their blood as having the potential to link diverse 
constituents. A Hindu interlocutor is portrayed as far from unique in hoping that ‗his 
one donated unit would be split and transfused into a Christian, a Muslim and a Sikh 
respectively, in order to show that all people and religions are one‘ (Copeman 2009a: 
90). In addition to anonymity Copeman notes that it is blood donation‘s ‗systemic 
properties of gathering and disbursal‘ that make it ‗particularly amenable to 
congregative thought‘ (2009a: 72): not only do blood camps bring together a diverse 
swathe of humanity in a specific place, the body tissue donated by a single donor is 
then divided into its constituent parts and distributed to a range of recipients. Thus, 
while anonymous, non-reciprocal blood donation may seem to run counter to the 
principles of classic anthropological gift theory, Copeman concludes that giving 
blood in fact contributes to the construction of the enduring social relations 
envisaged by Mauss (2016 [1925]), albeit offering a nationalist variant.  
John Harrington (forthcoming) similarly finds discourses of national integration 
pivotal to discourses surrounding blood donation in Kenya following the attack on 
Westgate. Even while the events at the shopping mall were still unfolding, thousands 
of Kenyans, predominantly in Nairobi but also in Mombasa and elsewhere, lined up 
to give their blood, collecting five times more than would usually be expected in a 
single week. This collective bloodletting was much remarked upon by politicians and 
on social media, as well as in the national and international press. Both President 
Kenyatta and online dialogues under the #Weareone Twitter hashtag held up blood 
donation as evidence of national unity, proof of the ability, and desire, of Kenyans to 
overcome the ethnic divisions that appeared to structure the violence that followed 
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the 2007 elections. President Kenyatta described the enthusiasm around blood 
donation as affirming, ‗deep inside, where it counts most, we are one indivisible 
national family‘.96 In a photograph widely circulated on Twitter, seven donors‘ arms 
were tattooed with the words ‗Now our blood flows through each other‘. Echoing 
Copeman, Harrington argues that it is the indiscriminate nature of blood transfusions, 
and the process via which it is gathered, mixed and distributed, that make it uniquely 
positioned to dissolve ethnic boundaries, constructing a ‗biopolitical collective‘ in 
the process. For Harrington, blood donation also served as a ‗barometer of 
civilisation‘ (B. Simpson 2009: 105). The order exhibited by a functioning national 
blood system – sustained by medical professionals and a cadre of educated and 
productive citizens ready to give blood – helped to reaffirm Kenya‘s membership 
within the international community, a position which had been called into question 
following the post-electoral violence of 2007-08 and the on-going International 
Criminal Court case involving several of the country‘s leading politicians (President 
Kenyatta among them).  
Blood donation became evidence of civic engagement, but also patriotic sacrifice – a 
way for Kenyans to productively counter the senseless, wasteful loss of blood that 
characterised the Westgate disaster. Harrington argues that the trope of patriotism 
encompassed within blood had particular resonance for two groups of ‗pariah‘ 
citizens, who strategically sought to use blood donation to demonstrate their 
commitment to the nation. Harrington cites the example of the Somali ambassador, 
who called on Somalis and Kenyan Somalis to follow his much-publicised example 
of donating ‗so that Kenyans could see that we are with them‘. Given that it was the 
Somali-based group al-Shabaab who claimed responsibility for the Westgate attack, 
blood donation became an evocative symbol in attempts to reconfigure Kenyan-
Somali relations. Kenyan Asians were similarly at the forefront of responses to 
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 Quotations in this paragraph, as well as the following two, pertain to Harrington‘s 
(forthcoming) article.  
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Westgate, a fact often cited in the press.
97
 Armed security teams associated with 
various Asian communities were involved in helping to secure the mall itself, and 
Asians were prominently engaged in the provision of emergency care and support 
throughout the attack and its aftermath. As John Sibi-Okumu ironically noted in an 
online opinion piece,  
―Westgate‖ came to be seen as the South Asians‘ finest hour. At last, South 
Asians had made it clear to all that they were well and truly Kenyan and, 
once again, the media found a perfect hook upon which to hang a sentimental 
narrative of unity in adversity.
98
  
Sibi-Okumu rejects this narrative for overlooking the long history of Asian 
settlement and contributions to the country; it was, however, common parlance at the 
time, and bolstered by Asian blood donation. Harrington notes that blood donation 
has a long history amongst at least one Asian community, linked in part to an 
explicitly nationalist aim. As the founder of Jain blood donation drives – running 
since 1978 – explained to him, giving to the National Blood Transfusion Service was 
motivated both by seva, the principle of selfless sacrifice central to Jainism (and 
Hinduism), and by a desire to demonstrate to ‗…the government [that] we are not 
only doing things for ourselves but for others‘. Following Westgate, images of 
Asians as donors and emergency support volunteers were drawn on to reframe 
narratives of insularity and alterity that have dominated discourses about the 
minority since the colonial era.  
Although Harrington does not dwell on the religious motives of Jain donors, it is 
clear that, as amongst Copeman‘s Indian informants, blood donation in the aftermath 
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 See: ‗Westgate attack: Asians, a selfless community‘. Daily Nation, 26 September 
2013 (available online: http://www.nation.co.ke/video/1951480-2007660-
nab7mqz/index.html, accessed 27 September 2016), as well as J. Verini‘s article: 
‗After Westgate siege, new respect for Kenya‘s Indians‘. National Geographic, 4 
October 2013 (available online: 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/131004-nairobi-westgate-mall-
kenyan-indians-gandhi-kikuyus-world/, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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 See J. Sibi-Okumu‘s article: ‗Alternate angle – love belatedly‘. Awaaz, 25 January 
2014 (available online: 
http://awaazmagazine.com/previous/index.php/archives/item/477-alternate-angle-
love-belatedly, accessed 7 January 2017). 
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of Westgate served a range of goals and produced multiple effects. Both scholars 
also observe the ambivalent relationship between voluntary blood donation and 
liberal market ideology. In India, Copeman (2009a) asserts that while the move to 
non-remunerated donation in India appears to run counter to liberal logics,
99
 blood 
banks often target key beneficiaries and locales of liberalisation – such as the 
customers and employees of shopping malls and multinationals – and seek to 
persuade donors by offering them discounted health insurance and other marketised 
returns. Moreover, both Copeman‘s and Harrington‘s analyses demonstrate that 
notions of productivity and waste are at the heart of contemporary donor imaginaries. 
If in Kenya donated blood was juxtaposed with the wasted blood tragically shed 
during the attack on the country‘s ultimate zone of liberal consumption, Hindu 
reformists in India valorise the utility of blood donation against profligate forms of 
giving. Blood, in other words, allows ‗the human body‘s productivity to be sutured 
not only into the productivity of markets but also into productive national and 
supranational imaginings‘ (Copeman 2009a: 72; see also Waldby & Mitchell 2006).  
 
Commemorating Karbala: the reform of mourning  
The blood donation drive I attended in Mombasa was the first event of its kind to be 
organised by Khojas in Mombasa. As explained in the jamaat’s synopsis of the day‘s 
proceedings, the drive was held ‗in commemoration of Ashura the great martyrdom 
of Imam Hussain (A.S.)‘.100 Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Muharram, is the 
most important moment of the Shia year; it is on this day that Karbala 
commemorations reach their peak. As mentioned in the Introduction, it is hard to 
overstate the significance of this historic event in Khoja daily life and ritual. Nadia, a 
dynamic female reciter surmised the sentiments of many when she told me one 
morning, ‗We were born to remember Karbala‘.  
 
                                                 
99
 Paid donations for blood were banned by India‘s Supreme Court in 1998 
(Copeman 2009a: 75).  
100
 See the Africa Federation website: ‗Mombasa Jaffery Medical Centre – blood 
donation to commemorate Ashura‘. (available online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/jamaats/kenya/mombasa/1044-mombasa-jaffery-
medical-centre-blood-donation-to-commemorate-ashura, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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Given the centrality of Karbala commemorations to Shia Islam, it is unsurprising that 
studies of Shia Muslims around the world allocate significant attention to the history 
and practice of mourning rituals, particularly those that take place during Muharram 
(Flaskerud 2010; Hyder 2006; Khosronejad 2015; Pinault 2001; Ruffle 2014; 
Schubel 1993). Scholars in this field have long been attendant to debates around 
ritual commemoration: how should Husain be remembered? What are the merits of 
different modalities of grieving? What is the historical provenance and ‗accuracy‘ of 
particular styles of commemoration? Before considering commemoration as an 
object of reform, I first outline key modes of remembrance in Mombasa. Throughout 
the year stories of the Battle conclude every religious function – majalis always end 
with the masaib (from suffering in Arabic), an emotionally charged recounting of a 
part of the Karbala tragedy, usually told from the perspective of one of its key 
protagonists. During the masaib, Khojas at the very least put their heads in their 
hands in quiet contemplation, many wail loudly; crying is particularly impassioned 
during Muharram. The various death anniversaries (wafat) of holy personalities 
marked annually – including during Muharram – involve the singing of marsiyas and 
nauhas (haunting a cappella eulogies evoking Karbala‘s martyrs in Urdu).  
During the first ten days of Muharram, which culminate with Ashura, a number of 
other forms of commemoration are added to this repertoire. These include funeral 
processions (held for each of Karbala‘s key protagonists within the imambargah),101 
as well as various additional bodily performances of mourning, such as matam 
(ritualised breast beating),
102
 saph matam (breast beating conducted while moving in 
a rhythmic circle) and, amongst some male worshippers, zanjir, self-flagellation with 
                                                 
101
 Funeral processions involve the solemn parade of a taziya or coffin, specific to 
the particular martyr being remembered, around the congregation hall, along with 
alams (battle standards) and various other relics. Funeral processions serve a 
mnemonic and didactic function, one of the multiple ways in which Shia 
hagiography is internalised over the course of a lifetime (Flaskerud 2010). For 
instance, on the day that Abbas, Husain‘s half-brother, is commemorated, an ornate 
silver water vessel hangs from one of the alams, symbolic of the fact that Abbas was 
killed while attempting to acquire water for his encircled kin.  
102
 Matam is a broad term for all forms of self-flagellation (i.e. it can include zanjir, 
described in the next footnote), although in Mombasa it usually refers exclusively to 
ritualised breast-beating performed by bringing the right hand to the left side of the 
chest.  
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metal blades (an act of intentional bloodletting).
103
 Matam and zanjir are strenuous 
activities. Amongst the female worshipers that I knew (who, as women, only engage 
in matam), degrees of vigour vary widely; some pummelled their chests with both 
hands, but I suspected that even the less energetic went home with bruises. The 
effects of self-flagellation receives attention in numerous accounts (Hegland 1998; 
Hyder 2006; Pinault 2001). As Tameen explained to me after my first encounter with 
the practice, ‗The whole point is to take us back to that time‘. Self-flagellation serves 
as a means of transport, back to the merciless plains of Karbala, back to 680 CE. In 
this vein, blood‘s noted ability to make the past viscerally present (Carsten 2013) 
helps explain its centrality in Khoja mourning rituals and décor: even for the 
majority who do not participate in zanjir, descriptions of the bloody suffering of 
Husain and his companions at Karbala form an important part of the masaib, while 
‗bloodied‘ cloth (produced through reddish tie-dye) decorates the Khoja 
imambargah and mehfiles, particularly during Muharram.  
Suffering through matam or zanjir makes the Karbala tragedy a corporeal one – it 
instils empathy for Husain and his companions and an embodied appreciation of 
their efforts. These and other Khoja mourning rituals speak to the ‗incorporating 
practices‘ that Paul Connerton (2013 [1989]: 94) has identified as so fundamental to 
collective memory (see also Halbwachs 1992 [1925-1944]). Via the body, Karbala is 
brought into every imambargah, into every Shia heart: Karbala is deterritorialised, 
globalised, internalised (Hyder 2006). Such performances not only transform 
congregants into some kind of whole, unified by rhythmic commemoration, their 
beat resonates far beyond its walls. As forms of lamentation practiced by Shia all 
over the world, participating in such rituals is about staking a place within a global 
ummah, bringing a shared sense of belonging into existence. Moreover, it is through 
their willingness to inflict suffering on themselves that Shias demonstrate their 
devotion to Husain; this is an oath of allegiance inscribed on flesh, be that bruises or 
cuts (Hegland 1998).  
                                                 
103
 Zanjir refers specifically to the metal flail but is used in Mombasa to refer to the 
practice more generally (also zanjir matam). Zanjir is the Urdu and Gujarati term for 
a practice that has numerous appellations and variations around the world, such as 
zanjir-zani in Hyderabad (Pinault 2001) or ‗hitting hydar‘ in Beirut (Deeb 2006: 
135). 
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The blood donation drive described above must be considered in terms of a wider 
geography of debates about how to commemorate Karbala. Based on research 
conducted in Iran around the time of the Islamic Revolution, Mary Hegland charts a 
distinct shift in ‗the central meaning of Shi‘i Islam among the Iranian masses‘ (1983: 
219). Hegland plots two contrasting images of Imam Husain, and associates each 
with a particular political ideology. Prior to the Revolution, Hegland argues that the 
notion of ‗Imam Husain as Intercessor‘ dominated Iranian conceptualisations: 
mourning the Imam was principally motivated by an individual‘s desire to improve 
their current worldly predicaments, as well as gain admission to paradise. ‗The 
believer strives to show his respect and devotion to the imam in every way possible, 
hoping thereby to become close to him, that the imam will feel disposed to provide 
assistance‘ (Hegland 1983: 221). Hegland suggests that modifying one‘s behaviour 
to accommodate the desires of the Imam – thereby currying favours and protection – 
was mirrored in the approach of many Iranians with regards to political and 
economic elites: 
The art of pleasing – the strategy of forming connections with the powerful 
and of modifying one‘s behaviour to please them – practiced in relations with 
the imams, is also applied to political dealings in the real world (1983: 224).  
However, with the popularisation of the teachings of Ali Shariati
104
 in the years prior 
to the Revolution, this quietist approach was increasingly abandoned and associated 
patterns of commemoration became the subject of critique. As one of Hegland‘s 
informants in Aliabad explained, ‗crying does not get you anywhere. It is not 
following in the way of Husain‘ (1983: 230). Imam Husain‘s martyrdom was thus 
revalorised: proximity to the Imam was achieved through emulation of his 
revolutionary behaviour, not mournful devotion. In this modified understanding, 
Husain‘s most important lesson to the faithful was the importance of standing up 
against oppression and injustice, focussing more on improving society rather than 
your own personal lot. The ‗Husain as Example‘ ethos, Hegland argues, played a 
fundamental role in galvanising Iranians against the Shah (see also Flaskerud 2013).  
                                                 
104
 Shariati, a sociologist of religion, was a hugely influential Iranian intellectual in 
the lead up to the Islamic Revolution.  
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Lara Deeb (2006) traces a remarkably similar contrast between what she calls 
‗traditional‘ and ‗authenticated‘ approaches to Husain in Beirut. As in Iran, these 
contrasting modes of commemoration are related to a reappraisal of the 
soteriological potential of grief. Divine reward is, for ‗authenticated‘ mourners, no 
longer primarily believed to stem from tears but social action. Proponents of 
‗authenticated‘ interpretations of Shia Islam – who Deeb defines as being 
particularly concerned with ‗historical accuracy and the use of rationality‘ (2006: 27) 
– condemn many customary mourning rituals.  
While traditional forms of commemoration involve embodying emotion in 
blood and tears, authenticated forms involve embodied emotion through 
realised activism‘ (Deeb 2006: 158).  
Thus, processions organised by Hizbullah (the political organisation who many of 
Deeb‘s ‗authenticated‘ informants are associated with) are characterised by 
regimented solemnity, and supporters are strongly encouraged to involve themselves 
in community (and/or military) service.  
If Deeb is one of a number of scholars to explore the significance of the Iranian 
Revolution in shaping Shia discourses elsewhere (see Leichtman 2009 regarding 
Senegal), Justin Jones (2015) historicises these claims. Jones traces the 
reformulation of attributes accorded to Husain to Sayyid Ali Naqi Naqvi‘s writings 
of the 1930s and 40s. Ali Naqi, perhaps the most influential (if controversial) of 
South Asia‘s 20th century Shia scholars, propagated his revolutionary interpretation 
of Husain from Lucknow. Many decades before the Islamic Revolution, Ali Naqi 
espoused a ‗Husainology‘ (Siegel 2001: 153) which, as in late 20th century Iran and 
Beirut, ‗firmly established Husain as a figure to be imitated rather than invoked‘, 
calling on his readers to ‗emulate Husain‘s struggle against injustice in all its forms‘ 
(Jones 2015: 91). Jones suggests that Ali Naqi‘s contribution was particularly 
noteworthy in its ‗attempt to open Husain‘s significance to all of humanity‘, with 
consistent emphasis placed on ‗reaching out externally to other Muslim and non-
Muslim communities‘ (2015: 103). Jones also points out that while it is difficult to 
ascertain the veracity of arguments that suggest Ali Naqi directly influenced 
Khomeini‘s interpretation of Husain – both men laid particular stress on the Imam as 
a figure of unifying reach –  
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the claim‘s very existence offers clear evidence of how, far from blindly 
following their counterparts in Iran or Iraq, the Indian Shi‘a have perpetually 
conceived themselves as developing their own religious traditions and 
literatures in situ, as having meaningful influence upon religious thought and 
leadership in the wider Shi‘i world (2015: 102, italics original). 
While both Hegland‘s and Deeb‘s accounts are attentive to the mobilisation of 
Karbala by political actors, Jones stresses that, even in the 1930s, ‗[t]he application 
of Imam Husain to forms of political resistance was nothing new in South Asia‘ 
(2015: 92). He writes 
Shi‘i languages of martyrology had crept into anti-colonial mobilisations in 
Awadh as early as 1857. From the 1900s, but especially by the 1930s, a 
number of writers and poets…were evoking the Karbala tragedy, with 
distinct recourse to the more political elements of Husain‘s struggle, as a 
metaphor for the on-going existential battle between righteousness and 
iniquity (Jones 2015: 92).  
If the ‗application of Shi‘i martyrology as a tool of ―state-making‖‘ (Jones 2015: 98) 
is well documented in the context of post-revolutionary Iran (Aghaie 2005; Kaur 
2010; Wellman 2015, 2017), Jones‘ research demonstrates ‗a comparable usage in 
pre-independence India, with the clear incorporation of the Karbala paradigm within 
the rhetoric and methodology of a late-colonial Indian nationalism‘ (2015: 98–99). 
Gandhi, for instance, drew especially on Husain as a model for pacifist struggle and 
civil disobedience, while Nehru emphasised Husain‘s appeals to universality, and the 
capacity of Karbala commemorations to bring together people of different faith. Both 
figures, in other words, invoked Husain to support their particular visions of the 
pathway to, and form of, a postcolonial future.  
The striking overlap between interpretations of Husain in very different contexts and 
historical moments demonstrate the fluidity of the ‗Karbala paradigm‘, a term coined 
by Fischer (1980: 21) precisely to stress its multivalent significance and adaptability. 
We now turn to the ways in which Husain‘s martyrdom is commemorated, debated 
and applied to particular political goals in Mombasa.  
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Tears of cognisance  
Edith Szanto (2013) has criticised the work of Deeb and Hegland (in a manner that 
could also apply to Jones), arguing that conceptualising mourning rituals in terms of 
a shift from redemption to revolution is too simplistic. Szanto contends that the 
problem with the binary ‗is that it simultaneously depoliticises salvation and 
desacralizes revolution‘ (2013: 78). Drawing on her research in the seminaries of 
Sayyidah Zainab, the town in southern Damascus where Zainab (daughter of Imam 
Ali and granddaughter of Prophet Mohammed) is said to be buried, Szanto argues 
that rather than a binary or a shift, mourning gatherings ‗encompass both salvation 
and revolution‘ (2013: 85). By way of example, Szanto cites a group of South Asian 
seminary students who registered their disavowal of the Iranian political process 
(which saw Ahmadinejad re-elected in 2009) by cutting their foreheads with swords, 
a commemorative act known as tatbir. Through this practice, the students inscribed 
their objection to Khamenei‘s support for Ahmadinejad and liberated themselves 
from the Ayatollah‘s authority (Khamenei is opposed to tatbir).  
In my reading, neither Deeb nor Hegland position the redemptive/revolutionary 
binary as definitively as Szanto suggests. Hegland (1983) notes that once the fervour 
of revolution had dissipated, the Husain as Intercessor/Example binary could better 
be understood in terms of a ‗symbiotic‘ relationship (1983: 230). Attitudes towards 
previously discredited mourning rituals softened, and came to be seen by some as 
essential for keeping the memory of Husain alive. Similarly, although I find Deeb‘s 
choice of the terms traditional and authenticated misleading, she recognises that 
these differing conceptualisations of mourning exist side by side in contemporary 
Beirut: even in ‗authenticated‘ versions of Ashura, notions of redemption have not 
been entirely negated, ‘rather that the primary tone of the commemorations has been 
altered‘ (2006: 151). However, what Szanto‘s critique usefully points out is that it is 
often difficult to distinguish between ‗reformed‘ and ‗unreformed‘ mourning 
practices. This section considers the example of crying for Husain in Mombasa and 
demonstrates that while shedding tears is denigrated as a disputable activity in some 
instances (i.e. as a performance in need of reform), many experience and narrate 
their tears in reformist terms. In other words, reformist discourse informs and 
legitimates what might be seen as a ‗traditional‘ mourning practice. This indicates 
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the inseparability of approaches to Husain in Mombasa, as much as the broad 
purchase of reformist discourse amongst Khojas.  
As Syed Akbar Hyder (2006) has pointed out, remembering the suffering of Karbala 
is always also about remembering the events that led up to it: in other words, to 
commemorate Karbala is to legitimate a Shia interpretation of history following the 
death of Prophet Mohammed. Hyder underscores that what is being mourned is a 
distinct and highly politicised version of history, an understanding echoed in the 
terms through which many Khojas described their ritualised grieving. Sitting in 
Sahil‘s office one morning, he explained: 
When you cry, people will ask ―Why are you crying?‖ We are crying to 
remember those atrocities suffered by Fatima, the Ahlul Bayt
105
 and all the 
Imams. From then until today, we are a target. There is no weapon for us 
today, crying is our weapon. And you get sawab [blessings] for crying. Imam 
Sadiq has written in one stanza, if 50 people cry, jannah [paradise] will be 
yours.
106
 
Sahil‘s commentary makes clear that crying, in his eyes, is not a passive pursuit. 
Crying gives expression to 1400 years of discrimination, it vivifies historical and 
contemporary persecution. Crying also has a particularly emotive agentive power: it 
provokes curiosity in others, it informs. This was reiterated by Nadia, the female 
reciter mentioned above. Looking out at the Indian Ocean from her family‘s breezy 
high-rise flat, Nadia stated, ‗We cry to rectify ourselves. To know our religion and to 
stand up. To tell everyone: we are active Muslims. If there was one thing I would say 
that defines Shias is that we are active Muslims….The Sunnis are passive‘. Crying, 
according to Nadia, is a source of self-improvement, knowledge and action, as well 
as a community-making practice. Malik, a man who, by his own estimation, is 
                                                 
105
 Literally ‗People of the House‘, this term refers to the family of Prophet 
Mohammed.  
106
 Throughout the month of Muharram, a large poster in the Khoja imambargah 
depicted a photograph of a child crying next to a quote attributed to Husain:  
Every Mu‘mim [believer], whose eyes shed tears upon the killing of Husayn 
ibn ‗Ali and his companions, such that the tears roll down his cheeks, Allah 
shall accommodate him in the elevated rooms of Paradise.  
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Mombasa‘s third or fourth most successful spare parts dealer, provided a similar 
interpretation: ‗Crying is critical to making us fresh‘.  
I see many parallels between the aforementioned accounts of crying and Saba 
Mahmood‘s (2005) much cited intervention in the literature on Islamic reform. 
Mahmood‘s research on the women‘s mosque movement in Cairo positioned 
repeated bodily acts – such as wearing the veil or behaving modestly – as the 
markers and makers of pious subjectivity. In addition to demonstrating the cultural 
and historical specificity of a desire for freedom from social conventions (exposing 
the liberal heart at the centre of anthropological conceptions of agency), Mahmood 
problematised the idea that innate desires stimulate conduct: ‗action does not issue 
forth from natural feelings but creates them‘ (2005: 157). Explaining how she 
developed her modest comportment, Nama, one of the women Mahmood worked 
with, described that it was through wearing the veil that ‗your inside learns to feel 
shy‘ (2005: 157). Similarly, for my informants in Mombasa, crying cultivates. And, 
in the aforementioned Khoja narratives, crying cultivates precisely the kind of 
action-oriented believer privileged in discourses of Shia reform.  
Crying was also frequently positioned in relation to tropes of rationality and 
historical accuracy that Deeb and others have noted as critical elements of reformist 
discourse. One evening, Ifza and I were sitting on the floor of the imambargah, 
waiting for Ammar Nakshwani, a well-known and somewhat controversial British-
Iraqi preacher hired by the Khoja jamaat to deliver the 2014 Muharram majalis, to 
begin the night‘s sermon. Ifza had expressed her intrigue in ‗doing ethnography‘ 
since we were first introduced, and on this occasion asked me what I thought of the 
displays of mourning when I first arrived. I confessed that on my first day in the 
imambargah, I was surprised by the intensity and collective nature of grief. Ifza 
nodded vigorously,  
Me too! I was too scared to ask about the wailing when I was little… I was 
ten or 11 when I had my first wail. It was a result of knowledge.  
Ifza went on to explain that it was only through her madrasa studies (religious 
studies, which Khoja girls attend weekly throughout primary school) that she came 
to understand the history behind the grief; it was this history that enabled her to cry.  
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Aqilah, who I would meet for an hour on Saturday mornings in-between the two 
madrasa classes she taught, had a similar interpretation. Aqilah, who is in her sixties, 
is one of the most respected female Khoja religious authorities, regularly reciting 
majalis and other educational lectures in Mombasa and around the Khoja diaspora 
(our weekly chats were interrupted when she went on a three-month trip to Karachi, 
Bujumbura and Dar es Salaam). Discussing correct comportment during the masaib 
(the part of the majlis when Karbala is invoked), Aqilah explained,  
‗You cry in order to think about what you are doing. You shouldn‘t be crying 
crocodile tears, but your tears should turn into following the example set by 
the holy 14.
107
 You shouldn‘t cry thinking about the torture they suffered, but 
rather ask yourself, why did they accept those tortures? They should be tears 
of cognisance‘.  
In contrast to the above individuals, all of whom were firm advocates of ritualised 
grieving, Leila and Hayat, close friends in their twenties, often promulgated what at 
first blush seems to fit closely with Deeb‘s description of ‗authenticated‘ approaches 
to crying. Under the glare of Hayat‘s garishly lit sitting room one evening, Leila 
proclaimed, ‗Many people here cry without reflection‘. ‗Yup‘, agreed Hayat, ‗all 
they want is josh! [fervour, ardour, zeal]‘. This set us off laughing. ‗The theatre‘, 
Hayat continues, ‗it‘s just too much‘. Leila points me to Ayatollah Motahhari‘s book, 
Misconceptions of Ashura, in which the Iranian cleric, killed during the Revolution, 
ridicules the practice whereby alims [Islamic scholars and preachers]
108
 embellish 
the history of Karbala just to make people cry. Although both are careful to maintain 
the comportment of grief during this part of the majlis (by looking down, head in 
hands), Leila admits that she‘s increasingly annoyed by the mournful theatrics; 
Hayat jokes that she sometimes uses the masaib to take a nap.  
These criticisms do not prevent Leila from reminding us, ‗Crying is highly 
encouraged in Islam‘. Turning to me she suggests,  
                                                 
107
 This grouping, often referred to as the 14 Infallibles within Shia Islam, includes 
the Prophet Mohammed, his daughter Fatima-Zahra and the 12 Imams.  
108
 The plural form of alim in Arabic is ulama, a term I did not hear amongst my 
informants in Mombasa.  
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Crying is a sign of connectedness. If you‘re unable to cry, it‘s a sign that 
you‘ve sinned a lot, that you‘re not connected. If the truth is apparent in front 
of you, will you stand up for it? How will change ever come if you don‘t? 
That‘s why we cry. Because we fail in so many ways. The point is to 
introspect: what are you doing to stand up for truth?‘  
Leila, happy to jest ‗inappropriate‘ outpourings of grief in some instances, continues 
to see crying as an instigator for action. The interlocutors I cited earlier would never 
criticise crying, yet they valorise it in similar terms: as a transformative act, steeped 
in knowledge and political potential. This section has sought to highlight the ways in 
which global discourses of Shia reform find echoes in perceptions of 
commemorative grief in Mombasa, whether or not they lead to a rejection or 
modification of mourning practices. The following considers how approaches to 
mourning rituals are also in a constant dialogue with wider (i.e. non-Shia) reformist 
discourses at the coast.  
 
Negotiating bid’a in Mombasa  
Islamic reformism emerged resurgent in Kenya in the 1920s, but has been 
particularly prominent – and possibly dominant – since the 1980s (Kresse 2007b), a 
product of increased Arabian investment in mosques and madrasas, coupled with the 
growing prominence of graduates from Middle Eastern universities amongst the 
city‘s religious elite (i.e. Kenyans returned from funded Islamic study abroad) 
(Bakari 1995b). Although variegated in terms of doctrinal background, funding 
sources and agendas, reformists are commonly glossed as ‗Wahhabis‘ (an 
appellation I follow here) and imagined by their others as a group, united by their 
‗rejection of a wide range of practices…. as unacceptable religious innovation 
(bid’a)‘ (Kresse 2007b: 230). Amongst other things, the bid’a label has been used to 
denounce maulidi commemorations for the Prophet‘s birthday, the role of customary 
healers (waganga), as well as the significance of local moon sightings (with 
implications for the start and end of Ramadhan). As outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter, a straightforward dichotomy between reformists and non-reformists does not 
stand up to ethnographic scrutiny: not only are reformist positions far more 
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heterogeneous than the ‗Wahhabi‘ label allows, many allegedly ‗customary‘ 
practices encompass histories that trouble this categorisation. Rüdiger Seesemann 
(2006) demonstrates, as one example, that contemporary maulidi commemorations, 
often dismissed as bid’a and held up as emblematic of the ‗traditional‘, Sufi-inspired, 
‗African‘ or ‗Swahili‘ Islam imagined as indigenous to the coast, are in fact a 20th 
century import from the Arabian peninsula. Recognising the limitations of the 
dichotomy does not, however, detract from its significance in East Africa. So 
embedded is this division, Kresse writes,  
…one can argue that the debate on maulidi – i.e. whether, and in which ways, 
the celebration of the Prophet‘s birthday is permissible and recommendable – 
in everyday life is itself a characteristic feature of Islam along the Swahili 
coast (2006: 210, emphasis original).  
As Kresse (2009) has elucidated elsewhere, this assertion can be expanded well 
beyond discourses pertaining to the Prophet‘s birthday: whatever one‘s stance, the 
debate around bid’a is an integral aspect of Muslim life in Mombasa.  
Muharram commemorations are very much part of this discussion. Kresse (2007b) 
traces oppositional approaches to Muharram that took place in 2003. At the start of 
the month an ‗Open letter to the preachers and imams of the sunna‘ (Kresse 2007b: 
247) circulated in pamphlet form in Mombasa, exhorting readers not to engage in 
Muharram commemorations of any form. Asserting that such activities were bid’a, 
the letter also stated that many accusations directed at Yazid, commander-in-chief 
against Husain at the Battle of Karbala, were outright lies. The communication was 
addressed to adherents of the sunna – i.e. people who follow the sayings and deeds 
of the Prophet – and signed ‗Ahlul Tawheed‘ (Kresse 2007b: 247) – i.e. people who 
believe in the oneness of god. This, Kresse asserts, is representative of the way in 
which Wahhabis position themselves as bearers of these two central pillars of 
Islamic faith, implying that those not in their camp are failing to comply with the 
core principles of Islam. No less universalising, however, were the written and oral 
responses to this pamphlet provided by Sheikh Abdilahi Nassir, one of Mombasa‘s 
most eminent Muslim scholars, who retains a prominent, if controversial, status 
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despite his conversion to Shia Islam in the 1980s.
109
 Kresse examines how Abdilahi, 
through pamphlets and a series of lectures, sought to employ two key rhetorical 
modes to delegitimise the Wahhabi position. Abdilahi demonstrated the breadth of 
opposition to Yazid‘s behaviour within Islamic scholarship, particularly citing well 
known Swahili champions of reform, while at the same time arguing that the details 
of Yazid's behaviour appeared to directly contradict the principles of Islam. By 
invoking Sheikh Farsy and other local reformists, Abdilahi sought to externalise the 
Wahhabis,  
…isolating and alienating [them] from the social community of local 
Muslims, by showing how they actually seem to think and act counter to 
established common standards of what it means to be properly ―Muslim‖ or 
―Islamic‖ (Kresse 2007b: 248).  
Through his lectures, Abdilahi emphasised the unity and solidarity amongst Muslims 
at the coast – be they Sunni or Shia, reformist or otherwise – and the otherness of 
Wahhabi doctrine.  
While Kresse‘s work is focussed on the discourses of prominent scholars, there is 
substantial overlap with the rhetorical strategies employed by my informants. 
Echoing Abdilahi were frequent affirmations of solidarity amongst Muslims at the 
coast, with Wahhabis painted as an exception to this long-standing rule. During a 
quiet moment with Ruqaya, a Swahili Ithna-Asheri who worked as a caretaker at the 
Khoja imambargah, she told me, ‗The difference between Sunni and Shia is not 
much – just praying and a few things like that. But the difference between Shia and 
Wahhabis is very big‘. When I asked her to elaborate she explained that Wahhabis 
would never use a turbah, a clay disk (ideally made from the soil of Karbala) 
mandatory for the performance of Shia prayer, nor do they have Imams. ‗They say 
that we commit shirk [idolatry]. It‘s not Sunnis but Wahhabis that say that we 
worship these things‘. Although the examples Ruqaya provides could equally 
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 Sheikh Abdilahi, who comes from a long line of Sunni preachers, describes 
himself as turning increasingly towards Shiism from the late 1960s, publicly 
proclaiming his conversion while living in Nairobi in the 1980s (Kresse 2007a). His 
conversion narrative does not touch on the Bilal Muslim Mission established by 
Khojas.  
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distinguish Shias from Sunnis more generally, for her what is important is the 
Wahhabi interpretation of these differences. Sunnis (non-Wahhabis), in Ruqaya‘s 
estimation, know that Shias are not idol worshipers; Wahhabis possess no such 
knowledge.  
Time and again, Wahhabis were exculpated for introducing division at the coast. 
Hafiz, an erudite elderly gentleman with a deep appreciation for Urdu poetry, 
situated the decline of Asian Sunni participation in Muharram celebrations explicitly 
with Wahhabi intervention. ‗The Memons, Bhadala, Kokni, they all used to have 
Muharram. Then, after the oil boom, Sunni participation went down. That was when 
propagation by the Wahhabis started‘. Hafiz notes that a similar wedge has emerged 
between Khojas and their Shafii brethren:  
It‘s been a shock to us in Mombasa. We had excellent relations with Shafii 
Muslims. But the Wahhabis are coming now, spreading anti-Shia propaganda. 
There are one or two mosques here that are openly talking against us. It‘s 
worrying, the extent of the madness.  
Finally, in the same manner that Abdilahi juxtaposes Yazid‘s barbarism with the 
principles of Islam (thus calling into question the latter‘s faith), a popular strand of 
public commentary amongst my informants involved outlining the contradictions of 
the Wahhabi position on bid’a. As Sahil asserted on another occasion,  
Wahhabis kill other Muslims because they say we have deviated. They are 
saying we are all doing bid’a, innovating things. But Saudis go to Frankfurt 
for a night of clubbing, come back, take a shower and pray. They are very 
narrow-minded people and have been so since the time of the Prophet. Even 
the Prophet said that the horns of Satan will come from Najd.  
‗That‘s in Saudi Arabia‘, he added pointedly. Here, the interchangeability of 
Wahhabis and Saudis emphasises adherents as distant others who unfairly attack a 
common ‗we‘, composed of coastal Muslims. At the same time, these discourses 
imply that the Wahhabi stance on bid’a is illegitimate because of their alleged 
proclivity for other activities considered by many in Mombasa as haram (the music 
and consumption of alcohol associated with clubbing being particularly referenced 
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here). This position is fortified through references to Wahhabis‘ allegedly insular and 
demonic temperament, grounded above by Sahil in the annals of Islamic history.  
A similar mode of rhetoric frequently circulated via WhatsApp. One day, I received 
a forwarded message from Sushaila, a woman originally from the jamaat in Dar es 
Salaam, explaining that Saudi Arabia celebrated its 83
rd
 national day with a cake so 
large that it had entered the Guinness Book of World Records; although there was no 
photographic accompaniment, the cake was said to be decorated with ‗a huge Saudi 
emblem and a photo-print of the first monarch of Saudi, King Abdul-Aziz. But‘, the 
text continued, ‗to them, to celebrate Maulidi, the birth of the Prophet of Islam (s) is 
haram or bida‘ah‘.110 The gist of the message was clear: the Saudis could not have 
their cake and eat it too. How could this extravagant anniversary celebration, 
complete with the veneration of a particular mortal personality, be acceptable 
Muslim practice while commemorations honouring the Prophet were not? 
Describing the cake to me the following day, Aqilah shook her head in disbelief, 
‗Saudis have forgotten god in favour of a king‘.  
Such sentiments find material form within the Khoja imambargah. Illuminated by 
four spotlights, a large framed photograph next to the pulpit at the front of the men‘s 
hall (where ladies‘ Friday majalis are held) portrays a handful of Khoja men praying 
at the desecrated graves of Jannat al-Baqi. Destroyed by King Ibn Saud
111
 in 1926 on 
the grounds that the visiting of such sites is prohibited in Islam, the cemetery of 
Jannat al-Baqi, located in Medina, once contained the graves of many of Prophet 
Mohammed‘s relatives and companions. That photographic evidence of its 
destruction is displayed so prominently within the imambargah is a testament to the 
significance of difference vis-à-vis Wahhabis within Khoja Islam.  
While each of the above cited interventions denigrate Wahhabism, they also 
demonstrate an intimate knowledge of Wahhabi critiques of Shia and local Muslim 
practices. The bid’a debate has profound effects on how Shias (and others) view 
their own practices; in some instances it also structures the rationale behind the need 
to change them. An example of this relates to zanjir, the form of self-flagellation 
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 One of the numerous alternative spellings for bid’a.  
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 Ibn Saud, known in the Arab world as Abdulaziz, was the founding monarch of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
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mentioned above, wherein male Shia mourners whip themselves using a flail ending 
in metal blades. A common and highly valorised manner of mourning Husain in 
some parts of the world, zanjir has also been a controversial element of Shia practice 
– and a focus of Shia reformism – since the 1920s, with the publication of Lebanese 
cleric Mushin al-Amin al-Amili‘s robust critique of the practice (Ende 1978; Pinault 
2001). Echoing Ali Naqi‘s emphasis on the need to reach out to other Muslims 
(Jones 2011), al-Amili sought to improve the ability of his coreligionists to 
proselytise by advocating the abandonment of what he saw as some of the more 
disturbing aspects of mourning rituals. However, as Deeb (2006) points out, debates 
around zanjir were confined to the seminaries and writings of religious scholars (in 
places like Jabal Amil, Damascus and Najaf) until the 1980s. This changed when 
Khomeini made his disapproval clear shortly before his death in 1989, and the 
practice was declared haram in Khamenei‘s 1994 fatwa. Various Lebanese clerics, 
as well as Hizbullah, soon followed suit. Despite disapproval and unease around 
zanjir amongst many Shia and Shia maraji (eminent clerics), the practice remains 
common (if much debated) in various locales, including parts of Beirut (Deeb 2006), 
Peshawar (Hegland 1998) and Hyderabad (Ruffle 2014). 
In contrast to the aforementioned contexts where self-flagellators take to the streets 
in long and bloody public processions, zanjir in Mombasa has always been a private 
affair. After the majlis on the night of Ashura each year, Khoja men who choose to 
perform zanjir congregate in the enclosed courtyard in front of the men‘s section of 
the imambargah. Women, who remain upstairs in the ladies‘ section, are not privy to 
this sight (although the clang of blades and shouts of ‗Ya Husain‘ can be heard), nor 
is the wider public. That this has always been the case is indicative of the minority 
position of Shias and Asians in Mombasa. While this element of zanjir has remained 
consistent, the popularity of the practice has declined significantly in recent years. 
Raza, actively involved in the jamaat‘s Young Men‘s Union and his family‘s mango 
export business, described the demise of zanjir in the following terms.  
Everybody does matam [ritualised breast-beating]. But zanjir… Anything 
that portrays a bad picture of Islam is slowly diminishing. It‘s too easy for 
others to attack as bid’a. It‘s just tradition but it makes us cold targets for 
Wahhabis.  
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In Raza‘s estimation, zanjir is both fodder for global Islamophobia and a threat to 
Shia moral and physical integrity. He continued by explaining its waning prevalence 
in Mombasa:  
Now only about 20 percent do it. Before it was 100 percent. I‘ve never done 
it, because I‘m afraid of blood. As illiteracy declines, so does zanjir… But I 
don‘t want to hurt others by talking about mosque activities. Everyone has 
their own ideas.  
Hayat was more categorical in her rejection. She welcomed opposition to zanjir as 
expressed by various Lebanese and Iranian clerics, and found Ayatollah al-Sistani‘s 
position on the matter unsatisfactory:  
Zanjir, for me, is a no-no. Al-Sistani has been too diplomatic about it. He 
hasn‘t explicitly rejected or accepted it. On the other hand, Fadlallah [a 
prominent Lebanese marja who died in 2010] and Khamenei have both 
strongly stated that it is not allowed. I find it barbaric and nonsense. I cannot 
defend it against [accusations of] bid’a. The people doing it put the rest of us 
at risk, you‘re just asking for trouble from Wahhabis. We‘re always going to 
be [seen as] the ―crazy Shia‖ as long as zanjir is around. I‘d like Sistani to 
have a clear position on it.
112
  
Hayat‘s and Raza‘s discourses mirror a long history of Shia reformists‘ emphasis on 
image and outreach: phasing out zanjir is framed in terms of a Shia public relations 
project, a means to improve perceptions of Shias held by other Muslims and non-
Muslims alike. At the same time, both express their concern for the practice in terms 
of bid’a. Although Raza is more cautious, both see zanjir as particularly susceptible 
to accusations of undue innovation. Moreover, it is their appreciation of Wahhabi 
opposition to the practice that make it a necessary object of reform: zanjir, by 
association, threatens the bodily and moral integrity of a wider Shia public, both 
locally and globally. Although no Shia I knew had faced physical assaults in 
Mombasa, many believed this was only a matter of time. As Raza explained to me, 
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 Leila took a different view. For her, al-Sistani‘s position was clear: ‗If it‘s 
prohibited to do anything to harm the image of Islam, then of course you should not 
be participating in zanjir. He doesn‘t need to say it‘. 
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‗If a Wahhabi sheds the blood of a Shia, they believe he goes straight to jannah 
[paradise]. So the Shia will be the first target‘. 
Here I should note that perceptions around zanjir and its effects were far from 
uniform. Khadija, a graphic designer, had a very different stance to the one 
expressed by Raza and Hayat. Born and raised in Bujumbura, her brothers, who still 
live there, are known for their zanjir prowess. While helping her toddler negotiate a 
meal of rice and dhal that we had been served after majlis she argued,  
All this rubbish around bid’a – it‘s only Wahhabis that say that, not any other 
Sunnis. Zanjir is our culture. As long as it is not harming anyone else, what‘s 
the problem? It‘s only showing love for Husain.  
Khadija went onto explain the dangers of accepting such narratives. ‗Look at maulidi, 
it‘s being played down now‘, she noted, referring to the fact that celebrations for the 
Prophet‘s birthday are more subdued and less numerous than they used to be 
(although the annual procession through town is still a major event). ‗This is a big 
mistake. You can‘t pander to these bid’a people. It makes others think they [i.e. 
Wahhabis] are right‘. For Khadija, responding to bid’a accusations ultimately 
strengthens Wahhabi dominance. In her reading, zanjir is a source of heritage, as 
well as a bulwark against Wahhabi power, and meritorious of protection on both 
counts. Although she differs from Raza and Hayat, Khadija‘s account further 
emphasises bid’a as a social force in Mombasa, something that affects the way some 
people view their own practices, even if they reject the notion itself.  
 
Intersections of reform and insecurity 
Recognising the multiplicity of stances on reform, what the above also makes clear is 
its entanglement with other issues in Mombasa. I want to extend these comments by 
considering concerns about Wahhabis in contemporary Mombasa in terms of the 
wider temporal and geographical frames from which my informants persistently 
drew. In a provocative contribution written shortly after 9/11, Engseng Ho (2004: 
210) assesses the history of encounter between Western maritime empires and 
Muslim societies around the Indian Ocean from the perspective of ‗the other boat‘. 
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Tracing a discursive pattern that links the 16
th
 century jurist al-Malibari to Osama 
bin Laden, Ho examines how Hadrami personalities around the Indian Ocean have, 
since the earliest days of Portuguese expansion, sought to mobilise Muslim 
opposition to Western domination by internationalising the site of struggle. 
‗Geography‘, Ho writes, ‗is key here. Peoples native to old diasporas have 
geographical sensibilities as large as whole empires; possessed of folklore, ritual and 
literature, their cultural memories reach back even further‘ (2004: 241). Although 
distancing himself from Huntington‘s (1996) infamous clash of civilisations thesis, 
Ho asserts that contemporary Indian Ocean imaginaries are usefully conceived of as 
involving ‗geographical equal[s]‘, pitting the US, an ‗empire without colonies‘, 
against a Muslim diaspora which has long envisaged its victimisation in expansive 
terms (2004: 241, 237).  
Cognisant of the homogenising pitfalls implicit in this argument, the scopic 
geographies of which Ho speaks nevertheless provide a useful framework for 
understanding contemporary debates around bid’a in Mombasa. Concerns about the 
Wahhabis‘ reformist agenda cannot be disentangled from a wider geopolitics of 
insecurity, or from the particularities of Shia religious history. Khojas, like many 
other Shia Muslims in the current historical moment, imagine themselves as the 
progeny of 1400 years of victimisation, succinctly described by David Pinault as a 
‗paradigm of persecution‘ (1992: 56). Beyond the frequent retelling of the 
martyrdom of Shia Imams since the time of the Prophet, more contemporary events – 
from Netanyahu‘s speeches against Iran at the UN to the ‗accidental‘ trampling of 
Shias at Mecca in 2014 – are articulated within a framework of persistent attack. As 
Akbar, whose permanently furrowed unibrow seemed to embody something of this 
anxiety explained,  
Everything that is happening in the world at the moment is against the Shia. 
Everything that is happening in the Middle East. In Bahrain. In Iraq. In Syria. 
Even Kenya. Here the Wahhabis are coming for us. Because we are the truth. 
The trope of persecution is often coupled with notions of Shia exceptionalism in this 
manner; Shia are thought to be targeted because their enemies know they are on the 
right path. 
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In Mombasa, this expansive geographic and temporal frame for understanding Shia 
relations with others is often translated into a vocabulary of global terror. This was 
made apparent one evening when I was accused of secretly recording a majlis in the 
women‘s section of the Khoja imambargah. When the device in question was 
eventually established as an umbrella rather than a camera, Yasmine, a leading figure 
within the Zainabiyya Ladies‘ Committee explained matter-of-factly,  
We‘re never going to open up to you. It‘s a shame you came at this time. 
Westgate, the terrorist attacks, we‘re not going to trust anyone because it‘s 
not safe now. You‘ve seen the security downstairs.  
Yasmine refers here to the three female security guards installed outside the 
imambargah for the first time a matter of days ago, and concludes her commentary 
with a definitive, ‗This place is not safe‘. This framing of local occurrences in terms 
of the wider geopolitics of the region, and within a language influenced by the long-
standing ‗war on terror‘ is by no means unique to Khojas. Constance Smith (2015: 
135) traces similar patterns of what she terms a ‗linguistic scaling up‘ amongst 
residents of Kaloleni, a housing estate in Nairobi. Discussing a 2014 shoot-out 
between individuals involved in a nearby robbery and the police, Kalolenians 
described being ‗held hostage for several hours‘ and that those involved were ‗just 
terrorists‘ (Smith 2015: 140, 133) – such articulations were made often, both in 
speech and online. Even if these iterations garner little attention from the Kenyan 
state, Smith argues that framing local violence in the language of ‗terror‘ adds 
legitimacy to Kalolenian experiences of insecurity, at the very least from the estate‘s 
diaspora. Duncan Omanga‘s (2014) analysis of the shifting figure of Osama bin 
Laden within Kenyan editorial cartoons mirrors this: although the nature of the threat 
posed by bin Laden is shown to change over time, Kenya is pictorially positioned at 
the centre of the global ‗war on terror‘ of which bin Laden was once principal icon. 
As these examples show, ‗terror‘ is very much alive in the Kenyan imagination, a 
theme we return to in the two following chapters.  
Khojas in Mombasa draw frequently, and often simultaneously, on these expansive 
and shifting temporal and geographic scales. Anxieties about how Shia practice is 
viewed by reformists is linked to a fear of attack which pertains both to Shia history 
and contemporary regional insecurity. Historical narratives of persecution are used to 
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frame rising tensions locally, and the historical event of Karbala is itself frequently 
retold in terms of global discourses of insecurity: Yazid, commander-in-chief against 
Husain during the Battle, was often described to me as a ‗terrorist‘.  
Commemorating Karbala, moreover, was also presented as a way of supporting 
government efforts to prevent the threat of terrorism. As reported in the national 
press, Khojas and other Kenyan Shias have long urged ruling elites to designate 
Ashura as a public holiday, this would allow Muslims a day off to preach peace and 
non-violence amongst their compatriots.
113
 As these examples ascertain, there is 
much slippage between reform and insecurity, religion and nation, past and present, 
Mombasa and Karbala.  
 
Blood donation in Mombasa 
The recent move to hold a blood donation drive during Muharram in Mombasa 
should be understood in relation to these overlapping themes. Examining donors‘ 
narratives, this section considers the ways in which giving blood is mobilised to 
respond to concerns related to ‗active‘ worship, innovation and insecurity, outlined 
above, bringing together notions of piety, nation and hierarchies of value defined by 
productivity. We start by returning to Copeman‘s (2009a, 2009b) distinction 
between centripetal and centrifugal modes of gifting, as well as centripetal and 
centrifugal modes of blood donation, which I find productive for thinking about the 
significance of the direction of flow in shaping the meanings ascribed to blood in the 
context of Muharram rituals.
114
 Writing on Beirut, Deeb (2006) notes, that while 
self-injurious latam (or ‗hitting hydar’ as zanjir is known in Lebanon) is still 
practiced in parts of the city, it is critiqued by others as backward and quietist:  
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 See the article by G. Bocha: ‗Shia Muslims in Mombasa mark Ashura‘. Daily 
Nation, 12 October 2016 (available online: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/Shia-Muslims-in-Mombasa-mark-
Ashura/1954178-3414458-133iv1z/index.html, accessed 23 August 2017). 
114
 While a comparison between Hindu and Shia discourses of reform is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, I see important parallels between the focus on ‗active‘, socially 
oriented worship and the associated reconceptualisation of soteriology outlined by 
Copeman and the scholars of Shia reform cited here. 
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…the association of blood with quietism may seem contradictory but 
violence is directed at the self, not outwards, implying a personal expression 
of grief, an internal struggle with regret, and the potential for individual 
salvation, rather than collective political or social action (2006: 150, 
emphasis added).  
Hizbullah and other advocates of ‗authenticated‘ Shiism have encouraged ‗those who 
feel the need to shed blood during Ashura to do so for the community good‘ (Deeb 
2006: 135): blood donation drives have been part of the Muharram landscape in 
Beirut for a number of years, producing large surpluses during the month when 
Karbala commemorations are at their peak.  
The distinction between zanjir and blood donation in Mombasa was often relayed to 
me in similar terms. ‗People do [zanjir] to honour Husain, to honour his sacrifice and 
show their devotion. But what good does it do?‘ Farida asked me. She continued,  
I‘ve heard many stories, that people don‘t feel any pain when they‘re doing 
zanjir [such is their devotion]. But you cry and bleed and then what? It‘s not 
enough. You have to go beyond yourself; this is the way of Husain.  
Here, zanjir – drawing one‘s own blood in a vivid display of devotion to Husain – is 
critiqued because of its individually-oriented focus and lack of worldly utility. 
Moreover, in the assessments of zanjir provided by Hayat and Raza above, 
practioners were portrayed as bordering on selfish for failing to consider the 
implications of their actions for a broader Shia populace. The latters‘ narratives draw 
on a long-standing association between outpourings of blood – whether intentional 
or accidental – and danger (Carsten 2013), in this case threatening the reputation, 
and possibly the life, of Shias.  
These negative connotations should not be read outside of the relationship between 
zanjir and constructions of class distinction in Mombasa and beyond. Although 
careful to state that zanjir was a matter of personal choice, Raza‘s commentary, 
relayed above, unambiguously associated the practice with the less well educated, a 
position echoed by many. As Leila intoned one afternoon, ‗It‘s usually not the 
people who are the most respected who do it‘. Leila went onto tell me of her zanjir 
traumas from a childhood in Karachi.  
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As a kid I was dragged onto the streets to watch [Muharram processions 
involving zanjir] by my relatives. I always hated it. All that blood, it makes 
no sense to me. Even here [in Mombasa], I feel squeamish just hearing the 
noise [of men performing zanjir] on Ashura. But at least I can‘t see it.  
In this narrative, Leila consigns zanjir to the backwater of South Asian traditionalism. 
Her comments are but one example of the way in which the Subcontinent is often 
evoked by Khojas (and Asians more generally), as the location of all things 
‗backward‘, characterised by poverty and an adherence to less accurate versions of 
Islam. Zanjir performances in Mombasa, though still problematic in Leila‘s eyes, at 
least do not occupy public space in the way they do in Karachi.  
Blood donation is not tainted with any of these associations. In the same way that 
zanjir – self-centred bloodletting – is portrayed by some as a lower class pursuit, 
blood donation has become a marker of social mobility within the Khoja diaspora. 
Driving home from the imambargah one evening, Sushaila recounted her frustration 
in trying to convince community elders to hold a blood donation drive in Mombasa.  
My family has been doing it in Dar for years; it‘s done by Shia communities 
all over the place. Whenever I tried to propose it, the elders were like, ―Ha, 
ok, we‘ll try‖. It‘s only now that things are finally changing.  
With this comment, Sushaila employs donation as a marker of distinction between 
the Khoja jamaats in Dar es Salaam and Mombasa: Dar is significantly larger and 
widely imagined as more progressive than the proudly conservative jamaat in coastal 
Kenya. Moreover, as mentioned above, reports of blood donation drives are posted 
on the Africa Federation‘s website, a means through which jamaats present 
themselves to each other; these accounts are careful to highlight the medicalised 
orderliness of the procedure. Sharing in the experience of donation, as well as 
sharing photographic evidence – as Mubina did in sending a picture of one donating 
daughter to another, whose jamaat in Toronto was also holding a blood drive – is 
another prong in a long history of Muharram commemorations as productive sites 
for the imagination of community. At the same time, donating is a way in which 
Khojas communicate their ‗civic enlightenment‘ (Harrington forthcoming) to each 
other. Although they would never explicitly boast (seeking worldly recognition is 
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widely disapproved of), donors nevertheless do communicate their act to others, 
forming ideas and judgements about who does and does not donate, in terms of both 
geographical areas (such as South Asia) and specific jamaats. In this sense, although 
blood is donated anonymously, the performance of donating is not. 
Blood donation was frequently evoked as being in line with the example set by 
Husain, mirroring the emphasis on emulation (over mourning) described by Hegland 
(1983), Deeb (2006) and Jones (2015). Imaginaries of centrifugal flow were central 
to this understanding. At the evening majlis following the blood donation drive 
described earlier, I chatted with Zahra and Zainab, friends in their mid-30s, about the 
significance of the morning‘s events. Zainab explained, 
Husain shed his blood for all humanity. Today we gave our blood for the 
humanity of Kenya. Of course, you cannot even begin to compare his 
sacrifice with what we did today. But it‘s a small gesture.  
Zahra agreed:  
Donating [blood] is a small thing. In some ways it‘s nothing. But maybe it 
will save even one life. Even in the Quran, it explains that if you save one life, 
it‘s as if you‘ve saved the whole of mankind.115  
What Zainab and Zahra valued about blood donation was its infinite potential reach, 
which links Husain‘s and their own (decidedly lesser) sacrifice. Unlike amongst 
Copeman‘s (2009a) Indian informants, Zahra and Zainab were not concerned with 
ethnic or religious enumeration: they did not dwell on the possible Swahili, Kikuyu, 
Christian or Hindu recipients of their blood. Rather than the capacity of blood to 
construct unity in diversity, they emphasised the universality constructed through a 
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 Here Zahra is referencing Surah al-Ma‘idah (5:32): ‗And whoever saves one – it 
is as if he had saved mankind entirely‘. Zahra and Zainab‘s discourses are reiterated 
on the website of the Africa Federation, the regional body that links Khoja Ithna-
Asheri jamaats on the continent. The Federation‘s general information page about 
blood donation concludes with a large black and red banner that reads, ‗Donate your 
Blood for a reason, Let the reason be to save life in tribute to the Great Martyrdom of 
Hazrat Imam Husain (AS), he sacrificed his life for Humanity‘. See the Africa 
Federation website: ‗Health bulletin – blood donation‘. (available online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/boards/education/education-team/1263-health-
bulletin-blood-donation, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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single donation. Their imagined recipients – like Husain‘s – are members of 
humanity. Although different to the Indian case, in both instances it is the 
indiscriminate nature of blood donation – its capacity to reach all, whether defined in 
the specific or the general – that is crucial. This also relates to the anonymity of 
donation: in Mombasa it is because blood‘s recipients are not known that a 
generalised ‗humanity‘ can be imagined as beneficiary.  
Religion and nation often emerged as entangled within these discourses of donation. 
Sipping one of the Azam Colas we‘d been given as fateha116 following a morning 
majlis, I asked Maalia, who had helped coordinate the blood donation, whether she 
had also given blood. She had, and presented her experience within a national 
topology of charity. 
You know, giving food to Africans. That‘s what Asians do. We have to stop 
this mentality. We have to stop producing the culture of dependence. Giving 
blood is different.  
Rabaab, a retired teacher, interjected, ‗Food is just one meal. Blood is a life‘. ‗So 
giving blood is better than giving food?‘ I probe. Latifah‘s response is cautionary:  
I‘m not saying that giving food is bad. There is so much poverty in Kenya, so 
many are in need of a good meal. But it‘s about figuring out how best to 
stand up to injustice. We can only strive to follow Husain.  
‗So blood donation is a way of standing up to injustice?‘ I seek further clarification.  
Of course. People who need blood are sick or injured. These things happen 
according to god‘s will. But the medical care in a place like Kenya – it‘s not 
sufficient. People die because of lack of money, lack of medicines, lack of 
blood. Donating is just a drop in the ocean. Fighting injustice has to become 
part of your life. The struggle is endless.  
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 Fateha refers to the votive foodstuffs distributed after religious functions, which 
are believed to be imbued with curative properties and spiritual sustenance due to 
their exposure to a place of worship. Fateha is sought after for the sick, thought to 
redirect the wayward and enjoyed by all as a regular boost to religious resolve. Items 
given as fateha are never discarded (see Wellman 2017 for similar practices relating 
to votive foods in Iran).  
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In one of the large Muharram murals reproduced in the opening vignette of this 
chapter (Fig. 33, p.155), Husain‘s suffering is visually paired with contemporary 
bloodshed in a variety of contexts around the world, a number of which are not 
associated with violence against Muslims, let alone Shias. Blood in this image 
evokes not just Karbala, but human suffering everywhere. Rabaab and Maalia‘s 
discussion on blood donation mimics this collapsing of scales between past and 
present, Karbala and Kenya; donation becomes another of the myriad ways in which 
the Karbala paradigm is globalised (Hyder 2006). As pointed out in numerous 
contexts, Karbala is a prism for understanding the world, and a source of inspiration 
for shaping it.  
Moreover, as in India (Copeman 2009b), it is blood‘s productivity and durability – 
contrasted to the ephemeral nature of food donations – that is valorised. Maalia and 
Rabaab imagine blood donation as mimicking Husain‘s attention to injustice, 
enabling them to better emulate the third Imam at the same time as redefine their 
position as Asians in relation to the state. In other words, it is in part via Karbala that 
Khojas reconceptualise their place in the Kenyan nation. Blood donation helps 
Khojas recast themselves as a different breed of Asian: moving beyond what is now 
seen as the less useful charity of the past towards a more enlightened donating future. 
Blood becomes part of the way in which Khojas imagine themselves as contributors 
to sustainable national development, rather than simply givers of charity. The 
national benefits of blood donation were emphasised in the short account of the day 
written by the jamaat’s Medical Board and circulated on the Africa Federation‘s 
website. The write-up emphasises the drive‘s success as a product of the 
collaboration between the Jaffery Medical Centre (a health clinic located in Old 
Town next to the Hyderi imambargah and associated with the Khoja jamaat) and the 
National Blood Transfusion Service, and concludes, ‗Since the National Blood Bank 
is perpetually short of blood, this gesture by Jaffery Medical Centre and the 
Community at large was well appreciated by the National Blood Transfusion 
Services‘.117 Unlike the Somali ambassador cited by Harrington (forthcoming), 
                                                 
117
 See the Africa Federation website: ‗Mombasa Jaffery Medical Centre – blood 
donation to commemorate Ashura‘. (available online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/jamaats/kenya/mombasa/1044-mombasa-jaffery-
medical-centre-blood-donation-to-commemorate-ashura, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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Khojas did not seek to publicise their blood donation beyond the regional jamaat 
website. But this emphasis on national contribution – and its demonstration to 
diasporic peers – is suggestive of on-going conversations about community-state 
relations amongst Khojas. If Husain has long been evoked as inspiration for (regime) 
change in various contexts, in 21
st
 Mombasa Karbala becomes a metaphor for a 
different mode of civic engagement. This has parallels with the Jain donors cited by 
Harrington (forthcoming), although perhaps in addition to wanting to be seen as 
patriots by others, Khojas deploy donation as a means to see themselves as more 
productive citizens.  
While the above points to an intertwining of Karbala and contemporary political 
concerns, it is in some ways blood donation‘s imagined status as an apolitical act 
that gives it its social value amongst Khojas. In contrast to the controversial status of 
zanjir – of debatable soteriological use, susceptible to accusations of bid’a and 
evocative of the ‗crazy Shia‘ – donating is not burdened with such associations. It is 
what Copeman has described as blood donation‘s ‗unambiguous… social utility‘ 
(2009b: 69) that underpins its ‗depoliticised‘ image: the value of the act cannot be 
contested. Asking Aqilah about the merits of blood donation in comparison to zanjir, 
she explained, ‗There are too many, always looking to attack us. But what can they 
say against giving blood?‘ Blood donation is presented here as a means to ameliorate 
the image of Shias, unlike many other practices which often exacerbate tensions with 
their others. This confidence was reflected in the staging of the donation drive: 
unlike zanjir, done at night in an internal courtyard, the drive was a (quasi) public 
event, with the gazebos placed in the middle of the Khoja car park, in full view of 
passers-by. Although the car park is in a relatively quiet part of the city – the 
narrowness and labyrinthine nature of the streets means that most vehicles avoid it – 
it is nevertheless located on one of Old Town‘s main roads, with a steady stream of 
pedestrians, pushcart vendors, tuk tuks and the odd car. Moreover, while the 
women‘s gazebo was screened off in order to allow for the removal of headscarves, 
the men‘s was wide open and members of the public were welcome to donate (a 
number of people from the wider Old Town community were reported to have done 
so in the aforementioned event write-up).  
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Blood donation in Mombasa has been promoted in part due to the growing 
prominence of the Who Is Hussain organisation within the Khoja diaspora. The 
domain name whoishussain.org is painted below the murals that coloured the 
imambargah car park; the web address also appears on many of the placards – each 
telling of Husain‘s contribution to humanity in universal terms – that decorate the 
Khoja mosque during the month of Muharram and that are carried by men during the 
Ashura juloos, a public procession through town.
118
 The organisation supports a 
global community of representatives who ‗… aim to inspire people through the 
timeless example of Husain and bring positive change in the world we live in‘, 
principally through blood donation drives, soup kitchens and the provision of 
‗campaign resources‘ (such as the aforementioned placards).119 On its website, the 
youth from various communities across London that started the organisation in 2012, 
stress ‗that we are apolitical, areligious and a-everything else that should divide us 
from one another!‘ (emphasis added).120 Blood donation emerges as an optimal 
means ‗to live up to the values inspired by Husain‘, as well as support the 
organisation‘s universalising goals.121  
 
Conclusion: from outpouring to containment  
This chapter has analysed the introduction of a Muharram blood donation drive in 
Mombasa, a context shaped by multiple and entangled discourses of Islamic reform. 
These discourses have been shown to influence how Khojas present and experience 
Karbala mourning rituals, including in cases where reformist logic is rejected, thus 
                                                 
118
 This procession, which occurs in the morning of Ashura, involves hundreds of 
Ithna-Asheris of various backgrounds, and brings Mombasa‘s main arteries to a 
standstill. Such processions form an important element of the Muharram literature 
(Korom 2003; Vahed 2002).  
119
 See the Who is Hussain website: ‗About us‘. (available online: 
https://whoishussain.org/the-organisation/about-us/, accessed 23 August 2017).  
120
 See the Who is Hussain website: ‗About us‘. (available online: 
https://whoishussain.org/the-organisation/about-us/, accessed 23 August 2017). 
121
 See the Who is Hussain website: ‗Save a life...give blood‘. 2013 (available online: 
https://whoishussain.org/save-life-give-blood/, accessed 23 August 2017).Who Is 
Hussain is one of a number of organisations that link Karbala and blood donation; 
the UK-based Imam Hussain Blood Donation Campaign, which started in 2006, is 
another example.  
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illustrating the difficulty of separating what counts as reform and what does not. 
Reform has emerged as a source of both aspiration and anxiety. Engaging with 
reformist challenges to ritual practice has, for Khojas and others in Mombasa, 
become ever more imperative in recent years because of the perceived growth of 
sectarianism and anti-Shia sentiment in the city, themselves seen as effects of the 
entrenchment of Wahhabi Islam. Unease pertaining to Muslim division and 
geopolitical insecurity are occurring at the same time as on-going debates about the 
place of Khojas as Asians within the nation state.  
Blood donation, I have demonstrated, is imagined as a productive response to these 
intersecting concerns. Unlike self-centred forms of commemoration such as zanjir, 
blood donation is valorised for its useful, worldly purpose that allows Khojas to 
better emulate Husain and his focus on humanity and injustice, central goals of Shia 
reform. By shifting attention away from the body of the self-flagellator, blood 
donation is imagined to ameliorate the image of Shias as a collective, locally and 
globally, and perhaps reduce the risks they face at the hands of others, particularly 
‗Wahhabis‘, in a moment of pronounced fears about regional insecurity. Giving 
blood is also seen to enhance their standing in relation to other Shia (such as those 
on the Subcontinent), and other Khojas (such as those in Dar). Moreover, the gift of 
blood is positioned as a sustainable one, a mechanism for crafting new kinds of 
relations between Khojas and their compatriots. In sum, giving blood underpins an 
ethical self-fashioning that facilitates Khoja constructions of themselves as 
‗progressive‘ Shias, Muslims, Kenyans and members of a particular jamaat.  
In her reflections on the anthropology of blood, Janet Carsten (2013) positions 
blood‘s uniquely emotive power as resulting from its physical properties and 
symbolic associations: blood is striking, not only for its colour and liquidity, but also 
its capacity to flow, literally and metaphorically, between domains that are usually 
kept separate. To conclude this chapter, I suggest that the move from zanjir to blood 
donation is linked to the ways in which blood‘s mobilities have been welded onto 
particular imaginaries of religion and nation. The (on-going) repackaging of blood 
within Khoja mourning rituals, I contend, is fundamentally an issue of containment 
and direction. Blood‘s ability to evoke heightened emotional responses was keenly 
appreciated by people like Raza and Hayat who suggested that the uncontrolled flow 
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of blood, gushing from the bodies of zanjir practioners, had the potential to both 
discredit and threaten Shia lives in Mombasa and beyond. Their disdain and fear 
relating to what they see as the bloody excess of zanjir contrasts sharply with the 
pride with which many memorialised their participation in the blood donation drive. 
Photographs of donors were shared around the world, and the orderliness of the 
procedure much commented on: this powerful, life-giving force had been controlled, 
put to its ‗proper‘ use, as a source of vitality. Thus, although the flow of blood is 
contained through donation, its continued liquidity is precisely what makes it an 
important ‗vector of connection‘ (Carsten 2013: S7) with fellow citizens and the 
divine. Through donation, blood remains at the heart of Khoja commemorations of 
Husain‘s martyrdom, but is rechanneled in ways that allows this evocative bodily 
tissue to underpin action-oriented notions of reform and citizenry.  
As I have shown above, the particularities of blood‘s mobility – the manner and 
direction in which it flows in Karbala mourning rituals – is linked to notions of 
social mobility, with the regulated passage of blood into collection bags at donation 
drives firmly associated with material and cognitive progress in the eyes of many. As 
the substance which connects the Khoja jamaat’s path from zanjir to donation, blood, 
for some in Mombasa, represents a trajectory towards a more enlightened pious and 
civic future. In this sense, blood‘s symbolic power is also associated with its role as a 
temporalising force: ‗…blood has the potential to carry multiple historicities, and to 
dissolve the distinctions between past, present, and future‘ (Carsten 2013: S18). This 
remarkable fluid does more than simply evoke a bloody history: as my informants‘ 
narratives suggest, blood can also be infused with anticipatory logics. A sustainable 
and life-giving gift, blood has the capacity to act on the future.  
What emerges from these reflections is blood‘s rather extraordinary capacity to 
encompass antimonies. As Carsten has noted:  
….blood may be associated with fungibility, or transformability, as well as 
essence; with truth and transcendence and also with lies and corruption; with 
contagion and violence but also with purity and harmony; and with vitality as 
well as death (2013: S2).  
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Blood‘s multivalent qualities and the instability of its significances was made 
abundantly clear through my informants‘ discourses and practices. Blood donation, I 
have argued, brings together idioms of blood and reform, and is an equally 
productive host for ambiguities and tensions. A voluntary and unremunerated act, it 
serves the utilitarian goals of reformist Shiism in part because it is shot through with 
liberal market ideals of productivity. Giving blood is both ‗apolitical‘ – 
unequivocally useful – and a tool in support of the ultimate political battle, against 
injustice. Donation allows a corporeal ‗stitching together‘ of Kenya and Karbala, 
religion and nation; it also forges a connection through multiple temporal frames. Its 
anonymity conjures a universal humanity, but knowledge of who does and doesn‘t 
donate fosters distinction individually, regionally and globally. Its very selfless-ness 
allows for the imagining of the self as superior to others. These intersecting concerns 
with status, time, religion and insecurity continue into the following chapter, which 
shifts our attention from blood donation to nostalgia. 
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Chapter 4  
Nostalgic desires: on the social value of 
loss in Mombasa  
 
Nostalgia (from nostos – return home, and algia – longing) is a longing for a 
home that no longer exists or has never existed. Nostalgia is a sentiment of 
loss and displacement, but it is also a romance with one‘s own fantasy. 
Nostalgic love can only survive in a long-distance relationship. A cinematic 
image of nostalgia is a double exposure, or a superimposition of two images 
– of home and abroad, past and present, dream and everyday life. The 
moment we try to force it into a single image, it breaks the frame or burns the 
surface (Boym 2001: xiii-xiv, final emphasis added).  
 
You can‘t help but be struck by Nadim‘s face. His perfect teeth positively gleam, 
offset by the dusting of henna that highlights his hair and beard. His eyes relay 
nothing of his woes; they are disarmingly tranquil.  
Nadim‘s caf  – Ghalib‘s – is empty at this postprandial hour and Nadim is telling me 
its history. Nadim‘s grandfather came to Mombasa from a tiny village near Mhasla 
in Maharashtra. He came to Kenya in a dhow, and was later joined by his wife and 
children. ‗My grandfather opened his first paan shop in Kibokoni. I know the exact 
location. It was just next to the shop of Hijri Lakha... Or was it Samji Kala?‘ Nadim 
reaches over to draw me a map of the premises, emphasising its minute size in 
contrast to the more notable establishments that flanked it. ‗Then he graduated to a 
shop on Piggott Place‘. Now little more than a car park strewn with rubbish, Piggott 
Place used to be a bustling market square, prominent enough to house a bust of the 
towering figure of Allidina Visram in the decades before independence. 
Over time, Nadim‘s own father learned the intricacies of the paan trade and opened 
his first shop on Makadara, opposite Posta (the Post Office), ‗Where Kitchen Queen 
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is now‘, Nadim adds helpfully (popular with lower income white-collar workers, 
Kitchen Queen caters to a mix of coastal and upcountry tastes). Eventually, 
sometime around 1968, Nadim‘s father got together with two of his brothers and 
opened Ghalib‘s Paan Shop near Sheikh Jundani Mosque, incorporating the family 
surname into the business for the first time. ‗Why are we hiding our name? We‘re so 
famous‘, Nadim explains the rationale behind this decision. The Ghalibs, as many 
others confirmed, were indubitably the best paan vendors in the city. ‗There was a 
big opening. The mayor was there and everything‘. Nadim remembers seeing photos 
of the event as a kid, his father and uncles adorned with flower garlands, surrounded 
by throngs of people.  
From the outset, the shop was a resounding commercial success, catering to the 
desires of a bustling port city. In addition to the thriving local client base, a steady 
flow of sailors, travellers and other itinerant souls frequented the shop. Descending 
from ships like MV Karanja – Nadim still remembers the stickers associating each 
huge metal travelling trunk with a particular liner –  
They all used to come to Ghalib‘s…. The parking lot outside the shop, that 
used to get absolutely packed. It was a night-time place. It opened in the day, 
but really it got busy at night. It was buzzing.  
Nadim‘s grin looks as if it might actually pop out of his face.  
When I was younger, I remember we were turning people away at night. It 
would be 12 o‘clock [midnight] and we‘d say, ―No, we‘re going home!‖ 
Some people used to try and bribe the waiters to get in. Imagine! These days 
the streets are deserted at night…  
His smile fades. From a very young age, Nadim helped out in the shop on weekends. 
Paid in packs of Smarties, he and his siblings would spend hours cutting stems off 
the betel leaves. The shop sold paan, as well as its usual sweet and savoury 
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accompaniments: faloodas,
122
 milkshakes, madafu [fresh coconut], bhajiyas, 
samosas.  
Initially the small paans for children – the totos [from watoto, meaning 
children in Swahili] – were free. My dad never used to charge for them. You 
would ask for some extra totos with the big ones you bought. As times got 
harder, people started coming in to get one big one and five totos – they were 
eating the small ones. 
Sometime in the early 1980s, in an effort to revive his declining profit margins, 
Nadim‘s father started charging for totos too. 
Nadim took over the family business in his 20s and things went fine for a while – but 
he sold up about ten years ago to try and make it in Leicester. ‗Business here just 
wasn‘t what it used to be… and I already had family over there [in the UK]‘. His 
relatives had been very successful – another friend of mine credited the Ghalibs with 
‗bringing paan culture to the UK‘. However, for Nadim, Leicester was tough. He 
worked in a call centre, before running a discount store and eventually a paan shop. 
The profits were abysmal. When he started contemplating a return to Mombasa, 
Nadim spoke to the person who had bought the original Ghalib‘s from him about the 
possibility of buying it back. Unfortunately, the new owner asked for double what 
Nadim had sold for, telling him, ‗The Somalis are willing to pay that‘. Nadim wasn‘t 
having any of it: ‗Fine, I said, sell it to the Somalis…‘ Nadim looks as if he wants to 
add something else, but he holds his tongue.  
When I came back [to Mombasa], I did my research. I saw places weren‘t 
doing proper faloodas or American milkshakes the way they‘re supposed to 
be. People know my name. So, let‘s see. 
The café in which we are sitting, located in the upmarket suburb of Nyali, on 
Mombasa‘s northern mainland, opened six months ago. Business has been 
improving tolerably, but Nadim is planning to start running a falooda happy hour 
during the week to help entice a broader clientele. ‗You know, this new Nyali crowd, 
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 Faloodas resemble a glorified milkshake, composed of rose syrup, milk and/or 
ice cream, vermicelli, tapioca pearls and basil seeds, along with various other 
embellishments.  
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they‘re not used to faloodas‘, he surmises, referring to the shifting palates and 
demographics that the whereabouts of this venture brings. Moreover, Nadim can no 
longer rely on the custom of the after dinner stroll – it‘s not just that paan has lost 
out to television he explains, no one walks around in town anymore (i.e. on the 
island), let alone in Nyali, a suburb built on the premise of car ownership.  
Nadim calls one of his staff, a young woman dressed in a little red waitress outfit, to 
give me a taste of Oreo-flavoured milkshake, it‘s one of his bestsellers. The menu 
board – coloured in every shade of pastel sugariness – lists a range of other options: 
Kinder Bueno, Cadbury‘s, Ferrero Rocher. Nadim‘s ice cream flavours – the basis of 
his faloodas and milkshakes – speak to taste buds with cultivated brand affinities. A 
prominent section of the menu reads, ‗All our juices are prepared using UV filtered 
water‘. As well as a counter for paan and another for ice cream, Nadim‘s shop stocks 
other miscellaneous wares: achari (spicy dried mango), FUDCO brand sopari (betel 
nut), bottles of Vimto, Snickers bars, Lay‘s crisps (universally referred to as crips in 
Mombasa) and little pots of citric acid, for preparing paan at home.  
Nadim looks round his small establishment; there‘s just space for three plastic tables 
and chairs, with a couple more outside.  
Now we have one paan counter. In the old days, we had four. Each one 
would be busy. We would constantly have 30 metres of sweet paan ready, 30 
metres of sweet paan with sopari [betel nut], 15 to 20 meters with sada 
khara. And a few totos. People would often come in and say, ―I‘ll buy 5 
metres‖.  
‗What?!‘ I exclaim, completely taken aback by the amount. Nadim laughs. ‗You see 
in those days there was a thing called the Drive-In‘. Nadim speaks of the Drive-In 
Cinema like a long lost and much missed friend, embellishing his description with a 
drawing of the set up (complete with the speakers for each hump where you parked 
your car). ‗Every Tuesday it was only 20 shillings a carload. And Tuesdays was my 
dad‘s day off!‘ Nadim beams.  
He used to tell us, ―Tell your friends, I‘m going [to the cinema]‖, and we‘d 
all pile into his Bedford Transit van. I still remember the number plate: 
KPV40.  
197 
 
At this point in the story I hear a hammering sound and Nadim glances back at the 
CCTV screen located near the till, showing the interior and exterior of his shop from 
12 different angles. One of the frames is blacked out; Nadim explains that his 
technician is here fixing a glitch in the system. ‗There are so many robberies and 
muggings these days…‘ Nadim searches my face thoughtfully; ‗Shall I show you 
what‘s really going on in Kenya?‘ With this interrogative I am introduced to 
Tycoonews, a Telegram chat group (and Twitter feed) set up by a Mombasan now 
residing in Essex. The Telegram group‘s 166 (and counting) members send 
information about incidents in Mombasa to their offshore administrator who uses his 
connections within the Kenyan security apparatus to verify the information before 
posting it to all members. Nadim isn‘t sure about the details of the verification 
process but he relies on the network for security updates, and helps expand the group 
by recruiting some of his shop customers as new members: ‗In case they‘re in some 
kind of accident or attack, I have their names and number plates‘. I make a joke 
about Nadim taking on the role of Big Brother. Nadim is rueful, ‗We never used to 
need anything like this‘.  
Our discussion moves to an examination of the dramatic decline in tourist numbers 
post-Westgate; the attack on Nairobi‘s most upmarket shopping mall happened less 
than three months ago. One of Nadim‘s friends runs a car rental business: ‗He 
usually doesn‘t see a single [vehicle] in November or December. This year, they‘re 
all parked‘. The government, I learn, have no clue what they are doing, regarding 
security or anything else. ‗At least with the Brits there was order, today it‘s pure 
corruption. Just look at the electricity supply!‘ he laments, gesturing around him; the 
lights have gone off twice during our chat. Power cuts, as Nadim is only too aware, 
pose a particular problem for ice cream – and profits.  
 
*** 
There is nothing particularly remarkable about Nadim‘s narrative, many readers will 
have heard similar nostalgic musings in other contexts. What was striking, however, 
was the ubiquity of such discourses in Mombasa. Nostalgia appeared to be 
embedded in the very fabric of the city, a critical component of daily chat, voiced by 
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old and young alike. What explains this? What are the conditions that produce 
nostalgia talk and what social role did it play in everyday urban life? 
This chapter analyses nostalgia in contemporary Mombasa in terms of economic and 
demographic change, and associated perceptions of rising insecurity. Over the 
following pages I outline some of the economic and demographic shifts happening in 
Mombasa to which nostalgic rhetorics point and think through some of the things 
nostalgia does on the East African littoral, i.e. to delineate the tensions and 
contradictions that nostalgic discourse is deployed to respond to (although by no 
means necessarily resolve). In contrast to the existing literature which tends to tie 
nostalgia to decline and stagnation, I suggest that many of the Mombasans I 
encountered were nostalgic because they have benefited from decades of rising 
prosperity. Nostalgia, I propose, is not only partially produced by economic gain, it 
also serves to indicate it. In other words, Mombasan nostalgia can be a source of 
status, memorialising proud stories of social mobility. Certainly, nostalgia talk in 
Mombasa also registers loss and rising economic insecurity, but this is only part of 
the picture. If in other contexts nostalgia appears to ‗desire…its own absence‘ (E. 
Simpson 2005: 245) – i.e. the nostalgic yearns for a time before they were nostalgic 
– I propose that, on this particular urban littoral, nostalgia is at least sometimes a 
desirable asset and a source of social capital.  
Moreover, I argue that nostalgic rhetorics are a critical way in which some people 
stake a claim to belonging in the city, constructing a shared and historically 
grounded Mombasan subjectivity based on a mutual appreciation of the city‘s 
decline. However, as I show below, nostalgia is as much about exclusion as it is 
relatedness. In addition to being indicative of wealth, I suggest that the second factor 
that makes nostalgia desirable in Mombasa is that it creates a hierarchy of urban 
belonging that privileges some residents‘ rights to the city over others. Highlighting 
the multiplicity of roles nostalgia plays, I demonstrate that this form of memory talk 
works as a source of distinction and affinity, disjuncture and continuity in Mombasa.  
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Reviewing nostalgia: observations from a postcolonial archipelago and a post-
Soviet littoral  
As noted by both Bissell (2005) and Berliner (2012), anthropology‘s origins are 
intimately bound up in a yearning for a past now lost or vanishing, epitomised by 
Malinowski‘s (1992 [1922]: xv) assessment that the discipline as a scientific 
endeavour was coming into being at the very moment ‗its material of study melts 
away‘. However, as Ang  & Berliner point out in their recent edited volume, ‗fine-
grained ethnographies of nostalgia and loss are still scarce‘(2015: 1),123 with much of 
the scholarship to date focused on post-socialist Eastern Europe (Berdahl 1999; 
Boyer 2006; Todorova & Gille 2010). As the authors delineate, this developing body 
of scholarship is taking nostalgia in various directions – unpacking the multiple 
meanings of nostalgia in particular contexts (Stewart 1988), identifying the objects in 
which nostalgia resides (Parkin 1999; Bach 2015) and exposing complex synergies 
of past, present and future in its yearnings (Boyer 2010; Bryant 2008). While it 
seems to me that these strands are perhaps less distinct than Angé & Berliner suggest, 
the springboard I find most productive for launching into my own field site considers 
nostalgia in terms of its agentive potential. As Dames has noted, nostalgia is ‗a force 
that does something‘ (2010: 272). 
During his research in Zanzibar in the early 1990s, William Bissell (2005) 
remembers being initially dismissive and later unsettled by his informants‘ nostalgia 
for the colonial era. Urban Zanzibaris, many of whom were born long after the end 
of empire, lamented the affordability, cleanliness and orderly nature of life under 
British rule. Unsurprised by the fact that the archives presented a very different story, 
Bissell asks, 
How exactly do we come to terms with expressions of colonial nostalgia by 
the descendants of those who struggled long and hard to overcome the effects 
of European domination and exploitation? ...What social and political desires 
are postcolonial Africans giving voice to when they speak well of the 
colonial past? (2005: 217).  
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 The following are noted by the authors as exceptions: Berliner (2012); Bissell 
(2005); Graburn (1995); Ivy (2010); P. Metcalf (2012); Schneider (2000).  
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Although his informants often conceptualised changing conditions to be a result of 
greed or a loss of faith (rather than in structural terms), Bissell argues that nostalgia 
in 1990s Zanzibar was spawned by the contradictions wrought by neoliberalism, 
which brought vast sums of capital investment to ‗historic‘ Stone Town while public 
services and majority living standards slumped.  
Writing against representations of nostalgia as a uniform and pervasive social fact, 
Bissell is careful to portray the multiplicity of nostalgic discourses circulating in 
Stone Town, identifying various ‗regressive nostalgias‘ and ‗counternostalgias‘ at 
play (2005: 239, 228). A highly orientalised and selective vision of 19
th
 and 20
th
 
century Zanzibar was deployed by investors, developers, conservationists and state 
officials, as well as some older elites, all keen to maximise on the opportunities 
offered by economic liberalisation and the growth of the tourism industry. Central to 
these nostalgic posturings was the invention of Stone Town as a coherent and named 
entity – ‗located somewhere in the imagination between Ruritania and Narnia‘ 
(Younge in Bissell 2005: 230) – as well as a source of shared heritage. In contrast to 
this commodified nostalgia, many ordinary urban residents evoked aspects of the 
colonial and revolutionary eras to denounce present conditions. Fatuma, for instance, 
recalled colonial procedural prowess as much as the sanctity of public space 
enshrined in revolutionary government policy to condemn the rapacious and 
haphazard approach to urban development she saw around her. If colonial and 
revolutionary nostalgias represented different genres of mnemonic narrative – the 
former was usually associated with the rule of law and ‗gracious‘ urban maintenance; 
the latter was used to evoke the social welfare provisions of the 1960s and 70s – 
individuals such as Fatuma deployed both, sometimes interchangeably, for similar 
critical ends. Extolling the values of the colonial and – to a lesser extent – 
revolutionary eras served as a trenchant mode of critique against rising socio-
economic inequality.  
In making his analysis, Bissell proposes a distinction between nostalgia and other 
forms of memory practice:  
…rather than evoking community and commonality, [nostalgia] works as a 
mode of social memory by emphasising distance and disjuncture (2005: 216).  
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In contrast, ‗collective remembrance typically emerges out of efforts to forge a 
shared (if illusory) sense of group identity, cohesion, and long-term continuities‘ 
(2005: 226). For Bissell, nostalgia works to disrupt conservation efforts that depict 
the city as the product of a shared history – he does not consider nostalgia itself as a 
form of community-making practice.  
Svetlana Boym (2001), in contrast, positions nostalgia as shot through with 
community. Her lyrical excavation of nostalgia begins by tracing its genealogy, from 
a 17
th
 century maladie du pays, a provincial and curable disease, to an incurable mal 
du siècle (Boym 2001: xviii). She posits the ‗global epidemic of nostalgia‘ (2001: 
xiv) that has accompanied the last two centuries as a product of the contradictions of 
modernity, a defence mechanism against the acceleration of time and socio-
economic upheaval. Nostalgia, in her reading, is inextricably linked to modernity, 
not only because it depends on a modern conception of time as ‗unrepeatable and 
irreversible‘ but also because time-space compression intensifies ‗an affective 
yearning for a community with a collective memory, a longing for continuity in a 
fragmented world‘ (Boym 2001: xiv, emphasis added).124 
 
Boym locates cities as particularly significant nostalgic sites, given the pasts – lived 
and dreamt, visible and invisible – that urban conglomerations gather: ‗The past of 
the city…is not entirely legible… it suggests other dimensions of the lived 
experience and haunts the city like a ghost‘(2001: 76). Urban ruins, Boym helpfully 
points out,  
…are not elegiac but rather dialectical; they suggest the coexistence of many 
historical layers, the plurality of possibilities. The ruin is a kind of 
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 Boym distinguishes between two forms of nostalgia, restorative and reflective. 
Restorative nostalgia is concerned with the reconstruction of the past. This strain, 
which importantly does not see itself as nostalgic, is an integral part of nationalist 
discourse in some contexts. Restorative nostalgia involves selective amnesia, an 
emphasis on (mythical) ‗origins‘ and a smoothing over – a silencing – of the 
histories that would complicate narratives of a more glorious and re-creatable past. 
Reflective nostalgia is equally selective but, in contrast to its counterpart, ‗lingers on 
ruins, the patina of time and history, in the dreams of another place and time‘ (Boym 
2001: 41). For the reflective nostalgic, the past is not something that can or should be 
restored, but rather endlessly longed for – the impossibility of return is precisely 
what makes the longing so (bitter)sweet. I find Boym‘s distinction useful, and 
although not specified again, this chapter is concerned with reflective nostalgia. 
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spatialisation of history, an image of what [Walter] Benjamin called 
―dialectic at a standstill‖, where various visions of the city clash and coexist 
(2001: 136).  
Boym considers past and present nostalgia talk in Moscow, Berlin and St Petersburg. 
Post-Soviet Petersburgian nostalgia focuses on particular ruins – such as Saigon, a 
Leningrad-era bar popular amongst a motley crew of poets, black marketeers and 
KGB informants – as well as the now decommissioned trams, which served the city 
so faithfully during a time where taxis and cars were unaffordable luxuries. Boym 
suggests that nostalgic posturings position St Petersburg as ‗a humane reminder of 
[an] old-fashioned urban cosmos‘, and valorise ‗a common urban culture that defies 
the boundary between high and low, artistic and commercial‘ (2001: 168). In other 
words, outpourings of nostalgia in this once great city are as much about ‗cultivating 
a different kind of civic consciousness‘ as they are about ‗wounded pride‘ (2001: 
147).  
Via nostalgia, St Petersburg residents quarry the past for alternative possibilities, 
uniting people through the memory – lived or imagined – of other ways of being in 
the city. As well as constructing a sense of civic relatedness, reflective nostalgia 
affirms that alternative futures are possible, precisely because the past was so (even 
if none of the alternatives offered by the past are desired in their entirety, or even in 
part).  
This chapter builds on the arguments put forth by Bissell and Boym. Nostalgia in 
post-socialist Eastern Europe and Zanzibar (a place that is both postcolonial and 
post-socialist) has emerged from political economies quite distinct from that of 
Mombasa. However, creating a dialogue between these regionally divergent 
accounts is precisely what allows me to unpack the multiplicity of drivers and effects 
of nostalgia in Mombasa in this chapter. Like both authors, I see nostalgia as 
inextricably linked to economic and demographic transformations. However, I am 
cautious of the tendency, exemplified by Boym, to tie nostalgia too simply to 
accelerated modernity, or to neoliberalism, as Bissell does. That we live in a time 
relatively faster and more uncertain than the past is, in my mind, too readily assumed 
by much of the contemporary social science literature, including and well beyond 
nostalgia studies. Given, as anthropologists, we accept the subjective nature of 
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temporality and risk, it seems to me rather difficult to prove that time or uncertainty 
is relatively and progressively speeding up or increasing. Even if it is, what does it 
add to our understanding of the world if we find proof of this quickening everywhere? 
To put it another way, tying nostalgia to accelerated modernity cannot account for its 
pervasiveness in some contexts and not others.  
The need for a historically and geographically contingent approach to nostalgia is in 
line with Bissell‘s (2005), and the latter part of Boym‘s (2001), text. Moreover, 
Bissell‘s consideration of the relationship between colonial nostalgia and economic 
liberalisation has helped me to see that something more complex is happening in 
Mombasa. Over the course of the chapter I demonstrate that that my informants‘ 
experiences are not neatly captured by words like economic ‗liberalisation‘ or 
‗neoliberalism‘, and that these categories belie the nuances their nostalgic tales 
actually tell. Moreover, unlike Bissell‘s informants who are nostalgic because they 
have been failed by neoliberalism, nostalgia in Mombasa is more often a product of 
prosperity.  
Bissell‘s emphasis on nostalgia as an ‗irreducibly plural phenomena‘ (2005: 239) is 
fundamental to the argument I pursue here, as is his recognition of the sentiment as a 
political endeavour: as I show below, nostalgia for the colonial era in Mombasa, like 
in Zanzibar, serves as an important source of critique through exposing disjuncture 
between past and present. However, my ethnography challenges Bissell‘s suggestion 
that nostalgia has little place when it comes to community and continuity. As Boym 
(2001) has highlighted for St Petersburg, I argue that nostalgia in Mombasa brings 
into being a community of Mombasans united by the memorialisation of alternative 
pasts.  
 
Nostalgic soil: economic and demographic seeds  
Tracing the location of paan shops owned by members of the Ghalib family over the 
course of the last century – from a tiny kiosk in Old Town, to the economic heart of 
island, and eventually the elite commercial suburbia of the northern mainland (not to 
mention establishments around the UK) – is as appropriate a guide as any to the 
changing economic fortunes of many of my informants. Nadim‘s emphasis on the 
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size of his family‘s first shop (‗It was a counter really‘), and his grandfather‘s 
‗graduation‘ from Kibokoni to Piggott Place, speak to the relatively humble 
beginnings of the family paan trade. Clearly, fortunes had been made by the time the 
flagship store was opened amidst great fanfare in the late 1960s, by which point the 
family surname was synonymous with quality paan. However, Nadim‘s 
acknowledgement of the economising tactics adopted by a ‗toto-buying‘ clientele 
from the 80s onwards, coupled with his own decision to go to Leicester the 
following decade, denote entanglements of economic growth and downturn, which I 
unravel here.  
In Mombasa, Asians play a significant role at both ends of the hospitality and retail 
sectors, owning most of the city‘s luxury hotels, as well as most of its tiny hardware 
stores. Many, like Nadim, are significantly wealthier than their parents‘ generation: 
Nadim works in Mombasa‘s wealthiest district, his children go to one of the city‘s 
more expensive schools. That said, ‗Business is not what it used to be‘, and Nadim is 
certainly struggling more than he expected to earlier in life. Samarah‘s story is more 
acute. She is, without question, getting a far better education than her parents ever 
did, thanks to the school‘s improving standards and the jamaat’s sponsorship of her 
fees;
125
 she hopes that she‘ll be able to do a computing course at the professional 
training centre attached to the school when she graduates. But that all depends; 
Samarah‘s father had to close their small ‗ration shop‘ (selling dried goods and 
spices) some years ago, unable to compete with the city‘s retail giants. Largely 
dependent on jamaat welfare and odd jobs provided by other members of the 
community, the family has very little disposable income.  
This story is not unique or new: the number of dukawallahs (small shopkeepers) in 
Mombasa has decreased markedly since the 1980s, undermined by a shifting 
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 All Asian communities make substantive welfare provisions for members in need 
of financial support, with the amount given dependent on the wealth of the 
community as a whole and the assessed need. Amongst Khoja Ithna-Asheris, it is 
common for poorer families to have health and education costs covered by the 
jamaat, some also receive assistance with rental payments. Those unable to work and 
with no other means of support are also provided with food rations and basic 
necessities. See Blank (2001) for an extended discussion of welfare and community 
taxation amongst Bohras, and Akhtar (2016) regarding Khoja support networks in 
Tanzania.  
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economic landscape, epitomised by the rise of the supermarket (although this pattern 
of wealth concentration goes well beyond the food sector). I suspect that Nadim‘s 
father‘s decision to charge for totos (small servings of paan) around this time is no 
coincidence. Outlets of Nakumatt, Tusky‘s, Budget and Uchumi, the country‘s 
biggest supermarket chains, now dot the city; one main thoroughfare has three 
options for clientele to choose from. Some of the supermarket chains are owned by 
Asians (a Shah family, for example, remain the majority shareholders in Nakumatt). 
At the same time, the supermarkets have, in less than a generation, put many smaller 
dukawallahs out of business. Gulshan, an Ismaili woman with a medium-sized bread 
factory, selling cheap white bread to dukas in the city‘s outskirts, predicts that she‘ll 
be able to stay in business for another five years before she totally loses out to the 
supermarkets. Many others have already closed shop. Both of these stories illustrate 
the uneven and often contradictory nature of wealth accumulation in recent decades: 
while Samarah‘s family livelihood is more precarious since her father was put out of 
business, growing community prosperity has afforded them access to various welfare 
provisions from the jamaat that would not have been so generous in the past. 
Gulshan, on the other hand, has made a small fortune on the back of liberalisation, 
even if these same forces will soon bring about the demise of her white-sliced empire.  
The tension between waxing and waning fortunes – at both a household and city 
level – is further illustrated in terms of changing educational patterns. By the time 
Nadim was in his late teens, his family could afford to send him to Allidina Visram 
High School, one of the few institutions offering A-Level examinations at the time, 
and certainly the most prestigious. Nadim, however, like most Mombasans I met 
over 40, did not go on to attend university. Mombasa‘s educational landscape has 
transformed markedly in recent decades, exemplified by the changing face of 
Mombasa‘s many ‗Asian‘ schools. For a start, despite retaining their communal 
names, Asian students constitute a minority (sometimes a significant one) in each of 
these private institutions.
126
 This in itself is demonstrative of the rapid expansion of 
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 To name but a few, these include the Jaffery Academy (originally a Khoja 
institution), the Oshwal Academy (set up by Oshwal Jains) and the Aga Khan 
Primary School (which, in its earliest years, catered to Ismailis).  
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the Kenyan middle class since independence.
127
 Moreover, particularly since the 
mid-1990s, all of these institutions have offered internationally recognised 
examinations (GCSEs, A-Levels or the International Baccalaureate); many now also 
boast state of the art facilities. I take these significant scholastic investments as 
evidence of Mombasa‘s bigger, more affluent and more educated middle class (who 
pay the school fees which fund the majority of investment).  
However, this has not been matched by an expansion of the tertiary education sector. 
In contrast to many other smaller urban centres in Kenya, Mombasa‘s university 
scene is limited to a teacher training college and a series of outlets that offer distance 
learning (no one I knew had successfully pursued this latter set-up). During the 
period of my fieldwork the Mombasa Technical Institute gained university status (its 
courses remain largely vocational), while Pwani University – the coast‘s first fully-
fledged university – opened in Kilifi, a town some 70 kilometres north. As 
elucidated in Chapter 2, the very limited availability of higher education options in 
Mombasa must be seen in the light of more than a century of coastal marginalisation 
by both colonial and postcolonial governments. For Nadim‘s generation, the absence 
of higher education opportunities was perhaps less noticeable. However, on the back 
of improvements in educational standards at the primary and secondary levels, some 
form of tertiary study is now normal practice for much of Mombasa‘s middle class – 
certainly for most Asians but also well beyond this demographic. Given the limited 
availability of options in Mombasa, all who can afford to do so pursue further 
education elsewhere (and these elsewheres are diverse: Nairobi, Manipal [India], 
Qom, Semenyih [Malaysia], Cardiff, Montreal).  
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 During my fieldwork, Kenya was declared a (lower) middle-income country, 
according to the gross national income per capita (GNI) measures employed by the 
World Bank. This announcement was first made by the Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics and later confirmed by the World Bank. See articles by J. Kisero: ‗Why our 
country is now a middle income economy‘. Daily Nation, 29 September 2014 
(available online: http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-National-Bureau-of-
Statistics-Income-Economy/1056-2469476-ppi4ggz/index.html, accessed 31 August 
2016), as well as the World Bank website: ‗WB update says 10 countries move up in 
income bracket‘. 2015 (available online: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2015/07/01/new-world-bank-update-shows-bangladesh-kenya-myanmar-
and-tajikistan-as-middle-income-while-south-sudan-falls-back-to-low-income, 
accessed 31 August 2016). 
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While an increasing number of students leave the city, the skills they acquire 
elsewhere often do not translate into jobs back home. Part of this is due to increased 
competition: many Kenyans of diverse backgrounds now have the educational 
qualifications to pursue professional and/or entrepreneurial careers – and are often 
willing to do the same job for less than middle class Mombasans. The discrepancy 
between improvements in education, lifestyle expectations and employment 
opportunities was made evident to me by Faisal Faraj, a Khoja with luminously 
black hair:  
My son studied law and wanted to come back to practice in Kenya. He 
wanted to give back, you know. I told him, ―Fine, that‘s all well and good, 
but let‘s go and sit outside the Law Courts tomorrow morning‖. We were 
sitting there in our Pajero, and he saw all the other lawyers arrive in tuk tuks 
or on foot.  
Faraj‘s son is now a lawyer in the English city of Peterborough.  
Another reason for the dearth of white-collar jobs is that Mombasa‘s economy has 
slumped. Both of the city‘s economic mainstays – tourism and shipping – have 
suffered major losses as a result of two decades of regional insecurity.
128
 Tourism 
nose-dived in Mombasa following a 2002 car bomb at an Israeli-owned coastal hotel, 
an incident that occurred at the same time as a failed attempt to down an Israeli 
airliner departing from the city‘s Moi International Airport (Prestholdt 2011). 
Having recovered somewhat in the decade that followed, tourist numbers have gone 
from bad to worse since 2011, when Kenyan troops entered Somalia on the pretext 
of preventing al-Shabaab incursions south. All of these factors feed into each other – 
Mombasans and the city‘s economy pay heavily as Kenya, the US and AMISOM 
attempt to defeat al-Shabaab, which in turn feeds into growing local frustration, 
attacks and more state security roundups. While most of my informants did not fit 
the racial or age profile that is usually targeted by the police, they are by no means 
unaffected. As Kajji Abbas, referring to a recent spate of grenade attacks, put it to 
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 Shipping fortunes have, however, improved since the dramatic decline in Indian 
Ocean piracy since 2013, itself a result of the now-standard practice of employing 
security personnel on all international vessels.  
208 
 
me one afternoon, ‗You can‘t do business in this climate‘. He relocated his family to 
Birmingham a few months later.  
As Kajji Abbas‘s move suggests, this economic landscape – a history of rising 
incomes, coupled with growing politico-economic insecurity in the present – has 
produced various demographic shifts amongst the city‘s elite. Many with money and 
passport potentialities (a spouse who chose to remain British at Kenyan 
independence, a child now married in Canada), have left the city. This is particularly 
true of Asians, but goes well beyond.
129
 While Asian emigration has been a feature 
of life in Kenya since the late 1960s, everyone I knew in Mombasa spoke of recent 
decades as those most marked by declining community numbers (for all 
communities), indubitably accelerated by the trend of pursuing higher education 
abroad. This steady trickle has in turn resulted in the closure of many Asian-owned 
urban landmarks – from the original Ghalib‘s Paan Shop to the Regal Theatre and 
the Drive-In: certainly, a waning clientele base precipitated Nadim‘s decision to 
move to Leicester in the mid-1990s.  
While Nadim is unusual in that he returned after a decade away, his ability to 
reinvent himself speaks to a second demographic shift: elite relocation to the 
northern mainland. Despite the disappointments of Leicester, Nadim has been able to 
draw on sufficient family resources to set up shop in Nyali. Formerly populated 
predominantly by luxury beach resorts, this area of the city has only become a 
residential and commercial hub in the last ten to 15 years. It is the preferred location 
for more recently arrived individuals of means, as well as increasingly attracting 
older residents with deep enough pockets. As also discussed in the preceding and 
following chapters, wealth aspirations and insecurity often go hand in hand in 
Mombasa. Choosing to reside in Nyali not only allows for ease of access to the most 
upmarket malls, eateries and hotels, the area is also perceived by many as less 
congested (and hence easier to police, as well as escape from). ‗On the island, you‘re 
stuck‘, Yash explained to me over a masala chai latté, pointing out that a 
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 The effects of outmigration are particularly marked for Asians not only because 
they, as business elites, are more likely to leave, but because of their relatively 
smaller numbers to start with (i.e. lots of middle class Swahili have also left but their 
absence is less marked). 
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simultaneous attack on the bridges leading northeast and northwest would imprison 
the city‘s heart (the ferry heading south being a less than ideal getaway vehicle).  
 
On past longing and present distinction: nostalgia as status symbol  
It is in terms of this confluence of economic and demographic factors that I suggest 
we understand the prevalence of particular forms of nostalgia in Mombasa. Certainly, 
the glorification of earlier eras cannot be divorced from the position of relative 
privilege that Asians and some others (such as those classed as ‗Arab‘) were 
accorded under the colonial three-tier system, a fact not lost on a number of my 
informants. Preparing her daily dose of beetroot and ginger juice one morning, 
Nadesh confided, ‗We all bought land for [the price of] peanuts. Everyone did in 
those days. Maybe it wasn‘t fair… but they were happy times‘. Nadesh hails from a 
wealthy Ismaili family, many others were far less able to capitalise on the 
opportunities offered by colonialism. However, even today‘s youth often alluded to 
the on-going implications of the change of Asian status that accompanied 
independence. Jumana, a young Khoja woman who finished university in Nairobi 
during my fieldwork, struggled for months to get an accountancy job in Mombasa. 
‗It‘s so hard to get jobs these days. So many places prefer Africans‘, she surmised 
wryly. Jumana, grandmother concurred, ‗It was never like this when I was young. 
Asians were always first in line‘. These oft-repeated statements evoke an idealised 
past where Asian prerogatives and a far smaller middle class meant that jobs were 
easier to find. 
As the above examples suggest, nostalgia in Mombasa is sometimes an indicator of 
diminished (post)colonial privilege. However, in contrast to Bissell, who positions 
his informants as the nostalgic losers of neoliberal reform, my suggestion is that 
many in Mombasa are nostalgic because they have benefitted from decades of rising 
prosperity. In Mombasa, I see rising wealth as both productive of and indexed by 
nostalgia. In this East African town, nostalgia marks present wealth, but not through 
a commodification or trivialising of the past. The nostalgia talk I heard usually 
valorised the past, memorialising rags to riches tales that simultaneously record 
trajectories of migration and social mobility. Nostalgia in Mombasa is less a 
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commodity than a source of social capital, one that is nevertheless intimately 
connected to economic gain and a history of Indian Ocean trade. 
My argument, thus, is that in lamenting a lost era, older Mombasans are indexing a 
marked improvement in household incomes over the course of their own and their 
families‘ lifetimes. Bemoaning the fate of the paan industry is a case in point. As 
Nadim and many others explained to me, evening strolls in search of paan and 
faloodas date from an era before the domesticating tendencies of home television. 
Although the loss of Mombasa‘s ruminating culture is much mourned, it also clearly 
denotes a lifestyle shift and wallet upgrade. One of the reasons why Ghalib‘s is 
(re)gaining popularity is because Nadim is providing a paan experience that caters to 
this change. ‗He‘s brought the finesse back from the West‘, Yash remarked as we 
drained the last of our faloodas, referring to Nadim‘s stint in Leicester. ‗Those [paan 
shops] in Kibokoni, we grew up in them, but who would want to go now?‘ While the 
few establishments to which Yash refers continue to survive, they provision a 
diminishing and lower class of paan chewers.  
Similar stories of upward mobility mark much nostalgia talk in the city. Supping 
afternoon chai with Hashim (who me met in Chapter 2), he recounted the long line of 
mithai wallahs (sweetshop owners) from which he descends, ending with a rueful, 
‗But I know my sons will never sell sweets!‘ Although nostalgic for the familial loss 
of a profession, Hashim‘s sons will not become confectioners because they are busy 
importing paper from Guangzhou and advising Airtel, Kenya‘s second largest 
mobile network provider, about expansion – careers of which Hashim is also 
immensely proud. In other words, these rhetorics of change and loss are also markers 
of status. In a similar vein, Mubina remembers the old days where grandchildren 
would never have lived so far away and Jaffer recalls the vibrancy of the Khoja 
debating society when community numbers were double. Mubina misses her 
daughter‘s twins, but loves the bi-annual trip to Edmonton (‗Although I would never 
go in winter, these people are mad!‘). Jaffer is distraught about the decline of 
community institutions (struggling against this downward slope is his raison d‘être), 
but each of his four children pursue distinguished occupations elsewhere. 
Assessments of the city as a site of employment opportunity tell analogous tales. 
While people bemoaned the increased competition in the job market and the 
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difficulties of finding work, such commentaries often served to denote privilege. As 
Faraj pointed out to his son from the comfort of the family Pajero above, the reason 
that many cannot find jobs in Mombasa is because their professional qualifications 
and lifestyle aspirations have outpaced local salaries.  
This trajectory of wealth was also evidenced via the frequent valorisations of what 
might be called a ‗sociality of less‘. People had very fond memories of the sharing 
economy that predated expendable incomes. Faraj remembered the bounties to be 
made walking around the market at closing time, ‗There were no fridges in those 
days so the mithai wallahs used to give all their leftovers to the kids at the end of the 
day‘. Khadija, similarly, recalled the excitement of going to see whether she and her 
brothers could augment the evening meal at the Old Port: ‗Sometimes Mum used to 
send us to get fish from the fishermen. For them it‘s good luck to give something to 
children so we would get free fish!‘ To my mind, these iterations demonstrate the 
entwined nature of loss and gain within nostalgic discourse in Mombasa. Faraj and 
Khadija mourn the solidarity of an impecunious past, as much as depict their 
journeys away from poverty. This pattern is mirrored in many of the frequent 
allusions to growing insecurity. If, as in the vignette above, Nadim‘s frequently 
malfunctioning CCTV system is a reminder of the social harmony of days gone by, it 
is also a testament to the model of his car and the price of Nyali real estate. This was 
echoed in Mohammed‘s lament, ‗Now we have an askari [watchman] 24/7. When I 
was a kid we didn‘t even lock the door!‘  
But nostalgia talk did not always relate to economic gain, and was also a register of 
the uneven and unpredictable nature of prosperity. Nadim‘s narrative – which 
juxtaposes a time when Ghalib‘s sold paan by the metre with the necessity of 
falooda happy hours today – captures this, in its delineation of the decline of the 
duka economy. Thanks to the success of previous eras and the support of family 
abroad, Nadim is lucky enough to have fairly substantial resources to help get his 
latest venture off the ground – but he is only just hanging on. ‗At least the 
supermarkets still don‘t sell paan!‘ he quipped on another occasion. Located little 
more than a stone‘s throw from a major shopping complex – which boasts, inter alia, 
a Cineplex and a trattoria selling imported Italian ice cream – Nadim is, in some 
senses, getting by because he is selling nostalgia. Now a rarity, his faloodas, the toto 
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paans, even the name of his establishment all evoke a bygone Mombasa that some 
are only too happy to return to, at least once in a while.  
Samarah‘s father, the now occasionally employed former ration shop owner, has 
been less fortunate. ‗Ladies used to come specially for our dhana-jeera [coriander 
cumin powder]‘, Samarah remembered wistfully. ‗We got all our masalas straight 
from India. The quality was much higher than those tiny packets you can buy in 
Nakumatt‘, Samarah contrasts her family‘s wares with that of the supermarket giant. 
It‘s not just quality that has been set adrift – it is a veritable style of shopping and 
interaction. ‗Some people used to stay for hours, my dad had a special seat for 
customers‘, Samarah smiles in recollection. Nowadays, there are still a number of 
ration shops in Mombasa, and I observed more than one ‗customer seat‘ in continued 
use – but that life is over for Samarah‘s family. ‗They wiped us out‘, she explains, 
articulating her loss as a direct result of supermarket power. Samarah‘s nostalgia, 
which tells of declining fortune on the back of the consolidation of power by 
economic elites, is, of the stories relayed here, most similar to that expressed by 
Bissell‘s (2005) informants.  
For many others, lamentations regarding decreased livelihood security were 
inseparable from insecurity more generally. As Nadim makes clear with the tale of 
his friend‘s decimated rent-a-car business, Mombasa‘s tourism-centred economy is 
the first to suffer from violent attacks and their political consequences. Speaking 
after Thomas Cook‘s 2014 decision to suspend chartered flights to Mombasa (itself 
on the back of a British Foreign Office advisory against all but essential travel to the 
coast), Mansoor did not mince his words, ‗It‘ll never be the same again. The Brits 
have ruined it for us here‘. Us, in this case, refers to the large ‗destination 
management‘ company for which he works. At least Mansoor could console himself 
with the continued custom of the more intrepid Italians and French.  
It was by no means only the tourist sector that has suffered in the city of late. Gulnar, 
proud proprietor of Mombasa‘s oldest perfumery, importers of alcohol-free oil-based 
fragrances from Paris (‗None of this cheap stuff from Dubai‘), was one of many to 
attest to a direct link between insecurity and profit margins.  
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Mombasa used to be the very best place in Kenya. Now it‘s stagnant. Last 
year [2014], with all the terrorist attacks and everything, it‘s the first year we 
didn‘t do well.  
About a week after an explosion on a bus arriving from Nairobi killed at least four, I 
heard parallel sentiments from the owner of Jawad‘s Cold Store. ‗Everyone is 
staying home‘, Kabir observed, passing me a plate of piping hot bhajiyas and 
gesturing around the unusually empty caf . ‗Mombasa was never like this…. If you 
want to do jihad, go to Pakistan‘. Nadim was feeling the effects even more acutely as 
faloodas and paan, everyone knows, are best consumed at night (when even more 
customers chose to remain indoors). ‗And to think, me and my friends used to walk 
from Kibokoni to Tudor at 3am!‘ Strolling at night is now most definitely avoided.  
I return to the nostalgia-security nexus again below. For now, what I hope is 
apparent from this section is that Mombasan residents use nostalgic rhetoric to 
narrate histories of wealth improvements against a backdrop of growing insecurity 
and diminishing economic opportunity. Nostalgia certainly served as a register of 
loss and decline, but also of economic advancement and upward mobility. As I have 
sought to highlight, much of the commentary I heard points to a complex interplay of 
loss and gain embedded within Mombasan nostalgia. These allusions to changing 
fortunes – recording economic appreciation and depreciation – connect those who 
tell them to the political economy of the Indian Ocean realm: fortune and loss are 
closely linked to the transoceanic trade of which they have been so integral a part. 
Nostalgia, in other words, subtly reinserts Indian Ocean historiographies into 
everyday interactions. This is significant to the notion of nostalgia as evocative of 
community and solidarity, an idea I explore further below. 
 
Claiming the city: nostalgia and civic relatedness  
As in Bissell‘s (2005) account of Zanzibar, the nostalgia I encountered in Mombasa 
often specifically referenced the colonial era, and served as a register for critiquing 
contemporary conditions. Echoing sentiments in the nearby archipelago, the colonial 
regime in Mombasa was often painted as being premised on the principles of 
orderliness and justice, now seen to be lacking amongst political elites. Nadim‘s 
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frustration with the erratic electricity supply, and his assessment as to its source 
(corruption; ‗At least under the Brits there was order‘) was mirrored by Mohammed, 
a Baluchi mzee (elder) many years his senior. ‗There were so many problems with 
colonial rule but at least they were educated in what it meant to be fair‘, he told me 
between slurps of iced tamarind juice at Jahazi Caf . ‗Ah, and the roads!‘ his 
younger friend Abdul interjected, ‗the traffic in Mombasa used to flow. Can you 
imagine? The Brits actually invested in maintaining them‘, he looks at me with a 
despairing smile. Mohammed snorts in agreement. Like in Zanzibar, these 
standardised narratives were voiced by many, regardless of age: Abdul was born the 
year Kenya gained independence but often alluded to the positive attributes of 
empire. Eisenberg (2009) found identical discourses amongst his Swahili informants 
in Mombasa‘s Old Town.  
The trope that kept emerging was a set of binary oppositions relating the way 
things had been during the days of the British Protectorate and the way things 
had come to be after independence. The shift was from ―clean‖ (safi) to 
―dirty‖ (chafu), ―efficient‖ to ―corrupt,‖ ―safe‖ to ―dangerous,‖ ―prosperous‖ 
to ―impoverished,‖ ―functional‖ to ―dysfunctional,‖ and ―quiet‖ (kimya) to 
―noisy‖ (kelele/fujo) (Eisenberg 2009: 55–56, italics original).  
Drawing on these narratives, part of what I would like to add to Bissell‘s (2005) 
observations on nostalgia‘s critical potential is a consideration of the way in which 
such discourses can forge unity through the exposure of disjuncture. As Boym (2001: 
168) has written with regards to St Petersburg, the past offers a rich array of ‗humane 
reminder[s]‘ for urban dwellers disillusioned with the present. In harking back to the 
(idealised) fairness and civility of times gone by, the Mombasans I met not only used 
the past to critique the present (exposing the disjuncture between the colonial and 
postcolonial eras, as Bissell suggests), they also used the past to imagine other ways 
of living together in the future. Even if the past imagined is rose-tinted, nostalgia talk 
in Mombasa simultaneously memorialises and projects different modes of living the 
city. Valorising the integrity of colonial civil servants and the seamless circulation 
system over which they presided, Mohammed and Abdul question the legitimacy of 
the contemporary political landscape and affirm their shared desire for alternative 
styles of urban governance. In a context where, for various reasons, people feel 
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disenfranchised by the political system,
130
 nostalgia for a past era represents an outlet 
for discontent and the articulation of alternatives where other forms of protest are 
deemed lacking. Thus, in contrast to the prevalent stereotypes that Asians are 
apathetic businesspeople and that inhabitants of the coast are too lazy to be political, 
I see nostalgia as evidence of a desire for change, even if ways to push for this at a 
county or national level are far from crystallised.  
Political critique is but one of nostalgia‘s many faces in Mombasa. Reminiscing over 
particular people, places and patterns of consumption that now no longer exist – 
from the lady selling bhajiyas in Piggott Place to the legendary mishkaki
131
 at Ricoda 
(‗The old Ricoda, the new one is crap‘) – is nothing short of a Mombasa pastime. 
Regardless of age, origin or sect, almost everyone I met had stories of fabled places 
of past. Here I should note that most of the people I spent time with in Mombasa 
hailed from families with long-standing connections to the place. I spent very little 
time with people who had recently migrated to the city (be that from upcountry 
Kenya, India or elsewhere). I suspect nostalgia would seem a less ubiquitous urban 
phenomenon had I done so. That said, at least amongst my informants some 
nostalgic posturings were widely shared. Recounting the lost joys of the cinemas and 
the food at particular establishments like Splendid View and Nosh were especially 
prevalent – Nadim‘s love for the Drive-In is exemplary in this regard.  
Younger people had plenty of means for appropriating these discourses, even if 
many of them were born long after the ruin of the institutions in question. Chatting 
with Farhana and Faharin – twins in their mid-teens – before majlis one evening, the 
two agreed, ‗It‘s so sad you can‘t just walk around Lighthouse anymore‘. When I 
asked what the Indian Ocean promenade had been like when they were kids, the pair 
looked at each other. ‗We only went when we were really small‘, offered Faharin. 
Many others – young and old – continued to map Mombasa according to now-absent 
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 As discussed previously, this includes the perception that central government will 
continue to neglect the coast, and that contemporary politicians have little regard for 
much more than their own pockets. Hassan Ali Joho, Mombasa‘s County Governor, 
was widely reported to be more concerned with maintaining the port‘s lucrative 
narcotics trade than governing the county. Finally, as also mentioned above, Asians 
feel marginalised by prevailing patterns of patronage which continue to be structured 
around ‗tribe‘.  
131
 Mishkaki, as previously noted, are barbecued skewers of beef or mutton.  
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institutions. Consulting Zarina about the location of her granny‘s house, she 
explained, ‗You know the place, it‘s just behind Naaz Cinema‘. Naaz, pictured in Fig. 
25 on p.105, was renamed (to Lotus) and then torn down well over a decade ago, but 
the building‘s demise has not dented its position as an urban landmark. Finally, city 
residents were quick to point out the deteriorating standards of fabled institutions 
within their own lifetimes. After a trip to the once iconic Rozina‘s, Nargis asked me, 
‗Did you eat the poussin?132 Meh, I used to love it but I‘d never go now… It just 
doesn‘t taste the same‘. The people cited in this paragraph would describe 
themselves as Kokni, Khoja Ithna-Asheri, Ismaili and Swahili respectively, and span 
five decades in age – the point being that I heard strikingly similar narratives from 
many mouths.  
Another favourite focus of attention evoked ‗lost‘ or ‗vanishing‘ patterns of sociality. 
Malik remembered growing up next to several Swahili families, ‗We were the only 
Khojas. But nobody minded if you picked their ndimu [limes]. The Swahili have 
such a good culture of neighbourhood‘. Saima, on the other hand, was one of many 
to remember the mythical ladies‘ evenings at Majestic Cinema: ‗If you lived in Old 
Town, you were there‘. When I asked whether she and her friends ever go to watch 
films at the Cineplex in Nyali these days, Saima shook her head, ‗Have you seen the 
prices?! Ni ghali sana! [They‘re so expensive!]. And plus‘, she gives me a 
mischievous look, ‗they don‘t even sell sesame seeds‘. The old movie halls, I learnt 
on multiple occasions, used to crunch with sesame seed shells after each screening, 
covered in the debris of this essential cinematic accompaniment.  
Dwelling on decline, I contend, is a form of social intimacy in Mombasa. Precisely 
because it is articulated by people from many walks of life (and often constitutes a 
pattern of discussion amongst friends, as illustrated in various instances above), 
engaging in nostalgic iteration evokes a community of Mombasans – of different 
racial and religious backgrounds – that have all been in the city for a long time. Angé 
& Berliner‘s notion of the ‗mnemonic community‘ (2015: 10) is usefully applied 
here: decline forges a community of strangers all (imagined to be) united in their 
knowledge of better days. Nostalgic reminiscences, I suggest, are a means through 
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 Poussin refers to a young chicken in some countries; in Mombasa it denotes a 
chicken dish prepared with a spicy sauce.  
217 
 
which individuals demonstrate the longevity of their ties to the city (and, as I 
elaborate below, position themselves in contrast to those with less rooted 
genealogies).  
Of course, as Kathleen Stewart has observed, nostalgia does different things, 
‗[depending] on where the speaker stands in the landscape of the present‘ (1988: 
227). In this regard, although the discourses I have discussed here were espoused by 
a broad range of Mombasans, I suggest that claiming longevity of connection to the 
city via nostalgia was perhaps particularly significant to Asians who cannot claim 
‗local-ness‘ via skin colour, in a context where being brown is not a sign of 
‗privileged autochthony‘ (Mbembé 2002: 256). As Achille Mbemb  writes of the 
racially based nationalism that characterises the continent,  
[r]acial and territorial authenticity are conflated, and Africa becomes the land 
of black people. Since the racial interpretation is at the foundation of a 
restricted civic relatedness, everything that is not black is out of place, and 
thus cannot claim any sort of Africanity (Mbembé 2002: 256).  
In this vein, I contend that while nostalgia provides an important means of place 
making for all long-time inhabitants, these claims to belonging perhaps have a 
particular resonance for Asians, who continue to be perceived as second-class 
citizens. These rhetorics not only root the speaker firmly in the history of the city, 
they construct a sense of civic relatedness precisely because they position her as part 
of a broader mnemonic community of Mombasans.  
 
Coping with uncertainty: nostalgia and narratives of blame  
As I have argued above, intimate – often corporeal – knowledge of pastimes, 
buildings and delights that now no longer exist is a way in which established 
residents create ties with each other, and the city itself. However, nostalgia is also a 
way in which a particular subset of Mombasans distinguishes themselves from those 
who cannot claim access to this heritage. Nostalgia roots the speaker in the city‘s 
history, from which others are implicitly or explicitly excluded. In other words, these 
discourses deploy temporality to create a hierarchy of urban belonging. Those who, 
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personally or through family lineages, cannot claim a Mombasan past, are positioned 
as not belonging. Put simply, long-standing residents constitute a decreasing 
percentage of the city‘s population: many, especially (but not only) Asians, have 
moved away, while Mombasa‘s population is perceived to have increased markedly 
since 1990. Most people I knew described a ‗ballooning‘ or ‗explosion‘ of urban 
residents in recent decades, due to the large influx of Somali refugees fleeing civil 
war in the north, as well as ever-growing numbers of people from upcountry and the 
surrounding coast.  
People from inland Kenya have been making home in Mombasa and its environs 
since the beginning of the 20
th
 century. As elucidated earlier in the thesis, the 
systematic preference for employing upcountry Kenyans where possible – as 
stevedores, hotel receptionists or civil servants – dates from the colonial era, and has 
been perpetuated in certain sectors to this day. Young coastal residents interviewed 
by Kresse spoke of the discrimination they face in the job market, with many public 
and private employers in Mombasa openly privileging Christian ‗black Africans‘ 
(2007a: 61). While the extent to which upcountry ‗invasion‘ continues in the 
contemporary economic moment is debatable, the perception that coastal wealth – 
and public space – continues to be usurped by non-Muslim outsiders remains 
widespread. Even with the economic downturn, as Kenya‘s second largest urban 
conglomeration, Mombasa remains a hotbed of opportunity in comparison to other 
parts of the country. Both in terms of Somalis (see below) and upcountry Kenyans, 
Mombasa is viewed by many long-time residents as being taken over by the wrong 
kind of people.
133
  
Kenya and Somalia share a lengthy and porous border and, as noted in the 
Introduction, people of Somali origin have a long history in Kenya. However, their 
presence in the country increased markedly following the escalation of violence in 
Somalia in the early 1990s. As explained earlier, those with family connections or 
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 Mijikenda populations from the surrounding coast have also long flocked to the 
city in search of work (Willis 1993). While looked down upon by others as poor and 
less urbane, they are not viewed with the same contempt as those from upcountry. 
This relates to the  adherence of many to Islam (even if they are often considered 
‗inferior‘ believers; see McIntosh 2009) and enduring connections with Mombasan 
families, historically through relations of servitude and agricultural tenancy. 
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financial means have sought to escape the vast refugee camps of the country‘s north, 
making their way to Nairobi and Mombasa. In Mombasa, many took up residence in 
Old Town, the part of the city historically inhabited by Swahilis and Asians 
(Eisenberg 2013; Kresse 2007a). In certain areas of the historic centre, Somalis are 
now a very visible presence, owning shops, cafés and residential homes, as well as 
constituting a vibrant part of street life. Areas such as Kilifi Corner or Mlango wa 
Papa – northern areas of Old Town – are imagined as Somali enclaves, which many 
non-Somalis now avoid. This is because, in addition to changing Old Town‘s 
economic and spatial dynamics, Somalis are imagined to threaten the Islamic status 
quo and, by implication, security in the city. Put simply, Somalis are frequently 
assumed to be Wahhabis, al-Shabaab sympathisers and potential ‗terrorists‘. That 
most ethnic Somalis are Shafii Sunni (not Wahhabi), that Wahhabism has a long 
history in Mombasa that well predates the Somali civil war, and that many preachers 
in Mombasa that espouse Wahhabi doctrine do not have Somali origins, does little to 
dislodge these stereotypes (McIntosh 2009; see also Chapter 3).  
This conflation between Somalis and urban insecurity often finds form in Kenyan 
government policy. Following grenade and gun attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa in 
March 2014, the government launched Operation Usalama Watch, ordering all 
refugees (the majority of whom are Somali) living in urban areas to ‗return‘ to the 
camps of Dadaab and Kakuma in the north of the country. Over the next few weeks 
many thousands of ethnic Somalis (both refugees and Kenyan citizens), particularly 
in Nairobi but also Mombasa, were arrested and detained as part of this national 
‗anti-terror‘ strategy. 134 The government‘s perception and treatment of Kenya‘s 
large ethnic Somali population was encapsulated in the title of a Human Rights 
Watch report: ‗You are all terrorists‘: Kenyan police abuse of refugees in Nairobi,135 
which was issued following a previous attempt to ‗return‘ Somalis to refugee camps. 
Unsurprisingly, such sentiments also find outlets in the media. In a heinous editorial 
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 See the Human Rights Watch article: ‗Kenya: end abusive round-ups‘. 2014 
(available online: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/12/kenya-end-abusive-round-
ups, accessed 10 September 2017). 
135
 See the Human Rights Watch report: ‗You are all terrorists‘: Kenyan police 
abuse of refugees in Nairobi. 2013 (available online: 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/29/you-are-all-terrorists/kenyan-police-abuse-
refugees-nairobi, accessed 19 August 2017). 
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published in the Daily Nation in March 2014, a senior editor of the country‘s best-
selling newspaper opined, ‗It would appear that every little, two-bit Somali has a big 
dream – to blow us up, knock down our buildings and slaughter our children‘.136 I 
cite these government policies and newspaper articles to demonstrate that 
Mombasans‘ perceptions of the link between Somalis, Wahhabism and ‗terror‘ are 
not divorced from broader national imaginaries. 
Here I should note that many Mombasans, such as café owner Kabir, distinguished 
between ‗original‘ Somalis – who have been part of the Kenyan social landscape for 
generations – and the ‗new‘ post-1990 crowd. For Kabir and others, it was the latter 
that posed a problem – not only did they have more money and influence, they were 
also more likely to be linked to Islamic extremism. ‗They are more radicalised than 
the rest‘, he asserted, pushing thick locks of hair out of his eyes for the fifth time, 
‗these are the ones going to Iraq and Syria‘. 
In a moment of population ‗influx‘ and rising geopolitical insecurity, I interpret 
nostalgia for places that are no longer there (or are no longer what they once were) as 
a tactic by which older elites attempt to define Mombasa as ‗theirs‘, as a city they 
have more rights to than others. Neha Vora (2013) notes similar processes at play in 
Dubai, where many of the older businessmen she encountered enjoyed recounting 
tales of gold smuggling along Dubai Creek, long before the liberalisation of the 
Indian economy. In addition to propping up performances of masculinity, the 
evocation of these daring days gives older Dubai Indians a claim to the city that 
cannot be corralled by newer migrants. This narrative positioning not only fashions 
us/them, insider/outsider dichotomies, it also makes it easier to arraign newer 
arrivals as culpable for contemporary problems. Relishing a plate of kachoris
137
 at 
Hashim‘s one afternoon, I asked him what he thought about the Munisipali‘s 
(Municipal Police) crackdown on street vendors, who had been subject to aggressive 
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 See M. Mathiu‘s article: ‗Are we just going to sit around and wait to be blown to 
bits by terrorists?‘ Daily Nation, 20 March 2014 (available online: 
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/Are-we-just-going-to-sit-around-and-wait-to-be-
blown-to-bits/1949942-2252048-format-xhtml-iyaakqz/index.html, accessed 10 
September 2017). 
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 As noted in Chapter 2, kachoris are deep fried balls of moog dhal, chickpea flour, 
green mango and spices. 
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round-ups since the start of the year.
138
 ‗Some of the hawkers should‘ve been cleared 
up, some of them should‘ve stayed‘, he responded diplomatically. Hashim explained 
that in contrast to the coastal Digo women who, according to him, had traditionally 
done most of the street vending, the behaviour of many upcountry hawkers was 
simply not acceptable. ‗We never used to have problems…‘ he remarked, ‗But these 
people have not been trained in the mannerisms of Islam‘. Hashim‘s discourse 
closely echoes well-established ideas about what kind of place Mombasa is, tensions 
about who has a ‗right‘ to be here (Muslims), and understandings of the provenance 
of many coastal problems (inland).  
In a similar vein, my trips to the market with Shahina would often be punctuated 
with derogatory commentary about Somalis. Detailing the absence of rubbish and the 
presence of order in an ostensibly pristine pre-Somali era, one morning she 
concluded her polemic with something of a rhetorical flourish, ‗These people are 
very dirty. I don‘t know why. If you want to do business, you must be clean, no?‘ 
This sense that Somalis have affected a change in the very character of the city was 
most keenly felt with regards to Old Town. Nuria, a woman in her mid-30s 
explained, ‗Old Town used to be so good. But these Somalis…They are noisy, loud, 
dirty. So not mstaarabu [lit. civilised person in Swahili]‘. At a Khoja ladies‘ social 
bringing together grannies and their granddaughters, I get chatting with Aamena, as 
she reapplies foundation on top of her already heavy make-up. Aamena now lives 
with her family in Kizingo, but this wasn‘t always the case.  
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 On 1 January 2014, constitutional reforms approved via a referendum several 
years earlier came into law. The most significant change brought about by the new 
constitution is the devolution of power to the newly created counties. County 
governments are now in control of their own finances – and also responsible for 
raising much of their expenditure locally. During my fieldwork, the Mombasa 
County Government‘s efforts in this regard centred on raising licence fees – tuk tuk 
drivers, juice bar owners and restaurateurs all complained to me about exorbitant 
hikes of between 100 and 400 percent from December 2013 to January 2014. At the 
same time, a licence fee was imposed on anyone selling items in the street: ‗hawkers‘ 
– as street vendors are commonly referred to in Mombasa – had essentially been 
priced off the street. Everyone without a licence – i.e. everyone – was regularly 
rounded up by the Munisipali. For the first few months, when this policy was 
enforced with a vengeance, the change it brought to commercial centre of the city 
was hard to exaggerate. The streets were empty, not only of people selling mangoes, 
tomatoes, cashews, hairpins, curtain wires or handbags, but also of customers.  
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We lived in Old Town until 2008, opposite the police station. I loved it… but 
then we shifted. There were too many Somalis where we used to live. And 
there are six girls and one boy in my family. Our parents were worried.  
Fatima agreed, ‗Old Town used to be so safe. Now it‘s full of druggies. It‘s all since 
the Somalis came – ten, 15 years ago‘. Fatima‘s precautionary measures included 
carrying the smallest possible handbag with her, as well as ensuring she returned 
home – to her apartment in another part of the island – by 5.30pm. The spectre of 
thieves, junkies and more generalised but equally threatening ‗others‘ looms large in 
contemporary Old Town – and these threats are frequently associated with Somalis.  
Here I should clarify that the prevalence of racialised stereotypes did not preclude 
more nuanced interactions. Shahina, for instance, always stopped for potatoes and a 
chat with Fatuma, a Somali woman with a wonderful open smile (‗She‘s so nice and 
very beauty, my god‘), and bought her dates from a little Somali-owned duka on one 
of Kibokoni‘s main thoroughfares. ‗He always gives me kwa kawaida‘, she 
explained. Kwa kawaida literally means as usual or usually in Swahili, a term which 
Shahina used to implore vendors to maintain established price and quality 
arrangements with her. 
However, there was a real sense of Somalis usurping urban space amongst many I 
spoke to. Chatting with Maryam while she heated some of last night‘s leftovers for 
our lunch I learn that, 
There used to be so few people in Mombasa. Now there are Somali people 
selling everywhere. They‘re on the streets, in the shops, they‘ve bought 
houses. They‘re breaking the old houses and making new buildings.  
Many were quick to explain that it was Somalis fuelling the construction boom and 
rise in real estate prices, as suggested by the fact that Nadim was priced out of 
buying back his old paan shop by Somali investors. Somali cash reserves, real or 
imagined, only added to the impression of ‗invasion‘. This sentiment was 
emphatically reiterated to me during a meeting with one of the city‘s more prominent 
Shia clerics of Swahili origin. In his assessment, ‗From the 60s to the 90s Mombasa 
belonged to Mombasans. We had influence, we were involved in every activity. Now 
we are dominated. The way has been given to non-Mombasans‘. When asked who 
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these non-Mombasans were, the Sheikh responded in his patrician tone, ‗Kikuyus 
and Somalis of course. You need only to look around you‘.  
Shahina, like countless others, positioned Somalis as having materially and morally 
polluted the city, bringing Wahhabi Islam to the mosques as much as trash to the 
streets. Although as mentioned above this association does not stand up to scrutiny 
(the majority of Somalis are not Wahhabi and the doctrine has a long history in 
Mombasa), people were wont to use Wahhabi and Somali interchangeably, 
exemplified by Kabir‘s matter-of-fact assessment one afternoon: ‗Somalis have 
taken over the mosques and people are afraid‘. Accusations that Somalis have had a 
detrimental impact on the form and content of Islam in Mombasa was often 
evidenced via a nostalgic take on women‘s clothing. Passing a woman in a face veil 
on the street would almost always elicit one of Shahina‘s rather magnificent tuts, 
after which she would sigh heavily and tell me, ‗Ladies in Mombasa never used to 
dress like this‘. The presence of ninjas on the street, as women in niqab or face veil 
were commonly described, was a reminder of their absence in days gone by, an era 
where everyone allegedly shared more similar Islamic principles. Melancholia for a 
now lost Islamic harmony was never far from Sahil‘s lips, ‗There was always such 
good relations between Muslims before, all Muslims used to get along‘. The niqab 
was a visible reminder of a shattering of this idealised past. For many Mombasans, 
the niqab denoted an incorrect interpretation of the Quran, which failed to accord 
sufficient rights for women – just one of the many things wrong with Wahhabism 
and, by association, Somalis.  
From here it is a small jump to blame Somalis for the city‘s declining security 
situation. With Operation Usalama Watch in full swing, the Mombasa County police 
chose the Easter weekend in April 2014 to set up a series of security check points 
around the county, including on the two bridges leading off the island. Good Friday 
and Easter Monday are public holidays in Kenya, and many people use the 
opportunity to journey out of the city for a day or two. The road blocks caused an 
impressive traffic snarl-up, and led to hundreds being arrested over the course of two 
days, mostly for not being in possession of correct documentation (throughout 2014 
the police interpreted it as their mandate to incarcerate anyone – not just people of 
Somali origin – unable to produce a national identity or alien card, or the money to 
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pay a bribe). Kabir, who I meet on the following Tuesday, was deeply unimpressed. 
‗It took me two hours to cross Nyali Bridge!‘ he exclaimed, putting a damper on a 
family outing to Pirates, a public beach on the northern mainland. A delayed Sunday 
sojourn was the least of it, Kabir simply could not comprehend the number of 
‗terrorist‘ incidents in the last three months – and was unequivocal in his analysis, 
‗What has happened to this place? You don‘t see Arabs or Asians doing this kind of 
thing. Only Somalis‘.  
As this range of examples shows nostalgic discourse – for Tuesdays at the Drive-In 
or evening strolls at Lighthouse, for a time before ninjas or ‗uneducated‘ hawkers – 
constructs the city as belonging to some people and not others. As much as 
excluding these ‗others‘, nostalgia is a way in which older residents make a claim to 
the city in the face of rising insecurity and perceived religious and demographic 
change.  
 
Conclusion: the desirability of nostalgia in Mombasa  
This chapter has examined the multiple drivers and social functions of nostalgia in 
Mombasa. Taking an ethnographic approach to the political economy of nostalgia, I 
have sought to highlight the nuances nostalgia talk can illuminate, be that in terms of 
the contradictory nature of prosperity or the intertwined nature of loss and gain, 
inclusion and exclusion in contemporary Mombasa. While attentive to the ways in 
which nostalgia is used to narrate politico-economic insecurity, I have suggested that 
it can be a source of social capital in two senses. Countering associations of nostalgia 
and economic stagnation, I have demonstrated that nostalgia in Mombasa registers 
wealth improvements, as much as laments decline. Moreover, rather than something 
to be eschewed or wished away, nostalgia can constitute a resource, frequently 
reiterated because it denotes a privileged claim on the city. This chapter underscores 
the irreducible plurality (Bissell 2005: 239) of nostalgia in Mombasa and its 
significance in everyday interaction for a diverse community of Mombasans 
struggling to get along with each other, and with social change.  
I have argued that nostalgia can be a source of distinction, marking the speaker‘s 
contemporary economic standing through alluding to histories of wealth 
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accumulation, or their position as more Mombasan than ‗others‘, based on a 
historically grounded appreciation of the city. At the same time, nostalgia creates 
bonds of affinity amongst long-standing Mombasan elites who (are also imagined to) 
remember places and patterns of old – be that sesame seeds at the cinema or the 
chicken tikka at Splendid View. Through its power to exclude those who cannot 
claim access to this epistemology of decay, nostalgia is simultaneously a vehicle for 
demarcating ‗others‘ and a trope via which older inhabitants seek to shore up their 
claims to the city. Nostalgic discourse often points to the disjuncture between past 
and present, structuring critical commentary about political elites, demographic 
change and the quality of chicken poussin. But it also posits continuity, underpinning 
a sense of shared history and bringing into being a community of Mombasans united 
in their remembrance of alternative pasts. Often drawing on equally rooted histories, 
the following chapter turns our attention to the ways in which urban residents strive 
to act on its future.  
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Chapter 5 
Negotiating the future: aspiration, 
anxiety and reform on a building site 
 
Dust deposits its all-encompassing cloak the instant I emerge from Rabi‘s car. The 
place is already heaving with workers, decked out in gumboots and boiler suits, 
some green, some orange. Three Asian overseers are giving instructions from the 
centre of the field; one of them has the remnants of a red tika
139
 on his forehead. 
Someone comes over to give us hard hats and Rabi suggests we start in the mosque, 
by far the most complete of the buildings. 
Rabi Jalal, the man overseeing the major Khoja building project known as the Jaffery 
Complex, has kindly agreed to take me on a tour. Rabi is enthusiastic in speech and 
manner, and he‘s a nimble navigator of the site. Stroking his stubbly grey beard, he 
stops in front of the mosque entrance to explain his architectural vision. ‗It‘s not 
traditional Islamic. Neither coastal. It‘s a mix of African, regional and my own 
inspiration. The mosque will not be dedicated to any particular Islamic faith‘. 
‗Really?‘ I ask in surprise. ‗It won‘t be a Khoja Ithna-Asheri mosque?‘ ‗No, no‘, 
Rabi is adamant.  
This mosque will be open to all Muslims. A few non-Khojas come to our 
[existing] mosque, but it‘s minimal. It‘s because it‘s branded as ours. This 
will be different. We‘re opening it with the Chief Kadhi [Kenya‘s preeminent 
Muslim legal authority] in May. This mosque is for everyone.  
Rabi then describes how impartiality is reflected in the building‘s design. ‗The 
minaret has coastal features, more or less. But that‘s also mixed in with Portuguese. 
The long windows represent the idea of divinity, going towards god‘. Pointing to the 
plasterwork ventilation windows on the side he continues, ‗The border windows are 
purely Swahili culture. But the arches‘, he points to the arcs that frame the building‘s 
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 Also called tilaka, this is a Hindu ritual marking warn on the forehead.  
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many frontal windows, ‗they are my own personal creation‘. Rabi smiles with the 
satisfaction of a Cheshire cat.
140
  
He can see the confusion on my face and is ready to elaborate. ‗You see, a Persian 
arch is like this‘, Rabi makes a slightly pointed shape with his hands. Switching to a 
more elongated half oval he states, ‗That‘s the Arabian or Mogul style. And the 
Swahili is like this‘, Rabi makes a third hand display that seems to be wider and 
more rounded – although by this point I‘m not entirely sure if I‘ve understood these 
handmade distinctions. ‗I went for something different‘, Rabi points again to the 
wide arches in front of us. These rise in an ogee-style pinnacle, and can be seen in 
the photograph below (Fig. 34).  
 
Figure 34: The religious nucleus of the Jaffery Complex, including its 
‘unidentifiable’ arches.  
This building will comprise a mosque, imambargah, madrasa and ghuslkhana, as 
well as a large kitchen and social hall.  
Eager for him to continue, I feign comprehension. ‗So how did you go about 
designing this shape?‘ I query. Rabi is all too happy to elaborate.  
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 Made famous through Lewis Carroll‘s (1974 [1865]) Alice’s adventures in 
Wonderland, this fictional figure is known for its iconic grin.  
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I looked at many books and websites, researching what is a coastal arch, a 
Persian, a Turkish. In the end, it‘s a bit like a coastal arch, but it doesn‘t 
reflect any particular thing. I wanted a neutral thing. Let‘s have our own arch! 
Rabi frames his desire for pan-Islamic neutrality squarely in terms of outreach.  
There are so many misconceptions about the Shia community. Muslims think 
we‘re a non-Muslim entity. These are purely wrong concepts. I want this 
[Complex] to put out a clear message. Number one: we are open, we don‘t 
have grudges. Let‘s let other Muslims know. Let them attend [our mosque]; 
let them get a better understanding of us. Let‘s make ourselves known better, 
rather than staying in seclusion. We‘re very few in numbers; we‘d be wiped 
out. They should know who we are.  
The emphasis on unity continues as we head inside what is still a shell of a 
building.
141
 Stacks of tiles, waiting to be laid out, cover the floor. ‗These are 
Moorish‘, Rabi says. ‗They will go up to window sill‘, Rabi indicates to about hip-
height up the wall. ‗The ones at the top will have Arabic inscriptions. They will 
praise Mohammed and his family. They all say very neutral things, like the names of 
Allah‘.  
As we carefully ascend what will eventually become a staircase, Rabi chuckles, ‗One 
Khoja tradition that we are incorporating is something that is not really Muslim. We 
don‘t like toilets to be in the mosque, so we‘ll put the toilets to the side‘, he indicates 
round the corner. 
Pointing to a white box-like building, Rabi continues his commentary,  
That will be the nerve centre. It will house the generator, the transformer, the 
CCTV. And then on the other side of the commercial centre [a large, yet to 
be started block that will face onto the bustling Nyerere Avenue], they‘ll be a 
water facility. We‘re going to have a bio-digester to purify the water through 
osmosis. All the water will be under our control. 
                                                 
141
 The photograph (Fig. 34 on the previous page) to which this discussion speaks 
was taken several weeks after the conversation described here.  
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From the first floor we have a good view of the foundations at the southern end of 
the cricket ground. These foundations, part of which can be seen to the left of the 
photograph below (Fig. 35), will eventually support three blocks of flats, alleged to 
become the tallest buildings in Mombasa. ‗Each block will have 20 floors each. 
We‘re going vertical!‘ Rabi exclaims proudly, ‗The cricket ground has been the heart 
of our community for nearly a hundred years. So we just decided to build around it!‘ 
 
Figure 35: Jaffery Complex with apartment block foundations to the left.  
A small corner of Kilindini Harbour, leading to the port, can be seen to the right of 
Jaffery‘s religious nucleus. The area of Likoni that comprises the city‘s southern 
mainland is visible in the distance. 
The Jaffery Complex, I am reminded, is being built on hallowed community ground. 
Purchased in 1923 by three wealthy scions of the jamaat, the land was bequeathed to 
the community for sporting purposes and became the site of the much loved cricket 
pitch. A clubhouse was added in the 1930s. The area belonging to Khojas is one part 
of a huge field that takes up a significant part of the southern centre of the island, 
divided into plots owned principally by different Asian communities: the Hindu 
‗Coast Gymkhana‘, the Bohra ‗Burhani Sports Club‘ and the ‗Goan Institute‘ are 
here, as well as the non-denominational ‗Mombasa Sports Club‘ whose chairmen 
have been drawn from a range of communities, Asian and otherwise. A sense of the 
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Jaffery Complex as part of this wider space is provided in the following photograph 
(Fig. 36).  
 
Figure 36: Jaffery Complex in context.  
Jaffery occupies the middle distance of this photograph. Part of the fields belonging 
to Coast Gymkhana and Burhani Sports Club can be seen to the right. A tea trading 
company and new bank constitute the other large buildings in the foreground.  
A number of older men I talked to reminisced about the inter-Asian cricket 
competitions of days past: the Khoja Ithna-Asheri team was widely remembered as 
one of the best by Khojas and non-Khojas alike. Although there is still a vibrant 
cricket scene in Mombasa, the sport now competes with a number of other past times, 
from football to Facebook; it has lost its centrality within Asian male sociality. Rabi 
added, ‗Since all the migration to the West, the club is not fully utilised‘. Despite 
cricket‘s waning popularity, the preservation of the pitch was a fundamental concern 
behind the design of the Jaffery Complex. ‗That was the big question‘, Rabi 
explicates, ‗how to preserve the ground? So we went vertical!‘ Rabi repeats his 
favourite phrase.  
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Mention of the site‘s origins reminds me of the various discussions I‘ve heard 
regarding the challenges this land has posed to mosque building stipulations. ‗So, 
can you explain, is this land waqf land now or not?‘ I ask Rabi.142  
‗Yes, now the building is a mosque‘, he affirms. ‗The government gave us a 
document assuring no repossession‘. I look at him blankly.  
Before building, a delegation went to visit al-Sistani [the Shia legal authority 
followed by most Khojas]. There were five, six people, including the 
Chairman [of the jamaat]. First we communicated by e-mail and phone – 
these maraji [leading Shia clerics] are not as free as they should be. We sent 
him all the documentation two or three months before visiting. When we 
asked him if we can build on non-waqf land, he asked, ―Will you get 
confirmation from the government [that they will not reposes the land]? If not, 
call it a bayt-ul-salaat [a prayer hall]. If yes, call it a mosque‖.  
The difference between these two buildings, I learn, is that saying prayers in a bayt-
ul-salaat reduces the potential amount of sawab (blessings) accrued from the act of 
praying. Praying in congregation is highly valorised in Islam, and praying with 
others in the context of a mosque is most meritorious of all. But this doesn‘t bother 
Rabi, ‗They say [a bayt-ul-salaat] reduces the amount of sawab, an orthodox would 
never settle with it. But for me you can pray anywhere‘.  
‗So is it a freehold property now?‘ I inquire.  
It‘s a leasehold. But that‘s not a problem. In England all property is leasehold. 
And according to the new constitution of Kenya there is no freehold land. In 
many places, there is no freehold land and they still build mosques. Islam is 
progressive; you have to follow the laws of the land. The national 
government has given us its consent – they are not going to repossess this 
particular mosque space. So it‘s a mosque.  
Rabi also shows me where the state of the art madrasa classrooms will be located 
(above the mosque), and takes me inside the soon-to-be-demolished Art Deco sports 
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 Under Islamic law, mosques are to be constructed on land that has been 
designated as inalienable and intended solely for religious or charitable purposes. 
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pavilion which contains an architect‘s model of the proposed site. Laid out in 
miniature I see the flats, jamaat offices, a religious complex (comprising mosque, 
imambargah, madrasa and social hall), plus a new sports pavilion – complete with 
roof-top pool and flanked by sports courts of various kinds – not to mention the 
multi-storey commercial space along the eastern edge, rents from which will help 
subsidise the rest of the estate. The almost impossible proximity of the many high-
rise buildings, both to each other and to the central cricket pitch, makes me wonder 
how cricket balls will be prevented from smashing glass; but mostly I am struck by 
the ambitiousness of the project. While the area of the site is not particularly large, it 
will eventually hold a quite extraordinary range of facilities. ‗This is about securing 
the future‘, Rabi tells me at the conclusion of our tour. 
 
The religious economy of urban space  
This chapter considers the confluence of factors that drive the development of the 
Jaffery Complex, bringing together a host of tensions discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis. Examining the intersection of aspiration and religiosity, notions of social 
distance and proximity, local attachment and global connection that the site 
encapsulates, I explore what it reveals about Mombasa‘s changing social and 
material landscapes, as well as how the buildings reflect Khoja efforts to reimagine 
their relations to the city and secure a place for themselves within its future.  
A number of academics have turned their attention to the ways in which religious 
building projects reflect and affect neoliberal urban transformations (Lanz & 
Oosterbaan 2016; Ukah 2016). Markha Valenta (2013) describes the Siddhivinayak 
Temple in Mumbai, a golden-roofed tower block that attracts some 100,000 visitors 
daily, as a prism reflecting wider changes in the city since the 1980s. Housing a 
small statue of Ganesh (the elephant-headed deity) in its inner sanctum, Valenta 
writes that the building‘s present-day monumentality, as well as its self-sufficiency, 
are wholly unexceptional when read against the backdrop of Mumbai‘s economy. 
Located in Prabhadevi, the centre of Bombay‘s now moribund textile industry, 
Siddhivinayak‘s conspicuous wealth reflects the luxury apartments and multinational 
headquarters that now increasingly eclipse the mill towers of an earlier era, material 
233 
 
manifestations of the government‘s prioritisation of business over labour. 
Liberalisation has brought vast wealth for some, at the exclusion of others; while rent 
hikes have forced many former mill workers out of Prabhadevi, Siddhivinayak has 
been a beneficiary of the fortunes of the city‘s growing middle and upper classes. A 
critical source of Siddhivinayak‘s ability to manipulate global economic flows and 
maintain a generous revenue stream pertains to its capacity to transmit blessings 
beyond itself. Visitors to the site present themselves in front of Ganesh in order to 
receive darshan (blessings); darshan, however, is by no means limited to those 
within the temple‘s vicinity. Various rituals are broadcast live on television, as well 
as through Siddhivinayak‘s website, which generates four million hits a month 
(Valenta 2013: 106). In other words, the temple is embedded within a ‗global 
dispersal of spiritual enrichment‘ (2013: 111), spreading darshan through vast 
electronic networks that in turn help sustain its coffers through equally extensive 
financial circuits.  
Although in some ways indicative of the intensification and increasing visibility of 
communalism that Valenta and numerous others have examined as accompanying 
neoliberalisation in India (Corbridge & Harris 2000; Hansen 1999), Siddhivinayak‘s 
visitors are drawn from an extremely divergent demographic and its pluralist appeal 
is a key element of the temple‘s marketing vocabulary. Its website, for instance, tells 
of the Muslim artists who carved the frame of the sanctum sanctorum, as well as the 
Marathi artisan that constructed its crown.  
The building, then, is presented as literally carrying within its body – 
through not only the religious identity but also the religion-specific styles – 
the skills and traditions of the craftsmen who made it, the very pluralism that 
it celebrates in its visitors, and by implication in Mumbai as a whole 
(Valenta 2013: 109, emphasis added).  
If the temple ‗[presents] itself as encompassing the world‘, Valenta writes, it is also 
heavily invested in ‗[protecting] itself from that world‘ (2013: 109). Siddhivinayak 
has a security apparatus to rival many airports. Visitors are subject to rigorous 
scanning and surveillance procedures, wealthy regulars can opt for a biometric 
identity card to facilitate entry and the temple‘s security personnel are trained by 
Israeli security forces. Moreover, the roof‘s solar panels provide all its electricity 
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needs, ensuring that an energy-dependent security set-up is never beholden to 
external power failures. Finding close parallels between Siddhivinayak and the city‘s 
burgeoning appetite for gated residences, Valenta positions many of these measures 
as being heavily influenced by the increasingly close cooperation between the Israeli 
and Indian governments in the wake of the Mumbai attacks of 2008, as well as the 
global security circuits that have emerged under the logic of the ‗war on terror‘. In 
this sense, the temple reflects both the privatisation of security that has accompanied 
late liberalism, as well as the increasingly interconnected logics of state and private 
security in a context of global ‗terrorism‘.  
While Valenta considers the confluence of religiosity, aspiration and security in the 
context of a temple, others have written on the conjunction of these factors with 
regards to gated communities and estates. Research in this area adds a further 
dimension to the literature that demonstrates the close interplay between fear and 
aspiration in the political economy of residence (Davis & Monk 2008; Davis 1998; 
Low 2004; Smith 2015). Smith‘s (2015) interlocutors in the Nairobi estate of 
Kaloleni (also referred to in Chapter 3), go to great lengths to secure their bungalows 
through hedges, fences and padlocked verandas, enclosing what used to be 
communal space. The securitisation of domestic space in Kaloleni is in part a 
product of a widespread disillusionment with government capacity (or desire) to 
protect urban residents from rampant violent crime. But it is also because of the 
‗desirability of [the] enclave‘ (Smith 2015: 145), portrayed on billboards throughout 
Nairobi (as well as proliferating within Kenyan cyberspace), and materialised in the 
elaborate security apparatuses that envelop sites of leisure and residency frequented 
by the city‘s elite. As Smith observes, ‗[a]rchitectures of security are also markers of 
exclusivity‘ (2015: 144). Smith‘s interlocutors assessed their more modest 
modifications to their houses in utilitarian and aesthetic terms. Fences, for many in 
Kaloleni, are beautiful, symbolic of having ‗made it‘, at least to a certain extent. 
Gates mark status, and entrench particular kinds of social difference, in this case 
class. 
Bringing religion into the picture, Ayșe Çavdar (2016) examines assemblages of 
Muslim and middle class values in the context of an Islamic gated complex in 
Istanbul‘s western outskirts. While Basaksehir started life as a social housing project, 
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it is now a constellation of gated communities around a vast enclosed park. 
Reflecting the rise to power of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been heavily 
involved in its development (first as mayor of Istanbul and later as president of 
Turkey), an increasingly wealthy segment of religious Istanbulites have sought 
residency in the area. Residents articulated their desire to escape the immorality and 
lack of safety that they associated with urban poverty, citing alcohol and drug abuse 
along with fear of theft. For many, Basaksehir offered a sanctuary, allowing them to 
live a more Islamic lifestyle at the same time as providing a secure environment for 
themselves and their property. Others had moved to Basaksehir from poorer religious 
neighbourhoods: for them Basaksehir provided a space to flaunt their new-found 
wealth, as much as avoid gossiping neighbours who used to criticise aspects of their 
lifestyle (such as allowing their daughters to return late from university). Basaksehir 
was thus a middle class haven, offering respite from the city‘s secular evils, and 
distance from interpretations of Islam positioned as ‗traditional‘ and out-dated. One 
resident summed up his preference for the area in the following terms: ‗In 
Basaksehir neither my car nor the headscarves of my wife and daughters cause any 
problem‘ (2016: 507). Within these explanations, religious, security and economic 
justifications are closely interlaced.  
 
Building aspirations: the Jaffery Complex and (trans)local status  
These reflections find close parallels in Mombasa. Speaking of the Khoja Ithna-
Asheri jamaat, Ali explained, ‗Back in the 90s, almost the entire community was 
still living in Old Town. Now, most people who can afford to live in Kizingo or 
nearby‘. The need to move out of Old Town – which, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, is widely considered a locus of poverty by many former and current 
residents – is one of the key drivers behind the building of the Jaffery Complex. As 
Rabi recounted to me during a meeting before our site tour,  
The idea to move out of the centre has been around for a long time. Every 
day there are more muggings and druggies and so on. These things are 
getting worse, especially with the influx of Somalis. And we‘re a 
conservative community. We‘re worried about our youth being influenced by 
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these things. Before we never had security concerns. Now there are frequent 
snatchings.  
In light of the perceived decline of Old Town, the original impetus around Jaffery 
was to move the jamaat’s religious institutions out of the area. Importantly, this was 
linked not only to increased security risks perceived to be associated with growing 
wealth disparities, but also middle class logistical constraints: more and more 
members of the jamaat live outside of Old Town and come to the imambargah by 
car. Many Old Town alleys are not navigable by car; those that can accommodate a 
vehicle are all one-way. Members of the Young Men‘s Union were expert valets, 
efficiently squeezing cars into the car park we encountered in Chapter 3, however, 
there would often be long tailbacks on Old Town streets, particularly on major 
occasions and during the months of Muharram and Ramadhan, when the majority of 
the jamaat attend evening majalis. ‗It‘s a nightmare; you can sit in the car for hours‘, 
bemoaned Sushaila. The jamaat’s car-owning wealthier members were increasingly 
inconvenienced by the imambargah’s location. Much of this discourse evoked the 
interplay between nostalgia and social mobility examined in Chapter 2. Leila‘s views 
on Jaffery were a case in point. 
We need a new mosque. It‘s so hard to park around Hyderi. Especially 
around Ramadhan. Last time we were stuck for two hours! So yeah, I think 
it‘s a good idea. But in a way being stuck is a nice thing, we used it to discuss 
the majlis for two hours! And we stopped for ice cream. But I can‘t wait for 
the new mosque.  
 Already cognisant of the forms of sociality she would miss with the move to the 
Jaffery Complex, Leila nevertheless saw it as a step forward for the jamaat.  
Another way in which class concerns drive the project is via a desire to ‗uplift‘ those 
still ‗stuck‘ in Old Town. To quote Rabi,  
Those living in there [i.e. Old Town] are missing out on amenities. We 
realised, we couldn‘t leave them behind. Jaffery will have all mod cons and 
security. It‘s all about economic upliftment.  
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The Jaffery Complex, in other words, is helping the jamaat to construct distance, 
both from a declining area of the city, and an impoverished past. Promotional videos 
for the Jaffery Complex on YouTube reflect this trajectory and indicate the kinds of 
subjects the project intends to construct. One short clip takes the viewer through 
artistic impressions of the forthcoming apartments, showing sleek, minimalist 
furniture in each.
143
 In the state of the art kitchen, something that looks suspiciously 
like a bottle of white wine stands on the central table. I did not know any Khojas 
who drank alcohol and I do not think that the jamaat in any way wishes to encourage 
its consumption; however, its inclusion reflects the bourgeois liberal subject that is 
both appealed to and produced through advertising campaigns around the world, and 
the kind of lifestyle parallels the Jaffery Complex aspires to. A more recent video 
provides an aerial view of a tuk tuk struggling through a water-clogged street in front 
of the existing imambargah (Hyderi) before panning to the pristine environs of 
Jaffery, gleaming cars parked carefully in front of the towering, freshly painted 
Complex.
144
  
Old Town residents, those intended to be helped along this march to a progressive 
future via the housing project, had mixed views on the matter. Sabiha, the wife of a 
prominent if less affluent community figure, was very proud of being gifted an 
apartment in thanks for her husband‘s services to the jamaat. Latifah, whose very 
different views on the matter were articulated in the vignette at the start of this thesis, 
emphasised her attachment to the area of Old Town in which she has lived for the 
duration of her married life, ‗No way I‘m leaving. I love Kibokoni. I‘ve been here 
for 31 years‘. (Latifah move to Kibokoni from Tononoka, another area of the island, 
when she married). She was also unimpressed with the relocation of the jamaat’s 
religious institutions that, to her mind, unfairly discriminated against the already 
poor. ‗Are they thinking we‘re going to take tuk tuks every time [to attend religious 
functions]?‘ she queried. Like most who live in Old Town, Latifah‘s family does not 
own a car; she walks to the existing imambargah in less than five minutes. Although 
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 See the Jaffery Complex Mombasa YouTube channel: Jaffery Complex 
apartments. 2016 (available online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=794garhDoyA, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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 See the Jaffery Complex Mombasa YouTube channel: Exclusive footage on 
Jaffery Complex Mombasa (drone view). 2016 (available online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8B0Y9PlInds, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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only a short, 50 shilling ride (approximately 35 pence) from Old Town, this expense, 
especially considering the busyness of the Khoja liturgical calendar, would be an 
additional strain on the family finances (not least because they would require more 
than one tuk tuk).  
No one is required to buy into the Jaffery Complex housing scheme. However, the 
jamaat has institutionalised a three-tier payment system to encourage and enable 
families of varying socioeconomic status to relocate. Wealthy Khojas are encouraged 
to buy outright; apartments for sale are, in Rabi‘s terms, ‗the most well furbished‘. 
While priority in one block will be given to Mombasa residents (Block B), 
apartments in Block C will be available for ‗community members worldwide‘ to 
purchase for below market rates. A designated cache of apartments provides for 
those in Mombasa who can afford eight to ten year payment schemes, paying ‗rent‘ 
towards the ultimate purchase of their homes at a rate established by the jamaat 
according to household income. Finally, as one promotional video explains,  
Block A will be allocated to economically challenged members of the 
community, who are not able to go for the tenant purchase scheme, these will 
remain as property of the Trust Board and given to deserving members of the 
community. Also included in this block are two floors each of self-contained 
bedrooms for Bewakhana [widows‘ flats] and Musafirkhana [travellers‘ 
lodge].
145
  
Flats in Block A will be rented out for ‗bare minimum rates‘, thus, in Rabi‘s words, 
‗enabling [poorer households] to start saving because they are no longer paying 
[much] rent‘.  
As observed in the literature on gated communities, the Jaffery Complex is evidence 
of increasing class segregation, which in the Mombasan context intersects with 
racialised patterns of residence. While many Asians have long preferred to live in 
apartment blocks or small housing societies, often with people from the same 
                                                 
145
 See the YouTube video created by S.KreationZ: The road to Jaffery Complex: a 
unique blend of religious, social, residential, commercial & sporting facilities. 2016 
(available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YYHPj-EmdPs, accessed 23 
August 2017). 
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religious community, ostentatious gated complexes such as Jaffery encode and 
entrench social hierarchies in a far more visible way, especially when compared to 
the social heterogeneity and residential proximity of Old Town. An aspect that has 
received less attention in the literature on gated communities is the way in which 
such building projects may work to reduce, as much as reinscribe, differences 
amongst residents, as well as between residents and the city beyond. Jaffery will 
enable poorer jamaat members to live in apartments that are similar in size and 
design features to the homes of some of the richest Khojas, as well as potentially 
give the less wealthy a step up on the property ladder. In this sense, the project is 
clearly designed to promote a degree of socio-economic levelling amongst Khojas. 
At the same time, the payment schemes and economic segregation of the flats serve 
to re-inscribe Khoja class hierarchies. As Latifah‘s concerns about the cost of 
transport to and from the new Complex illustrate, it may even contribute to further 
impoverishing those who choose not to leave Old Town.  
This tension between reducing and reinscribing class difference is also visible when 
one considers Khoja relations to the city‘s Asian population more generally. Via the 
Jaffery Complex, Khojas often presented themselves as ‗catching up‘ with other 
communities who have already sought estate-style segregation: ‗The Ismailis have 
had proper [gated] housing for so long, even the Memons now have‘, remarked 
Sabiha, carefully avoiding the oil spitting from the pan where she was deep-frying 
puris.
146
 ‗It‘s time we joined the club!‘ Sabiha‘s comments construe a variegated 
Asian middle class, status within which is in part measured via the gated enclave. 
Many Ismailis, long-standing rivals of Khojas Ithna-Asheris (see Introduction), have 
lived on estates since the 1950s. There are three Ismaili gated communities in 
Mombasa, two on the island (in the northern neighbourhoods of Makupa and Tudor) 
and one on the northern mainland. On the island, the two estates comprise a large 
central jamaatkhana (Ismaili prayer hall) surrounded by blocks of flats, coupled with 
a few low-key enterprises such as a gym and a hairdresser. Although now showing 
their age, these estates were seen as the height of modernity when first built; yet 
another way in which the Ismaili prosperity and ‗advancement‘ in relation to other 
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 Puris are a biscuit-shaped, savoury snack made of deep-fried chickpea flour and 
spices.  
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Asians was made manifest in the eyes of some of my informants. Memons and 
Bohras have constructed large estates north of the island within the last decade. 
Encircled by impressive outer walls, replete with glass and barbed wire trimmings, 
both estates resemble fortified citadels.  
This trend towards gated complexes amongst Asians, however, is by no means 
universal. When I asked Kabir whether any of his fellow Bhadalas lived on similar 
estates, he responded with a withering laugh, ‗Only rich communities have such 
things‘. Even though there are a growing number of wealthy Bhadala, Kabir‘s 
comment adds further evidence to the ways in which social differences find spatial 
form in Mombasa. He added that it would be impossible to leave Old Town, he 
could never forgo the pleasure of sitting out and watching the world go by at night. 
A Baluchi family I spent time were also unimpressed with the idea. There had, in the 
past, been talk of building a gated complex for Mombasa‘s Baluchi population, ‗But 
nobody wants to live in a community!‘ laughed Hamida. Her husband Azim added, 
‗Too much gossip. It‘s better if we‘re spread out‘. Baluchis tend to speak Swahili at 
home and have allegedly intermarried to a far greater extent than most other South 
Asian origin communities in Mombasa.  
Importantly, the communicative power of the Jaffery Complex is not limited to 
shaping class divisions in Mombasa. Chatting with Ali one afternoon, I asked for his 
opinions on Jaffery.  
You want to know what I think? It‘s too big. We‘re not big enough to afford 
something like that. It‘s a luxury we cannot afford. And we‘ve already paid 
too high a price for the bling bling. A lot was sacrificed for that. 
I ask him to clarify what.  
Finances. These are resources we already have elsewhere [i.e. there is already 
a mosque, madrasa and imambargah in Old Town]. Maybe one block of flats 
would‘ve been ok. But not this. 
 If this is the case, I enquire how he thinks the project came to fruition in the first 
place.  
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I think there‘s a bunch of people who want to make a mark. Other [Khoja] 
communities have big [housing] complexes and we don‘t, even though 
Mombasa is where the core of the community came from. 
Here Ali is referring to Mombasa‘s central node in patterns of migration and 
emigration that have shaped the global Khoja diaspora as it appears today. Ali looks 
at me, perhaps worried that he‘s been overly critical of the jamaat hierarchy. ‗For the 
record, it‘s not that I want them to fail… A lot of people want them to fail, but I want 
them to succeed, I wish them every success‘. The project is a means through which 
current jamaat leaders construct their legacies in Mombasa and beyond. 
Indeed, it is partly through architectural projects that other locations of the Khoja 
diaspora is assessed from Mombasa. People would often ask me if I‘d been to the 
imambargah in Dar; ‗It‘s huge, big enough for life size tombs [of the Imams]‘, 
explained Sakina, apparently exaggerating only slightly. Nadia wanted to know if I‘d 
visited the Lavington Complex in Nairobi (which hosts the capital‘s Khoja mosque, 
imambargah, library, kindergarten and various other facilities). ‗It‘s state of the art. 
They even have a rubberised running track!‘ It is within this global geography of 
edifices that Khojas in Mombasa often positioned the Jaffery Complex: ‗This is the 
one of the oldest and most important jamaats and we‘ve had no new buildings for so 
long!‘ With this comment, Khadija asserts Mombasa‘s historical significance as 
worthy of contemporary investment. The absence of such projects is at odds with 
Mombasa‘s place in Khoja history; buildings are seen to give material value to the 
jamaat’s prominence within a global Khoja narrative. Befitting of its historical 
prominence, Jaffery attempts to ameliorate the Mombasa jamaat’s ‗edifice complex‘ 
(Grant 2014) on a diasporic scale. 
These discourses are also reflected in textual form. One morning, I am chatting with 
Sahil in his office when he gets temporarily called off somewhere. Waiting for him 
to return, I reach for the April 2013 copy of Federation Samachar lying near his 
desk. The English language magazine of the Africa Federation of Khoja Ithna-Asheri 
jamaats is published somewhat sporadically every few months.
147
 Samachar 
                                                 
147
 Mentioned above, the Africa Federation unites the Khoja jamaats of Africa. Its 
secretariat is located in Dar es Salaam. 
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meaning news in Gujarati, the first part of the periodical is dedicated to updates, 
activities and events from the jamaats ‗Around Africa‘, with a smaller section about 
jamaats elsewhere. This is followed by various general sections on health and family 
issues, as well as snippets of Khoja history in the ‗Trips down memory lane‘ section. 
On the front of the issue in Sahil‘s office is a picture of a collapsed building, with an 
ambulance in the foreground and people searching through rubble. The front-page 
headline reads ‗Tragedy in Dar es Salaam‘. Inside, I learn that in March 2013 a 
privately owned 16-storey block of flats being built next door to the Khoja mosque 
in Dar had tragically collapsed, killing 36 people including four young Khojas who 
had been playing football. The article details the relief effort – which involved 
various segments of the jamaat, as well as arms of the state, volunteers and 
construction companies who came together in what was ‗no lesser than the aftermath 
of an earthquake‘.148 A relief fund had been established on the Africa Federation‘s 
website to help support the victims‘ families.  
Buildings are not just a focus of the Federation Samachar‘s pages when collapsed. 
Studying the issue more carefully when I get home, I find articles on five 
construction projects currently being undertaken by Khoja jamaats worldwide: at the 
time of publication, a ‗middle-income‘ apartment block in Dar had just been 
completed, while ground had been broken commencing the construction of the 
‗AFED Commercial Complex‘. Also in Dar, money accrued from renting this 
commercial space will help fund Africa Federation activities and was heralded as a 
‗landmark in self-sufficiency‘.149 Construction had reached the sixth floor of the ‗Al 
Qa‘eem Building Housing Project‘ in Arusha (consisting of apartments for jamaat 
members), while the Ja‘fari Islamic Housing Corporation in Toronto detailed its 
plans to construct a suite of one-bed apartments for the elderly. The periodical also 
contained a three-page spread dedicated to Mombasa‘s Jaffery Complex. As well as 
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 See: ‗Tragedy in Dar es Salaam as building collapses‘. Federation Samachar, 
April 2013, 34(5): 21. (available online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/images/stories/federationsamacher/issues/Federatio
n%20Samachar%20April_2013%20fnl%20mail.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017). 
149
 See: ‗AFED Commercial Complex takes off in Dar‘. Federation Samachar, April 
2013, 34(5): 13. (available online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/images/stories/federationsamacher/issues/Federatio
n%20Samachar%20April_2013%20fnl%20mail.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017). 
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outlining the dignitaries who attended the ground breaking ceremony in September 
2012 (the Chairman of the Africa Federation and the President of the World 
Federation, among others), excerpts of the Africa Federation Chairman‘s speech 
emphasised the importance of the ‗towering personalities‘ of the Mombasa jamaat 
within the evolution of the Khoja diaspora and the development of Kenya.
150
 The 
article outlined the Africa and World Federation pledges to the project, and ends by 
describing a meeting hosted by the Mombasa jamaat chairman after the ceremony in 
which ‗current challenges encountered by Shias globally‘ and various housing issues 
faced by other African jamaats were the main points of discussion.
151
 The report 
includes a one-page ‗Fact file‘, detailing the reputed architects, lawyers, engineers 
and surveyors involved with the project, as well as listing various key elements of 
the project:  
Plumbing, Drainage and Fire Hydrant systems, Electrical systems, 
Emergency backup power provisions, Power and lighting and A/C points, 
generators, Bio digester provisions, water systems, elevators….152 
As is evident from the number of building projects discussed in a single issue of 
Federation Samachar, buildings are an important medium of communication – and 
competition – amongst different parts of the Khoja diaspora. 
 
The political economy of sawab  
The final section of the Jaffery Complex ‗Fact file‘ is entitled ‗Masjid or musalla‘.153 
It explains the ‗fervent efforts‘ underway to try to secure the allocation of a small 
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 See: ‗Jaffery Complex launched in Mombasa‘. Federation Samachar, April 2013, 
34(5): 44. (available online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/images/stories/federationsamacher/issues/Federatio
n%20Samachar%20April_2013%20fnl%20mail.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017).  
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 See: ‗Jaffery Complex launched in Mombasa‘. Federation Samachar, April 2013, 
34(5): 43–45. (available online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/images/stories/federationsamacher/issues/Federatio
n%20Samachar%20April_2013%20fnl%20mail.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017).  
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 See: ‗Fact file: the Jaffery Complex Mombasa, Kenya‘. Federation Samachar, 
April 2013, 34(5): 45. (available online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/images/stories/federationsamacher/issues/Federatio
n%20Samachar%20April_2013%20fnl%20mail.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017).  
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freehold area on the otherwise leasehold land on which the Complex is situated, thus 
enabling the construction of a mosque (masjid), rather than simply a prayer hall 
(musalla or bayt-ul-salaat). At the time of the article‘s publication, although the 
site‘s most important building was already taking form in ‗[t]he shape of a Masjid…‘ 
it currently held the status of a prayer hall, until further notice. The section ends by 
reassuring readers that,  
Donors will continue to get the benefit of Sawab-e-Jariah (perpetual benefit) 
for as long as the place is utilised as a Musalla (Bayt us Salaat) for the 
purposes of performing Salaat.
154
  
By the time of my site tour with Rabi, nearly two years after this article was written, 
the Jaffery Complex‘s core religious edifice had achieved masjid status. However, in 
attempting to reassure donors that they would still accrue the blessings that come 
from donating to the project, the Federation Samachar‘s plea indicates the concern 
that people would be less willing to donate given the bayt-ul-salaat‘s lower position 
(relative to a mosque) within what I am calling the ‗sawab economy‘. Sawab, 
meaning reward or spiritual merit, can be obtained in many ways in Islam, such as 
through prayer, Quranic recitation and the annual giving of zakat and khums. 
However, many other acts, provided they are done with the right intention (an 
assessment that is made by god alone), also have the potential to produce sawab. 
‗Bringing a glass of water to your husband can bring sawab‘, explained Rahila by 
way of explanation, ‗it all depends on what is in your heart‘.  
Much as Valenta (2013) has written in the context of the Siddhivinayak Temple in 
Mumbai, the Jaffery Complex‘s capacity to garner funds – and in the Mombasan 
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 For this and the following quotes in this paragraph, see: ‗Fact file: the Jaffery 
Complex Mombasa, Kenya‘. Federation Samachar, April 2013, 34(5): 45. (available 
online: 
http://www.africafederation.org/images/stories/federationsamacher/issues/Federatio
n%20Samachar%20April_2013%20fnl%20mail.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017).  
154
 Both parentheses in this quote appear in the original. Bayt us Salaat is the 
Federation Samachar‘s spelling of bayt-ul-salaat. 
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case, to be completed – is linked to its ability to disburse blessings (sawab). 
Although in Rabi‘s mind praying in a mosque or bayt-ul-salaat did not affect the 
merits of collective prayer, the Federation Samachar article suggests that others 
were not of the same view, and that the distinction had implications for the financial 
feasibility of the project. As Rabi explained, ‗Of course people are more likely to 
donate if there‘s a mosque. It doesn't make much difference to me, but some people 
feel that a mosque brings more sawab‘.  
It is in part because the project depends greatly on donations from the diaspora that it 
was desirable to ensure the building was a mosque, not a bayt-ul-salaat. Drawing on 
diasporic links makes sense from a financial perspective – Khojas now settled in 
Europe and North America are often wealthier than those who remain in East Africa. 
Of course, it is not simply the potential for spiritual reward that drives these 
donations. As Rabi explained during our site tour, ‗Many people originally from 
Mombasa, they love it here. They want to visit, they identify themselves with here, 
so they donate. If you‘re intentions are right, sawab can be the cherry on the cake‘.  
As suggested by the YouTube videos and Federation Samachar article, various 
media platforms have been mobilised to help foster this flow of donations and sawab. 
The Jaffery Complex has a presence on Twitter, WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook and 
YouTube; news about the project is also advertised on the World Federation and 
Africa Federation websites. These platforms update those in Mombasa and well 
beyond about the project‘s progress. One video, entitled ‗Revamping! Ongoing 
progress July 2016 – Jaffery Complex Msa‘ takes the viewer through the various 
construction activities occurring onsite – including the laying of conduit, concrete 
slabs and ducting.
155
 The steel reinforcements being put in at various levels around 
the elevator shaft are also emphasised, as are the impressive cranes involved in the 
activity of building. The video ends with a message thanking the Mombasa jamaat 
Chairman for his tireless contributions to the Complex and concludes, ‗Now we ask 
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 See the Jaffery Complex Mombasa YouTube channel: Revamping! Ongoing 
progress July 2016 – Jaffery Complex Msa. 2016 (available online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujR8MytYlaI, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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for all you, for your support and duas [supplications] for successful comopletion of 
whole project [sic]‘.156  
While watching such videos does not in itself accrue blessings (as in the case for 
Siddhivinayak), Rabi and others hope they will encourage Khojas to reach into their 
pockets in ways that offer the potential of gaining sawab. The Jaffery Complex, in 
other words, is brought to fruition through a global circulation of prayer, finances 
and spiritual reward, to which the masjid at its heart itself contributes. Jaffery is 
embedded within intersecting media, financial, migration and spiritual flows, as 
much as politico-economic competitions.  
The intersection of political, material and religious factors is also apparent if one 
considers how the masjid status was finally achieved. As elucidated by Rabi, a 
delegation visited al-Sistani to seek advice regarding how to proceed in order to 
address the issue of non-waqf land at the earliest stages of the project. The fact that 
al-Sistani held an audience with the delegation is in part testament to Khoja political 
connections and financial resources (a number of Khoja men I knew had also met the 
Ayatollah on separate occasions). Although all stressed the accessibility of al-Sistani 
(and other Shia maraji) as one of the defining features of Twelver Shiism, this sort 
of access is only possible for those who have the resources to make the trip to Najaf. 
The jamaat’s ability to secure the mosque site as waqf land is also suggestive of its 
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 In addition to promotional videos showcasing the apartments for sale and the 
facilities the site offers, these media productions evidence the various activities 
already underway at the Complex. Videos uploaded in the last year include the 2016 
Ramadhan lectures of the well-known British-Iraqi preacher Ammar Nakshwani, 
mentioned previously. These were recited from a pulpit at Jaffery and available 
through the Jaffery Complex‘s Facebook and YouTube pages. In this series, one 
video shows lecture attendants bidding ‗Kwa heri & kuonana‘ (goodbye and see you 
in Swahili) to Nakshwani. The camera evidences many non-Khojas among the 
attendees. Another video depicts the success of a recent medical camp for children 
from orphanages around Mombasa. Flanked by smiling Khoja volunteers and 
various medical professionals, young Mombsans receive triage, medical and optical 
check-ups; there‘s also time for games and lunch. As promised, the Jaffery Complex 
is reaching out. See the Jaffery Complex Mombasa YouTube channel: Copy of safari 
njema bwana Ammar – kwa heri ya kuonana! (Dr. Sayed Ammar Nakshwani). 2016 
(available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ezUX53ISpH4, accessed 23 
August 2017), as well as Medical camp for orphans at Jaffery Complex Mombasa. 
2016 (available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BoouVUh5pJM, accessed 
23 August 2017).  
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financial and political connections in Kenya. This, a number of my informants 
explained, was in no small part due to the Chairman‘s political clout. Sajjad Rashid 
(commonly referred to incorrectly in the press as Rashid Sajjad) has been a hugely 
successful economic and political actor at the coast for at least three decades. In an 
article published in the mid-1990s, Mohamed Bakari described Rashid as the 
‗political king-maker at the Coast‘ (1995a: 67), noting his then recent nomination to 
parliament by the then-president Moi, as well as his appointment as Chairman of the 
Kenya Ports Authority (the body which controls Kilindini Port). Without going into 
further detail, Bakari mentions the potential leverage available to the Ithna-Asheri 
community via Rashid‘s position, speculating that,  
[Rashid] should at least be able to ease the bureaucratic bottlenecks for his 
community in terms of frog-jumping the often cumbersome administrative 
requirements for acquiring licenses, work permits, passports… (1995a: 67).  
Rashid‘s vast real estate fortune came to light during my fieldwork in March 2014, 
when, following years of court battles (including with his former ally President 
Moi),
157
 he was forced to surrender 1.6 billion shillings (nearly 12 million pounds 
sterling) of ‗prime public property‘, handing title deeds of ‗irregularly‘ acquired land 
back to the county government.
158
 Hassan Joho, Mombasa‘s expansive governor, 
presented the handover as part of a crackdown on corruption in the county more 
broadly. Rashid‘s political connections, however, still run deep: in early 2016, a road 
in the city was renamed after him, provoking a well-known pastor and housing rights 
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 See the article by K. Some: ‗Why former Kenyan president is restless in 
retirement‘. Africa Review, 6 November 2011 (available online: 
http://www.africareview.com/special-reports/Why-former-Kenyan-President-Moi-is-
restless-in-retirement/979182-1268184-7jkbwtz/index.html, accessed 23 August 
2017). 
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 See the article by W. Mwangi: ‗Tycoon cedes Sh1.6bn property‘. Daily Nation, 
13 March 2014 (available online: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/Rashid-Sajjad-Land-Public-Property-
Title-Deeds/1954178-2243500-11pbcvt/index.html, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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activist to comment on twitter, ‗We now glorify grabbers as Mombasa Governor 
names road after Rashid Sajaad [sic]‘.159 
Rashid remains one of the most powerful businessmen at the coast, owning glass and 
fruit processing facilities, among numerous other ventures. He has been elected by 
the Khoja jamaat’s adult male population as Chairman (a renewable two-year post) 
on numerous occasions; his most recent stint as jamaat leader endured from 2011 to 
the end of 2015.
160
 By all accounts, Rashid has been a driving force behind the 
Jaffery Complex. There is no evidence to suggest that the granting of a small part of 
the area as waqf land has circumvented the law, however, that Rashid‘s political 
influence facilitated this process was common knowledge. ‗Such things are 
impossible without connections in Kenya‘, commented Khadija, ‗I‘m sure Rashid‘s 
relationships in government have helped. But in a good way‘, she added quickly, 
‗I‘m not saying he‘s done anything wrong‘. Khojas are intensely proud of their audit 
culture, a legacy Hafiz positioned in terms of the longevity of their exposure to the 
British. Always ready to joke when not reciting Urdu verse, ‗The Brits‘, he mused, 
‗they made us squeaky-clean‘. Nevertheless, earthly political connections – both in 
Iraq and Kenya – have helped Khojas construct a new masjid in the centre of 
Mombasa island, thus also generating additional potential sawab and further 
donations associated with this designation as a more pious space. The road to Jaffery 
Complex demonstrates entanglements of market, religious and political economics.  
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 See the article by D. Tsuma Nyassy: ‗Plan to rename road after Fidel sparks 
protests‘. Daily Nation, 27 January 2016 (available online: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Plan-to-rename-road-after-Fidel-sparks-
protests/1056-3050198-jjjsi9z/index.html, accessed 23 August 2017). This article 
also describes protests relating to the renaming of another road in Mombasa after 
Raila Odinga‘s deceased son Fidel. 
160
 Elections for office holders within the Khoja jamaat occur every two years, at the 
annual general meeting attended exclusively by men. Although lauded by others as 
democratic, Ali was unimpressed with the process, ‗Usually there‘s only one person 
standing. They‘re just formally appointed. If there are two, quite a lot of behind the 
scenes campaigns take place. But there are no actual debates‘. 
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‘Live in Confidence!’: coping with insecurity  
If security motivations behind the Jaffery Complex relate in part to growing class 
divisions and the fear of property theft, they are also closely linked to perceived 
religio-political transformations in Kenya in recent decades. As outlined in the 
chapter on Islamic reform, Mombasa is now often articulated as being plagued by a 
previously absent sectarianism and an often associated risk of ‗terrorism‘, spurred 
particularly by the growing prominence of ‗Wahhabis‘. The Wahhabi threat is 
frequently articulated in racial and class terms by many in Mombasa, assumed in part 
to be associated with the expansion of the city‘s allegedly more ‗fundamentalist‘ 
Somali population, as well the growing number of under-employed youth (a 
demographic that has expanded as tourism has dwindled).  
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, these perceived demographic and religious 
changes at the coast, and the associated rise in attacks on Kenyan soil, often result in 
a discursive shifting of scales, which positions Mombasa as a node in a global nexus 
of ‗terror‘. Conceptualising the local landscape in terms of impending threat, many 
of the people I spent time with in the city were exploring ways to improve their 
personal security. Here I should clarify that the city‘s Asian communities have been 
taking security into their own hands for a long time. The speed at which the Ismaili 
security phone tree functioned was made evident to me on the day that Masjid Musa, 
a mosque allegedly recruiting youth to al-Shabaab, was stormed by police.
161
 Within 
minutes of the raid Nadesh, with whom I‘d been running errands at Posta, the 
general post office, had received a security alert by text advising recipients that an 
incident was afoot and that people should avoid travelling around town. We drove 
quickly to the Aga Khan Club, which, although central, was an excellent safe space 
according to Nadesh. The Club, which includes a social hall and café famous for its 
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 This event, also mentioned in the Introduction, occurred in February 2014. 
Hundreds were arrested (mostly young men) and miscellaneous paraphernalia seized, 
including what was allegedly an al-Shabaab flag and recruitment videos. Judging the 
veracity of the mosque‘s ‗extremist‘ ties and the legality of state actions was the 
subject of much discussion in the weeks that followed. People I knew were appalled 
that the national authorities had allowed policemen‘s boots to desecrate the sacred 
space of the mosque, while Faizle, owner of a popular café believed that the vast 
majority of those arrested had been at the mosque for the free biryani.  
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meat pies, is surrounded by high walls. Entrance to the grounds is restricted to those 
who comply with the class and racial profiling meted out by two security guards.  
Khojas, like Ismailis, have their own security committee and procedures: the city is 
divided into zones, with a designated team leader in charge of contacting everyone in 
a particular area in the event of unrest. Security remains a particular concern around 
elections, especially in the wake of the violence of 2007-08 in which, as mentioned 
in the Introduction, hundreds were killed and thousands displaced following the 
disputed poll (although there were riots and looting in Mombasa during this two 
month period, the city was spared the carnage seen in the Rift Valley and other 
areas). Responding to the fear of clashes around elections, Khojas always conduct a 
community census prior to polling day: ‗That way we can be sure everyone is 
accounted for‘, explained Ali, ‗in case there is any unrest‘.  
‗Terrorism‘ was seen to pose a far more ubiquitous threat, and gated communities, 
such as the Jaffery Complex, were often framed as responding to this shift in the 
nature of urban insecurity. In other words, gated compounds represent the latest, and 
most upmarket, iteration of some of the wealthier Asian communities‘ efforts to 
secure themselves in the city. As Enisa said to me while waiting for the 
commencement of the ladies‘ afternoon majlis one Friday,  
We don‘t want to leave Africa. We‘ve spent all our lives here. But this 
terrorist situation, it‘s worrying. And now these two shot in Old Town… 
Mombasa is not such a place. Why was it done? They‘ve [the government 
and the media] played it down because the tourist industry is already 
suffering. But all our family elsewhere are ringing us worried. My family has 
been here for generations, but I don‘t see a future for my kids in this city. 
We‘re considering our options. 
Enisa‘s dialogue references the palpable rise in anxiety that followed the killing of 
two European tourists in Old Town in June and July of 2014. As mentioned at the 
outset of this thesis, early one morning, a Russian lady was shot while wandering 
near Fort Jesus, just south of Old Town; two weeks later a young German woman 
was killed near the northern edge of the historic centre. Although nothing conclusive 
emerged from these separate incidents, gangs, sometimes rumoured to have links to 
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al-Shabaab, were widely believed to be responsible. In light of this growing sense of 
urban risks, Enisa described her mitigation strategies:  
We‘re planning to move to Jaffery – inshallah the apartments will be 
completed soon. But I don‘t know, everything depends on what happens with 
all this fujo [chaos].  
Enisa currently lives in a relatively upmarket apartment on the edge of Kizingo; her 
family has been able to afford one of the units available for purchase.  
Jabran, a travel agent with a fondness for animated political debate, had a similar 
analysis. Extolling the virtues of Khoja institutions in Mombasa he asserted, 
‗Everything a person would want to go to Europe for, we have provided it: education, 
health, housing‘. ‗So why have so many gone elsewhere?‘ I quizzed. ‗Security‘, 
Jabran replied right off the bat, ‗Security is one thing over which the Khojas have no 
control‘. Squinting out across Tudor Creek, the body of water adjacent to the 
restaurant where we had met, he added, ‗If you want to stay here, you have to think 
carefully about how‘. Jabran pulled a business card out of his wallet and told me of 
one Khoja family had who had started specialising in bulletproof cars; the company 
slogan read ‗Under one shield‘. Moving into this venture, Jabran suggested, provided 
financial and personal security for the family, who now owned a bulletproof vehicle 
themselves. A niche market, to be sure, but reflective of the rise in drive-by 
shootings in recent years. As detailed in the Introduction, the targets of these 
shootings were often Muslim clerics and their financiers.  
Jaffery‘s marketing slogan, ‗Live in Confidence!‘ reflects this concern for a 
securitised future. At a Khoja-owned chemist one afternoon I asked Mehdi for his 
thoughts on the Complex being built. ‗It will give the jamaat control of critical 
security features‘, he replied. ‗Just imagine if they bombed the bridges…‘ he paused 
pensively, reflecting on the precarity of Nyali Bridge and Makupa Causeway, the 
island‘s connections to the mainland.162 ‗At least with the bio-digester, we would 
have water‘. ‗Oh, so are you planning to move to Jaffery then?‘ I asked, unaware of 
these plans. Mehdi looked at me with mock horror, ‗No way! Moving out of Old 
Town nearly killed me‘, Mehdi had moved out of the area five years ago, ‗but now 
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 This echoes Yash‘s comments about the risk posed by the bridges in Chapter 4. 
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I‘ll never leave Kizingo. I need my peace‘. Despite his aversion to the idea of living 
in the Complex, Mehdi was reassured by the fact that the jamaat would, if necessary, 
be able to provision water to Khojas on the island more generally; he had heard there 
would always be plenty in reserve.  
In line with the literature cited above, many aspects of the project designed to 
promote ‗confidence‘ were also taken to indicate class. When I mentioned the bio-
digester to Faraj a few days later, he smiled broadly: ‗Top of the range! None of the 
other communities have this‘. As Faraj‘s comment suggests, the class appeal of 
particular health and safety features was also a prop for intra-Asian competition. 
These discourses demonstrate a close interplay between different kinds of urban 
anxieties, as well as aspirations. The numerous and interrelated issues that make 
living in Mombasa insecure – from crime and power cuts, to rising rents and the 
threat of terror – are all responded to by the Jaffery Complex.  
 
‘Unidentifiable’ arches: designing outreach and reform 
Well beyond bio-digesters and CCTV cameras, security concerns have also shaped 
the architectural form of the religious nucleus of the site, which combines a mosque, 
imambargah, madrasa classrooms and ghuslkhana.
163
 In order to examine the 
significance of its architectural features, I turn first to the growing body of research 
that considers the construction of mosques and Islamic centres in Europe (Roose 
2009, 2012; Saleem 2013; Verkaaik 2012) and North America (Biondo 2006; Dodds 
2002; B. Metcalf 1996) . This scholarship is attentive to the ways in which mosque 
patrons, committees, architects and congregants select, justify and experience 
particular architectural choices, highlighting the range of motivations and political 
manoeuvrings behind ultimate decisions. In line with the literature on Islamic reform 
discussed in Chapter 3, designs are often valorised because they have shed ‗regional‘ 
or ‗cultural‘ features in the name of what are considered purer or more authentic 
materialisations of Islam. In other instances, Muslim denominations mark their 
distinctive sectarian affiliations and/or migration histories through architectural 
choices. As illustrated in the work of Eric Roose (2009, 2012), there is no necessary 
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 A ghuslkhana is where the body is ritually washed prior to burial.  
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correlation between architectural styles and pan-Islamic or sectarian orientation, nor 
between materiality and place of origin. Roose (2012) analyses discourses pertaining 
to a mosque in Rotterdam and another in Amsterdam, both of which are based on the 
mosque in Medina established by Prophet Mohammed (known as Al-Masjid an-
Nabawi, the Prophet‘s Mosque). Although both of Roose‘s key interlocutors sought 
to draw on the Medina design as a source of ‗Islamic authentication‘ (2012: 303), 
Roose finds that they did so in completely different ways. For Gaffar, a man who 
moved to the Netherlands from Surinam in 1990 in order to help unite the Dutch 
branch of the Barelvi order
164
 under the World Islamic Mission (WIN), Medina was 
the perfect example of the structure common amongst Sufi mausoleums, comprising 
a central dome with corner turrets, built over Mohammed‘s tomb. Gaffar used a 
number of WIN publications to visually pair the Green Dome of the Medina with 
that of his Amsterdam mosque, as well as hung posters of the Prophet‘s tomb within 
the building. However, he also added a smaller cupola to his Amsterdam 
construction, intended to symbolise Abu Bakr (the first caliph of Sunni Islam), 
through whom the Barelvi caliphs trace their genealogy. Gaffar was, moreover, at 
pains to ensure that his architect designed minarets that were distinct from the Saudi-
built constructions that surround the Medina mosque, reflecting Barelvi emphasis on 
countering Wahhabi (and Ahmadiyya) proselytising agendas. He installed a 
multitude of lights within the dome‘s interior, which, according to Gaffar, 
symbolised Sufi saints channelling Mohammed‘s light from heaven (and gave 
material form to Barelvi practices of saint worship). Gaffar, in other words, drew on 
Medina to develop a specifically Barelvi mosque. 
In contrast, Ajdid, the Dutch Moroccan project manager for the Esslam mosque in 
Rotterdam, confounded his architect and municipal authority by not drawing on 
Moroccan iconography or Dutch architectural styles when designing a new prayer 
hall. Instead, Ajdid sought to achieve a pan-Islamic style, specifically by referencing 
the mosque at Medina. Medina was an optimal choice for Ajdid because, ‗all Islamic 
styles were included in it and all Muslim nationalities had worked on it, symbolizing 
the political unity of the Ummah‘ (Roose 2012: 295, italics original). In emphasising 
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 The Barelvi movement is a Hanafi order dating from the late 19
th
 century, whose 
name derives from the Indian town of Bareilly in which it originated. The movement 
today counts millions of followers worldwide.  
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Medina‘s and Essalam‘s pan-Islamic features, Ajdid sought to avoid associations 
with official Moroccan Islam, Sufism and Salafism, as well as reject the hybridised 
elements proposed by his architect and local council. The political meanings ascribed 
to design features – and the agendas they are intended to affect – is, as Roose‘s 
analysis shows, hugely varied, even when drawn from the same source. 
In many places, construction discourse revolves around the extent to which a mosque 
should blend in with its surroundings: these conversations also often overlap with 
debates around Islamic reform, but can do so in markedly different ways. In contrast 
to the ‗amalgam of vernacular and Islamic styles‘ that characterised mosque building 
in Britain in the post-war era, Shahed Saleem points to a trend towards the mosque 
as ‗a more completely ―Islamic‖ object‘ visible in the UK today (2013: 198). 
Particularly since the early 1990s, several mosques have been remodelled or 
expressly commissioned not to reflect their surroundings: gone is the red brick and 
tiled roofs that were preferred by many Muslim communities in earlier eras. At a 
design meeting that Saleem attended in East London, one participant expressed his 
dissatisfaction with a proposed design – and with the mosque leadership he was 
striving to unseat – ‗…we do not want a multicultural minaret, we want an Islamic 
minaret‘ (2013: 196, emphasis original). Oskar Verkaaik, on the other hand, 
describes a young Dutch Moroccan‘s desire to build an ‗anti-mosque‘ (2012: 166), in 
order to better reflect the simplicity of Islam‘s first mosque, as well as avoid the 
orientalising baggage he associated with minarets. With his supporters citing 
research into the sunna (which, they vouched, did not stipulate the need for a 
minaret), Said reasoned, ‗We want a nice looking, inviting building, that fits within 
the Netherlands. We want people to think: ―Wow, what kind of building is that?‖‘ 
(Verkaaik 2012: 166). Such a structure was also seen to be more appealing to youth. 
Blending in with the surrounding environment is often couched within discourses of 
security: Said‘s design preferences were in part aimed at avoiding the vandalism and 
vitriol that Muslim edifices have been exposed to throughout Europe and North 
America. While others in his community were not necessarily won over by Said‘s 
ideas, Verkaaik asserts that it was support from the municipality that eventually led 
to the inclusion of two glass minarets in the building design: the minaret won, not so 
much because members of the community saw it as an essential symbol of Islam but, 
according to several informants, because local authorities wanted the new 
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construction to speak directly to the anti-Islam position of Geertz Wilders‘ Freedom 
Party (PVV).
165
 In the above analyses, authors point to the range of interlocking 
religious, security and political agendas at play in mosque design.  
Rabi‘s discourse pertaining to the design of the Jaffery Complex similarly aims to 
make a variety of appeals. His emphasis on the coastal flair of the side windows 
grounds the building‘s relationship to the littoral, while the planned opening by the 
Chief Kadhi affirms its connection with official Islam in Kenya. Rabi‘s arches, 
however, were proudly described to me as ‗unidentifiable‘. These arches are 
certainly intended to build on long-standing Islamic traditions. However, he is 
attentive to the geographical and sectarian histories embedded in specific features, 
and it is precisely these particularities that he is concerned to avoid. Rabi‘s aim was 
two-fold: to construct a complex with pan-Islamic appeal, void of most 
denominational and cultural associations, at the same time as positioning the site‘s 
residents and principal patrons (Khojas) as unambiguously Muslim. This public 
relations project was essential, according to Rabi and others, in light of the 
increasing sectarian tensions in the city. Chatting in the sitting room of his decadent 
home one evening, Malik, seated under a large photograph of Khomeini, explained,  
We‘re a very closed society. We have a tendency of disliking outsiders. We 
never mingle with the Sunnis, even if we‘re invited. Maybe one or two 
persons will go [to an event they organise]. Today, there is some anti-Shia 
sentiment in Mombasa. But a time will come when there‘s friction [with 
Sunnis] as in other places – Iraq, India, Nigeria. Before it comes, let us tell 
them who we are. We‘re not doing enough to advertise who we are. We need 
to come out, interact.  
I asked Malik how he thought this might happen.  
Jaffery, for example. The design says it all: this is a mosque for all Muslims. 
I‘m sure Rabi told you, it‘s going to be opened by the Chief Kadhi. And we‘ll 
organise big iftars there [the fast breaking meal during Ramadhan], and 
health camps. It‘s going to be such a space.  
                                                 
165
 Wilders is a right-wing Dutch politician with a staunchly anti-Muslim political 
agenda. 
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‗Is the jamaat really planning to let any Muslim in?‘ I wanted to know; Malik 
assured me they would. I nodded carefully, not quite believing it. Malik spotted my 
hesitation and went on,  
Why is fundamentalism getting so strong? Two reasons: they have a lot of 
money and they accept everyone. We are too insular. We say I‘m a Shia or 
I‘m a Khoja and only Shias and Khojas are allowed here. We need to 
accommodate everyone. Fundamentalists are wide open. This is one lesson 
we can learn from them. 
In addition to helping reduce sectarian antagonisms and the associated prospect of 
violence, the emphasis on inclusivity was also seen to have religious merit. This was 
often articulated to me in terms of sawab, discussed in the previous section. As Sahil 
noted, ‗We get so much sawab when our Ismaili, Bohra and Shafii brothers come to 
mosque. Jaffery will increase this‘. 
Commentary on Jaffery must be read in light of the discourses of Islamic reform that 
were discussed in Chapter 3. The Jaffery Complex is not only imagined to help 
mitigate sectarianism in Mombasa through its appeals to a universalist Islam, the 
building also positions Khojas as adherents of a ‗correct‘ interpretation of Islam. 
With the Jaffery Complex‘s mosque opening only a few weeks away, I asked Wadee, 
an ebullient middle-aged accountant, how he felt about the planned transformation of 
the existing Khoja institutions – Hyderi and Husseini – into a hospital and school for 
Old Town residents. ‗Oh it‘s great!‘ he exclaimed. ‗We want to give back to the 
place that has nurtured our community for so long. Plus‘, he went on, ‗they [the 
buildings] hardly look Islamic as it is!‘ I asked Wadee to elaborate. ‗Husseini is fine‘, 
he replied, ‗but Hyderi, you can walk past it without even knowing it‘s a mosque!‘ 
Husseini, which can be seen in the image on the next page (Fig. 37), with its green 
and white minaret, was, for Wadee, a suitably recognisable Islamic space. Hyderi – 
which comprises the existing Khoja imambargah and adjacent mosque – does bear a 
sign saying ‗Shia Ithna-Asheri Mosque‘, but this is set some way back from the 
building‘s frontage and is only really visible if standing in the car park opposite, not 
while walking down the street. The building, which also appears on the following 
page (Fig. 38), does not bear any ‗obvious‘ indications of being a Muslim place of 
worship, and both mosque and imambargah are invisible at street level.  
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Figure 37: Husseini Masjid, Old Town. 
This mosque is principally used by Khoja men and some other male Shias; the 
building also includes a madrasa. 
 
Figure 38: Hyderi imambargah and mosque, Old Town.  
The faint sign, at the top of the building set back from the street, reads 'Shia Ithna-
Asheri Mosque'. 
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The ageing building next door, however, which used to house jamaat offices, bears a 
discrete plasterwork star and crescent,
166
 coupled with the digits 786 embossed in 
Gujarati numerals (this can be seen in the photograph on the next page, Fig. 39). 
According to contested interpretations of Islamic numerology, 786 stands for 
Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-Rahim (meaning ‗In the name of Allah, the most Merciful, 
the most Beneficent‘, an invocation that, inter alia, commences religious functions). 
In this system, the 28 letters of the Arabic alphabet are assigned numerical values; 
the total numerical value of the Bismillah phrase produces 786. Asking some in 
Mombasa about the number‘s significance produced swift dismissals, ‗It‘s just 
tradition‘, explained Ifza as we sat in her family‘s small and immaculately tidy 
sitting room, part of a modest block of flats near Nkrumah Road. ‗We don‘t really 
believe that stuff anymore‘. ‗In India, they‘re obsessed‘, added her younger sister 
Tameen, elongating the word obsessed to reinforce her point; ‗Mobile phone 
numbers with 786 are sold for millions‘. Saleema, the young women‘s grandmother 
who I had thought was engrossed in CitizenTV‘s lunchtime Swahili news 
programme (‗Habari‘), turned to us. ‗Su kaho chho? [‗What are you saying?‘ in 
Gujarati]‘, she looked at the pair disapprovingly, before informing me that I 
shouldn‘t listen to everything young people tell me. Ifza and Tameen gave each other 
a knowing look; minor altercations relating to Islamic practice were all too familiar 
in this household.  
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 This symbol has a long history and multiple meanings; it is associated with Islam 
in many parts of the world, and is also a target of reformist critique.  
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Figure 39: Former jamaat offices embossed with the Gujarati numerals 786 
above a star and crescent. 
As mentioned in the discussion on European mosque construction above, some 
communities choose to build in styles that reflect the architectural patterns in which 
they are situated, a blending that is often articulated as intended to improve relations 
with wider society. In other cases, Muslims have chosen mosques that explicitly 
eschew features perceived to be evocative of the local context, in favour of forms 
that speak to a ‗global Islam‘. In Mombasa, Rabi‘s designs combine both. Rabi‘s 
emphasis on the ‗coastal‘ and ‗Swahili‘ features of the mosque specifically reference 
the locality. At the same time, the building‘s character – that he positions as 
unambiguously Muslim but not sectarian – attempts to mark in concrete the 
similarity between Khojas (Shias) and other Muslims at the coast. Mombasa houses 
an extensive and heterogeneous collection of mosques that eschew simple 
categorisations. However, the mosque being built as part of the Jaffery Complex 
shares very little with the Khoja buildings it replaces. It is also markedly different 
from the onion-domed minaret style that characterises the long-standing Memon- 
and Bhadala-built mosques of Old Town (images of which appeared in the 
Introduction, Fig. 7 and Fig. 10), and has none of the ornate plasterwork that flatters 
the Ismaili jamaatkhana at Kuze (also exhibited earlier, Fig. 8). That styles have 
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changed is not surprising: these Old Town mosques were all built nearly a century 
ago (or more). But architectural shifts reflect the changing religious landscape, both 
within Asian communities and the city itself. Even if it does so in the most vertical 
way possible, Jaffery‘s religious building strives to reduce markers of cultural and 
religious difference, as well as appealing to reformist architectural fancies.  
 
Preserving Khoja Mombasa  
At the same time as striving to evoke a distinctly pan-Islamic identity, the Jaffery 
Complex also encodes Khoja-ness on the Mombasan landscape in a more prominent 
and definitive way than ever before. Sitting on Halima‘s blue sofa while we 
packaged green strings
167
 for a majlis she was hosting in the mehfile of her home the 
next day, I asked her what she thought about the building project. ‗What‘s the point?‘ 
she replied rhetorically,  
In six or seven years we will only be 600 to 700 [people] here. It will only be 
old people. All the children now, they go [away] to study. And their parents 
follow. The community is becoming lesser. So what‘s the point?  
To my mind, Halima‘s discourse answers her question: it is in part because of 
dwindling numbers that the Jaffery Complex is going up now. Currently dotted 
around the city in various locations, the Complex will centralise Khoja residential 
patterns, and encircle a significant part of the jamaat within the confines of a single 
wall. Jaffery will not bear any inscriptions defining its residents as Khojas, but it is a 
statement of unity – and distinction – nonetheless. 
The need for this is linked to the oft-repeated notion that Khoja youth are 
increasingly less interested in being Khoja. This issue is dealt with expansively in a 
number of publications written by the jamaat’s keenest historian and cultural 
conservationist, Hassan Jaffer. His works, which include titles such as An 
endangered species (2012) and Whither Khoja? (2008), lament what Jaffer sees as 
the growing lack of youth engagement in community affairs throughout the diaspora. 
This narrative was emphasised to me during an afternoon meeting with Ameer at 
                                                 
167
 These are worn for spiritual protection on the right hand.  
261 
 
Pizza Inn in City Mall, Mombasa‘s most upmarket shopping complex, situated north 
of the island. Sipping on bottled water, he tells me, 
You know, minorities are often avoiding to mix with others. The Arabs and 
Persians have married with locals, and they have lost their identity. It‘s 
amazing. Our forefathers have come and they have stuck with their cultures 
and identity. We have been saved. Older generations recognised that without 
community we are nothing. If you belong to a community, you know you are 
something… But now we are forgetting our mother tongue, we face so many 
challenges from our youth denying their identity to be Khoja. They don‘t 
understand the importance to remain unified, to remain one.  
While a number of young people rejected such analyses in discourse and practice –
volunteering for the jamaat and its various charitable activities was a major 
preoccupation for many of the younger people I spent time with – centralising Khoja 
residence was seen as perhaps helping to reverse this trajectory. The project will not 
only unite the community physically, it also leaves little space – literally – for a lack 
of participation in community affairs. As Iqbal noted, ‗They want people close to 
mosque. If they‘re here, there‘s no excuse not to come‘. If Foucault (2012 [1975]) is 
one of many to have noted the regimes of discipline and subjectification made 
possible through particular architectural designs, it seems to me that the 
centralisation of community life in this way is a case in point. Here I should note that 
while Iqbal was less than comfortable with the surveillance made possible through 
Jaffery, others were keen to live in the same compound as the mosque, which would 
make it easier – and safer – for Khojas to pray and socialise together. As Marinabai, 
a gentle octogenarian who currently lives in Old Town told me, ‗Now I have to rush 
home after night majalis. If we were just there [i.e. living next to the imambargah], I 
could stay and chat with my friends‘. Although Marinabai‘s flat is only a short walk 
away from the existing imambargah, she‘s careful not to be out late at night.  
Features of the mosque and madrasa classrooms above it were also seen to increase 
participation in religious affairs by appealing to particular demographics. ‗The only 
way to get the youth more involved is by adapting to their needs‘, Zaafira, a retired 
teacher, informed me. ‗Jaffery will be a modern era mosque. And the [madrasa] 
classrooms won‘t be traditional. All modern facilities, each one will have a TV‘. 
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Mehnaz, who had recently begun a career in the same profession as Zaafira, was one 
of several women who couldn‘t wait for the opening the Jaffery Complex mosque: 
‗We‘ll finally have space for ladies. There‘ll even be a separate space for ladies on 
their periods‘. At present, neither of the Khoja mosques in Mombasa includes a 
female section, although some women go for prayers at the Bahman mosque 
(established through Kuwaiti funds, Bahman includes a mezzanine for women above 
the main prayer hall). This again links back to the sawab economy discussed above; 
praying in congregation is highly meritorious in Islam and the opportunity for 
women to do so was eagerly awaited. This gendered modification of Khoja religious 
space was also articulated as demonstrative of ‗progress‘. As Farida remarked, 
‗We‘re finally entering the 21st century. I couldn‘t believe it when I first arrived in 
Mombasa. In Toronto we‘ve had a women‘s space in the mosque for years‘. In sum, 
as well as being seen as needed interventions in the face of community decline, the 
upgrading of Khoja religious and religious study space enabled those in Mombasa to 
mark their ‗modernity‘ in relation to their diasporic peers.  
Investing in such a monumental project at this historical juncture in many ways 
makes sense. Despite the much-touted political and economic insecurity, Mombasa 
was a hive of construction during my fieldwork – both on and off the island – 
suggesting that many have seen this as an opportune moment to build for the future. 
Although I do not have details regarding relative real estate or construction costs, 
periods of instability have long been noted as moments of potentiality for those with 
capital (Klein 2008). For a collective feeling the decline of its numbers, the project 
encourages more to stay and invest in the city, thus helping to perpetuate the 
community. The project also reiterates the enduring connections between Khojas and 
the city. Hafiz was unequivocal in this regard:  
We are investing in this grandiose housing project. It shows our commitment 
to this place. It shows our love for Africa, our attachment. Other Asians here 
keep one foot in India, or the UK. And they‘re always ready to run away in 
case of trouble. But not Khojas. 
As discussed in the chapter on façades, building projects are about both leaving a 
mark on the urban landscape, and staking a claim in the city‘s future. Buildings last. 
They also cost money and often take a long time to build. In this sense, the Jaffery 
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Complex encapsulates many of the tensions of the buildings of a century earlier, 
which mark distinction as much as affinity to place.  
Finally, attention to preserving a specifically Mombasan Khoja-ness helps explain 
the care with which the cricket pitch at the Complex‘s centre has been preserved. 
Speaking of the grounds in its previous incarnation as a cricket pitch and pavilion, 
Malik was wistful, ‗Jaffery Club was our nucleus. Today nobody wants to go. 
Everyone used to be there, every Saturday and Sunday‘. ‗Even ladies?‘ I ask. ‗No, no 
ladies. We used to keep them locked in the house‘, he grins making sure I‘ve 
understood the joke.  
But men used to love it. If you didn‘t go you were missing out. There were 
no hotels, or any of these things. The only entertainment was Jaffery.  
The original Jaffery Sports Club has nurtured a number of Kenyan sporting heroes. 
Chief among these are Yusuf Karim and his son Aasif. Yusuf, the unrivalled ‗King 
of Mombasa Courts‘, dominated coast tennis for 25 years and was also an 
outstanding cricketer, his contributions to the city‘s sporting scene immortalised via 
the renaming of a city road after his death.
168
 Aasif, who honed his left-arm spin on 
the Jaffery wicket, went onto become a world-class player and Kenya Cricket 
Chairman. Aasif relocated to Nairobi decades ago but, Malik told me, ‗They still 
serve ―Aasif Karim chips‖ at Shaam-e-Bahaar [a popular Mombasa restaurant] in his 
honour‘. Everyone hopes the Jaffery Complex will reinvigorate – and expand – the 
Khoja sporting scene, squeezing tennis, badminton and volleyball courts, as a well as 
a rooftop swimming pool onto the site, as well as retaining the cricket field. The 
cricket pitch preserves Khoja history in the city, while the Complex attempts to 
secure the jamaat’s future.  
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 See the article by E. Ondieki: ‗The Karims: story of one family‘s dominance in 
sports‘. Daily Nation, 20 May 2017 (available online: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/lifestyle/The-Karims/1214-3935096-
fdgu3i/index.html, accessed 23 August 2017). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the Jaffery Complex, a gated community being 
constructed around a ‗mosque for all‘, holds together many of the key themes of this 
thesis. The project is driven by mobilities, relating to wealth accumulation and the 
movement of people, and is embedded within circulations of media, finance and 
sawab. Its form is a product of Khoja diaspora politics and Shia religious elites in 
Iraq, as well as deep local political connections. It conjoins a host of anxieties and 
aspirations, related to insecurity, piety and notions of ‗progress‘. Jaffery carves a 
distinctly Khoja space onto the Mombasan cityscape, at the same time as seeking to 
reduce social difference through features perceived to align with the ideals of Islamic 
reform and Muslim unity. It is, moreover, an impressively vertical affirmation of 
urban attachment. The Complex will lead to the radical modification of some 
elements of Khoja history (transforming the existing imambargah and Old Town 
mosques into welfare institutions), while ardently preserving others (the beloved 
cricket pitch), for posterity. The building site, in other words, is infused with many 
of the geographies and chronologies that characterise contemporary Mombasa.  
  
265 
 
Conclusion  
 
…even those who are well informed comprehend it not.  
– Muyaka ibn Haji al-Ghassani, 19th century Swahili poet, 
quoted in an anthology by Abdulaziz (1979: 20).  
 
The above line, from a poem about Mombasa by Muyaka, the city‘s most celebrated 
poet, indicates that life on this littoral has long been recognised as a puzzling and 
opaque affair. As a means of illuminating the urban forms described above, the 
conclusion starts by highlighting the interventions this thesis has sought to make in 
relation to the bodies of literature from which I have drawn. I then bring together its 
key themes to outline the central facets of the ‗Mombasan urbanism‘ that has 
emerged from these pages.  
The body of this thesis starts and ends with chapters about the ways the people I did 
research with have transformed the Mombasan landscape through buildings. I have 
added an East African perspective to the literature on architecture and empire, 
examining how mid-20
th
 century building patrons employed Art Deco to carve out a 
place for themselves as particular kinds of citizens within a colonial Indian Ocean 
realm. These historical reflections emphasised the agency of the colonised in the 
construction of the three-tier system, as well as demonstrated how imperial rule was 
challenged, not through the political channels that others have carefully documented, 
but through edifice.  
The decorative finesse of Deco and the segregated verticality of the Jaffery Complex 
could be read purely in terms of the ‗elsewheres‘ to which they speak, and certainly 
provide a material scaffold to forms of social distance. I have argued, however, that 
the buildings addressed here must also be seen as indicative and productive of 
attachment to place, borne of historical longevity and a desire to shape the urban yet 
to come. The city‘s first library co-opted high-end fashions by way of Paris and 
Bombay, at the same time as envisaging an urban future beyond the racialisation of 
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empire. The size and style of the Jaffery Complex is motivated by Khoja diasporic 
politics and clergymen in Najaf, as much as a desire to forge new solidarities 
between urban residents. Engaging with academic accounts of Art Deco, religious 
buildings and gated enclaves, I have demonstrated that these architectural forms can 
both deepen and diminish social distance. The physical environment of 
contemporary Mombasa also serves as a chronicler of social change: the contrast 
between Art Deco and the pan-Islamic features of Jaffery demonstrate urban 
residents drawing on different sources for notions of collectivity over the course of 
the last century, from India and Europe and towards a deterritorialised ‗global Islam‘.  
This thesis expands the literature on Indian Ocean subjectivities, much of which has 
considered the texts and lives of prominent businessmen, politicians and 
philosophers, or examined the littoral entanglements embedded in Swahili cultural 
forms. Adopting a perspective grounded in the lives of people of Gujarati origin, this 
thesis has provided an alternative angle to this scholarship, highlighting discourses 
of nostalgia, practices of food consumption and Art Deco façades as objects of 
Indian Ocean research that both confirm and contest imaginaries of littoral 
connectivity. Considering this scholarship in tandem with the anthropological 
literature on cosmopolitanism more broadly, the ethnography presented here has 
examined how worlds beyond are valorised, concealed, resolutely localised or not 
imagined at all from Mombasa.  
In the field of memory studies, I have drawn on academic examinations of nostalgia 
from a broad range of contexts in order to consider its catalysts and consequences in 
Mombasa. Countering the notion that nostalgia is simply a product and testament of 
decline, I have demonstrated nostalgia to be a source of social capital, a form of 
rhetoric in which established urban elites narrate histories of wealth accumulation 
and mark privileged claims to the city over others. Mombasa has long been seen as a 
place inundated by people from upcountry, my analysis has added Somalis to these 
imaginaries of siege, and illuminated how nostalgia apportions urban woes to people 
from both of these aforementioned social categories in a moment of tangible political, 
economic and religious uncertainty.  
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This thesis has sought to break up the racialised triptych that continues to structure 
stereotype and scholarship in East Africa. While acknowledging the political and 
emotional traction of the terms ‗African‘ and ‗Asian‘ for many, my informants 
included, this thesis has demonstrated that one means of minimising the racialised 
and exclusionary baggage they carry involves an attentiveness to the more precise 
social categories through which urban life is lived and imagined. I have endeavoured 
to move beyond teleological accounts of people of Gujarati-origin as trailblazers, or 
as individuals whose lives are determined by internal communal dynamics. 
Pioneering narratives and the significance of sectarian affiliations emerge often in 
this thesis, but these are considered in terms of a wider politics of locality. I have 
shown, for example, that rags to riches tales historicise claims to the city, and that 
communally-defined buildings also attest to a grounded investment in colonial and 
postcolonial futures.  
Regarding the study of Islam in Kenya, this dissertation has helped flesh out the 
category of ‗coastal Muslims‘, which, although always acknowledged as 
encompassing a broad swathe of people (including those of South Asian origin), has 
usually been studied through Swahili or Mijikenda perspectives. Here I have added 
Khoja Ithna-Asheris, Ismailis, Bohras, Memons, Koknis and Bhadalas to the picture, 
demonstrating some of the ways in which individuals from these diverse 
denominations relate to the state and the wider Muslim world, as well as to others in 
Mombasa. Bringing ethnography on Shia reform in the Middle East and South Asia 
into conversation with studies of reform along the Swahili coast and an emerging 
scholarship on blood donation, I have introduced new objects and geographies of 
reform in Mombasa. Presenting blood as a means and target of reform amongst 
Khojas, the thesis has engaged with the extensive scholarship on the transformation 
and political application of Karbala commemorations, as well as with debates about 
bid’a on the East African littoral.  
My informants‘ lives have been shown to be embedded within local and global 
politics of piety, as they both critique and corporealise notions of reform. The 
ethnography demonstrates that questions of faith are never ‗purely‘ religious: efforts 
to cultivate better Muslims often bleed – sometimes literally – into projects of civic 
self-fashioning, as well as performances of affluence. These intertwined processes of 
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identification are being contrived in a moment of heightened security concerns, itself 
imagined as deeply entangled with the resurgence of reform and rise of Wahhabism 
in East Africa. My considerations of the Jaffery Complex provided further evidence 
of the interlaced geopolitical, economic and diasporic concerns that shape material 
constructions of piety.  
Affirming the significance of an imagined dichotomy between reformists and their 
others in the city, several of the chapters highlight a nexus between insecurity and 
Islamic reform within urban imaginaries. Concerns about the shifting shape of 
religiosity in the city underpin much littoral nostalgia, for the days before the niqab 
and a Muslim unity of old. Changes to Karbala commemorations and ‗pan-Islamic‘ 
architectural interventions simultaneously appeal to reformist notions of a culturally 
unadulterated Islam, while striving to reduce Muslim division and the possibility of 
sectarian violence in a moment where reformism is perceived to have exacerbated 
these tensions. Reform, in Mombasa, emerges as both threat and goal: while a 
‗Wahhabi‘ agenda is frequently derided, it is also often through the adoption of 
reformist language and practice that the ‗Wahhabi problem‘ is addressed and ‗more 
pious‘ Muslims brought into being. 
This thesis has described Mombasan Muslims struggling with history and with the 
future. Legacies of coastal marginalisation and the effects of present-day national 
security logics have been charted through new frames, shown to produce, among 
other things, residential and ritual changes in the contemporary moment. This 
everyday approach to insecurity enriches existing accounts of the implications of 
state-sponsored ‗anti-terrorism‘ initiatives and rising political violence along the East 
African seaboard, which tend to paint the region in broad brushstrokes, or focus on 
the lives of the young men who bear the brunt of both policy and insurgency. A 
blood donation drive and a building site were demonstrated to gather a host of 
insecurities, Islamic reforms and aspirations. Appeals to coastal Muslim unity in the 
face of a perceived ‗Wahhabi‘ threat, evident in the texts of prominent Muslim 
intellectuals considered by others (Kresse 2007b), are also to be found in 
architectural features and idioms of blood.  
For the people described in these pages, Islam frequently plays a role in their implicit 
and explicit attempts to defend the city as a particular kind of place, be that in ideas 
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of the kind of people that ‗belong‘ to Mombasa, or in patterns of food consumption 
that cannot be extricated from long histories of Muslim marginalisation in relation to 
the state. While some Muslim ‗others‘ are imagined to underpin many of the city‘s 
problems, Islam is also understood to be critical to a more amicable future; this 
tension structures novel engagements and disengagements with urban others. 
Reaching out to fellow Muslims from behind a gated community is one example 
here; giving blood to assuage global injustice is another. In a postcolonial context 
saturated with the policies and imaginaries of the late ‗war on terror‘, the Muslims I 
have described here are acutely aware of the sectarianism and solidarities offered by 
the present. 
These conclusions provoke further questions. Who are the ‗Wahhabis‘ and ‗Somalis‘ 
that form such an important part of the Mombasan imaginaries discussed above? 
What themes would emerge if we were to focus our lens on the myriad ‗Kutchi 
Sunnis‘– such as Gamrais or Kumbhars – who are not building gated communities or 
driving Toyota Proboxes? This study, the first, to my knowledge, which considers 
the slippage between Karbala and Kenya, augments the sparse literature on Africa as 
a site of Shiism. This field of research merits expansion through an investigation of 
the changes to coastal religiosity wrought by the Bilal Muslim Mission. Bilal has 
played a small part in this thesis, and brief outlines of the organisation exist (C. 
Ahmed 2009; A. Jaffer 2013; Penrad 1988). However, sustained ethnographic study 
of this proselytising and development charity, and of the relationships between 
Khoja Ithna-Asheris and the many thousands they have helped convert, would add a 
new layer to the study of Shiism on the continent. This is particularly the case, I 
contend, because, although Iran and the charisma of Khomeini loomed large 
amongst the Shias I knew in Mombasa, Khoja proselytising activities in East Africa 
long predate the formation of the Islamic Republic. 
As a contribution to the field of anthropology, this thesis adds to the scholarship on 
the challenges of ‗being‘ Muslim in the current historical moment, and, as outlined 
above, speaks to the anthropology of ritual, Islamic reform and insecurity. I have 
offered a Mombasan lens to the discipline‘s rich reflections on material culture, 
cosmopolitanism and memory. The questions this thesis raises, as well as its 
contributions to various regional and thematic bodies of scholarship, have resulted in 
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part from taking seriously the prescription against bracketing anthropological 
research in terms of geographically specific literatures and concepts (Appadurai 
1986). This study has brought theory and ethnography from a range of locations to 
bear on the East African littoral, demonstrating that accounts of self-flagellation in 
Syria, nostalgia in St Petersburg and cosmopolitanism in Chitral can also enliven and 
enrich the study of Mombasa. To my mind, this sort of theoretical and ethnographic 
flexibility is critical as the discipline continues to struggle to put the long-standing 
goal of ‗writing against culture‘ into practice (Abu-Lughod 2014 [1991]). 
 
Mombasan urbanism through everyday timespaces  
The diverse themes described above are held together by the city, the anthropology 
of which this thesis has also sought to advance. In terms of the study of African 
cities, these pages provide evidence for the heterogeneity and multiplicity of 
metropolitan forms on the continent, bolstering ‗everyday‘ ways of telling urban 
experience in this region of the world. In the narratives I have presented, Mombasa 
certainly emerges as a place of uncertainty, but my analysis underscores the myth of 
seeing African urbanity purely through optics of crisis and poverty. This thesis 
makes the case that African cities, and cities more generally, are particularly 
amenable to study through the chronologies and geographies embedded in everyday 
experience. Through the chapters presented here, I have suggested that investigating 
the dispositions towards time and space that circulate in urban discourse and practice 
can help tease out the multiplicity of ways in which a city is lived and imagined. 
Temporalities and spatialities expose the city as a shape-shifting object – whose 
boundaries wax and wane according to context – as much as an evolving and 
unfinished one, in which the present is endlessly remade in relation to past legacies 
and future imaginaries. Attention to the articulation of chronologies and geographies, 
in other words, helps to excavate some of the contradictions and connections that 
make the city what it is, and provide ethnographic evidence for the city as ‗a thing 
always in the making‘(Simone 2009: 3). 
Putting time and space at the heart of my explorations of the everyday has allowed 
me to explore ‗Mombasan urbanism‘, a concept I present by way of conclusion. The 
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Mombasan urbanism I have traced is fuelled by patterns of mobility linked to both 
economics and migration. These mobilities shape the built environment, and run 
through discourse and practice. Rather than assuming Asians as a uniformly affluent 
minority, I have examined contradictory patterns of wealth accumulation over the 
course of the last century, and how these uneven processes link to a broader political 
economy shaped by imperial trading regimes and the unevenness of postcolonial 
economic fortunes, associated, in recent decades, with contemporary regional 
insecurity. Against this backdrop, my analysis has considered how social mobility is 
performed in and projected onto the urban landscape. The ethnography demonstrates 
social mobility to be embedded in architectural forms, from bas-relief zigzags to ‗top 
of the range‘ biodigesters. Social mobility is found in eulogies to sesame seeds, and 
concerns about the future of a confectionary shop; it converges with ideas about the 
flow of blood. Throughout, I have pointed to the ways in which social mobility in 
Mombasa intersects with physical movements through space, as people – particularly 
those of Gujarati, Somali and upcountry origin – have arrived, settled and departed 
from the city, fostering new patterns and practices of distinction in the process.  
Mombasan urbanism extends across time and space. Its buildings – old and new – 
speak to others across the littoral, and around the world. Memories of colonial order 
inform how people understand contemporary religious and demographic change, as 
well as stake a claim to the city in the present. Geopolitical anxieties pervade the 
most intimate corporeality and colour children‘s paintings, while anticipatory logics 
structure the shape of arches. Building on the burgeoning anthropological literature 
on security – which has been particularly attentive to issues of time – this thesis has 
considered the varied temporal and spatial logics that characterise experiences of 
and responses to insecurity in Mombasa. This approach, as outlined above, has also 
allowed me to trace the intersections between insecurity and Islamic reform. 
Scholars of Ithna-Asheri Shiism have long been concerned with the expansive 
histories and geographies that adherents around the world draw on to understand 
contemporary encounters between themselves and others, a mode of conceptualising 
encounter also noted by Ho (2004) with regard to Hadramis. Drawing this together 
with evidence from Kenya that demonstrates that multi-scalar imaginaries of 
insecurity are by no means limited to coastal Muslims, I am left to suggest that 
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systematic attention to the overlay of geographies and chronologies will be useful for 
the anthropological study of insecurity and reform in many contexts.  
If the above collapses the city as a spatial and temporal scale, I have also traced how 
notions of time and space are made to coalesce around the object of Mombasa, 
informing patterns of claims-making that construct this port town as a distinct 
geographical and historical object, inhabited by people with deeply rooted histories. 
The taken-for-granted locality of bhajiyas is one example of the ways in which 
Mombasans often do not so much claim rootedness, as live it. Bhajiyas and other 
patterns of food consumption construct Mombasa as a place divorced from Kenya 
and the Indian Ocean beyond, demonstrating that the city is a product of divisive, as 
much as contiguous, spatial imaginaries. Long-standing relationships to Mombasa 
and its distinctiveness as a spatial entity are further emphasised through discourses of 
nostalgia, which, by excluding those who (allegedly) do not possess a rooted 
epistemology of decay, serve to sever the city from the Kenyan interior and Somalia 
to the north. Thus, while this research is aligned with the historical and 
anthropological scholarship that demonstrates the mutually constitutive nature of 
local and global, my ethnography suggests that acknowledging this interplay should 
not prevent us from investigating how these constructs are imagined – and produced 
– as distinct in daily practice. Nostalgic rhetorics, coastal snacks and additions to the 
built environment reaffirm and challenge ideas of Indian Ocean connectivity, and 
suggest that we should be mindful of its shifting utility as a lens of analysis. 
The Mombasan urbanism outlined here provides ethnographic testimony for how, to 
return to Roy (2016) with who we began this thesis, urban experience is necessarily 
negotiated at scales that implode and reinforce the city. The performances of 
urbanity I have traced here can smell a bhajiya a mile off, speak Swahili to its parrot 
and Kutchi to its granny, and conjure Karbala as a means to address insecurity in 
Mombasa. The city‘s façades tell of imperial and local connections, of pan-Islamic 
and coastal reform. These performances, material constructs and modes of being in 
the world are simultaneously emplaced and hard-to-place. They paint a Mombasan 
urbanism that is rooted, expansive and always in the making.  
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